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Table of Contents

Articles:

GIAN ENRICO RUSCONI: *Marxism in West Germany*
W. MÜLLER, C. NEUSÜSS: *The Illusion of State Socialism*
JÜRGEN HABERMAS: *Reply to Müller and Neüsuss*
CLAUS OFFE: *Further Comments on Müller and Neusüss*
ISTVÁN MÉSZÁROS: *Phases of Sartre's Development*
CHRISTIAN LENHARDT: *Anamnestic Solidarity*
SANDOR RADNOTI: *Bloch and Lukács*

Notes and Commentary:

MICHAEL LANDMANN: *Bloch in Korčula, 1968*
JOSEPH GABEL: *Hungarian Marxism*
K. KOSÍK, J.-P. SARTRE: *An Exchange*

Reviews:

ERICA SHEROVER: R. Jacoby, *Social Amnesia*
JAMES MILLER: J. Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*
GEORGE MOSSE: J. Cuddihy, *The Ordeal of Civility*
BRIAN SINGER: J. Rancière, *La Leçon d'Althusser*
TOM GOOD: Three Recent Books of R. Debray
GREG RENAULT: D. Smith, *Who Rules the Universities?*
TORONTO *TELOS* GROUP: *Short Journal Reviews*

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Number 25 Fall 1975

Table of Contents

ARTICLES:

Introduction to the Müller and Neusüss Discussion 2
Ruth Heydebrand and Patricia Tummons

Marxism in West Germany 6
Gian Enrico Rusconi

The Illusion of State Socialism and the Contradiction between Wage Labor and Capital 13
Wolfgang Müller and Christel Neusüss

A Reply to Müller and Neusüss 91
Jürgen Habermas

Further Comments on Müller and Neusüss 99
Claus Offe

From 'The Legend of Truth' to a 'True Legend:' Phases of Sartre's Development 112
István Mészáros

Anamnestic Solidarity: The Proletariat and its *Manes* 133
Christian Lenhardt

Bloch and Lukács: Two Radical Critics in a 'God-Forsaken World' 155
Sandor Radnoti

NOTES AND COMMENTARY:

Talking with Ernst Bloch: Korčula, 1968 165
Michael Landmann

Hungarian Marxism 185
Joseph Gabel

Introduction to the Kosik-Sartre Exchange 192
Andrew Feenberg

The Kosik-Sartre Exchange 193

REVIEWS:

Russell Jacoby, *Social Amnesia: A Critique of Conformist Psychology* 196
Erica Sherover

Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis* 210
James Miller

John M. Cuddihy, *The Ordeal of Civility. Freud, Marx, Lévi-Strauss* 221
George L. Mosse

Jacques Rancière, *La Leçon d'Althusser* 224
Brian Singer

Régis Debray, *La Critique des Armes I and II*

Régis Debray, *Prison Writings* 233
Tom Good

David N. Smith, *Who Rules the Universities?* 238
Gregory Renault

Short Journal Reviews 243
Toronto Telos *Group*

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Introduction to the Müller and Neusüss Discussion

by Ruth Heydebrand and Patricia Tummons

The following set of articles from West Germany dealing with the recent debate concerning state interventionism not only provides an outline of the types of Marxist analyses presently being developed, but also indicates the major schools of West German Marxist thought. As Rusconi points out, there are currently three main trends: the orthodox (the official Communist Party and some peripheral Marxist-Leninist groups); the neo-orthodox (centered primarily in Berlin's Freie Universität and around the *Sozialistische Büro* or journals such as *Probleme des Klassenkampfs*); and the critical (embodying what remains of the Frankfurt School, and rotating around such journals as *Aesthetik und Kommunikation*).

The Müller and Neusüss article presented here is one of the major documents outlining the neo-orthodox position. To briefly summarize its historical-political setting, it originally appeared in 1970 at a time when Germany's "economic miracle"—mainly resulting from membership in the Common Market—had begun to lose some of its mystique. In the face of internal unrest, the liberal coalition government of the social democrats and Christian democrats legalized the Communist Party. While this action affirmed West Germany's self-image as the "showcase of democracy," the government also saw it as an opportunity to integrate the external challenges to authority posed, for the most part, by radical student activism. The CP, however, offered a political program based on a particularly crude version of the theory of State Monopoly Capitalism (StaMoKap), which aligned it with East Germany's official doctrine and served to alienate it from large numbers of non-Communist Leftists. In particular, the Party's emphasis on reforms rather than extra-Parliamentary mass action, could not impress those radical segments of the German Left who preferred a more activist approach. In effect, then, the CP offered a course of political action not significantly different from that of the traditional Social Democrats, the official heirs of classical reformism. Not surprisingly, therefore, the legalization of the Communist Party gave renewed impetus to the critical discussion of the theory of revisionism and its political consequences. And it is precisely this problematic to which Müller and Neusüss address themselves.

What is common to all forms of revisionism, according to Müller and Neusüss, is a view of the state as the more or less benevolent source of redress of the injustices wrought on the proletariat by the capitalist class. But such an approach is illusionary insofar as it does not perceive that state intervention on the worker's behalf is ultimately constrained by the state's direct links to the capitalist mode of production. The revisionist program of "state socialism" is rendered especially absurd by the fact that the outer limits of the

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state's distributive functions are set by its inability to redistribute more than the net social product. Moreover, revisionism fails to recognize that the state can no longer even function effectively as "the ideal collective capitalist." As such, it has been and will continue receiving an overload of directives and responsibilities which it finds ever more difficult to fulfill. The state, in Müller and Neusüss' view, is essentially incapable of resolving the most fundamental contradictions between wage labor and capital, and will no longer be able to conceal this fact once economic crises have reduced the resources available for redistribution. The state will, therefore, eventually be demystified in its appearance as a neutral mediator and exposed as necessarily tied to the interests of the capitalist economic system. Such exposure will in turn clear the way for, on the one hand, the development of a revolutionary consciousness adequate for the resumption of open class struggle between capitalists and workers and, on the other, the demise of the revisionist leadership of the working class which has held sway up to this point.

Müller and Neusüss further develop their argument that state intervention in the economy is doomed in their discussion of the shift from absolute to relative surplus value in the process of capital realization. During the period of early capitalist accumulation, the state apparatus did play an important part in preventing exploitation of the working class to the point of its extinction by curbing the excesses of individual capitals through legislation affecting the length of the working day. Of course, as Marx himself showed, these concessions were made in the "best interest of capital." But with the shift from absolute to relative surplus value, the state apparatus cannot similarly legislate against excessive exploitation in relation to constant capital, e.g., speed-ups, new and sophisticated forms of Taylorism, etc. Because these latter techniques are both diverse and highly complex, Müller and Neusüss claim that they simply do not permit regulation through enforceable legislative actions.[1] For this reason, they maintain that wage labor will no longer be able to rely on the state as an effective mediator, but will instead be compelled to address its grievances to individual capitalists.

There is, however, a problem with all of this. Stated simply, Müller and Neusüss fail to relate their analysis to contemporary capitalist society. In particular, their reliance on an ambiguous conception of wage labor (or the working class) as the revolutionary agent seems, in today's context, to be

1. Müller and Neusüss only briefly consider, then dismiss, the possibility of state-regulated co-determination of work conditions by both capitalists and workers as having any real chance for success. The bureaucracy which would be required to oversee and enforce such co-determination would itself make such regulations prohibitive in their eyes. Yet, co-determination already exists in large industries in Germany and Sweden, where it has been found extremely helpful in building up workers' morale and productivity. Furthermore, it has not required the development of an undue number of government agencies: the capitalists themselves who are involved seem to appreciate the benefits that accure to them through their cooperation in such programs. Cf. the series of three articles by John Doig, "Democracy on the Job," which appeared in *The Toronto Star*, March 3-5, 1975, and which implicitly suggested—in a relatively right-wing newspaper—co-determination as a possible solution to many of Canada's labor problems.

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extremely problematic. Altogether lacking in specific content, their reference to the present-day working class tends to be abstract and consequently appears more like an exercise in nostalgia. Even if it is theoretically possible for "wage labor" to eventually perceive "capital" as its "real enemy," we are still left with a purely formal solution to the contradictions of capitalism insofar as the most essential categories of this formulation are precisely the ones which remain substantially undeveloped.[2]

Furthermore, barring unforeseen sudden collapse, the relatively short-term prognosis for continued state intervention in advanced capitalist societies would appear to be good. If this is the case (as it certainly has been for the five years since Müller and Neusüss wrote their article), we remain faced with the problem of a contemplative politics—similar to that of the much criticized reformists—whose only hope for revolution lies in waiting passively for an eventual crash which we are ultimately helpless to bring about.

Finally, one of the more provocative points developed by Müller and Neusüss is their critique of the "politicism" of Habermas and Offe who, they claim, overemphasize the political dimension of contemporary society at the expense of the economic. According to Müller and Neusüss, such a one-sided conception misleads these two thinkers into projecting an unproblematic and virtually indefinite development of capitalism. It is unnecessary at this point to offer a detailed summary of the positions of Habermas and Offe, since their replies are also included among the documents presented here. Briefly, both Habermas and Offe are in agreement that 1) the state continues to function effectively in crisis intervention; 2) the contradictions between wage labor and capital—though not eliminated—have been transformed; and 3) these contradictions now manifest themselves either in the form of a "legitimation crisis" (Habermas), or as conflicts arising on the periphery of the production process (Offe).

What is perhaps in some need of elaboration, since it is only presupposed and not immediately obvious from any of the following pieces, is the historical tradition lying behind the analyses of Habermas and Offe: i.e., Critical Theory's break with traditional Marxism. According to the major exponents of the Frankfurt School in the 1930s, the transition from liberal and competitive capitalism to late monopoly capitalism meant the collapse of base and superstructure and, consequently, the de-emphasis of the production process as the exclusive locus of class struggle.[3] From this viewpoint, class struggle has expanded throughout all of society concomitant with the expansion of capitalist domination. Consequently, the analyses which take Critical Theory as their point of departure are more concerned with viewing

2. Müller and Neusüss themselves warn against this in their "Introduction": "In order to avoid misunderstandings. . . we wish to emphasize that we are not presenting a concrete analysis of state socialism." But this caveat is not at all reassuring since there are no indications of whether and under what circumstances it is possible to relate their analyses to anything concrete.

3. For a more detailed account of this, see Giacomo Marramao, "Political Economy and Critical Theory," *Telos* 24 (Summer 1975), pp. 56-80.

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the system as a whole, and frequently include a focus on the political dimension as opposed to the narrower economic viewpoint which was developed in relation to the earlier stages of capitalism. It is possible, therefore, to see Habermas and Offe not as denying altogether the possibility and desirability of revolution, but as trying to articulate new foundations for revolutionary change commensurate with the conditions of contemporary capitalism.[4]

Although this debate is almost five years old, the issues have by no means been settled. Hopefully, the publication of these articles will provide the basis for further elaboration and discussion, and assist in the appropriation of what is useful for an analysis of state intervention in U.S. capitalism.

4. For a further discussion of the relation of Habermas to the tradition of the Frankfurt School and Critical Theory, see James Miller's review of Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, in this issue of *Telos*.

ESSAYS ON THE NEW WORKING CLASS

by Serge Mallet

Edited and translated by Dick Howard & Dean Savage

This anthology of writings is the first book in English to provide a comprehensive view of the life-work of Mallet. The three major divisions of the book deal with the "Evolution of the Working Class," "The New Working Class and Technocracy," and the problem of "Workers' Control," particularly as it relates to the May 1968 events in France. Finally, a Glossary composed by the editors gives an invaluable descriptive list of the major institutions, groups, and people in the French milieu contemporaneous with Mallet's work. Approximately 240 pages. Publication date: December 1975. Pre-publication price: $3.00

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Marxism in West Germany*

by Gian Enrico Rusconi

To an outside observer, the most striking feature of Marxism in West Germany is a lingering feeling of trauma—the trauma of a violent break with a tradition which, for better or worse, has become part of a tormented national cultural identity, mirroring real social conflicts. Indeed, Germany "gave rise" to historical Marxism, not simply as the cultural birthplace of Marx and other "classics," but also by providing the prototype of a Marxism which has become a cultural and organizational model for the labor movement. Today's Germany, however, has violently rejected this historical legacy. If the Nazis liquidated Marxism as a scientific theory and as a *Weltanschauung* (and thus the discussion of the removal of Marxism from German culture also involves the meaning of the collective experience of Nazism for Germany, well beyond that of military defeat alone) it is also true that the estrangement of the Marxist tradition passes through the painful history of the German labor movement.

Today, the social democratic party holds sway over Leftist workers and intellectuals. Although it cultivates the "memory" of Marx, it has renounced any organic, scientific and political relation to Marx's thought—not only in official political platforms, but also in the concrete elaborations of its militant intellectuals. Cleverly exploiting all of the communists' political errors and uncertainties, while emphatically focusing on the "humanist" and "libertarian" components of the Marxist tradition (from the "young" Marx to the biased and sentimental use of Luxemburg), theoretical social democracy presents itself as social thought immune to any "dogmatism, economism, scientism, utopianism," etc., which, in varying degrees, characterize "German" orthodox Marxism. Whereas in Weimar "Marxism" was still regarded as the social democrat's explicit ideology (despite heavy revisionism such as Hilferding's in the 1920s), today it is impossible to theoretically identify German social democracy. A large part of the German public saw, with a mixture of stupor, satisfaction, and skepticism, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt present himself (in a televised interview, yet) as a promoter of a cultural re-elaboration of social democracy in a Popperian version of "critical rationalism" on the occasion of the publication (by the social democratic party's official publishing house) of a book edited by young social democratic intellectuals and prefaced by the Chancellor himself, entitled: *Critical Rationalism and Social Democracy*. The situation is much more serious than

*Originally published as "Uno Strappo Violento con la Tradizione," in *Rinascita*, no. 32 (August 8, 1975), pp. 21-22. English translation by Patricia Tummons.

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could be inferred from the simple instrumental polemic against the neo-Marxist foolishness of the JUSO—the young socialists appearing on the political scene with a theoretical posture which social democracy gave up long ago. Behind the proclamation of the affinity between the Popperian method ("a scientific method and an ethical-political attitude in the tradition of the enlightenment") and the social democratic method ("politics as the pragmatic working toward ethical goals" where the democratic ideal is not based on impossible certainties but on verifiable experience, whereby "socialism can be founded only ethically, not 'scientifically,' once we discard the metaphysics of the history of historical materialism")—behind this re-elaboration hides an important attempt to hook up again with the "ethical" component of traditional social democratic Marxism (even if it is forgotten that such an historical component wanted to remain "Marxist").

To be an active Marxist in the full sense in Germany today, can entail, among other things, significant personal costs. The *Berufsverbot*—whereby those suspected of being "hostile to the Constitution" are forbidden to have public careers, even teaching—is a weapon willingly threatened and used against those who do not limit themselves to just dealing with the Marxism in an academic fashion. Here we come to the "nitty-gritty" of our observations on contemporary German Marxists—observations which naturally do not seek to exhaust the spectrum of positions.

Three main directions of contemporary German Marxism can be distinguished (contemporary is almost synonymous here with "young," since the cultural rebirth of Marxism is connected with the generation formed in the 1960s): the *academic*, the *anti-dogmatic*, and the *orthodox*. Although these three terms entail value associations, they should be understood in the least prejudiced way. Let us begin with the "academic" direction.

In the last decade, Marxism has once again become the subject of scientific interest in universities. This was unthinkable just twenty years ago, when only a few university centers, having professors with particular political or intellectual orientations, kept in touch with Marx and Marxism (e.g., the Marburg School with Abendroth and Hofmann, the Frankfurt School with Adorno and Habermas, but also Fetscher, or journals such as *Marxismus-studien*). Elsewhere, Marxism was considered to have been scientifically liquidated and was tolerated only as a hobby. This is not the place to recall the political and sociological reasons which brought about the simultaneous revival of Marxism and the students' movement. It remains that, notwithstanding the ebb of mass movements, Marxism has survived. Furthermore, in many cases, yesterday's activists are today's young professors. Given the important role that the German university structure (which has survived the wave of protest undamaged or even with increased efficiency) still plays in the formation of German youth, academic Marxism can perform a significant critical and scientific function. The dangers it confronts are those of a relativistic ecumenism typical of all academia, or, further, those of a subtle de-historicization of Marxist thought, where it becomes one "classic

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among many," and where, instead of the obsolete Marx-Weber confrontation, there is the one between Marx and Adorno—for the benefit and consumption of institutional routines. At any rate, the university provides the cultural terrain and the work base of the other two Marxist trends as well, besides providing their basis for subsistence.

"Non-dogmatic" or critical Marxism is perhaps that direction whose representatives and themes are best known abroad. Not only Alfred Schmidt and Oskar Negt have continued in the Frankfurt tradition, but so have Helmut Reichelt, in his important analyses of *Capital*, and A. Lorenzer, in his welding of Marxism with psychoanalysis following the work of Mitscherlich. Along with these problematics, which privilege the subjective moment, the critique of positivism and the demystification of capitalist false consciousness, the more properly economic and sociological studies are gaining weight, thanks to another center of Marxist rebirth: Berlin's Free University. The most relevant names in this context are Elmar Altvater and Rolf Ebbighausen. They guide and stimulate groups in studying problems of the monopoly capitalist state and, more generally, of advanced industrial society in its economic and political contradictions. The journal *Probleme des Klassenkampfs* regularly reports contributions in this direction, while *Aesthetik und Kommunikation* is more often the voice of the problematic of the Frankfurt tradition. It is not easy in a few words to outline all the specific features of these Marxists' various ways of re-posing and reformulating the general principles of Marxism in their analyses of social structure, class struggle, and capitalist contradictions. These analyses tend to reflect the specific features of West German advanced capitalist society. The very context within which they operate (that of the university and, in general, of well-educated youth) brings to the forefront the problems of "intellectual labor," posed in the most abstract terms of "productive" and "unproductive" labor. Special attention is paid to the structures and administrative techniques of "monopoly state capitalism." Here the uninitiated reader will have trouble locating original or innovative arguments in the dense elaboration of this problematic. In other words, the conclusive outcome of many discussions is not always altogether clear, except for the internal polemic or against the rigidly orthodox Leninist interpretation of *StaMoKap* (as the problematic of state monopoly capitalism is usually referred to).

A constant feature of the German debate is the almost obsessive hostility between the above mentioned neo-Marxists and "orthodox" Marxists. It is something more than an open debate: it is the traditional rupture which manifests itself in many forms. In addition, all participants virtually ignore contributions from abroad—a phenomenon which only now is timidly beginning to be overcome. But we must now examine more closely who the "orthodox" are.

Recently, their output has considerably increased in quantity as well as in quality. I am not referring so much to the publications directly edited by the Institute for Marxist Studies (IMSF)—i.e., *Marxismus Digest* and

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Marxistische Blätter—but to the vast and intense production of the Pahl-Rugenstein publishing house, whose book series has gained a significant place in the scientific and political publishing world, and to the journals *Das Argument* and *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*. Edited by Wolfgang Fritz Haug in collaboration with a staff already well established in their particular fields,[1] *Das Argument* presents, roughly every two months, a series of organic contributions concerning themes ranging from recent interpretations of fascism to the class struggles in West Germany, to the reinterpretation of historiography of the labor movement, to problems of school and education, criticism, social sciences, and the problem of the dialectic. In other words, there is an effort to constantly update, from an "orthodox" viewpoint, major contemporary problems for the benefit of the student masses. But the term "orthodox" has become so discredited that it must be qualified. In this context, it refers to a Marxism rooted in the theses of Marx, Engels, and Lenin without any particular need to "re-read" them or to reformulate their problematics, even if these tasks are understood in a positive and creative sense (as with French and Italian Marxists). Rather, Marxism is understood by the orthodox direction as a completed scientific and theoretical system, while particular attention is paid to Lenin's contributions—even his philosophical ones (this *is* important). It entails more than merely affirming Marxism's scientific and political "autonomy," which should be obvious to any kind of Marxism. It entails a completeness which has been translated into real theoretical and political praxis in the socialism of the USSR and the DDR. This is the decisive element in separating "orthodox" Marxists from the others. But the question concerns more than just a specific judgment on socialist countries, particularly the DDR. "Orthodox" Marxists are often critical of these countries (even though they carried out an interesting project of comparing eastern and western "systems"), while other Marxists (except for a few extremists who consider all socialist systems as still bourgeois and capitalist) frequently recognize the material and social achievements of eastern socialism in light of the gigantic difficulties which had to be overcome. Hence, the distinction between orthodox and other varieties of Marxism obtains on a deeper level, and touches on the very framework of the theoretical categories used. The idea that socialism has been "achieved"—even if perhaps somewhat imperfectly (where the prognosis calls, however, for doing "more and better," and not for changing the fundamental structures)—is *one* element of a complex *Weltanschauung* which can only be briefly indicated.

In 1973, *Das Argument's* 81st issue opened a debate on the "problem of reflection" (a *bête noire* for "Western Marxists"). Naturally, the relation between material and mental reality was presented not as a purely epistemological problem, but as involving the relation between material and mental production. Thus, if "the field of ideological class struggle that deter-

1. The fields are mostly sociology, political science, psychology and history, with representatives such as F. Deppe. K.H. Tjaden, K. Holzkamp, etc.

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mined it and the particular position of intellectual workers in the social system of the division of labor within the framework of class relations is excluded," it cannot be scientifically dealt with. This position is reiterated in the recent issue (no. 90, 1975), in response to a tough attack from *Probleme des Klassenkampfs,* which accuses *Das Argument* of conducting a pseudo-discussion to the advantage of an abstract doctrinarism with suspicious political implications. Actually, looking beyond individual arguments to the intent and tone of the principle contributions (e.g., Holzkamp's article in *Das Argument* 84 and the editorial in 85), it becomes clear that the whole discussion is meant to present Marxism as a fundamental science beyond any possible reproblematicization and any epistemological uncertainty: Marxism as a founded science even in its epistemological presuppositions. Of course, this has nothing to do with "neutral and objective" science, the undialectical science of neopositivism (whose critique constitutes one of the leading threads of the discussion), but it concerns rather the materialist and dialectical science of the proletariat which responds to its "interests." "In the last analysis, the interest in materialism is the interest in abolishing alienation. Bound to this interest, the dialectic is critical and revolutionary." The reference to Marx's words cannot hide the fact that the model for this entire discussion remains explicitly the Lenin of *Materialism and Empiriocriticism.* Thus, this serves to renew purely and simply the classical contraposition between "materialism" and "idealism," without historicizing and concretizing their significance (or conforming their univocal sense of yesterday as valid for today). "In idealism, with the predominance of the idea, the dominance of the propertied class is indirectly legitimated; in materialism, on the other hand, there is the tendency to legitimate power in the hands of the material producers." [2]

According to the theoreticians of reflection, scientific knowledge "is dialectical insofar as it renders fluid once again reciprocally fossilized moments; it is materialist insofar as it opposes the appropriation of ideal production from material producers. To conceive mental labor and its function materialistically means to see in it what is typical of laboring humanity and its society, its fruits and possibilities. It amounts to requiring that intellectual labor abandon its traditional privileged position; it means to promote the reappropriation of alienated ideal production by material producers."[3]

But even if this is granted, the contradictions between science and historical society still remain *outside* of the particular social order, be it capitalism or socialism; but in fact, as far as the latter case is concerned, the contradictions are declared to be overcome. It is not accidental that the problem of the relation between science (epistemology) and society is *substituted* by that between intellectual labor and general material production and its modes of appropriation. Further, class conflict is reduced simply and exclusively to the categories of producers versus expropriators,

2. Cf. W.F. Haug, *Das Argument,* no. 81 (1973).
3. *Ibid.*

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workers versus monopolists, and ultimately is surreptitiously portrayed as the geopolitical confrontation between imperialism and socialism. This oversimplification of the problematic has a political function: the message is addressed to the masses of intellectual workers who have no other perspective than to alienate their mental efforts to monopoly capitalism. Marxism is presented to them not in the anguished guise of a self-critique that concerns their very identity as generic intellectuals and as technicians created out of a society that has inextricably fused science, technology and capital (for whom the urgent scientific task becomes untying this knot, and certainly not the "idealistic negation" of science, as too many Marxists obstinately stress, although reconstituting in its dialectical structure autonomy and dependence). Instead, Marxism is presented to them as a critique of capitalism understood as the private appropriation of a collective achievement and, therefore, from the viewpoint of a socialism that would set things right, primarily as the reappropriation of their own labor and of their own intellectual and scientific accomplishments.

These arguments are persuasive insofar as they are aimed at technological production and scientific activity understood in the conventional sense of "natural" sciences. It becomes equivocal, however, when it pretends to be a general epistemological foundation, or even when it only expands to include "other" sciences such as political economy. On the other hand, it is undeniable that the goal of this formulation is to attain a politically unquestionable "scientific" certitude in this sector. But then there are the patent dangers of a nominalistic solution. The examples are frequent: we will consider only one which is significant because it has provoked a generally justified reply against a summary rejection of "political economy" (as practiced in East Germany)—a rejection which has appeared in *Kursbuch*. Concerning the major problem of the intensification of work in socialist countries *vis-à-vis* capitalist countries (implying the whole problem of the socialist usage of science and technology), the authors dispense with the question as follows: "Above average performance [in capitalist countries] harms the working class and reinforces the power of capital. In socialism, on the other hand, where the work force is no longer a commodity and where the right to work holds sway, superior performance does not benefit the profit of the capitalists, but of the society."[4] No additional comment is needed to show the inadequacy of these types of arguments, which are revolting to intellectual workers.

If the critical discussion of science—political economy in particular—with all of the practical and strategic implications that it has for the analysis of present-day capitalism, is one of the polemical points differentiating between the two above-mentioned strands of Marxism, an element of convergence can be found in their common critique of social democracy. In the *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* of June, 1974, we find an article by J.

4. From an article in *Das Argument*, no. 68 (1971).

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Harrer on "Typology and Definition of Social-Democratic Politics," which is in many respects typical of the "orthodox" position. In concise pages that encompass the whole history of the German Social Democratic Party, social democracy is reduced to its two partially co-existing, partially conflicting souls: the social-liberal integrationist soul and the more properly reformist one, which deludes itself in believing that capitalism can be changed through "structural reforms." With a harshness which is the exact opposite of the systematic anti-communism of official social democratic ideology, the image which emerges from it is that of a party absolutely unsalvageable for a socialist perspective and politics. "In West Germany the debates carried out in recent years within the social democratic party between the integrationist wing and the reformist one do not objectively represent (i.e., independently of subjective intentions) a struggle for or against the transformation of the social-democratic party into a socialist party, but only a process whose result could be, at most—within a unitary organization or in different parties—the restoration of the 'classical' double social-democratic structure. At any rate, it is possible only with a reconstitution and strengthening of socialist reformism in which Marxist positions are tolerated. On the other hand, with the predominance of the social-liberal monolithic variant, the social-democratic party could come close to that double character which it assumed after 1914, with the rejection of Marxist praxis." As can be seen, this is a perspective which has nothing in common—either theoretically or practically—with orthodox positions.

Actually, the political practice—primarily trade-unionist—of the German Communist Party appears less intransigent than what the above statements imply. Yet, it is symptomatic that while the heterodox Marxists in Frankfurt or Berlin connected to the "socialist opposition" seem to have a complex, flexible and critical problematic adequate to undertake an eventual process of political clarification for intellectual, popular, and working social-democratic masses, the orthodox Marxists seem too preoccupied to define themselves "outside and against" the system with rigid theoretical schemes. These schemes may be effective owing to clarity and simplicity, but are inadequate for the complex cultural and political situation in contemporary Germany.

It is all too easy and uncharitable to denounce all forms of today's German Marxism for their abstractness and estrangement from collective consciousness. The source of this is that previously mentioned traumatic rupture. Those who have not lost sight of the cultural expression and organized movement of historical Marxism cannot avoid a sense of incredulity in this total "amnesia." What connects us to this past Marxism are only books, and not political, cultural or collective experiences. Yet, *one* of the tasks of Marxist intellectuals should be precisely to revive the consciousness of such experiences—even if they are primarily negative. It could be one of the ways to correct theoretistic and abstract tendencies which always fatally emerge where Marxism is not—in some form—social practice.

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The Illusion of State Socialism and the Contradiction between Wage Labor and Capital*

by Wolfgang Müller and Christel Neusüss

The following article provides a synopsis of different versions of the revisionist theory of the state, and of its immanent tendencies. Further, it outlines a critique of the establishment of income distribution as an autonomous sphere, independent of production, and of the way state socialism is presented as carrying out its specific functions, as Marx indicated by means of the Factory Legislation. Only on the basis of these preliminary considerations it is possible to relate the concrete manifestations of the state's social and political-economic functions to the process of capital realization and its contradictory development.[1] Although this deals with revisionist *theories* of the state, it is not an actual analysis of contemporary state socialism. Thus, the historical and material conditions within which the illusion of state socialism has come about are only touched upon. The history of theory is generally kept separate from the history of capital. Yet, it is necessary to critically evaluate the revisionist theorists' reification of the state—or rather, of income distribution—as a preliminary analytical step.

I. The Political Significance of Revisionist Theories of the State

In the history of the labor movement, the relation between the state and capitalist society was crucial in the debates concerning the working class' political strategy and organizational form to separate revolutionary from revisionist positions. The conception of the state as an institution relatively *independent* of the contradictions of society has been and still is the basis for all revisionist strategy and praxis. Initially, the revisionist strategy claimed to transform capitalism into socialism with the gradual take-over of state power by the working class through legal reforms within the existing system.

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1. These considerations emerged from discussions held while preparing for a series of essays investigating so-called "interventions of state socialism" in the civil society of the Federal Republic of Germany. Aside from the authors, some of the other participants in the discussions were Elmar Altvater, Bernhard Blanke, Kristina Blunck, Ulrich Huttenlocher, and Alex Schubert. Altvater's analysis of the boom published in *Sozialistische Politik* 5 (1970) was used in these discussions. In addition, Altvater was directly involved in the preparation of Part II.

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(Gradually, revisionist theoreticians abandoned the conceptual framework of the labor movement; thus, e.g., instead of talking about "working class," they speak of "democratic processes.") But so far, this opting for a continuous "revolution from above"[2] (here, too, revolutionary language is used as jargon) has only resulted in the explicit abandonment of socialism as a political goal. "He who pronounces himself in favor of the method of legal reform *in place of and as opposed to* the conquest of political power and social revolution does not really choose a more tranquil, surer and slower road to the *same* goal. He chooses a *different* goal. Instead of taking a stand for the establishment of a new social order, he takes a stand for surface modifications of the old order."[3]

A strategy focusing on the bourgeois state as the subject of social change can be deemed as potentially successful only if the state is seen as a "sacred vessel" to be filled with either capitalist or socialist contents (depending on the historical situation) and if the state produced forms within which to reproduce social life. According to Marx, however, "bourgeois society is combined in the form of the state"[4] so that "existing society" can function "as the *basis* for the existing state."[5] In other words, the existing state is the outcome of a developed commodity-producing society which includes all the contradictions inherent in this mode of production. Consequently, as an institution, the state is itself riddled with these contradictions.[6] The

2. Cf. P. Lapinski, "Der Sozialstaat, Etappen und Tendenzen seiner Entwicklung," in *Unter dem Banner des Marxismus*, II (1928), p. 383; reprinted in *Gegen den Strom*, I (August, 1959), p. 39.

3. Rosa Luxemburg, "Social Reform or Revolution?" *Selected Political Writings*, ed. Dick Howard (New York, 1971), pp. 115-116.

4. Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*, trans. M. Nicolaus (London, 1973), p. 102. See also the *German Ideology* (New York, 1968), p. 60: "Since the State is the form in which the individuals of a ruling class assert their common interests, and in which the whole civil society of an epoch is epitomized, it follows that in the formation of all communal institutions the state acts as an intermediary, that these institutions receive a political form. Hence the illusion that law is based on the will, and indeed on the will divorced from its real basis—on free will."

5. Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Program* (New York, 1966), p. 17. See also Marx, *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* (Cambridge, 1970): "What then is the content of political adaptation, of the political end: what is the end of this end... What kind of power does the political state exercise over private property... Does the state isolate it from the family and society and bring it to its abstract autonomy? What then is the power of the political state over private property? Private property's own power, its essence brought to existence. What remains to the political state in opposition to this essence? The illusion that it determines when it is rather determined" (p. 100). "...[T]he inalienability of private property is the alienability of universal freedom of will and ethical life. Here it is no longer the case that property is in so far as I put my will into it, but rather my will is in so far as it is in property. Here my will does not own but is owned" (p. 101).

6. Early on Marx demonstrated that in the case of government administration, social contradictions are reflected in the state. See his "Critical Notes on 'The King of Prussia and Social Reform' (1844)," in Easton and Guddat, eds., *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society* (New York, 1967): "The state cannot transcend the *contradiction* between the aim and good intentions of the administration on the one hand and its means and resources on the other without transcending itself, for it is *based* on this contradiction. It is based on the contradiction between *public* and *private life*, on the contradiction between *general interests* and *particular interests*. The *administration*, therefore, must confine itself to a *formal* and *negative* activity

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revisionists' rejection of this notion of the state is thus consistent with their implicit rejection of the idea that the capitalist mode of production can be abolished only by the revolutionary working class (rather than by the state apparatus).[7]

Since the bourgeois state is defined as the product of developed commodity-producing society, i.e., capitalism, and since the strategy of the labor movement must be determined accordingly, it is crucial not to limit the critique of revisionism to a critique of isolated political institutions. But to the extent that the debate has become politically relevant at all it is precisely this kind of interparliamentary critique, which has characterized the debate on revisionist theories of the state in the German New Left. Marx's, Engels', Pannekoek's and others' critiques of bourgeois parliamentarism were used during discussions on the question of participation in the Federal Elections (*Bundestagswahlen*), when the SDS (the Association of Socialist German Students, or *Sozialistische Deutscher Sudentenbund*) had to define the role of a socialist party in a bourgeois parliament under conditions of monopoly capitalism. Along with Agnoli's *Transformation der Demokratie* (1967), these critiques were the basis for the position that the parliament was useless as an arena of class struggle and to bring about socialism—a position still held by the DKP (German Communist Party).[8]

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because its power ceases where civil life and its work begin. Indeed, as against the consequences which spring from the unsocial nature of this civil life, of private property, trade, industry, and the mutual plundering of different civil groups, as against these consequences *impotence* is the *natural law* of administration. This dismemberment . . . of *civil society* is the natural foundation on which the *modern* state rests . . . If the modern state would want to transcend the *impotence* of its administration, it would have to transcend itself, for it exists *only* in contrast to that life" (pp. 348-349). In contrast, the following quote illustrates the theory of state monopoly capitalism today: "As has been indicated, the monopolies must use the state as an instrument, which can be used against them." In Herbert Meissner, ed., *Bürgerliche Oekonomie im modernen Kapitalismus* (East Berlin, 1967), p. 422. Even though still paying lip service to the contradictions of capitalist society, the theory of state monopoly capital forgets that these contradictions are reflected in the state apparatus as well as in its political potential for action. Hence, the state apparatus cannot be conceived as a homogeneous instrument which is, by nature, neutral and therefore of potential service to the interests of each class.

7. Lenin, *State and Revolution* (New York, 1932). In criticizing Hegel's mystification of the state (where the state appears as the embodiment of reason), Marx himself clearly shows that only the proletariat as a subject can overcome the contradictions of bourgeois society. See also Karl Polak, "Karl Marx über Staat, Eigentum und Recht," in *Karl Marx. Begründer der Staats- und Rechtstheorie der Arbeiterklasse* (East Berlin, 1968), p. 35 *passim*. Again in a critique of Hegel, Marx recognized "that the determining principle of reality is class struggle, i.e., the contradiction, and political power in the form of state is the expression of this contradiction of struggle" (*Marx-Engels Werke*, I, p. 51). And further: "The dictatorship of the Jacobins was the attempt to control the contradictions within civil society through political power. It failed and had to fail" (MEW, I, p. 42). For details, see A. Gurland, "Produktionsweise, Staat, Klassendiktatur" (unpublished dissertation: Leipzig, 1928).

8. In this context, see the essays by J. Deppe and J. Agnoli in *Neue Kritik*, VIII, No. 44 (1967), pp. 48-66; IX, No. 47 (1968), pp. 24-33, as well as Pannekoek, Lukács, Friedländer, Rudas, *Parlamentarismusdebatte* (Berlin, 1968). A study group of the Freie Universität, Berlin, and B. Rabehl discuss the debate in their book, *DKP—eine neue sozialdemokratische Partei* (Berlin, 1969). [Translator's note: "German Communist Party" (DKP) is the new name of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) taken in 1968 after it was legally permitted to exist again in West Germany.] The book also presents and criticizes the tradition and contemporary forms of

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But the Left's uncertainty regarding the extent of the present SPD government's maneuverability and its possibilities to "manipulate crises," shows very clearly that the critique of parliament, i.e., the political critique of a political institution, can be no more than one aspect of the total critique of revisionism. Eventually, if it takes itself seriously, such a partial critique must not only become critical of the various functions of today's state—e.g., its set of instruments for "guiding" the economy," for "satisfying the needs" of society—but it must then become a critique of its concrete limitations and contradictions. The presentation and critique of government institutions as manipulatory tools of the ruling class fails to show its limitations. The latter can only be shown through an analysis which concretely demonstrates the needs for, and limits to, state intervention in terms of the contradictions of the capitalist mode of production, as a process of labor and realization.[9]

Along these lines, Lenin's theory of imperialism is more relevant than his presentation of the Marxist theory of the state in *State and Revolution* in evaluating the bourgeois state and its functions at the service of capital realization. This is because in the latter, Lenin tends to discuss the state in general, independent of the specific form that it takes in the various phases of the historical development of society's organization of material reproduction. Thus, the differences between feudal and bourgeois state fade in the polemic with Mensheviks and revisionist German Social Democracy shortly before the October Revolution. This follows consistently from Lenin's purpose in *State and Revolution*, i.e., a *political* critique of *political* institutions to demonstrate the necessity of the collapse and smashing of the state apparatus by the revolutionary working class. In *State and Revolution*, the problem is to determine the working class' political strategy *vis-à-vis* the political institutions of the state apparatus in a

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revisionist state theories, as well as their political and strategic consequences. It shows analogies between the revisionism of the Social Democrats in Germany and Austria during the 1920s (Otto Bauer, Karl Renner, Rudolf Hilferding, Eduard Bernstein, Karl Kautsky, and others by discussing their thesis of "organized capitalism" as a novel and potentially crisis-free form of the capitalist mode of production), and they show similar parallels in relation to the contemporary DKP theory concerning state monopoly capitalism and the political sociology of Habermas and Offe, which continue both the tradition of the social democratic theory of the state during the Weimar Republic, as well as bourgeois sociology since Max Weber. For further details, see pp. 65-119 of their book, where the various forms and contents of the revisionist state theory are described; here they can only be outlined. See also P. Lapinski, *et al.*, in their introductory essay to the new edition of *Gegen den Strom* (cf. note 1 above). Their repeated demand, also brought forth by the DKP book, for an "historical-genetic" analysis of the capitalist state has not been fulfilled in their publication (if that was ever intended). In its attempt to give a full overview of revisionist political ideas, the critique invariably starts with the particular, where it is quite adequate, since it is based on the critique of revisionism in the labor movement. But in the process it loses sight of the systematic context of revisionist theories, along with a contextual critique of revisionism. Hence, it follows that it is difficult on this basis to find theoretical departures for a real materialist analysis of capitalism and class.

9. This essay is a prolegomenon for this purpose. Cf. also Elmar Altvater's "Konjunkturanalyse," *Sozialistische Politik* 5 (1970).

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revolutionary situation. But if the problem is to determine the operating room and the perspective for practical strategies in the formative stages of a socialist movement, then a Marxist theory of the state in terms of Lenin's *State and Revolution* is of little help. For, while it refers to the general necessity of smashing the state apparatus, it does not provide the tools for evaluating the range and effectiveness of state intervention in the process of capital realization. (For the same reason, *State and Revolution* is useless as an introduction to "the" Marxist theory of the state). Today, it is necessary to develop criteria to determine the scope of the state apparatus' manipulative possibilities, their limitations, where they create new contradictions, where they entail—within capitalist forms—real socialization (e.g., in standardizing production), etc. in order to develop strategies. The issue then is not to come up with a general Marxist theory of the state, but to probe the specific functions of the state in safeguarding the process of capital realization in advanced capitalism, as well as the limits to these functions.

Revisionism is the means whereby the class enemy becomes entrenched in the labor movement and the ideology of the ruling class also becomes the ruling ideology of the working class. Of course, this diffusion does not "ride on the back of a mere idea," but occurs on the basis of actual experiences which constitute the background for both revisionism and workers' false consciousness. In the history of the labor movement the experience of "socio-political" bourgeois state legislation is essential for the emergence of revisionism. Such protective legislation limits certain forms of exploitation in capitalist enterprises and on the basis of a minimum wage guarantees the material existence of wage labor during times when it cannot sell its labor power as a commodity on the market (sickness, old age, unemployment). These laws can easily appear as curbs to capital's domination over living labor, particularly since the mediation of class struggles has always resulted in their enforcement. Through the eyes of the working class—but especially through those of its organizations[10]—the state could thus appear as a possible instrument in the gradual usurpation of political and social power by means of the "salami tactic." As Sering correctly states: "there is a tendency that, up to a point, the influence of reformism parallels the development of this function of the state (transportation, education, social policy)."[11] Increasing state intervention in economic and social policies, the

10. Is it not the case that the revisionist theory corresponds primarily to the consciousness of bureaucratized union functionaries, who no longer personally experience the conflict with capital but are essentially characterized by their partially successful activity as mediators in relation to top organizations and the state administration? In contrast, as many studies show, this dichotomized consciousness is still predominant among the mass of workers. Without an explanation of those organizational forms which actually mediate the class struggle, it seems altogether impossible to account for the formation of revisionist consciousness. It is doubtful that it is possible to talk about "actual experiences" without reference to the level of organization and the precise social situation where such experiences take place.

11. P. Sering, "Wandlungen des Kapitalismus," *Zeitschrift für Sozialismus*, Nos. 22-23 (1935), p. 717.

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concentration of capital, and long periods of prosperity (primarily before World War I and after World War II)[12] form the basis of that experience which suggests the possibility of capitalism's gradual transformation through the state apparatus. Prior to WWI, this possibility was expressed in Bernstein's theory. During the Weimar Republic, it can be found in the theory of organized capitalism and economic democracy (Hilferding, Naphtali, etc.) and in the early stages of the Federal Republic of Germany (the Munich Program of the German Federation of Unions [*Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund*] in 1949). It is also expressed in those theories that define the present phase in capitalist development as state monopoly capitalism. Finally, it is expressed in the theory of the welfare and interventionist state, along the lines developed by the Frankfurt School (Habermas, Offe, etc.).

The relationship between workers' and students' empirical consciousness and revisionst theories occurs when theory is used to ground and legitimate experience, thus making it appear as necessary. This has two consequences. First, any political agitation among workers must take into account the long reformist tradition. The critique of reformist ideas is perhaps even more important with respect to agitation among university students since their position is tied to the state more closely than wage labor. But this debate can only take place if the relationships between economic conditions and political forms, between economic and political struggle, can always be concretely articulated. Secondly, this ultimately leads to the conclusion that revisionism and false consciousness cannot be eradicated solely by theory, but by social and class struggles.

II. On the Theory of State Socialism

1. The Sovereignty of the State in the Distribution of the Social Product.

Revisionist theories, political science, and many economic theories share the assumption that under capitalism the state can comprehensively and consciously regulate economic, social, and political processes. In this context, the state as "state socialism" would be independent of capitalist production in the "distribution of the social product." Allegedly, the state could use its leverage to improve capitalist society, or even to gradually

12. It seems that the experience of the indispensability of "successful" cooperation with the state apparatus during World War I (up to the denunciation of rebellious workers) was of decisive importance for the union apparatus. The memory of so-called war socialism was important for the illusion of "organized capitalism," as was the war economy organized by the state (i.e., essentially the representatives of the interests of the large military complex). This applies, for example, to Wissel and Hilferding. In this context, see Lapinski's essay above, which treats in detail the emergence of institutionalized class cooperation during WWI and demonstrates its continuation into Weimar. The formation of the *Zentralen Arbeitsgemeinschaft* (Central Council for Cooperation) between unions and business (November 1918) for the purpose of undercutting the revolution, albeit for different reasons, is only a highlight here. Cf. also Deppe, Freyberg, Kievenheim, Meyer, Werkmeister, *Kritik der Mitbestimmung* (Frankfurt, 1969), and Rabehl, *op.cit.*, p. 74.

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transform it towards socialism. Thus, this conception also assumes that "the spheres of distribution and of production are independent, autonomous neighbours."[13] Consequently, "distribution" should not be affected by fundamentally non-manipulatable limitations posed by production and the laws controlling it. This notion can be found in revisionist theories as well as in numerous bourgeois theories (mostly in political science).

As an example, Otto Kirchheimer, whom the West German Left has been fond of quoting in recent years, distinguishes between the "sphere of direction" and the "sphere of distribution." The sphere of direction is controlled by "laws inherent in the capitalist economic order," whereas the sphere of distribution "is in the domain of the free play of political forces."[14] A "sphere of direction," which Kirchheimer identifies with capital production, is postulated against an autonomous sphere of distribution that can be regulated by the state. In Paul Sering's *Jenseits des Kapitalismus*—the bible for a whole generation of Leftist unionists and Social Democrats—the separation of distribution and production is blatantly obvious: it is becoming 'more and more visible that the actual distribution of income is

13. Marx, *Grundrisse, op.cit.*, p. 90. In bourgeois science, the concept of "distribution" is *a priori* limited to the level of the net social product; thus, the possibility of distribution on a different level, e.g., that of the productive agencies—that of labor power and the means of production—is already excluded. In this context, it is usually claimed that the social product distributed by the state is in a process of continuous growth. This requires some comment: The proportion of the gross social product claimed by the state in the form of taxes and deductions for social security amounted to 11.8% (8.9 plus 2.9) in 1913; 23.1% (16.7 plus 5.6) in 1929; 34.4% (25.1 plus 9.3) in 1963, for the "Reich" and the FRG respectively, including Berlin. See K. Elsholz, "Strukturänderung der Sozialpolitik," *Kleine Schriften zur Sozialpolitik und zum Arbeitsrecht*, IV, No. 10 (Munich, 1963), p. 36. Disregarding the fact that during the last decades, there has been a definite decrease in the state's contribution to the gross social product, the increased proportion does not change the fact that prior to the government's collection of taxes and social security, the "distribution" of the social product takes place as a direct conflict between the two classes, i.e., concretely in wage negotiations, or in the underlying latent or open class struggles. Obviously, concerning the deductions for social security (9.3% in 1963), it would be difficult to argue here for a redistribution by the state, since nothing else is involved but an insurance guaranteed by the state. No one would seriously entertain the notion that a private insurance company, for example, would be state intervention into capitalist distribution. Social security simply means a redistribution within the wage quota, and from a general perspective, whether paid immediately in the form of wages or after the utilization of labor in the form of pensions, it all belongs to the value of labor power. Since its value includes its "educational cost" as well—e.g., a grade school education—in the final analysis, the proportion of government expenditures allocated for it is a proportion of the variable capital advanced by collective capital, which does not, however, circulate as individual wage. A very considerable proportion of government expenditures falls, therefore, into the category of variable capital or—loosely expressed—the wage quota. Similarly, it should be possible to attribute a portion of the collective social surplus to the various sectors of the budget, where part of it is merely redistributed to certain parts of capital (subventions, tax breaks, etc.) or is spent on the ideological, military, and other forms to protect capital relations. The idea of "redistribution" would thus become a lot narrower. This is one of the tasks that must be undertaken in a concrete analysis of interventionist state socialism.

14. O. Kirchheimer, "Weimar und was dann?" in his *Politik und Verfassung* (Frankfurt, 1964), p. 42. Tugan-Baranowsky already perceived distribution purely as a power issue, while seeing production as determined by economic and technical laws. Cf. E. Preiser, *Handwörterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften*, under "Distributionstheorie," vol. VIII, p. 623.

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not determined by immutable economic laws, but that it can be changed, instead, through political struggle to influence the government's economic policy."[15] Just as the economism castigated by Lenin understood the economic sphere as ultimately determining the political, the opposite appears in revisionism as "politicism." Revisionism turns the political possibilities of the state, as opposed to economic laws, into an absolute by neatly separating the totality of capitalist society into spheres. Of these, the political sphere stands out since it permits crucial social changes without any essential changes in the economic sphere. To illustrate this point, revisionism points to the socio-political activities of the capitalist state. For example, Bernstein claims that "the classical conception of capitalism usually refers to three *separate* areas: the mode of production, the form of distribution, and the legal order. Only the mode of production has remained essentially unchanged in previous times. The two others, however, have undergone great changes."[16]

This absolute separation of the two spheres through which the state apparatus comes into its own, leads immediately to the autonomy of the state *vis-à-vis* the capitalist mode of production. This absolute separation of the two spheres is also expressed in the theory of "political wages," as formulated by Rudolf Hilferding. Wages are no longer determined by economic laws, but by the strength of the working classes' parliamentary representation, the strength of its organization, and the relations of social forces outside Parliament.[17] The ability to control economic antagonism by means of cartels [*Generalkartell*] finds its counterpart in the political ability

15. Sering, *Jenseits des Kapitalismus* (Nuernberg, 1946), p. 59. One edition of several thousand copies was bought up by I.G. Metall. Fritz Vilmar in *Rüstung und Abrüstung* (Frankfurt, 1965) draws heavily from Sering. Rudi Dutschke likes to quote Sering; however, he prefers the 1930s essays.

16. Peter Gay, in *Das Dilemma des demokratischen Sozialismus* (Nuernberg, 1954) reports here the concept in one of Bernstein's speeches from 1925. Cf. Marx's critique of John Stuart Mill, *Capital*, vol. III, pp. 878ff; also Luxemburg's critique of Bernstein, *op.cit.*, pp. 106-107: "Again and again, Bernstein refers to socialism as an effort toward a distribution which is 'just,' 'juster' and 'still more just'... Social Democracy seeks to establish socialist distribution by eliminating the capitalist mode of production. On the contrary, Bernstein's method proposes to combat capitalist distribution in the hope of thereby gradually establishing the socialist mode of production."

17. *Protokoll des SPD-Parteitages in Kiel*, 1927, p. 170. Hilferding, who converted to revisionism during the Weimar Republic, already presupposed in his *Finanzkapital* (where he primarily deals with the circulation sphere and essentially ignores the production process) that the developmental process of capitalist production would tend toward the formation of general cartels, thus eliminating the anarchy of production. The primary task for the socialist revolution would then mostly consist of the elimination of inequalities in distribution. At that time, he qualified his remarks that such a development would only be possible economically, not socially or politically. Cf. *Finanzkapital* (Frankfurt am Main, 1968), pp. 322 and 403. During Weimar, Hilferding used these ideas as a basis to develop his theory of "organized capitalism," and in this context, his conception of the "political wage." For a critique of this theory, see M. Kriwizki, "Die Lohntheorie der deutschen Sozialdemokratie," in *Unter dem Banner des Marxismus*, III (1928-29), pp. 381ff, reprinted in *Gegen den Strom, op.cit.*, pp. 75ff; see also W. Gottschalch, *Strukturveränderungen der Gesellschaft und politisches Handeln in der Lehre von Rudolf Hilferding* (Berlin, 1962).

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to control the income of the masses, independent of economic laws. Claus Offe's thesis is part and parcel of these revisionist attempts. Supposedly, individual income today falls under "political regulation" and can no longer be explained by the capitalist mode of production, but only by the socio-political constellation of different social strata.[18]

Thus, distribution is no longer seen as a necessary moment of the production processes and of the circulation of capital, but as an area of politically determined state activity. The proportions according to which the state distributes what is produced—"the cake of the social product" (Erhard)—depend on the intensity and vehemence with which the "interests" of the various social groups are presented to the state, on the amount of working class power, on the "citizens' " political consciousness, on the interest of the state in a "balanced system," and on whether or not the process of forming political will [*Willensbildungprozess*] is democratic or authoritarian. It depends on the administration's efficiency, on what party wins elections, on the degree of political participation, etc.[19] In other words, since socio-political conditions are independent of economic laws, distribution depends on "social change."[20] Even so, "the economic tendency toward

18. See Claus Offe, "Political Authority and Class Structures: An Analysis of Late Capitalist Societies," in *International Journal of Sociology*, II, No. 1 (Spring 1972), pp. 73-108. Habermas refers to severe state interventions in the "system of commodity production and distribution" (Habermas, *et al.*, *Student und Politik* [Neuwied, 1961], p. 22), but then he is forced to concede that "private disposition over the means of production continues to be the basis of the economic process" (p. 23). In his theory of state socialism he relies heavily on the explication of the sovereignty of state power as distributive *vis-à-vis* the capitalist production process, which becomes most visible in his theses on the determinants of political actions of state power.

19. This is a brief overview of the decisive aspects in theories of state socialism in Hilferding, Sering, Offe, Habermas, Hennis, and others, concerning the distribution formula according to which the social product is divided among various "social groups" and state activities (social consumption, social investments, the military). There is a distinction between those theories of the state which already refer to the contemporary capitalist state as state socialism (Offe) and those which presuppose that state socialism could eventually gain ground through a gradual rolling back of monopoly power by means of democratic forces in Parliament. This distinction is primarily based on the latter's assumption of the direct influence of the monopolies on the state and of thus seeing the state as an instrument of monopolies. The former presuppose that today it is "problematic" to impute "the dependence of political activities on economic interests." Cf. Jürgen Habermas, *Theory and Practice* (Boston, 1973), p. 235. On p. 195 he refers explicitly to the "stage of organized capitalism" where the "sphere of commodity exchange" is already largely politically mediated. But since here in particular the theory of state monopoly capital argues on the level of political influence, no clear relation between the state and the capital realization process is visible (precisely in distinction to the mere "dependence" on "economic interests").

20. Marx, *Grundrisse*, *op.cit.*, p. 87. "The aim is...to present production...as distinct from distribution, etc., as encased in eternal natural laws independent of history, at which opportunity *bourgeois* relations are then quietly smuggled in as the inviolable natural laws on which society in the abstract is founded... In distribution, by contrast, humanity has allegedly permitted itself to be considerably more arbitrary." Here and in what follows, Marx suggests how, through the "crude tearing-apart" of production and distribution, the production process appears as a natural process. As a consequence the distribution process becomes a phenomenon which is solely determined by "social laws" (p. 89) (which, in this context, are synonymous with "social chance"). The inability to understand capitalist production as the circulation process of capital results in the elimination of distribution from this context. From this, then, comes the

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inequality" is not simply denied. Precisely because its political sphere has come into its own, however, the state is able to "politically compensate" the inequality necessarily resulting from the mode of production. Thus, on the basis of this alleged "autonomy" of political power from the economy, the keys to the distribution of the "social product" are rightly at the disposal of the state.[21]

Thus, through state intervention, capitalist production of commodities has become separated from distribution, both in order to expand production as well as individual consumption. The state appears as an autonomous subject with respect to relations of production. Consequently, bourgeois theory describes the state as the "distribution state," "welfare state," "interventionist state," "service state," the "obliging state"—in short, "state socialism."[22] Accordingly, state socialism is characterized by the state's access to an increasing proportion of the social product. This product can be used and distributed according to political and social considerations in the form of social services, welfare and warfare projects. The creation of what is to be distributed, i.e., the production process, is not a distribution problem. Thus, state action can be seen as purely political, dependent on political power relations, but independent of economic laws governing the reproduction of capitalist society.

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illusion of the redistribution by the state at the level of "income." From its very inception, revisionism ties in with the basic thought pattern of bourgeois economy (which does not prevent it from falling prey to much greater illusions). This is what Marx is criticizing here. See also his *Critique of the Gotha Program, op.cit.*, p. 11: "Vulgar socialism (and from it in turn a section of democracy) has taken over from the bourgeois economists the consideration and treatment of distribution as independent from the mode of production and hence the presentation of socialism as turning principally on distribution." The real development of this critique is, of course, contained in *Capital*.

21. Cf. here Habermas, *Student . . ., op.cit.*, pp. 42 and 50. The same can already be seen in Bernstein, Kautsky, Cunow, Renner, and others: see I. Fetscher, ed., *Der Marxismus, seine Geschichte in Dokumenten*, vol. III (Munich, 1965), pp. 41-56. In the *Godesberger Program, op.cit.*, it is stated, "The market economy as such does not guarantee a fair distribution of income and wealth: for this, a purposive policy concerning income and wealth is necessary" (p. 16). See also Otto Brenner, "Technischer Fortschritt und Gewerkschaften," in *Automation und technischer Fortschritt in Deutschland und den USA* (Frankfurt, 1963), pp. 308ff: "Automation and technological progress permit greater welfare for everyone. But to what extent the labor force will share it depends on the way in which the higher national income is distributed. . . The declared goal of the unions has been and will be the increase of the workers' share in the national income" (p. 312).

22. As with original revisionism, today's apologists for capital in political science view the state's distributive activities as a new development. Thus, they denounce this function with concepts like "welfare state," the state as "the great equalizer," etc., since this function violates the principles of performance and market income. See Ernst Forsthoff, "Begriff und Wesen des sozialen Rechsstaats," in *Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Staatsrechtslehrer* (Berlin, 1954), No. 12, pp. 8ff; Werner Weber, *Spannungen und Kräfte im Westdeutschen Verfassungssystem* (Stuttgart, 1951). In the following analysis of advanced capitalism we will repeatedly point out analogies between revisionists and reactionary bourgeois scientists in order to show that there is just no third way between Marxist and bourgeois social analyses and that revisionist theories necessarily flow into bourgeois theory. It is impossible to deduce completely different social conclusions on the basis of "scientific" findings, from Forsthoff to Hennis, as Habermas would like to do. It always remains a (moralizing) critique.

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In contrast, economic theories generally have a more realistic assessment of these economic laws, and thus of the limits to state action. This is already expressed in the terminological distinction between "primary" and "spontaneous" as opposed to "secondary" and "political" distribution. In many cases (especially in conservative versions), there is a clearer perception of the limits on state redistribution inherent in "the requirements of sound economic processes" (they usually appear, e.g., in the experts' warnings against "a runaway social policy" and in recommendations that the best social policy is grounded on sound economic policy). Yet, the actual relation between production and distribution is not recognized. Nor can it be otherwise. From the bourgeois viewpoint, product distribution—hence, income—cannot be understood simply as a moment in the circulation of capital. To do this would require dealing with the production sphere as the only point of production of surplus value, in accordance with the concept of circulating and self-realizing capital.

Following Marx, revisionist theories still refer to the "capitalist" organization of production. For example, Habermas and Offe—not to mention the pre-fascist revisionists, who could still naively operate with the concept of capitalism—glide right over the very thing which is specific to the capitalist mode of production: that the circulation of capital is the basis for the economic reproduction of society and that the sphere of income distribution is only a moment in the circulation of capital. Consequently, from capital's standpoint, "political wages" are seen as variable capital since the amount advanced thus affects the rate of profit. This alone falsifies the idea that the capitalist mode of production and the state's distributive function are two separate moments in capitalist society.

2. The Inability to Understand the Dual Character of the Production Process

As already suggested, overestimating the ability of the state to intervene in the distribution process takes different forms in various theories, ranging from the complete neglect of the production sphere to a limited consideration of it, thus following the division of labor as it exists in the bourgeois sciences. More recent state socialist theories are no longer formulated in terms of the social praxis of the labor movement (and hence, they are no longer really revisionist). They present themselves primarily as socio-political theories relegating the analysis of the "economy" to economic theories. From the latter, they lift out those statements that fit with their conceptions. Habermas thus relies on Joan Robinson for the "refutation" of Marx's theory of value, Offe on Shonfield, and all of them on the Keynesian variety of bourgeois economics.[23] They no longer understand that to postulate as absolute the

23. A. Shonfield, *Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power* (London, 1965; and W. Müller, "Habermas und die Anwendbarkeit der Arbeitswerttheorie," in *Sozialistische Politik* I (1969), pp. 40-44. The revisionists' arbitrary use of the concepts "social product," "social wealth," or sometimes, "abundance of commodities," and then again "products" already indicates that they no longer see a problem with what Marx describes in the

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particular segments of the totality of the capitalist mode of production is already implicit in the particular sciences and in their division of labor with respect to theory construction. Glueing together statements in the various segments cannot result in a conception of the whole. Since Bernstein, however, all revisionists share the position that the production process—even where it is explicitly discussed—cannot be seen as the contradictory unity of the processes of labor and capital realization. Rather, it appears as a mere labor process which is still identifiable as capitalist only because of its specific legal and organizational forms.

Luxemburg already criticized Bernstein because, "by 'capitalist' [he] does not mean a category of production but of property rights; not an economic unit but a fiscal unit... By transferring the concept of 'capitalist' from the relations of production to property relations...he moves the question of socialism from the realm of production into the realm of relations of fortune —from the relation between capital and labor to the relation between rich and poor."[24] Here it is obvious how Bernstein's reduction of the critique of capitalism to the issue of "fair distribution" is a result of his purely sociological-legal conception of capital relations. This, in turn, is the basis for his reformist strategy with the state seen as the subject of social transformation. Such a conclusion can be reached only if the production process is not seen in its two-fold character, but as mere labor process whose capitalist character is only contingent and can therefore be eliminated under capitalism through the good will of the capitalist and corresponding pressure by the working class.

What is lost is any notion that the production process, as the process of capital realization, is determined by certain regularities operating behind individuals' backs and which turn individual capitalists into their instrument. Even though revisionists speak of "capitalist production," thus believing that they are talking in Marx's sense, they suppress the *specific* character of the capitalist production process. Every production process is also a labor process. Independent of the relations of production, it is the performance of useful labor with the purpose of producing commodities. "In the labor-process, therefore, man's activity, with the help of the instruments of labor, effects an alteration, designed from the commencement, in the material worked upon. The process disappears in the product: the latter is a use-value, Nature's material adapted by a change of form to the wants of man."[25] The realization process, on the other hand, is characterized by the production of use-value, not for its own sake, but as depositories of exchange value. The capitalist's aim "is to produce not only use-value, but a commodity also; not only

very beginning of *Capital*, i.e., that in capitalism, social wealth appears as an enormous abundance of commodities. The arbitrariness of the conceptualization indicates the overlooking of the specific problematic of the mode of social production: the dual character of the commodity as exchange value and as use value, and—accordingly—the dual character of labor and the production process.

24. Luxemburg, *op.cit.*, pp. 96-97.

25. Marx, *Capital* I, p. 180.

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use-value, but value; not only value, but at the same time surplus-value."[26] The capitalist production process exists only if, on the one hand, it produces more value than the capitalist invested in it through the purchase of the means of production and labor power and, on the other, the values produced can be sold as commodities, to be finally converted into money.

All the methods and organizational forms of exploitation practiced in the history of capitalism, along with the crises and the misery they create for the total population, are a result of the law that applies to each individual capitalist: capital realization is a precondition for his existence. From the hierarchical organization of manufacturing to the technical design of the machines, from the outlay of factories to all the various speed-ups, the whole production process is characterized by the need to realize individual capital. All these methods are designed for the capitalist's benefit, allowing maximum exploitation of the labor day—the labor time sold by the worker—down to the very last minute. The capitalist sees to it that labor power is "applied with the average amount of exertion and the usual degree of intensity."[27]

The specific legal and organizational forms of the capitalist production process are nothing but the necessary expression of the two-fold character of the production process under capitalism as both a process of labor and capital realization. But, almost without exception, revisionists see all of this as chance accident. This is especially obvious in the characterization of the capitalist's role *vis-à-vis* the worker. In revisionist theory, this relationship is not explained in terms of economic relations between capital and labor, i.e., their relation within the process of capital realization. They are blind to the fact that the individual capitalist and the individual wage laborer are economic masks hiding capital relations. Their ideologies of economic and participatory democracy are also rooted in this blindness. Thus, Fritz Naphtali writes: "In the plant, the entrepreneur, or management in general, and the worker confront each other; here, the overcoming of managerial despotism requires workers' right to participate in decision-making. Workers should no longer be treated as disenfranchised objects."[28] Thus, capitalist despotism is only the result of arbitrariness and can be removed on the organizational level by the establishment of committees to participate in making decisions within the capitalist enterprise. Socialism becomes an ethical challenge and capitalism an issue of entrepreneurial morality.

Another rejection of the two-fold character of the capitalist production process can be found in Paul Sering's theory of production hierarchy. He sees the capitalist enterprise as a rational organization, where the "intelligentsia of production" (technicians, market experts) "work unflaggingly toward further progress and the creation of cooperative forms of technical and economic organization," and where managers are, "above all, people with the ability to

26. *Ibid.*, p. 186.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 196.
28. Fritz Naphtali, *Wirtschaftsdemokratie* (Frankfurt, 1966), p. 23.

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make and implement decisions concerning the maintenance of a complex organization... The only point where the old entrepreneurial function has been maintained is at the top of the pyramid—the monopolistic and financial oligarchy—where production management does, indeed, depend on the profit motive of the owner. And this oligarchy...becomes increasingly entwined with the organs of state economic policy."[29]

Thus, the dual character of the production process as both labor and realization is ignored. But in the capitalist enterprise, managers simultaneously obtain from labor both commodities as well as surplus-value.[30] Thus, in Sering's account, the subjugation of living to dead labor, the squeezing out of surplus-value, and the economizing of capital (which means that "in spite of cutting corners, it is thoroughly wasteful with manpower"),[31] disappear from the organization of production in the capitalist enterprise. Instead, capitalism is seen as a technical and rational institution where only its organizational top remains capitalist. Thus, the introduction of socialism merely requires changing top personnel, rolling back the capitalist oligarchy's influence on economic policy through a strong social-democratic government, and gradually dismantling the top by replacing it with planning experts. The current strategy of the German Communist Party (which, drawing on the theory of monopoly capitalism, calls for the peaceful transition of capitalism to socialism) is based on such ideas. Thus, the power of monopoly capitalism is to be reduced on two fronts: through workers' participation in decision-making in their work-place; and through the establishment in economic policy of a democratic program to fight monopolies. The struggle is for gradually taking over the "apparatus to direct and manage the economy" and "subordinating it to the interest of the people." "Between the hegemony of monopoly capitalism and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat for the transition to socialism, there is the phase of struggle to establish and develop a democracy opposed to monopoly capitalism."[32]

3. Successful Boom Policy as a Precondition of Social Policy

The autonomy of the state's distribution policy presupposes that the state is independent of the laws of capitalist production governing realization, the "economy" generally flows *without crises,* and the economic reproduction of society *grows* continuously. As already indicated in the case of "political wages," all categories of "distribution" (which always refers to income) and the policies concerning them are, above all, categories of capital circulation.

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29. See Sering, *Jenseits...*, *op.cit.*, pp. 47-49.
30. See here especially Marx, *Capital* I, pp. 330-332 and 334-335.
31. *Ibid.*, III, pp. 77-173.
32. *Imperialismus Heute* (Berlin, 1968), pp. 239 and 727. Cf. the chapter "Die demokratische Alternative gegen den staatsmonopolistischen Kapitalismus," pp. 724-751; see also its criticism by Rabehl, *op.cit.*, pp. 67ff.

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Consequently, stagnation in circulation must affect distribution. Unemployment and stagnation, or even a falling rate in social production, tend to turn any state distribution policy into a mirage. Consequently, all plans and prognoses of the West German government regarding its social policy have generally assumed the continued growth of the social product.[33] This assumption of the absence of crises must, however, be justified; and theories of state socialism differ as to their justifications.

For Bernstein, as well as for the theorists of "organized capitalism" during the 1920s,[34] crises were to disappear owing to capital's concentration and the formation of finance capital. In contrast to "competitive capitalism" and the "anarchy of the market," capital would be able to plan production with the assistance of the democratic state. After the world economic crisis, however, revisionist theories had to develop different explanatory models since the assumption of a crisis-free economy resulting from the uncontrolled unfolding of the laws of capital accumulation had been exploded by the world depression. Since then, almost all bourgeois and revisionist theories—from welfare state theories and neo-liberalism to the rightist and leftist spin-offs from Keynesian theory in the contemporary Social Democratic Party and in the unions—assume that the economy can be stabilized through state intervention. On this basis, the state can then develop freely as state socialism.

Today, it is no longer possible to naively attribute the overcoming of crises to the natural mechanisms of capital accumulation. Rather, the attempt is now made to establish crisis-free production through conscious state intervention, i.e., through a subject not involved in the processes to be regulated. Thus, the state's policy for crisis management and for distribution are interdependent: crisis-preventing state interventions are the precondition for its socio-political actions. In turn, the autonomy of the state in the sphere of income distribution is the precondition for its "crisis-preventing strategies."

This point can be easily illustrated with the following example. In bourgeois-technocratic thinking, the assumption underlying the notion of "political wages"—i.e., that wages can be politically regulated—is seen as the basis for regulating the economy through "income policies," "concerted action," and "wage guidelines." As an expression of state autonomy in distribution, "political wages" now serve as the unmediated economic instrument of manipulation to stabilize production against cycles. Thus, the state intervenes in the circulation of capital by taking initiative in distribution so as to "cushion" economic crises. Accordingly, the state's regulatory activity

33. Thus, for Secretary Auerbach of the Ministry of Labor, economic coverage of pensions and health insurance is insured only if gross wages and salaries increase annually by 5.8%, up to 1985. (See *Tagesspiegel,* December 23, 1969.) Cf. also *Sozialenquete,* "Soziale Sicherung in der BRD" (Stuttgart, 1966), pp. 143ff, esp. p. 153, where it is shown that social security, and particularly unemployment compensation, would totally fail under conditions of mass unemployment.

34. See Eugen Varga's essay, "Probleme der Monopolbildung und die Theorie vom 'organisierten Kapitalismus'," in his *Die Krise des Kapitalismus und ihre politischen Folgen* (Frankfurt, 1969), pp. 11-41. See also Rabehl, *op.cit.,* pp. 97ff.

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presupposes that the assumed autonomy of distribution is limited so that state intervention in this sphere does not affect the production process.[35] From this viewpoint, the separation of production from distribution is no longer total, but one-sided. Distribution policy is postulated as independent of the laws and limitations of the process of capital realization. But, at the same time, it is also assumed that the accumulation process, now under the neutral label of "continued economic growth," can be actually affected through distribution policies as a form of crisis control. On this basis, the relative autonomy of the state in the distribution sphere and, hence, in determining distribution policies, are legitimated along with its strategy of "crisis prevention."[36] One becomes the precondition for the other, and both are anchored in the same subject. Consequently, the accumulation process and its internal laws become unproblematic, especially since during the last 20 years the effectiveness of state policy and the accuracy of the theories based on these assumptions have apparently been demonstrated in West Germany.

Most of the contradictions between capitalist production and social policy are thus eliminated. This is best exemplified in the left-Keynesian or unionist notion that effective "crisis management" is possible through wage increases meant to stimulate effective demand in the form of increased purchasing power. As early as 1928, Fritz Tarnow wrote: "the concern here is not with social issues, but with the economy's need to enforce the increased use of consumer goods in order to clear the way for increased consumption and production."[37] This comfortable tradition of mere appeals to the state and to the "reason" of the capitalist class—rather than the actual preparation of the working class for revolutionary practice—counts among its followers I.G. Metall which in 1967 recommended that the state aid workers in the "purchase of a car through investment credits, thus simultaneously stimulating the auto industry." At the same time, I.G. Metall also complained about the industry's lack of integrity, for having cut social benefits and wages during a crisis out of sheer nastiness and against their awareness that only mass consumption could guarantee the market for their products.[38] At least Tarnow was aware of the problem when he wrote: "Of

35. Here we are dealing with a problem that we could not fully agree on during our discussions. What are the practical consequences of the illusion of the distribution sphere's autonomy or political wages under conditions of anti-cyclical boom policies? To what extent does it not involve *de facto* recognition of the dependence of distribution on production, as well as the limits this dependence imposes?

36. J.M. Gillman, *Prosperity in the Crisis* (New York, 1965), demonstrates how the welfare state theories of the New Deal era considered social security as a mechanism for crisis regulation (p. 132). Then Gillman tests this assumption on the basis of the cyclical movements of capital in the U.S. and shows that its significance is only of secondary importance that that it is *not* a decisive factor for economic stabilization.

37. Fritz Tarnow, *Warum arm sein?* (Berlin, 1928), pp. 71 and 49. For a critique, see Kriwizki, *op.cit.*; Erika König, *Vom Revisionismus zum demokratischen Sozialismus* (East Berlin, 1964), pp. 158ff.

38. *Metall*, No. 16 (1967), and *Weissbuch der I.G. Metall* (1968). It can also be seen how Brenner, in 1967 and 1968, argues for the theory of regulating the crisis through increases in general income.

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course, the *individual* manager can continue to calculate as though a wage cut would be nothing but an advantage. But such manipulation would no longer be possible for management *as such*, whose interests in capital and profit would suffer severely from such a decision."[39] He thus pleaded for a balanced distribution of the total purchasing power between consumption and accumulation which, by harmoniously integrating the interests of both capital and the working class, would provide the basis for healthy capitalism. But Marx had already commented on such ideas: "To each capitalist, the total mass of workers, with the exception of his own workers, appear not as workers, but as consumers... Of course he would like the workers of *other* capitalists to be the greatest consumers of *his own* commodity. But the relation of *every* capitalist to *his own* workers is the *relation as such of capital and labor*, the essential relation."[40] In 1967, the praxis of crisis manipulation by the state had shown that it is up to "state socialism" to take into account this "essential relation": the state thus cut the social budget and had to permit stagnation and even some lowering of wages.

Thus, what is ignored is that capital exists only as *individual* capitals and that the state can represent collective capital only to the extent to which it represents the interest of individual capitals, or at least, of its most powerful faction. It is inherent in capitalist relations that the contradictory interests of each individual capitalist seek to develop the maximum consumption potential of all workers, with the exception of his own, whose wages are to be kept at a minimum. These interests cannot be eliminated by the state. This is further expressed in the fact that the "spontaneous" distribution of wages and

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39. Tarnow, *Warum arm sein?*, *op.cit.*, p. 53.

40. Marx, *Grundrisse*, *op.cit.*, p. 419. See also p. 420: "Capital itself... regards *demand by the worker* i.e., the payment of the wages on which this demand rests – not as a gain but as a loss. I.e., the *immanent relation between capital and labor* asserts itself. *Here again it is the competition among capitals,* their indifference to and independence of one another, which brings about that the individual capital relates to the workers of the entire remaining capital not as to workers; hence is driven beyond the right proportions." And he states in *Capital*, II: "But if one were to attempt to give this tautology [that crises are caused by the scarcity of effective consumption] the semblance of a profounder justification by saying that the working-class receives too small a portion of its own product and the evil would be remedied as soon as it receives a larger share of it and its wages increase in consequence, one could only remark that crises are always prepared by precisely a period in which wages rise generally and the working-class actually gets a larger share of that part of the annual product which is intended for consumption. From the point of view of these advocates of sound and 'simple' (!) common sense, such a period should rather remove the crisis. It appears, then, that capitalist production comprises conditions independent of good or bad will, conditions which permit the working-class to enjoy that relative prosperity only momentarily, and at that always only as the harbinger of a coming crisis" (pp. 410-411). See also M. Kriwizki, *Lohntheorie*, *op.cit.*, who shows that the theory of political wages is based on the assumption that the capitalist could economize in regard to constant capital and allot these savings to the worker: "In regard to Marx, when we find that he juxtaposes variable capital or wages against surplus value, wages are juxtaposed to constant capital in all cases that we have referred to, and changes in wages are related to changes in constant capital. Hence, the division of newly created value into the value of labor and surplus value is discarded. This eliminates the battle ground on which the clash between the two classes takes place... This is the same transfer of the analysis away from the relations of production onto technology, which is conceived as located outside of the social relations" (pp. 97ff).

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profits is not regulated by the state at all, but via *direct* confrontation at the bargaining table. Briefly summarized, the activity of the state is limited to the redistribution of wage incomes ("social services," manpower training) and to a certain redistribution of profits among various groups of capitalists (subventions, tax breaks for investments, etc.). Thus, it is no longer possible to assume the complentarity of the state's functions as manipulating crises and as taking care of social policy. Under capitalism, the state is as unable as ever to even attempt the reproduction of economic power relations free of crises, while trying, at the same time to politically dissolve this relation of dominance. In so far as it is necessary to maintain a certain minimum of social "stability" for the smooth functioning of capital realization, an attempt is made by the state to reduce this general contradiction. This function is carried out through *social policy as appeasement policy* [*Befriedigungs-politik*], which thus remains a moment in the ongoing reproduction of capital relations. In this sense, it becomes the exact opposite of the state's political autonomy.

In this respect, and in this respect alone, bourgeois science has fewer illusions than all the revisionist trade union theoreticians since the Weimar Republic. Accordingly, the functions of state socialism are to be subordinate to the primary function of securing growth and prosperity. The conflict between these two state functions is fully recognized, but harmony is re-established by the claim that sound economic policies are the best social policies. In securing growth, sound economic policies give the state the needed means to carry out its function of social distribution while, in addition, preventing "unemployment." Along these lines, the *Sozialenquete* [the Social Inquiry of 1966] sponsored by the West German government (and undertaken by professors close to the parties in power) assumed that, as far as the function of social policy is concerned, i.e., fulfilling the people's needs for security and welfare, there is an identity between these tasks and the goals of economic policy.[41] An economic policy that does not interfere with social policy by increasing costs at the wrong time (and it always turns out to be the wrong time)[42] should thus be in a position to guarantee economic growth and "full employment."[43] "In general, social policy is by nature oriented towards the

41. Cf. *Sozialenquete, op.cit.*, pp. 140ff.

42. *Ibid.*, pp. 153ff. It is argued here that under conditions of a fired-up economy, social benefits have an inflationary effect, but they are economically possible and perhaps even reasonable during a crisis. (Here, the illusion is similar to that of the unions.) The latter is, however, not recommended on the basis of political factors, since such measures are difficult to revoke later on without the potential danger of social discontent.

43. Time and again, it is necessary to altogether avoid bourgeois-scientific concepts, which so obviously veil reality, or at least to put them in quotes. Thus, according to prevailing opinion, "full employment" includes an official unemployment statistic of "only" 3-5%. The figures of the official unemployment statistics are, in turn, misleading (particularly during a recession or a "low"), because they do not include foreign workers who have been returned to unemployment prematurely (especially female workers), or who went home on their own. The figures hide a much larger industrial reserve army, which is actually the appropriate concept for capitalist reality. This is another reminder indicating how—in bourgeois science—one constantly moves

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long range and can only be rationally implemented if the economy succeeds in preventing excessive ups and downs."[44] This results in the need to direct social policy and subsume it under economic measures, as long as it can be done without endangering "social peace." Maintaining "social peace" is, therefore, a determining factor for the lower limits of social benefits (just next to maintaining the capacity for "work and performance, educational training, and mobility"). "Price stability" and the "management's readiness to invest" define the upper limit.[45] According to the authors of the *Sozialenquete*, this is the leeway given to the redistributive socio-political measures of the state.

4. State Socialism and Pluralist Democracy

The theoretical separation of economic conditions from production and distribution has political consequences. Historically, of course, the theory is the consequence of a revisionist praxis which it further confirms: the Social Democratic Party's attempt to justify its non-revolutionary politics, its collaboration with capital and the bourgeois state have led to recurrent attempts to show not only that today's capitalism is fundamentally different from that of Marx's day, but that there has been a qualitative change in the relation between the capitalist production process and the state. This subsequently legitimates the strategy which is actually practiced, i.e., the class cooperation in the bourgeois state. For revisionist theories of the state, the state's autonomy in distributing the social product and the disappearance of capitalist crises (either as a result of natural processes of capitalist development, or as a result of the state's crisis mangement) constitutes an essential precondition for the gradual transition of capitalism to socialism, of the bourgeois state to a socialist and democratic constitutional state. Once social-democratic theoreticians from Bernstein to Habermas have put state socialism on the firm grounds of a continuously increasing "abundance of goods," there are no longer any insurmountable obstacles to the realization of a democratic society: "From this perspective class conflict loses its revolutionary guise, a *progressive democratization of society* is not excluded from the outset, even *within the economic order of capitalism.*"[46]

Bernstein wanted to formulate a non-revolutionary strategy for the working class: social reform instead of revolution. The claim that a working class

around dummies, which, however, from the perspective of capitalist society and its science, are necessary and the only reality which actually determines the actions of capital's agents and of government functionaries.

44. *Sozialenquete, op.cit.*, p. 153.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 144, where the limits to social policy are generally correctly outlined. On the other hand, the state, e.g., the U.S., is less able to take care of the lower limits. They are only considered as a phase of capital's prosperity. See also p. 145: "Industry's readiness to invest is necessary in the interest of the growth of general welfare as well as in the interest of full employment... In the interst of the continued international capacity of the economy, it is impossible to decrease the volume of exports... Hence, an extension of the social budget competes primarily with an increase in real income."

46. Jürgen Habermas, *Theory and Practice, op.cit.*, p. 233.

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revolutionary struggle had become historically obsolete—socialism could be achieved through the state by means of labor parties and strong cooperation of unions—this claim led to the elaboration of the idea of the state's independence from the conditions of capitalist production. In the course of its further development (the Weimar Republic), the state has increased through mediation by parliamentary debate, its interventions in society, primarily in the distribution sector (an increasing proportion of the social product was distributed by the state). Therefore, the state's distributive function came to be viewed as the sphere of autonomous state power as opposed to capital accumulation. Here is the origin of Hilferding's theory of political wages and the corresponding notions of Kirchheimer, Sering, and other social-democratic theoreticians.

According to Hilferding, class power relations are constantly assessed by elections. These powers are immediately translated by Parliament into the will of the state, which, in a democracy, is the will of its citizens. This, according to Hilferding, results in the "adaptation of state power to changing power relations," which necessarily leads to an increase in the labor party's influence, since the proportion of workers in the population is increasing. This in turn should be followed by an increase in wages that are determined not economically, but politically. "Now the workers consider the state as a political instrument for the building of socialism."[47] Elections and parliament are the means for the peaceful resolution of the struggle between wage labor and capital.

In 1949, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) endorsed the West German Constitution in the Parliamentary Council [*Parlamentarischer Rat*]. The provisional nature of the new state, its open attitude to socialization of large industries (Article 15), the strong position of the ruling party and of the Chancellor, the jurisdiction of the Republic's legislature, and the basically fixed clause concerning state socialism (Article 20), led the SPD to think that the new state would be sufficient to transform the capitalist society which by that time had already been restored, to a socialist society.

Firmly counting on election victories, the SPD sought to achieve their social and political ideals by taking over state powers with a parliamentary majority. The ambivalent and even negative position during debates on the Constitution of the SPD concerning the political right to strike, as well as the absence of any protection for mass action in the Constitution itself, indicate that revolutionary mass action and labor struggles were not included in this plan.

Similarly, the contents of their political ideas refer less to the working class as the historical subject of social processes than to the state. The difference between the Christian Democratic parties (CDU-CSU) and the SPD

47. See Rudolf Hilferding, "Probleme der Zeit," in *Gesellschaft* I (1924), p. 13, and his "Realistischer Pazifismus," in *Gesellschaft* II (1924), p. 111. See also W. Gottschalch, *op. cit.*, pp. 198-218.

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concerning the relation between state and society culminated with the Christian parties ascribing to the state only a subsidiary, retroactive and corrective role in social and economic development, thus seeing social policy as an unproblematic by-product of unhindered economic growth on a capitalist basis. In contrast, the SPD emphasized the state's responsibility for social and economic processes: the realization of social justice through state intervention in the economy and through legislated planning and socialization. After fascism, the key issue in the SPD's political program was *state socialism*. Its social target was to "remove humanity from the situation of being an object" (Carlo Schmid), the historical agent being the SPD as a parliamentary party, with Schuhmacher as the Chancellor competent to set guidelines: thus socialism was to be ushered in through a "revolution from above."[48] The task of socialism as set forth in the Godeberg Program and in the practical alignment with the Christian Democrats on ideas concerning social policy after the "Great Coalition," was nothing but the emergence of what was already inherent in the SPD's political conception right after the fall of fascism: this conception, in turn, was essentially an up-dating of the revisionist tradition of the Weimar Republic.

It must be conceded that post-war revisionist theory went a step further, fully developing the immanent logic of its approach prior to fascism—but this happened on the basis of specific historical developments: the resignation of the SPD as the self-proclaimed representative of the working class and its rebirth as a mass party. In this development, the state is not only seen as independent from the capital realization process, but society itself is conceived as pluralist and dealing with multiple conflicts of interest.

Following the logic of a theory which sees the antagonism between capital and labor as a mere conflict over the distribution of scarce resources, class conflict as such altogether disappears for modern revisionism. Class conflict becomes pluralist debate over a cake which is continually getting bigger; an increasing social product decreases scarcity. "Based on a high and rising level of the productive forces, industrially developed societies have expanded social wealth. This in turn lends realism to the consideration that the antagonistic sharpness of competing needs may be blunted in view of a continued, if not increasing, pluralism of interests and in line with the definite possibility to satisfy these needs." A "society living in abundance" makes obsolete "compromises dictated by scarce resources."[49] Thus, class theory has turned

48. In this whole context, see H.-H. Hartwich, "Sozialstaatspostulat und gesellschaftlicher *status quo*" (unpublished manuscript), pp. 1-66.

49. Jürgen Habermas, *Strukturwandel der Oeffentlichkeit* (Neuwied, 1962), p. 254. Here, parallels can be seen to the following statement by Erhard: "It is so much easier to grant to each individual a larger piece of a cake that is getting bigger than to try to profit from a fight over the distribution of a small cake." Erhard, *Wohlstand für alle* (Düsseldorf, 1957), p. 10. Rabehl points out that in the "sociology of the state," "it is not class struggles that determine this monopolistic society; rather, this era is based on the democratic struggle of the 'underprivileged' for recognition and support by the state." (Rabehl, *op.cit.*, p. 93). This political idea rests precisely on the reduction of capitalist contradictions to distribution problems. Underprivileged

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into the theory of pluralism. The "class struggle," to which revisionists still paid lip service during the Weimar Republic, is reduced to balancing pluralistic interests through competing organizations and representative practices.[50] The Social Democrats of Weimar still assumed that the social interests relevant to the formation of political will would always be constituted by the conflict between capital and labor and that the conflict had decreased owing to economic developments. Hence, for them, the state apparatus (especially Parliament) became a useful instrument in the gradual transition to socialism. Post WWII revisionism moves further away from Marxist theory. The formation of political will and the decision-making process are seen as resulting from conflicts of interest among pluralist social groups. While the theory of state socialism claims the autonomy of the state from capitalist production in regulating crises and in distribution, it recognizes no corresponding autonomy of the state from social groups. Just the opposite: in this theory, the state is seen as a tool to implement or to merely mediate various social interests and interest groups, which consequently can determine state policy. Such a conception, on the one hand, sees the state as *dependent* on social interest groups (with wage labor and capital still predominating), but at the same time it perceives the state as *autonomous* in relation to the "economic process." Hence, it follows by necessity that the connection between the production process and the constitution of social conflicts are torn apart. If the state is understood as the real or potential subject of the distribution of the "social product" and of the regulation of the economic process, and if in principle the laws of distribution and regulation as laws of the capital realization process do not have priority over the state, then there can be no connection between the capitalist mode of production and conflicts of interest which then appear as merely "social." If the state can change the distribution of "social wealth" without abolishing capital relations, then social conflicts of interest over distribution can no longer be understood as merely the result of capital relations. Society is hypostatized to the arena of interests to be mediated by the state.[51]

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social groups are those who are not given a big enough share by the state. As soon as the state puts bigger pieces into their mouths, their underprivileged status ends. Offe draws the correct conclusions from this when he writes: "In general, the repressive character of a political system—that is, those aspects serving to strengthen authority—is measurable in terms of whether...it accords equal *prospects for political consideration* to all the various classes of mutually incompatible social *interests, needs, and claims*, or whether these prospects are distorted or biased in some specific direction" ("Political Authority...," *op.cit.*, p. 80). Here the underprivileged groups have refined themselves into underprivileged needs.

50. E. Fraenkel, "Strukturanalyse der modernen Demokratie," in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* (supplement to the weekly *Das Parlament*), December 6, 1969, p. 23: "Pluralism is the state theory of reformism. It implicitly rejects the thesis that the antagonism between capital and labor, whose existence it does not doubt, leads by historical necessity to the *Aufhebung* of this antagonism in the classless society." See also by the same author, *Deutschland und die westlichen Demokratien* (Stuttgart, 1964).

51. P. Sering, "Der Faschismus," in *Zeitschrift für Sozialismus*, Nos. 24-25 and 26-27 (1935), p. 775.

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If all the state needs is "a positive indication of how to realize justice through the intervention of state socialism," then in principle the laws of capital realization could not prohibit it from doing this, given the contemporary conditions of capitalist societies and states. Other forces, aside from those of material production, must be at work here. For contemporary revisionism, the issue of the democratic and social constitutional state becomes the issue of its democratic potential, and the issue of the "political maturity of the people"[52] becomes that of democratic and peace-loving forces. No longer is any attempt made to define such forces, except for the mention of the little word "anti-monopolist." Increases in democratic potential and the formation of political will require an automatic increase in the margin of state power to direct the realization of social justice. The continuous transition toward a society which is self-regulating is thus possible insofar as a growing democratic force usurps the state apparatus and uses it to establish a just and rational social order. Because "the state advances to become the bearer of social order,"[53] the kind of social order that is realized depends on the consciousness of those who use the state. Thus, the justification given by Frankfurt School sociologists, who polled students at the end of the 1950s, was that, since students provide the manpower for leadership positions in the "large industrial enterprises" and in the civil service,[54] they are particularly relevant to this theory as democratic (!) potential. The political and social consciousness of managers and higher civil servants is thus essential in determining the reason or unreason of "political and social processes" and of the method and substance employed in satisfying needs. Social contradictions are ultimately reduced to individual consciousness: the good or ill will of the capitalists or their managers; the reactionary or progressive consciousness of civil servants; the question, for example, from which social strata the elite reconstitutes itself. Here we have already come to Dahrendorf.[55]

Whether reason or unreason determines the organization of production and the satisfaction of social needs, as well as the question of reason in political decisions, becomes a matter of what is in individual heads (especially the heats of the elite). Democracy becomes a question of the ideological and political orientation of the ruling elites. The theory of democracy atrophies into the theory of elites. Even if various sociological categories are used to historically explain present social conditions and the formation of the

52. Habermas, *Student...*, *op.cit.*, pp. 35 and 45.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
54. *Ibid.*, pp. 52ff.
55. Critical research of the elite takes the same direction. See, e.g., Helge Pross, *Manager und Aktionäre in Deutschland* (Frankfurt, 1965), and W. Zapf, *Wandlungen der deutschen Elite* (Munich, 1965). See also the theory of state monopoly capitalism (as well as the corresponding numerous studies of contemporary history as published in the GDR), which attempt to prove the particularly aggressive and reactionary nature of the monopolies and the state on the basis of the identity of the elite structure in fascist and contemporary Germany. According to this approach, the most important argument for the claim that West Germany is a monopoly state is the existence of the same individuals in both economic and political elites.

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political will, the analysis still concludes by promising the beginning of the end of domination through the recurrent appearance in the ruling apparatus of individuals with a critical consciousness.

By comparison, Offe's theory of the welfare and interventionist state has no illusions. Offe's theory of the welfare and interventionist state, which continues Habermas' theory of state socialism, no longer involves the concept of social emancipation. Class conflict is eliminated as a dynamic force of social development and the critique of political economy is explicitly rejected as a theoretical approach to understanding the movements and laws of monopoly capitalist society. "In the planned capitalist welfare state, domination of man over man (or of one class over another) has largely given way to the dominance of a few spheres of social function over others... The gap that ran *between* the great position groups [read: classes] in the early stages of capitalism has shifted, as it were, to within individuals themselves."[56]

Offe's theory has fewer illusions because it sees the boundaries limiting "the range of action given to the political-administrative center"[57] as nearly insurmountable. State power is here defined as social-irrational activity. The processes and forms for the formation of political will have been run into the ground and ossified. Practical, i.e., rational activity of state power is ruled out, since the social mechanisms for the articulation of needs and for the self-definition of state power do not function to ensure the system's equilibrium. The ossified forms in which social needs are now articulated are the boundaries to be overcome.

If these forms were to change, then the state's actions would change as well. The road to change is a revolution of individual needs which alone would permit a change in those phenomena and organizational forms that have so far determined the formation of political will. At least, this conclusion could be drawn from Offe's approach. But it is not expressly stated, and rightly so. For why should individuals revolutionize their consciousness and needs, so long as the state succeeds in "avoiding crises" and so long as sharp social contradictions can be ignored from the outset in anticipation of "success." (Offe's terminology brings his theoretical standpoint in line with this concept.)

What applies to Offe applies to Habermas as well. A fundamental change in the form and content of the state's distributive powers, which they equate with the rationalization of the totality of social reproduction processes, does not require a basic revolution in production relations, but merely a change in the formation of political will. According to Offe, such change would mainly involve those processes which create the political will of parties (the pressure to mediate among particular group interests),[58] as well as that of the "pluralist" system of federations. These processes present to the state only

56. Offe, *op.cit.*, pp. 95-96.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 103. [English translation slightly altered.]
58. *Ibid.*, pp. 83ff.

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those partial interests which can be organized and can create conflict. Only by these means can the state be moved to action, as its function is to maintain the system's equilibrium through the avoidance of conflict. The partial interests would determine how and why the social product is distributed by the state. Accordingly, general social needs for schools, hospitals and for the development of public transportation systems, are not sufficiently dealt with by the state since these needs cannot be articulated by partial interests that alone can organize and create conflict.[59] Thus, the organization of society into a pluralist system of federations and the specific effect this has on the process of political decision-making prevent the state's rational action towards satisfying general needs.

At this point, in spite of all reservations against authoritarianism, the analysis of "left" theoreticians of state socialism converges with that of the right. Conservative theoreticians of state socialism such as Hennis[60] begin by assuming that in order to carry out its business *efficiently* and in terms of the *general* satisfaction of its citizens' needs, the state must be freed from the "accidents" caused in the democratic formation of political will. This is all the more so, since the state now can essentially fulfill needs through administrative and distributive functions. The state's democratic legitimation rests on its function to provide for its citizens' welfare; to this end, it must organize its institutional apparatus toward fulfilling these immanent "requirements" [*sachgesetzliche Forderungen*]. In order to democratically function according to its legitimation, the state would have to free itself from all forms of informal, pre-state [*vorstaatlich*] formations of political will. Thus, it would not be hampered in the fulfillment of its democratic tasks by social conflicts of interest. In this context, the "experts on behalf of the common good" recommended by Erhard play an increasing role, even if under changed names. Hennis, for example, refers to "institutionalized eyes and ears" who remind the state of its general tasks as opposed to the pressure of group interests. At last, a good use might be found here for political scientists. The process of forming political will requires the transformation of the state apparatus into more authoritarian forms and, in keeping with this, the creation of a "people able to be governed [*regierungsfähig*]" (Hennis), or more explicitly: "The maturity of a society corresponds to the degree to which it can be manipulated." "And from the perspective of scientific research, which is making great strides in this area, there are neither factual nor normative limits to manipulation."[61] According to Erhard's 1965 proclamation, formed and informed society go together. Authoritarian state socialism and the manipulation of the "citizens" it provides for are only two sides of the same coin.

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59. *Ibid.*, p. 85.
60. W. Hennis, "Aufgaben einer modernen Regierungslehre," in *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* VI (1965), pp. 422-441.
61. R. Altmann, *Späte Nachricht vom Staat* (Stuttgart, 1969), p. 51.

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Thus, the argument can be summarized as follows: If the state is to be democratic, i.e., responding to the wants of its "citizens" and taking care of their needs, then it must streamline its activities, if possible, on the organizational level. In other words, it must transform itself into an authoritarian state. Social pluralism of interests, or the "social articulation of interests," hampers the state in effectively organizing distribution (e.g., shifting priority from "social consumption to social investments,"[62] i.e., to education, transportation, etc., was essential for the economy's continued growth). Thus, pluralism must either be eliminated, reduced, or organized as a corporation. This conclusion could also be drawn from Offe's analysis of the obstacles to rational state power. According to this, there is no reason why enlightened statesmen—who have succeeded in increasing their range of maneuverability by liquidating that pluralism of interests which only limits the state, and who lend their enlightened ears to the science that counsels politics—there is no reason why these statesmen should not contribute to the establishment of a better society as well. Why should they not consider those needs for "housing, health, transportation, education, constitutional government, and leisure"—needs which, however, are presently ignored since needs are expressed by federations and by the parties which must always be committed to their own interests because of election strategies.

Accordingly, Habermas perceives scientists as providing the ability to "rationalize" political decisions.[63] Scientists act as political advisors and, by publishing their findings, create the enlightened masses which bestows relevant political meaning onto their enlightened advice. "Citizens" thus form the objects of "mass enlightenment" by the scientific elite. Widmayer, the technocratic educational economist and planner, correctly refers to Habermas and Offe when he recommends as a cure-all for society's ills the scientific advisement of politics and the end to all influence on the state from federations and from parties corrupted by elections.[64]

The rightist theoreticians of state socialism see the solution to the problem as obvious. State socialism means "taking care of" in the dual sense of the term: providing for the necessities of life as well as for the political silencing of those taken care of. A higher standard of living can only be guaranteed on the basis of increased manipulation of the clients. Thus, the conservative approach to state socialism models its conception of the distributive state according to the organizational principles of the capitalist industrial enterprise. As the "total entrepreneur" in the highly organized capitalist "total enterprise," it is oriented towards efficiency, and its efficiency is determined by "the degree of its organizational-instrumental adaptation to a

62. This expression was first used in industry publications and in Erhard's official address of 1965.

63. See Habermas, "Wissenschaft und Politik," in *Offene Welt* 86 (1964), pp. 413-423.

64. H.P. Widmayer, "Aspekte einer aktiven Sozialpolitik. Zur politischen Oekonomie der Sozialinvestionen," lecture presented to the *Verein für Sozialpolitik* (1969).

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given situation."[65] Both bourgeois science and, of course, capitalists, hold that the capitalist dictatorship over the workers in industry has priority over the needs of the citizens as consumers for an increasing mass of commodities from which to freely choose. The need for improved working conditions can be considered only to the extent to which they do not interfere with the economic side of the enterprise: "If he becomes part of the production process, man must necessarily submit to its economic laws of efficiency. The economy is not an end in itself, and man is not really a means to the end. The purpose of the economy is to satisfy man's material needs, to give him the means to free himself for higher spiritual and moral goals. But this is possible only if man becomes part of the production process which requires his subordination to the goals of the enterprise, thus becoming a means to an end. This is certainly an inner contradiction which is, however, in the nature of this matter."[66] In the jargon of the scientific apologists of capital, there exists an insoluble contradiction between the needs of the worker as consumer, and as a spiritual-moral being who must transcend his existence in the industrial enterprise as a "mere means to an end." In principle, since these needs oppose each other, participation in the industry's decision-making can be permitted only to the extent that "the relation between the factor of human performance and the enterprise is formed in a way that carries out the enterprsie's goals as perfectly as possible... The individual worker should gain the impression that he is not a mere object but that he can somehow participate in shaping his own fate as part of the enterprise."[67] But, against these sporty recommendations of capital's scientific apologists to use co-determination as a tool to increase efficiency (the union's efforts to make co-determination palatable to capital are nowadays not too different), capitalists argue, now as ever, that co-determination results in decreased productivity. To them, dictatorship rather than manipulation in the

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65. See Hennis, *op.cit.*, p. 429. See also p. 427: "If it is correct to perceive in the science of government something like a science of management of the modern state, then our field (political science) creates the impression of a management science, whose only theme is co-determination." This whole point is first made attractive to the public in the ideologies of the structured society (*formierte Gesellschaft*), a slogan that was also swallowed by some of the Left.

66. Karl Hax, *Personalpolitik und Mitbestimmung* (Cologne, 1969), p. 16. See, in this context, Marx, *Capital*, I, p. 356: "It is very characteristic that the enthusiastic apologists of the factory system have nothing more damning to urge against a general organisation of labor of society, than that it would turn all society into one immense factory." The early bourgeois economists were not so bold as to ask of the wage laborer total submission during the work day, so that he would be free for his "higher mental and moral ambitions." Instead, they wisely distributed this "internal contradiction" among the different classes. Thus, Storch (1815) praises the advantages of capitalist society: "The progress of social wealth... begets this useful class of society... which performs the most wearisome, the vilest, the most disgusting functions, which takes, in a word, on its shoulders all that is disagreeable and servile in life, and procures thus for other classes leisure, serenity of mind and conventional (c'est bon!) dignity of character," *ibid.*, p. 647.

67. As an illustration, see the well-known slogan, as effective now as ever: "The democratization of the economy is as nonsensical as the democratization of schools, barracks, and jails." Quoted from the *Industriekurier*, 1965.

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industrial enterprise appears as a more reliable instrument to extract surplus value.[68]

But the real issue here is this: the crucial contradiction is not seen as obtaining between capital and wage labor, but between the citizen as consumer and as wage earner. For him, freedom and a good standard of living require his enslavement as producer. While there is of course no such problem for the capitalist, production and consumption oppose each other as irreconcilable differences within *each and every* individual worker. Whether revisionist or conservative, the theory of state socialism ultimately reaches the point where it projects onto the individual himself the contradictions prohibiting the rational organization of society. "Leftist" theoreticians of state socialism describe this conflict of interest within the individual as the result of historical processes mediated by the way in which social interests are formulated. Rightist theoreticians perceive the conflict as a natural constant. Hence, the difference between political strategies: enlightenment of the masses administered by an enlightened elite, or manipulation. In both instances, the masses are objects to be handled by the elites.

Different political goals also follow from this. While the authoritarian state is an unavoidable necessity for the conservative, for the revisionist[69] it is an historically developed institution, thus subject to change. But the revisionist's presentation of the historical conditions which have formed the "citizens' " present political consciousness and his conception of the economic reproduction of society indicate that, for him, social change is possible only as "revolution from above," meaning that his postulate, the abolition of domination, is nothing but empty rhetoric. Since the capitalist welfare state can now manipulate economic crises, it will not allow future crises and it will no longer be possible in the future for workers to become aware of social contradictions on the basis of their own experiences. "The relation of the client to the state is...not one of political participation, but a general attitude of expectation, of anticipation of welfare, but not an attempt to actually force decisions."[70] How, then, can individuals by themselves change their consciousness if the state grants them welfare and if nothing changes in the given situation—or if it even improves, since a quantitative increase in state benefits can be anticipated if the state can indeed regulate crises? In sum, how can consciousness be changed if capitalist contradictions become blunted? "What we have here, in brief, is the foundation of the socialist program by means of 'pure reason' [*'reine Erkenntnis'*]. We have here, to use

68. Hax, *op.cit.*, pp. 24 and 16.

69. We also include under the concept of revisionism more recent West German authors because of an issue that should at least be suggested here. It concerns the relationship between a working class addressed to the state by its own organizers and its theoreticians. This relation is obvious in regard to Hilferding and Tarnow, for example, but it is not so obvious with Habermas and Offe. It is beyond doubt, however, as far as some Frankfurt sociologists are concerned who are around union headquarters. On the other hand, it must be clarified to what extent it is correct to still refer to reformism in relation to the contemporary role of unions and the SPD—a reformism that would tie in with revisionist theory as opposed to revolutionary Marxism.

70. Habermas, *Student...*, *op.cit.*, p. 32.

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simpler language, an idealist explanation of socialism. The objective necessity of socialism as the result of the material development of society, falls away."[71] As Habermas argues conclusively,[72] the introduction of socialism by "pure insight," by the enlightenment of the masses, is an issue for the enlightened elites.

Contemporary revisionists either totally eliminate the production process from their social analysis or else throw it overboard as the locus of exploitation and the production of surplus value (e.g., through "the value-creating potential of science"). Individual consciousness, therefore, can come into being only in relation to the distribution sphere. In this conception, political consciousness is primarily directed to the state and to politics. As "critical consciousness" its critique is limited to the norms relating to the distribution of "income" and "life chances": are they just or unjust, sufficient or insufficient?

A scientific method that starts with the state as its object of investigation ultimately dissolves the totality of social processes into separate spheres. By deriving from the modes of the state's appearance its autonomy from the production process, the method thus turns the state into the foundation of the social order, no longer perceiving social conflict as concretely constituted by the modes of social production. By doing so, it comes to the conclusion that the individual himself is to be divided into separate spheres as well. In contemporary revisionist theory, this appears in the concept of political consciousness, which refers only to the relationship between the "citizen" and the state. Seen in this way, it is easy to speak of the apolitical consciousness of the German proletariat, after it could not be led to stand up against the *emergency laws*—a highly charged political issue—in order to defend "the democratic state." Struggles between wage labor and capital in the factory are put aside as "merely economic" and as guided by false consumer needs. Thus, the relationship between wage labor and capital as the empirical basis for the formation of political consciousness no longer figures as an issue at all. Those who complain about the proletariat's lack of political consciousness easily forget that they are the very ones who eagerly collaborate in the creation of the ideology legitimating the state.

Above all, the history of "industrial society" is thus seen as the history of capital and of its state, but not as the history of the working class, its struggles and defeats.[73] Presented in an upside down bourgeois version whereby dead labor dominates living labor, this history ensnares the revisionists'

71. Luxemburg, *op.cit.*, p. 59.

72. Here, again, we refer to the logical consequences of non-revolutionary recipes against capitalism, whose logical consequences were already characterized by Luxemburg. As already indicated, she demonstrates how the non-revolutionary path, in the case of Bernstein, may lead to a different place, i.e., maintaining the usual state of affairs with a few improvements. Here, it must be added that Habermas very deftly translated this inner logic into its external manifestation.

73. Cf. the *Illustrierte Geschichte der deutschen Revolution* (reprinted Frankfurt, 1968), where memories of the struggling people are frequently recorded.

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consciousness, for whom the working class has always been a mere object in historical development. Concrete proletarian struggles are suppressed in the revisionist historical consciousness, along with the revolutionary struggles carried out by social-democratic organizations.[74] If these intellectual critics complain today that the socialist state threatens to develop into an authoritarian state because of the "passivity of the working class," then they should not forget that since the November revolution, at the latest, workers have been directed toward the state by the SPD (and also more and more by a party that conceives itself as communist after it had been legalized). They should remember that the SPD has presented the bourgeois state to the workers as the target for their demands, and that the workers' initiative has been smothered time and again by the SPD and the unions, often in collaboration with the bourgeoisie. Last, but not least, they should bear in mind that such a working class consciousness (if the description actually applies) is the result of this historical experience *and* its theoretical affirmation by social democratic theoreticians since Bernstein. The ideology of state socialism is thus ultimately connected with the historical suppression of the working class as a conscious subject carried out through its organizations.

"Prosperity for all" becomes the basis for legitimating state power and its institutions. It appears as something which can be regulated by the state in conjunction with the economic ruling class ("the economy"), in order to distribute to the masses their due. Similarly, the masses can expect and demand this prosperity from the state. Here, the masses appear as demanding objects legitimately asserting their rights to welfare planning, whereas the state appears as the benefactor and the permissive subject: commodities seem

74. Rabehl, *op.cit.*, p. 154: "Since reformism conceived of state monopoly capitalism as a guarantee for the introduction of socialism in society, it attached the workers to the democratic constitution, i.e., it conditioned them to passivity during crisis stages." But it never becomes totally clear throughout the whole book why a negative fixation on the state should be juxtaposed as the only possible cure to a positive fixation, which is correctly criticized in terms of its consequences for the history of social democracy. Thus, Rabehl states on p. 106: "Revolutionary theory becomes the strategy for action, which observes the contradictions of capitalist and monopoly capitalist production, the distortions between the industrial classes, the stagnations, the partial crises, the process of the dissolution and formation of classes. . . but the strategy either brings out or intensifies these latent or open contradictions through class action. This requires the continuous attack against individual state institutions, whose task it is to direct certain social areas (e.g., education and training, the health and legal systems, police, army, etc.), in order to lay bare and prevent the functions of the state, so that they cannot be consolidated into a counterrevolutionary power." If the level of contradiction is to be found on the level of capitalist production it would also exist on the level of the contradiction between wage labor and capital. But then it does not become clear why those concerned should develop their strategy for action primarily against the capitalist state and not against capital itself. This negative fixation on the state (rather than on capital and then, mediated through it, on the state) threatens to lose sight of the real enemy. This becomes evident, for example, as soon as the execution of state power is superficially diluted (e.g., amnesty, reduction of police and legal terror, or illusions about the SPD government in general). When this happens, the illusion arises of a fundamental change. This is further evident in the purely political concepts of organization that are determined by this conception of the state. At the most, they only verbally concede the necessity of an "economic" basis for class struggles.

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to fall from heaven. But a really scientific social theory must assume that, prior to their partial distribution to the masses, all products have been produced by the masses as a whole. Thus, masses are not secondary, they are not recipients or, at most, claimants. Theory, on the contrary, must start with the assumption that they are subjects working and producing within a specific mode of production. Concretely, this means that they must be viewed as subjects used by capital, or rather, the objects of capital as subject. And the state cannot be investigated only as the "distributor," as the "welfare" state or as "state socialism," but its functions must be seen as stemming from the necessity to produce commodities before distributing them: i.e., the state, especially in state socialism, takes on special functions for reproducing capital on the basis of contradictions in the specific stages of capital's historical development. A Marxist analysis must, therefore, consider "distribution of national income" as a moment in the production and circulation process of capital, and it must attempt to understand the functions of the state on this basis.

III. The Distribution of Income and the Circulation of Capital

As we have seen, the postulation of income distribution as a sphere separate from production (which presupposes the distribution of the means of production) is a crucial theoretical assumption for the revisionists to justify the basic power of the state to intervene in the distribution of income. The imagery is that of the social product as a "cake"[75] whose pieces are to be distributed in isolation from the conditions of production, depending only on the resolution of conflicts of interest. But this imagery presupposes that after having produced the commodities, capital hands them over to society to freely dispose of and, with disinterested benevolence, watches the struggle of those wanting a piece of the cake. Capital itself is satisfied by what is obtained in the struggle of those associations which lobby on capital's behalf. Thus, there exists only a political—and not an economic—relation between capitalist commodity production and capital, and the income distribution "emerging" from it.

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75. The imagery of the "cake" is an extremely popular way of looking at things, and even big shots in economics like to indulge in it. See, for example, J.M. Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (London, 1971): "On the one hand, the labouring classes accepted from ignorance or powerlessness. . . a situation in which they could call their own very little of the cake that they and nature and the capitalists were cooperating to produce [!]. And on the other hand, the capitalist classes were allowed to call the best part of the cake theirs. . ." And even today in "modern industrial society," it is only one group of confectioners who bakes the cakes: "This national income is the actual creation of value of the West German economy. It is the 'big cake,' i.e., the total, which is available for wages and capital income, for ground rent, and national expenditures. Everyone tries to grab as big a piece as possible of this cake." Cf. Kurt Walter and Arnold Leistico, *Anatomie der Wirtschaft* (Hamburg, 1969), p. 42.

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1. Primary Distribution and State Redistribution

But bourgeois theories of economic distribution are certainly not so simple. According to them, the relation between distribution and redistribution is definitely determined economically and not regulated by political laws alone. The state's redistribution policy here appears as a *secondary* corrective to the *primary* distribution carried out through "payments to factors." Later corrections to primary distribution may no longer be executed more or less arbitrarily or according to the political balance of power, but only on the basis of the earlier primary distribution. As Preiser suggests,[76] power can only affect primary distribution as part of the given economic system, since the influence of power is assumed to inhere in the economic laws determining distribution. This interpretation of the economic laws of income distribution appears decisively in the circulation theories of distribution, where "wages and profits. . .form the basic income for consumption and investment which, in turn, provide the means for payment of wages and profits the next time around."[77] Thus, distribution is seen as a moment in the reproduction cycle: it loses its character as an independent process subject to political manipulation. Or, in other words: political redistribution policies must anticipate specific definite counter-measures. This, in turn, is expressed as political conflict over goals, since economic counter-measures now endanger the realization of other political goals.

Such a conflict over "goals" of growth or distribution takes the following form: it is "possible to start from a minimum limit on capital interest, which just barely maintains investment and employment, but which, if lowered, prevents the growth of the economic market from functioning. This minimum limit on capital interest is at the same time the maximum limit for real wages. If the maximum limit of capital interest, which is also the minimum limit of real wages, is exceeded, then a 'social revolution' is triggered, and the economic system breaks down as a market economy."[78] The underlying economic contradictions between wage labor and capital surface in such conflicts over political goals, but they are not understood by bourgeois economics as the moving forces behind these conflicts. Thus, on the

76. Erich Preiser, "Distribution. Theorie," in *Handwörterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften*, vol. II, p. 624. Preiser describes "power" as a political and social category that is also economically relevant, since economic categories and "pure" laws necessarily reflect social and political power. In this formal fashion, an attempt is made to express power as an "economic potential." Cf. Marx, *Capital*, I, pp. 751-758.

77. Wilhelm Krelle, *Verteilungstheorie* (Tübingen, 1962), p. 110. Here we refrain from discussing the various types of distribution (personal, functional, sectional). By "distribution" we mean "income distribution." Cf. Preiser, *op.cit.*, and Leo Kowalski, *Einkommensverwendung, Einkommensverteilung und Vermögensverteilung* (Tügbingen, 1967), which deals with more recent approaches to bourgeois economics. Here we are not concerned with distribution as such, but with the relation between distribution and capital realization.

78. Georg H. Küster, *Untersuchungen zur Einkommensverteilung im Wirtschaftswachstum* (Berlin, 1969), p. 15. Küster refers to Wilhelm Krelle, "Bestimmungsgründe der Einkommensverteilung in der modernen Wirtschaft," in W.G. Hoffman, ed., *Einkommensbildung und Einkommensverteilung* (Berlin, 1957).

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one hand, there is the typical distinction between economic and political evaluations of state income redistribution (while revisionist theoreticians and political scientists assume a very wide scope for state manipulation, political economists are much more skeptical). On the other hand, economic distribution theories are still committed to the notion of the state's manipulatory powers. Thus, they can only describe potential conflicts of goals and indicate methods resulting in optimal outcomes for a rational economic policy should goals be contradictory. Bourgeois economists see information on such conflicts and the understanding of the reasons behind contradictory goals as means to deal with conflicts. Of course, such idealistic assumptions presuppose the state as an all-embracing subject in relation to the economic system. It requires only the continuous improvement of channels of information (especially regarding conflict situations) and of instruments of manipulation in order to meet the challenge for a rational economic policy: "rational politics must be goal-oriented and its method must be adequate."[79] Revisionist theories and political science would also agree on this point.

Thus, by observing economic regularities, economic distribution theory consistently arrives at a realistic view of possibilities for political redistribution. In his "distribution theory," Krelle[80] reaches the disillusioned insight that "short term policies within a market economy" must be "corrected" because of long-term counter-effects. Unlike unions' faith healers, who seek to cure the problems of capitalist distribution with placebos like "the placing of wealth in the hands of the workers," bourgeois economics reaches the concrete insight that this type of redistribution is impossible. No matter how Föhl and Hennis twist and turn matters, they also rediscover what has been confirmed by all surveys so far: a "real redistribution" of wealth is impossible.[81] Attempts to change the distribution of income and wealth in favor of wage labor result either in a decreasing rate of income, employment and growth, and a flight of capital, or in a mere redistribution between the "state sector" and the "private economy," but not between wage labor and capital. Put briefly: "to him who has will more be given" [Mark 4:25, RSV].[82] Bourgeois economists cannot get around the fact that the capitalist

79. H. Giersch, *Allgemeine Wirtschaftspolitik: Grundlagen* (Wiesbaden, 1960), p. 23.

80. If we look at the result of distribution theory as a whole, we find a totally unanticipated stability of the market economy system. Almost all short-term changes provoke long-term reactions, which can eventually cancel out the former. . ." Wilhelm Krelle, *Verteilungstheorie, op.cit.*, p. 257.

81. Carl Föhl and Manfred Hennies, *Vermögensbildung in Arbeitnehmerhand* (Pfullingen, 1966).

82. Carl Föhl, *Kreislaufanalytische Untersuchungen der Vermögensbildung in der Bundesrepublik und der Beinflussbarkeit ihrer Verteilung* (Tübingen, 1964), p. 40. This is nothing more than a bowdlerization of the law of accumulation. Marx, *Capital*, I, p. 645: "But all methods for the production of surplus value are at the same time methods of accumulation; and every extension of accumulation becomes again a means for the development of those methods. It follows therefore that in proportion as capital accumulates, the lot of the labourer, be his payment high or low, must grow worse. . . Accumulation of wealth at one pole is, therefore, at the same time accumulation of misery, agony of toil, slavery, ignorance, brutality, mental degradation, at the opposite pole, i.e., on the side of the class that produces its own product in the form of capital."

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accumulation process polarizes socially produced wealth in the form of private capital against the poverty of wage labor that cannot sell anything but its labor power. And this still holds for "modern industrial society." "For to him who has will more be given;" he who has nothing must work to live. As a consequence, to him who has will be given even more.

But the realism in such a conclusion is nothing more than "down to earth thinking" which is only in a position to grasp that those who have shall receive, but not the have-nots. Thus, the realism of economic theory stops abruptly if it turns to recommendations for state policy. Is it not precisely the "formation of wealth" that has been recommended for years by economic experts?"[83] But this formation can be guaranteed only if redistribution is possible. Economic circulation analyses realize that capitalism requires a minimum of class conflict for its smooth functioning. The attempt to resolve class conflicts, however, necessarily leads to their reappearance at a higher level. Yet, these analyses conclude that redistribution as a possible means for such resolution is a pure illusion, either in the long run or permanently. There are two ways in which bourgeois scientists can pull out of this dilemma. They can either withdraw from the state decision-making processes and leave the arena to political decisionism, or they can suggest the redistribution of income and wealth to be done "prudently" (really meaning: ineffectively), with the goal of deceiving wage labor as to the actual state of affairs.[84]

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83. As a typical illustration of the bourgeois science view, see Georg Leber, ed., *Vermögensbildung in Arbeiternehmerhand: Wissenschaftliche Beiträge, Dokumentation* (Frankfurt, 1965). All contributors follow the direction anticipated by Leber in his Introduction: "It might be possible to take steps, on the safe grounds of scientific knowledge, towards changing an unjust and outdated income structure."

84. Erich Preiser and Gerhard Weisser, who co-authored the two-part article on distribution in the *Handwörterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften*, are polarized as to the procedure which is used by bourgeois scientists to deal with the problem. In his essay, Erich Preiser presents his version three times, just to be on the safe side: "If we want to discuss the problem [of capital formation] at all, then we must assume that [in the bargaining process] both partners act in good faith, which should result in some loss of profit for management, but which would not threaten its existence..." And: "The prospects for investment policies (and hence wealth) are all the better, the more cautiously these policies proceed." Erich Preiser, "Theoretische Grundlagen der Vermögenspolitik," in Georg Leber, ed., *op.cit.*, pp. 34, 38, 41. But what does this "caution" actually look like? Gerhard Weisser, in "Distribution: Politics" (in *Handwörterbuch, op.cit.*, p. 645) has an answer: "Corrections to the distribution policy partially conflict with the rule of compatibility. Extreme measures could be too strong to keep the market economy functioning. If for the sake of optimal autonomy of the participants in the system, a decision is made in favor of a kind of system that is basically a market economy, then one must recognize some limits for corrections in distribution. Of course, the determination of such limits cannot be undertaken here either in general or for West Germany. In this area, science is hardly able to achieve a position that would eliminate risks from political praxis..." Similar statements, by the way, can be found in *Sozialenquete, op.cit.* There is nothing new here: the bourgeois scientist gingerly leaves the field to the politician with the full knowledge that the functioning of the "market economy" will be taken care of. The actual goal of the policy concerning income and wealth is to "satisfy" wage labor. This is frankly admitted by innumerable representatives of our "democratic order." See, for example, Georg Leber, according to whom the task is "to guarantee freedom and property as the basic elements of our democratic order." Leber, "Die Gretchenfrage ist gestellt," in *Die Zeit*, October 2, 1964, reprinted in his *Vermögensbildung in der Arbeitnehmerhand, Dokumentation*, vol. II (Frankfurt, 1965), p. 63. More on this can be found in E. Altvater,

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In this manner, goal conflicts appear as a contradiction inherent in society, which reappears in the realism of economic distribution theories and in the recognition of the need for redistribution. The contradiction between wage labor and capital is thus reproduced on the theoretical level. It is not, however, the result of deliberate attempts to veil reality. The veiling itself must be seen as closely tied to the reality of capitalist commodity circulation. Capitalist production is commodity production, i.e., commodities are produced for circulation. In the circulation process, however, the types of values comprising each specific commodity cannot be determined. Or, to put it differently: what laws of distribution affect the value realized by the sale of the commodities? What is the source of the money which is exchanged for commodities, and in which the prices of commodities is realized? Part of this money comes from workers, who spend their wages in exchange for commodities. As far as circulation is concerned, workers are only consumers provided with money, for whose purchasing power the sellers of commodities (the entrepreneurs) compete. Wages appear merely as income effective in demand. This income is exchanged for commodities whose origin in capitalist production, and hence their value composition as wages (as wages, surplus value, and constant capital) cannot be recognized. Illusions about possibilities for distribution are based in this sphere. Within the framework of these illusions the state seems to have the power to counteract the redistribution of purchasing power resulting from redistribution policies and their negative consequences.

These *illusions*, based on circulation relations, are inconsistent with a more *realistic* understanding of the limits of state distribution measures, which includes the production sphere in the economic analysis of distribution. Thus, the above contradiction is based on the economic relation between production and circulation, and can only be resolved through a precise analysis of the dual function of the value unit constituting variable *capital* for the capitalist and *income* (wage) for the worker.[85] If this is expressed in a simplified form as the "dual character of wages," then the contradiction between wage labor and capital is already inherent in the category of wage and thus already implied in distribution theory when it is concerned with the particular categories of income (wage, profit, rent), i.e., before it takes up the *relation* between wages and profits. In economic distribution theories, both aspects of the bourgeois analysis of capitalism reappear: on the one hand,

"Gewerkschaften und Vermögenspolitik," in *Heidelberger Blätter*, Nos. 11-12 (April-October, 1968), pp. 61ff, and W. Müller, "Grenzen der Sozialpolitik in der Marktwirtschaft," in Nedelmann and Schäfer, eds., *Der CDU-Staat* (Frankfurt, 1962).

85. Marx, *Capital*, III, p. 883: "The so-called distribution relations, then, correspond to and arise from historically determined specific social forms of the process of production and mutual relations entered into by men in the reproduction process of human life. The historical character of these distribution relations is the historical character of production relations of which they express merely one aspect. Capitalist distribution differs from those forms of distribution which arise from other modes of production, and every form of distribution disappears with the specific form of production from which it is descended and to which it corresponds."

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capitalist commodity production is simply conceived as the production of goods generally determined by the natural conditions underlying the industrial work process, without any social contradictions ("modern industrial society"). On the other hand, the theory is based on commodity circulation and money incomes (flow of goods and money). Thus, bourgeois distribution theory gets some idea of the repercussions of the contradictions within the production sphere as manifested in the circulation sphere. Only in this perverted form is it possible for this theory to arrive at correct predictions concerning limitations to measures for income redistribution. But if bourgeois science is to give expert advice, it must retreat to circumspection or political decisionism. The contradiction in economic distribution theories is anchored in capitalist reality itself.

The key to uncover the distribution relations on the level of "income" is in the analysis of the socio-historical determination of the distribution relations on the level of production, i.e., in the analysis of capitalist relations,[86] where the means of production in the form of capital are opposed to "free" wage labor, i.e., wage labor free from the means of production. Thus, we must pursue the question: what is the relation between the two sets of distribution relations? To what extent is one only a moment of the other? Treated in detail, this question provides the core of the analysis of capital and the fetishes it produces which, in turn, include the corresponding modes of consciousness in economic theory.

2. Net and Gross Social Product: National Income and Capital Maintenance

In bourgeois theory, the sum of different forms of income ("income of employed workers," "income from business and assets") represents the "national income."[87] This income corresponds to the total costs of the production factors of labor, land, and capital which have been expended during a given year by the enterprise. Consequently, national income is equated with the net social product at factor cost. What constitutes costs for the entrepreneur appears as the same amount as flow of income for the "owners of the production factors."[88] Wage corresponds to work performed, ground rent (lease or rent) corresponds to land made available, profit corresponds to capital. Consequently, the subject matter of functional distribution theory is the "distribution of national income among the production factors of the national economy, labor, land, and capital, in the corresponding forms of income as wage, rent, and profit in accordance with their productive contribution and economic power."[89] In bourgeois theory,

86. See *Capital*, II, pp. 392ff.

87. Here, we disregard the specific forms of state distribution that involve a statistical distinction between net social product at market prices and national income, which derive from indirect taxation and payment of subventions. This distinction is irrelevant to our argument.

88. "The pay for the performance of the factors in the enterprise constitutes income for the recipient" in A. Paulsen, *Volkswirtschaftslehre*, III (Berlin, 1965), p. 9.

89. Dr. Gabler's *Wirtschaftslexikon* (paperback ed.), vol. 6 (Frankfurt, 1969), column 2955.

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regardless of attempts to bring it up to date, Monsieur le Capital and Madame la Terre[90] thus still appear in beautiful harmony with labor as the creators of the "wealth of the nation." What is counted as national income in the hands of owners of these "factors" appears in the enterprises as the creation of value in the national economy. The national income as the sum total of the creation of value corresponds to the net social product (at factor cost) as the sum of consumption and net investments.

So far, we have only dealt with bourgeois economic definitions which see income *qua* income, since they all derive from the performance of the three "production factors." Looking more closely, we discover, however, that this equation involves circular reasoning. The circularity results from the dual conception of income, i.e., from the perspective of its "receiver," and from that of its "creative process." All income is created through production in the economy. Thus, it is primarily mere income. Only later is it distributed to the various "groups of receivers": workers and wages, capitalist and profits. Now this is an obvious fact of capitalist economy (we shall disregard ground rent here). But what conclusions follow from that? Capital is productive, because it maintains incomes; and it receives an income, because it is productive. All further arguments become an elaboration of this tautology, whether it concerns the theory of the marginal productivity of distribution or any other theoretical variation.[91] Thus, we shall examine this circular reasoning in terms of the "creation of value" and in terms of "received income."

Let us first consider the aspect of value creation. Or, in other words, in what ways it is justified to assume the productivity of capital? The basic problem lies in the fact that prior to distribution, values must be produced before they can be ascribed as income to whatever "factor." Thus, the analysis of distribution must start with the production process. The capitalist production process has a dual character. It is simultaneously a process of labor and of realization. To the capitalist production manager, however, the commodities produced are significant only to the extent that they have use value, i.e., they can be exchanged for money on the market. But now another determinant is added, so that in return the capitalist receives the capital he advanced to the production process, plus a surplus. This surplus, however, cannot be derived from the exchange of commodities. The surplus received by the seller is a loss for the buyer, and since everybody is in the role of buyer and seller, surplus and loss balance out. Thus, surplus must have been created in the production process itself. The question is, how?

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90. "In capital—profit, or still better capital—interest, land—rent, labour—wages, in this economic trinity represented as the connection between the component parts of value and wealth in general and its sources, we have the complete mystification of the capitalist mode of production, the conversion of social relations into things, the direct coalescence of the material production relations with their historical and social determination. It is an enchanted, perverted, topsy-turvy world, in which Monsieur le Capital and Madame la Terre do their ghost-walking as social characters and at the same time as mere things." Marx, *Capital*, III, p. 830.

91. In connection with the presentation of these theories, see Erich Preiser, "Distribution," *op.cit.*

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The answer of bourgeois economics is unambiguous: through the contribution of the factors in production, i.e., labor, capital, and land. This argument is based on a very superficial consideration: for the production of commodities, an enterprise combines land or a site, machinery, and workers. The natural requirements of the work process state that, during an historically given phase of technical development, work can be produced only in combination with the means of production. These requirements are molded into the theory that, as a result, 'income' must flow to the productive factors involved. Here, bourgeois economics ignores the fact that while goods are produced by such a combination of factors, it is not necessarily a capitalist production process, whose outcome results in *commodities* and—if successfully sold—in *money*. Secondly, this perspective omits the fact that machines and raw materials do not turn out products all by themselves (and products are the essence of the production process) but would sit around as useless objects unless used and transformed by living labor. In contrast, management science, which is concerned with the production process itself, does have some notion, however vague, of the dual character of the production process. It thus distinguishes between operation and enterprise, between productivity (in the technical sense) and pay-off (as realization of capital invested). All of this is eliminated, however, in the theory of productive factors (or is thrown into relief, if in the investigation of "optimal combination of factors," their technical interaction and their relation to prices are treated on the same level).

Let us first consider the share of capital advanced by the capitalist. It is spent to purchase the means of production (machines, raw material, etc.) and to purchase labor as a commodity on the labor market. The value of labor power as a commodity, like all other commodities, is realized by the worker (at least, averaged out over a cycle), i.e., it must be paid by the capitalist. The worker realizes labor-power's "exchange-value, and parts with its use-value." This use value of labor power, labor itself, now no longer belongs to the worker, but to the capitalist who bought it. Consequently, the capitalist owns what results from the application of labor power's use value. The fact that "half a day's labour is necessary to keep the labourer alive during 24 hours" provides the conditions to make the production of surplus value possible in the first place: "the value of labour power and the value which that labour-power creates in the labour-process, are two entirely different magnitudes; and this difference of the two values was what the capitalist had in view, when he was purchasing the labour-power. The useful qualities that labour-power possesses, and by virtue of which it makes yarn or boots, were to him nothing more than a *conditione sine qua non*; for in order to create value, labour must be expended in a useful manner. What really influenced him was the specific use-value which this commodity possesses of being a source not only of value, but of more value than it has itself."[92] While the creation of value does

92. Marx, *Capital*, I, p. 193.

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result from the combination of the means of production and labor, the various factors of the labor process, however, "play different parts in forming the value of the product."[93] While the value of the means of production is simply maintained in the labor process through the transfer of its value to that of the product being produced, "each instant" of labor-power's activity "creates an additional or new value."[94] Thus, it does not happen that, during the labor process, there is first the transfer of the value of the means of production, and then new value is created. On the contrary, these happen simultaneously, owing to the dual character of labor as concrete and useful, and as abstract and value-adding. For if labor power is to really be value creating, it simultaneously must be the expenditure of the worker's real abilities through the concrete use of the means of production. Thus, in the value-creating process, the value of the means of production is necessarily transferred through its use to the product. The worker "is unable to add new labour, to create new value, without at the same time preserving old values, and this, because the labor he adds must be of a specific useful kind; and he cannot do work of a useful kind, without employing products as the means of production of the new product. The property therefore which labor-power in action, living labor, possesses of preserving value, at the same time that it adds to it, is a gift of Nature."[95]

The capitalist must advance capital for the purchase of labor-power as well as for the means of production. The part of advanced capital whose value is merely transferred, but not changed in magnitude, Marx called "constant capital" (c). In contrast, the capital expended for labor power—which does, in fact, change its value in the production process—is referred to as "variable capital" (v). While the capitalist is, therefore, advancing c + v for the production process, this finally results in commodities, whose total value is greater than c + v; it is c + v + s, where (s) represents the surplus value produced by labor in the realization process. The values created in the production process—and this goes back to our original question—are products of living labor. The "productive function" of capital consists merely in its purchase of labor-power and the means of production in order to combine both in the labor process to produce value and, most of all, surplus value, i.e., a surplus beyond the capital advanced.

If in the theory of productive factors, the same productive power is assigned to both dead and living labor, it is because workers, who are deprived of all means of production, are dependent on the capitalist's purchase of their commodity, labor-power. Thus, the capitalist will combine it with dead capital (the means of production) as long as the worker needs the opportunity to become productive. As a result of antagonistic relations of distribution—the capitalist owns the means of production, the worker owns his labor

93. *Ibid.*, p. 199.
94. *Ibid.*, p. 208.
95. *Ibid.*, p. 206.

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power[96]—labor appears as if it were merely one productive force among others, next to land and capital. Just as the capitalist cannot produce commodities without the worker, the worker is also unable to actively produce as long as the capitalist does not make his means of production available. It is also clear that the value of the capital invested in the means of production is not value-creating, but its value is merely transferred to the commodity in the work process. "A machine which does not serve the purposes of labor, is useless. In addition, it falls prey to the destructive influence of natural forces. Iron rusts and wood rots... Living labor must seize upon these things and rouse them from their death-sleep, change them from mere possible use-values into real and effective ones. Bathed in the fire of labor, appropriated as part and parcel of labor's organism, and, as it were, made alive for the performance of their functions in the process, they are in truth consumed, but consumed with a purpose, as elementary constituents of new use-values, of new products..." "This natural power of labour takes the appearance of an instrinsic property of capital, in which it is incorporated, just as the productive forces of social labor take the appearance of inherent properties of capital, and as the constant appropriation of surplus labour by the capitalists, takes that of the constant self-expansion of capital."[97]

Unveiling the secret of value-creation and surplus value also shows why this relation is necessarily incorrectly indicated as the "productive contribution of the factor of capital" to the process of value creation. The parts of a given new value, i.e., the value of the product (c + v + s) minus the merely transferred partial value of (c), thus appear in bourgeois consciousness as contributions by the "factors" and are designated as "national income"[98] through an unconscious occlusion of facts. That the creation of value is solely the result of labor bypasses this class consciousness, which does not constitute itself only on the basis of "economic interests," but through the special mode of production itself.

Having considered the above mentioned circular conclusion from the viewpoint of value creation, we shall now investigate it in terms of income. So long as the natural power of labor appears as self-maintenance of capital in the production process (and capital is thus seen as a "creative force"), it is

96. "It may be said, of course that capital itself...already presupposes a distribution: the expropriation of the labourer from the conditions of labour, the concentration of these conditions in the hands of a minority of individuals..." These distribution relations "determine the entire character and the entire movement of production." Marx, *Capital*, III, p. 879.

97. Marx, *Capital*, I, pp. 183 and 606-607.

98. To counteract the illusion that v plus s would be the Marxist expression of the bourgeois category of "national income," it should be pointed out that bourgeois theory and statistics includes everything into income that goes either to a private individual or to a corporate body. But v plus s designates only the value added *per annum*, which can be statistically inflated already by totalling incomes from wages and profits, to which are added the incomes of civil servants, even though the proportion of the state comes from v plus s. This complex of problems, which includes such involved issues as the relation between productive and unproductive labor, would require a separate analysis. Here, it should merely be emphasized that it is impossible to simply substitute v plus s for "national income."

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necessary to analyze how the free gift of living labor appears on the level of income and how such phenomena are generalized and "scientifically" systematized by bourgeois economics.

The capitalist distinguishes himself from the worker by controlling the means of production which, under contemporary technological conditions, are essential to the worker in order to produce. Within total capital,[99] these conditions represent an important resource whose continuous maintenance and expansion is vital to the capitalist. What applies to the means of production also applies to the other parts of constant capital (raw material, etc.), i.e., their value in the work process is merely transferred. Even though they are fully integrated into the work process (the worker always works with all the machinery), they are only part of the realization process to the degree that they were used up or depreciated in the work process during the use of the means of production. This part, for reasons of capital maintenance, is the first thing to be written of as a deduction.

In terms of the formation of bourgeois categories, it is at this decisive point that the term gross social product is distinguished from the net social product (which is equated with the national income). The gross product includes the total annual deductions for depreciation of durable means of production (i.e., used for a given production year, but lasting longer than that). These deductions equal the sum of all replacement investments for a year, which serve to maintain fixed capital—the capitalist form of constant means of production. Thus, while the net social product refers only to the newly created values during a given year, the gross social product also includes the "costs" incurred for the replacement of invested capital used in the production process during that time span. Put differently: the net social product, which is to be ultimately distributed as national income, does not include the costs of replacing fixed capital. In the bourgeois conception, the annual creation of values resulting from the "performance of the three factors" does not contain the value of the depreciated and replaced means of production, although this must also be produced. Each capitalist who produces the means of production has no notion whether his products will be used for capital replacement or for accumulation. He would pretty soon terminate production if value were not created by it. While the three production factors appear in the creation of the net social product and

99. The total capital of the capitalist also includes the portion expended for the purchase of labor power. The buying of raw materials, etc., also constitute expenditures of money capital and its change of form into productive capital. The difference between the productive capital that functions longer than a production period and the other capital that is advanced for a short time period only is of great practical importance for the capitalist. It therefore demands conceptualization in the categories of fixed and circulating capital. This distinction approximates the distinction between investment funds and floating funds in management theory. In contrast, the categories of constant and variable capital have no such practical significance in bourgeois economy; hence they are not used. They actually could not be applied, because they express the class character of capitalist production, i.e., the production of surplus value.

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national income, the production of replacement for depreciated means of production is, however, presupposed as a quasi-natural by-product of the production process. The free gift of labor, "to maintain value by adding value," is reflected in bourgeois theory by its exclusion from the national income, the net social product.

In bourgeois economics, this is expressed in the definition of capital, investment, and income. A.C. Pigou, who remains undoubtedly one of the fathers of welfare economics, compares capital to a lake "into which a great variety of things, which are the fruit of savings, are continually being projected. These things, having once entered the lake, survive there for various periods, according to their several natures and the fortunes that befall them."[100] But everything that goes into the lake will also eventually leave it. Now, in order to hold the "water level" constant, things going in must have a specific magnitude. They must at least allow for sufficient drainage, just as with the depreciation of capital. But what is the depreciation of capital? Pigou only includes "the ordinary wear and tear which machinery and plant undergo when carrying out their functions."[101] The necessity for maintaining capital rests on the fact that if "outflowing" capital were not replaced, not only would the flow of capital trickle away and the lake go dry: "In this event, however, humanity will take no interest, for the demise of the last capitalist item will certainly have been preceded by that of the 'last man'."[102] Thus, Pigou reasons, it is necessary to first deduct the cost of replacing the value of "outflowing" capital, before the "national dividend" can be distributed among the production factors. Consequently, only the national income can be distributed, not the gross social product. The gross social product is used, but not distributed. In this way it could happen that in 1968 in West Germany 404.91 billion German marks were distributed, but 530.40 billion were used.

Prior to the distribution of "income" on the basis of each factor's specific "performance,"[103] the used capital that was invested in the means of production must be reproduced. Capital thus has the right to emerge from every production cycle at least without having incurred any substantial loss.[104] Only what goes beyond replacement can, therefore, be considered as

100. A.C. Pigou, *The Economics of Welfare* (London, 1960), p. 43.

101. *Ibid.*, p. 46: "Maintenance of capital intact in our sense is thus equivalent to maintenance in an absolute sense save only that provision must be made against destruction by an 'act of God or the King's enemies'." Pigou was able to put such a statement on paper in 1932, when capital destruction took place on an enormous scale during the world economic crisis. But it seems that the economic crisis was an emergency provoked by our Good Father with the proletariat in an unholy alliance.

102. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

103. "The performance of management consists of the actual performance of management (!) and—at any rate, in a family enterprise (!)—in the availability of capital, land, and structures..." From Walter and Leistico's "treasure chest," i.e., Kurt Walter and Arnold Leistico, *Eine Einführung in die Volkswirtschaftslehre, op.cit.*, p. 44.

104. Even the great Paul A. Samuelson makes it clear that the social and historical determination of these processes cannot possibly enter into a head filled with bourgeois ideas, so

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an increase. "Social income (or product) is by definition the net output of the economy. But 'net' has two unavoidable implications. One is that capital is intact. The second is that 'capital' can be distinguished clearly from final or ultimate goods so that consumption of products through the year in ultimate uses is not confused with intermediate consumption. By definition, social income is then a measure of output—total net output, not ultimate consumption or any other larger or smaller total... We must value in terms of current welfare also such parts as represent a net addition to...the country's capital."[105] Only the net result of annual labor is applied to welfare. Since, however, replacement for the depreciated means of production must be produced as well, the annual labor of a society can be split in two. That labor used to replace expended capital does not increase welfare. But that part of annual labor that produces the means for consumption and for net investment is applied to welfare. According to these categories, capital can thus demand priority in satisfying its claim to eternity—its claim not only to be considered as eternal as Nature (which provides the analogies for Samuelson and Pigou), but also to really exist in this form. The maintenance of labor, however, is delegated to the area of consumption under the category of "social income."

Consequently, the distinction between gross and net social product turns out to be not only a statistical-technical device, but the way in which the free productive power of labor (i.e., its ability to maintain the value of the means of production by transferring it to the product during the creation of new values) is reflected as a natural characteristic of capital. At the same time, this distinction requires that the maintenance of capital have priority over the distribution of the net social product. In this fashion, it is possible to first secure simple reproduction, which therefore has logical priority over extended reproduction as well (this is why Marx and Engels present simple and extended reproduction separately, at the end of the second volume of *Capital*). On the basis of this distinction, the first result of the production process is the reproduction of capital; the next result is wage and capital side by side, one serving to reproduce living labor, the other serving for the continuous extension of capital production, or accumulation. The reproduction of the two sides of capital relations, capital and wage labor, is thus completed. All of this appears as "given." The only technical problem remaining is to determine "gross" and "net," which comprises the bulk of texts on national economy.[106]

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that these processes continue to appear as natural laws. See his *Economics* (7th ed., New York, 1967), p. 177: "One would not think much of a statistician who estimated the change in human population by ignoring deaths. If he just added up gross births, without subtracting a good estimate for deaths, he would get an exaggerated notion of the net change in population. The same holds for economic equipment and buildings; net change is always gross births (of capital) [!] minus deaths [!] (or capital depreciation)."

105. Simon Kuznets, "On the Valuation of Social Income: Reflections on Prof. Hick's Article," Part I, in *Economica*, vol. XV (1948), p. 13.

106. See also Erich Schneider, *Einführung in die Wirtschaftstheorie* (Tübingen, 1958), especially vol. I: *Theorie des Wirtschaftskreislaufs*.

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The free gift of labor is thus used to maintain the value of that constant capital used in the process of value creation. This appears as the self-maintenance of capital on the level of value creation, and is expressed on the level of income determination as the replacement of used-up capital prior to all income distribution. The distinction between gross and net social product is not merely technical, but of fundamental importance, as long as business cycles are concerned. This fact, however, is picked up by bourgeois economics. As is well known, the "propensity to consume" plays a significant part in the short-term rates of employment and income in Keynes' theory. *The more consumers use up their income in consumption, the greater the* effective demand, the higher the number of orders, and the higher the rate of employment, and, consequently, that of total income. But if consumption can use only the net social product, the "national" income, then the amount of investment used in the production of the replacement for depreciated means of production suddenly becomes a factor of great importance. For now the amount of actual consumption, given a certain propensity to consume, also depends on the amount of write-offs: "It is important to emphasize the magnitude of deduction which has to be made from the income of a society, which already possesses a large stock of capital, before we arrive at the net income which is ordinarily available for consumption. For if we overlook this factor, we may underestimate the heavy drag on the propensity to consume which exists even in conditions where the public is ready to consume a very large proportion of its net income."[107] And this is why Keynes complains about the experience during the world economic crisis, when the tendency of each individual capitalist to postpone replacement investments generally intensified the crisis. Not only did the investment multiplier decrease because of lack of size, but the crisis broadened because all the money deducted from active capital in the form of finance capital for the replacement of machinery was held back. "They reduce the current effective demand and increase them only in the year in which capital replacement actually occurs. If the result of this is even worsened by 'financial astuteness,' i.e., because it seems wise to write off initial investments more quickly than the equipment is actually depreciated, then the cumulative results can become, indeed, very serious."[108] According to Keynes, the "financial astuteness" of individual capitalists, who claim higher, more careful deductions, helps to bring about the crisis of the whole capitalist economy. Amounts are thus written off to cover depreciation without replacement investments being made. This subsequently reduces the total demand by increasing production costs (the deductions or write-offs are, after all, costs that the capitalist wants returned by increased prices), but under these conditions, the investment policy does not create new income. Now the higher these write offs, the lower the income

107. John Maynard Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interst and Money* (London, 1964), p. 104.
108. *Ibid.*, p. 100.

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available for consumption. Thus, the pressure to maintain individual capital tends to make the crisis of total capital more acute.

What the distribution theoretician cannot understand when he deals with net amounts has now become obvious. His distribution theory floats off into the air, but the capitalist's attitudes on write offs and investments pulls it down, time and again, to the level of facts. Distribution theory is affected if capital realization so requires. The size of the cake to be distributed depends on the extent to which the preconditions for capital realization have been met. All distribution theories assuming the propensity to consume would increase through a more equitable distribution of income (a higher proportion of savings derives from higher income as compared to lower income), and, therefore, would increase effective demand as well, ignore the moment of capital realization. Here what is crucial is not effective demand, but capital realization expressed in the size of the profit rate on advanced capital. And this is why Keynes correctly attributes the decrease of effective demand to the "financial astuteness" of capitalists; they must be astute (i.e., behave as character masks for capital), regardless of what becomes of effective demand and distribution.

This is also apparent in business economics, i.e., regulations covering the write offs of individual capital, which demand from the "honest merchant" precisely the "financial astuteness" which has such disastrous effects on total capital. "The highest principle in judging the balance is the principle of business prudence. This prevents a reduction of the substance of the business, which would occur if profits were rated too highly and would consequently be distributed [as dividends]."[109] For these reasons, the principle of minimum value is postulated. It states that, of the two possible bases of evaluation—present value and investment value—the lower one must be applied. Thus, the main purpose is to maintain the substance of business, capital. As long as there are no actual losses, and a minimum standard of living can be maintained by the capitalist class, then prudent (i.e., exaggerated) investments for capital maintenance and for "miscellaneous" profits are constants derived from various sub-totals, if not for statistical purposes, then for the individual capitalist. It is actually only a question of individual "financial astuteness" whether profits are declared or are immediately entered as reserves or balance. Deductions or write offs also follow the price trends in the means of production. If replacement costs increase, write offs must be higher; if they decrease, they may fall below the initial cost, if the write off of liquidated funds is actually used for replacement.[110] Official statisticians are cognizant of this principle in their calculation of the net social product, and thus deduct the "write offs valued at replacement prices" from the gross social product.[111] Thus, the individual

109. Günter Wöhe, *Allgemeine Betribswirtschaftslehre* (Berlin, 1962), p. 389.
110. *Ibid.*, p. 403.
111. *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 1969, "Vorbemerkungen zu den Statistiken der volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtrechnung," p. 485.

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capitalist already applies the distinction between capital maintenance and value creation, between capital replacement and distribution, without malice. He simply acts as a "financially astute" capitalist. And as a capitalist, he does not care about income distribution as it results from his actions, but only as a precondition for his decisions on capital realization.

Now capital realization is expressed as the quantitative increase of advanced capital. The capitalist wants an increased return on the value which he expended in the form of money; and only if he gets it will he continue the production process. The costs of wages are crucial to the capitalist. They determine the amount he has to advance for the purchase of labor power as variable capital. "Production costs" increase with increasing wages; therefore, all else being equal, profits will fall. The fact that the distribution of income is highly relevant to the individual capitalist as a precondition for capital realization readily reveals the above discussed contradiction between redistribution and economic growth. This problem, which is crystallized in bourgeois economics as goal conflict, implies, as a mediating moment, the assumption that profits exist in order to be accumulated. How else could a contradiction between redistribution of income and economic growth be formulated, if not under the condition that growth is generated by profits? This assumption is based on capitalist production relations themselves. Capital, as homogeneous, can only change quantitatively, i.e., through growth. All the pressures of competition force onto the capitalist the character mask of capital, so that he can follow the imperative: "Accumulate! Thus say Moses and the Prophets." But accumulation goes beyond mere capital maintenance, it is realized through the value produced which we have equated with the net social product, or national product, in order to simplify matters. In other words, it is realized through the net social product which supposedly is available for distribution as "national income." Unbeknownst to bourgeois economics, the fundamental contradictions inherent in the accumulation process thus intrude into its theories in the guise of "goal conflict" between distribution and growth. But this necessarily has consequences for so-called distribution. The notion that distribution is a sphere where there is a cake to be distributed is rendered absurd not only by the pressures for maintaining capital—which are manifested as the slicing of write offs from the cake to be distributed *prior* to any distribution—but also by the pressures for capital accumulation. When write off deductions precede distribution, when the distribution of the left-overs, i.e., wages and profits, is carried out not according to the laws of an autonomous sphere of distribution, but according to the laws of capital accumulation—what is left, then, of the notion of a possible redistribution?

So-called state socialism thus has no control over what can be redistributed between the classes. Its possibilities and actions for redistribution lie *within* classes; this point has already been discussed but still requires concrete analysis. When the amount of wages is dictated solely by the laws of accumulation, the reproduction of labor power is no longer really safe-guarded. Only

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in these cases can the state enforce a redistribution between wage labor and capital in order to maintain labor power as the basis for capitalist exploitation. But this does not affect the principle that the laws of distribution are identitcal to the laws of the accumulation and circulation of capital. Here, we reach the point where the inner logic of the argument goes beyond the investigation of the distributive power of state socialism and requires analysis of the extended reproduction of capital. But this would go beyond our present topic.

The illusionary character of revisionist theories of state socialism actually becomes visible only if relations of income distribution are referred back to distribution in capitalist production. Here, it also becomes clear that the revisionist theory of the state is directly derived from those misconceptions which the capitalist mode of production generates even in the consciousness of its own agents and, in turn, in the economic sciences based thereon. Yet, the bourgeois and revisionist conceptions are not simply veils or ideologies in the ordinary sense. They are necessary products of the way in which capital relations appear. This essential relationship which determines capitalist social production does not really appear as such, but as totally reversed in the sphere of circulation, a moment of which is income distribution. Here, the bourgeois illusion of freedom originates, starting with the individual's freedom as "consumer" and "wage earner" up to the power of the "New Economic Policy" for "global guidance of the economy" or for "redistribution through income policies."

As before, revisionist organizations today aim at changing the existing capitalist society (still called "capitalist") in the direction of a "more humane" society, and this goal forms the basis for their participation in the existing bourgeois state. But, for reasons elaborated above, revisionist theory does not understand the extent to which this state can only exist on the foundation of capitalist production and how it takes on new functions. Neither does it understand how this capitalist foundation determines and circumscribes the state's interventions in the "economy" down to the smallest detail. Participation in the bourgeois state and the more or less intense integration of historical working class organizations mean—first of all—an enormous strengthening of state authority.[112] On the other hand, the *complete* absorption of bourgeois illusions is, at the same time, the first step towards their destruction. An important part in the intial phase of this disillusionment is the theoretical critique of these illusions. It must be shown how these illusions are internally consistent with the capitalist mode of production. More than a mere statement of the limitations to "government policies," this critique can contribute to their understanding, which is possible only on the basis of these necessary illusions. Government policies cannot fulfill revisionist hopes and promises. Hence, the critique should lead to practical conclusions that aim toward real rather than apparent change.

112. See, finally, the illusions held by many Leftists concerning the coalition government of the Social Democrats (SPD) and the conservatives (FDP) [in West Germany—translator's note].

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IV. The Necessity of State Interventions for the Maintenance of Capitalist Society

1. The Enactment of Labor Legislation according to Marx

As we have seen, revisionist theories have one feature in common: they understand the state in its different functions, especially in regard to its social policies, as a "separate entity," detached from the production process of capitalist realization. But Marx conceives "existing society" as "the *basis* of the existing *state*,"[113] and it is from society and its contradictory basic relations that an understanding of bourgeois society as "concentration...in the form of the state"[114] must be developed, always in its concrete, historical modes of appearance. A Marxist theory of the state is meaningful only in these terms. It makes no sense as a formal theoretical structure. Hence, it is no accident that in all of his sketches investigating capitalist society, Marx always started with basic relations characterizing the sphere of production, i.e., capitalist relations. Neither is it accidental that he planned, but never wrote, a separate volume on the "State" (which he considered so important that he wanted to do it by himself, in contrast to his other works). But the general level of abstraction that Marx pretty consistently adheres to in his treatise on "Capital in General," is not maintained several times in the first and second volumes of *Capital.* Marx abandons it in order to develop the specific modes in which the bourgeois state intervenes on the basis of the fundamental contradictions between the processes of labor and realization. This point can be illustrated by summarizing Marx's presentation of the emergence and passing of the factory legislation—how a specific function of the state came about—as described in the first volume of *Capital.* Put differently, the presentation of a concrete example, i.e., the derivation of the "existing state" from "existing society," should demonstrate what Marx meant by the "concentration of bourgeois society."

This does not mean, however, that Marx's "historical sketch" (which is in places very detailed) can be taken out of the presentation in *Capital* without reference to its systematic position. Characteristically, the revisionist interpretation of Marx merely refers to isolated historical facts with brutal disregard to their contextual significance (i.e., their relation to the presentation of the movement of "Capital in General"). Here the revisionist evaluation of the factory acts and the limits set to a normal working day by the state is no exception. When Marx speaks of the "victory of the principle" in relation to the introduction of the ten-hour day, the Social Democrats always interpret this sentence as acclaiming the gradual advancement of socialist principles in capitalist society. The factory acts, according to Bernstein, represent a piece of "social control" and hence a piece of socialism.[115] Sering sees them as a "regulation of society according to human

113. Marx, *Gotha Program, op.cit.*, p. 17.
114. Marx, *Grundrisse, op.cit.*, p. 108.
115. Luxemburg, *op.cit.*, p. 72.

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needs, rather than according to automatic laws of the market."[116] It is therefore important to give some idea of that point in the systematic development of the concept of capital where Marx begins to discuss the legal restriction of the working day.

Marx starts the dialectical presentation of capital with that basic category from which all others (and thus all phenomena of capitalism) can be derived, i.e., the contradictory form which is bestowed on the product of labor during exchange as a *commodity*. He unravels how the contradiction between use value and value becomes embodied in the commodity and, hence, how the dual character of commodity-producing labor is expressed in money. He had already developed the different functions of money in the first section of volume I. The transition from money to capital takes place only in the second section. In the first section, the basic difference between the circulation of money as capital and the simple circulation of money is shown in detail. Simple circulation ends with the consumption of commodities; it is aimed at the commodity's use value. But the circulation of capital is an end in itself. Its purpose is capital increase, i.e., the self-realization of value: to squeeze out extra value from labor power. Thus, if the exchange of uneven values is excluded and each commodity is assumed to be exchanged at its value, the source of surplus value cannot be circulation as such. The source of surplus value can only be in the production process. As a precondition, however, this requires that the money owner must be able to buy in the market labor power as a commodity, along with other prerequisites for production. Hence, one precondition is the wage worker "freed" from the means of production: the free wage worker. (This relationship distinguishes capitalist social forms from all others. Either the material conditions for production are in the hands of producers, or these producers are mere appendices to the conditions of production, e.g., the serf tied to the soil and owned by the ruling class). The value of the commodity labor power equals that of all other commodities, i.e., the sum of the labor time spent in its producton (which means the maintenance of the "labor race"[117] as a whole, its education and normal existence depending on the cultural level of a given country). The use value of the commodity labor power, its application in the production process itself (this is the topic of the first volume of *Capital*) legally belongs to the buyer who—as a tool of capital—tries to squeeze maximum surplus value out of it. To the capitalist, the production process means the production of surplus value and not the satisfaction of needs. (The commodity cannot have value only, but must have use value in relation to certain needs: without use value, the commodity could not bear value.) To the capitalist, the use value of labor power as a commodity consists in the production of more value than the value

116. P. Sering, *Jenseits des Kapitalismus, op.cit.*, pp. 50ff. See also *Capital*, I, p. 295. Further, F. Naphtali, *Wirtschaft . . ., op.cit.*, p. 19, where he talks about a significant curb to capitalist arbitrariness (!).

117. This concept, frequently used by Marx, refers to the collectivity of workers as individual sellers of the commodity labor power, as contraposed to "working class."

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that went into its production. Here, he has two alternatives: he can apply labor power to production as long as possible beyond the time ordinarily needed to replace only the value he advanced. This lengthening of the working day beyond the necessary extent creates absolute surplus value. On the other hand, the production of relative surplus value results from shortening the required labor time by increasing the productivity of labor (e.g., by speeding up the line). Of course, the production of relative and absolute surplus values have always gone together in the realization process. They are treated separately in order to show their specificity in pure form. But the sequence in which they are treated is not arbitrary. The main form of surplus value produced until the legal restriction of the length of the working day was absolute surplus value. Capital had been using this form to such an extreme extent that state intervention became unavoidable. Afterwards, capital greedily rushed into the production of relative surplus value which became its essential mode, though not the only one. (Time and again, especially during an economic boom, capital tries to lengthen the working day according to its needs.)

The maximum lengthening of the working day is a natural need for capital, and therefore for the capitalist as personified capital. It is his natural right, since he has bought the labor power at its value according to the laws of equivalent exchange for use during a day. Hence, he may dispose over its use value as with any other commodity. Shortening the working day, e.g., by taking a break, is theft from the capitalist's property. The worker as seller of his commodity, labor power, recognizes the law of commodity exchange, but it has a different content for him. The excessive lengthening of the working day beyond its ordinary duration prevents the normal regeneration of labor power. Consequently, the worker's only property is prematurely exhausted. To the worker, therefore, theft is the working time beyond the ordinary working day. The rights of the seller are opposed to those of the buyer: "...apart from extremely elastic bounds, the nature of the exchange of commodities itself imposes no limits to the working-day, no limit to surplus-labour. The capitalist maintains his rights as a purchaser when he tries to make the working-day as long as possible, and to make, whenever possible, two working-days out of one. On the other hand, the peculiar nature of the commodity sold implies a limit to its consumption by the purchaser, and the labourer maintains his right as a seller when he wishes to reduce the working-day to one of definite normal duration. There is here, therefore, an antinomy, right against right, both equally bearing the seal of the law of exchanges. Between equal rights force decides. Hence is it that in the history of capitalist production, the determination of what is a working-day, presents itself as the result of a struggle, a struggle between collective capital, i.e., the class of capitalists, and collective labour, i.e., the working class."[118]

118. *Capital*, I, p. 234.

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The struggle between the two classes is inherent in the nature of the very relationship which constitutes the classes of owners of mere labor power and owners of the material conditions of production. There is no "rational solution" in this relation: only preliminary decisions after violent confrontations. This antinomy makes class struggle imperative. (Class struggle is different from the political forms in which it might also be carried out, or in which its formation is attempted. At no point does Marx characterize this class struggle as merely "economic.") Thus, the relationship between wage labor and capital obtains within a society of commodity exchange. This relation is not subsumed under normal forms of social regulation, i.e., commodity exchange and private property as governed by general laws. Specifically, because it insists on the law of commodity exchange, the working class is outside the social context that can be regulated by law.

On the basis of the history of capital in England, Marx documented in detail how this antinomy attains historical meaning. Here, a distinction must be made between two tendencies.[119] The immense drive of capital to lengthen the working day overcame a variety of traditional limitations, and—most of all—the resistance of the workers themselves. In this process, capital received essential support from the state, which allowed it to impose compulsory legislation lengthening the working day. This type of legislation had accompanied the rise and predominance of capital since the late Middle Ages (primary accumulation). Here, the state was used directly as an instrument of the capitalist class. "But in its blind unrestrainable passion, its werewolf hunger for surplus labor, capital oversteps not only the moral, but even the physical maximum bounds of the working-day."[120] Thus, the capitalist mode of production produced "the premature exhaustion and death of this labour-power itself" and hence it had the tendency to eliminate the potential for its realization. Capital thus contradicts itself. Capital and the capitalist behaved according to the principle *"Après moi, le déluge."* But this tendency for self-destruction created a counter-tendency towards the maintenance of conditions for further capital realization. This counter-tendency consisted essentially in the resistance of workers, whose existence, as owners of a particular kind of commodity, is threatened. "The first conscious and methodological reaction of society against the spontaneously developed form of production"[121] took shape through a process of complex mediations, and was repeatedly threatened by reversals. The factory acts were introduced as a negative expression of the werewoof hunger for surplus labor. "They curb the passions of capital for a limitless draining of labour-power, by forcibly limiting the working-day by state regulations, made by a state that is ruled by capitalist and landlord."[122]

119. *Ibid.*, p. 270.
120. *Ibid.*, p. 265.
121. *Ibid.*, p. 480. Of course, this does not refer to society in general, but capitalist society.
122. *Ibid.*, p. 239.

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Marx compared this counter-tendency with the necessity that forced English capitalist landlords to reproduce by artificial fertilization the soil's natural productivity exhausted by their blind exploitation of it. According to Marx, factory legislation was "just as much the necessary product of modern industry as cotton yarn, self-actors, and the electric telegraph."[123] But this necessity does not occur automatically. Factory legislation is the result of a protracted, more or less open class struggle between the capitalist and the working classes. It is mediated by a plurality of political conflicts, even among factions of the ruling class and with the participation of relatively marginal groups. But this necessity, dictated by the very interests to maintain capital realization, is asserted more or less unconsciously on the level of specific conflicts of interests. Even here, however, it never achieves its ultimate assertion. How this state of affairs came to pass can only be documented through a concrete study.[124] On the other hand, such a necessary empirical analysis can be called Marxist only if it relates in a conscious and methodologically sound fashion to the contradictory tendency within capital itself. Otherwise, we will have just another run-of-the-mill study in sociology or political science.[125] Consequently, we will trace the background of Marx's "historical sketch."

Ever since the establishment of big industry, the working day was repeatedly lengthened with the greatest use of force. This occurred even after it had already been extended to twelve hours or more by the middle of the 18th century. "Capital celebrated its orgies. As soon as the working class, stunned at first by the noise and turmoil of the new system of production, recovered in some measure its senses, its resistance began, and first in the native land of machinism, in England. For 30 years, however, the concessions conquered by the workpeople were purely nominal. Parliament passed 5 Labour Laws between 1802 and 1833, but was shrewd enough not to vote a

123. *Ibid.*, pp. 480ff. Isn't the comparison of the workers with the soil actually false? The exhaustion of the soil forces the capitalist landlord, who calculates in long terms, to give the matter some thought (just like the slave-owner, who would not waste his slaves, as long as there were no ample and cheap supply on the slave market to permit such waste). Soil cannot act as a conscious subject, there is no limitless supply of it as there is of the working population. Marx seems to contradict here the rest of his presentation, in which he shows how the necessity of supply and demand obtains precisely through the mediation of class struggles.

124. Marx himself refers to his presentation as an "historical sketch" (*Capital*, I, p. 298).

125. See E. Altvater on "Die Probleme einer marxistischen Konjunkturanalyse," in *Sozialistische Politik* 5. It is no accident that the approach of political science to pluralism in Germany has been formulated by some of the very same revisionist theoreticians who lived through and participated in such conflicts of interest within the union and the party. They were the first to raise the more or less isolated investigations of such "conflicts" into a discipline and put it on a theoretical basis. They thus arrived at their ideological consequences drawn from the practical way in which they perceived their "interest groups." This began at the latest after WWI, albeit frequently still in Marxist terminology. Ernst Fraenkel states it very succinctly: "Pluralism is reformism's theory of the state." Cf. Fraenkel, "Strukturanalyse der modernen Demokratie," in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, op.cit.*, p. 23. Already in 1928, Fraenkel presented the essential elements of the pluralist conception under the title "Kollektive Demokratie" in *Arbeitsrecht und Politik. Quellentexte, 1918-1933*, Th. Ramm, ed. (Neuwied, 1966), pp. 79-95. See also F.L. Neumann, *Behemoth* (Oxford, 1944).

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

penny for their carrying out, for the requisite officials, etc. They remained a dead letter."[126] The Factory Act of 1833 finally established an ordinary working day of 12 hours, although only for adolescents. For children between the ages of 9 and 13, it was limited to 8 hours. Capital, however, "began a noisy agitation that lasted for several years" against the implementation of the Act, with the aim of changing the categorization of children and adolescents to its advantage. But extra-Parliamentary pressures became more threatening, and the House of Commons refused to alter the Act. But capital found numerous other possibilities for evasion: the official reports of the factory inspectors teem with complaints as to the impossibility of putting the act into force." "In the meantime, however, conditions had greatly changed. The factory hands, especially since 1838, had made the Ten Hours' Bill their economic as they had made the Charter their political election-cry. Some of the manufacturers even who had managed their factories in conformity with the Act of 1833, overwhelmed Parliament with memorials on the immoral competition of their false brethren whom greater impudence, more fortunate local circumstances, enabled to break the law. Moreover, however much the individual manufacturer might give the rein to his old lust for gain, the spokesmen and political leaders of the manufacturing class ordered a change in the front and of speech towards the workpeople. They had entered upon the contest for the repeal of the Corn Laws, and needed the workers to help them to victory. They promised, therefore, not only a double-sized loaf of bread, but the enactment of the Ten Hours' Bill in the Free-trade millenium. Thus, they still less dared to oppose a measure intended only to make the law of 1833 a reality. Threatened in their holiest interests, the rent of the land, the Tories thundered with philanthropic indignation against the 'nefarious practices' of their foes."[127]

The 1844 Amendment to the Factory Act which protected women in the same way as adolescents, was brought about through class struggles, whose effectiveness was reinforced by factional infighting within the ruling classes. "For the first time, legislation saw itself compelled to control directly and officially the labor of adults." In order to avoid future unrest, the Act set up various specific measures. Marx reported some of them in detail, concluding that: "It has been seen that these minutiae, which, with military uniformity, regulate by the stroke of the clock the times, limits, pauses of work, were not at all the products of Parliamentary fancy. They developed gradually out of circumstances as natural laws of the modern mode of production. Their formulation, official recognition, and proclamation by the State, were the result of a long struggle of classes."[128]

Thus, the years 1846-47 was the introduction of free trade and of a new Factory Act which was essentially the expression of the apex of the Chartist

126. *Capital*, I, pp. 278ff.
127. *Ibid.*, pp. 281-282.
128. *Ibid.*, p. 288.

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Movement and the agitation for the Ten Hours. The latter was also supported in Parliament by the Conservatives enraged over the victory of the Free Traders. Capital tried to prevent the actual introduction of the ten-hour day for adolescents and female workers through a class campaign. After the wage losses resulting from the 1846-47 crisis, there was a further cutback by about 25% with the gradual reduction of the work day. "Under such favourably prepared conditions the agitation among the workers for the repeal of the Act of 1847 was begun. Neither lies, bribery, nor threats were spared in this attempt. But all was in vain."[129] Thus, this campaign was aborted, and on May 1, 1848, the ten hour day became a fact (although not for male workers). "But meanwhile the fiasco of the Chartist party whose leaders were imprisoned, and whose organization was dismembered, had shaken the confidence of the English working-class in its own strength. Soon after this, the June insurrection in Paris and its bloody suppression united, in England as on the Continent, all fractions of the ruling classes, landlords and capitalists, stock-exchange wolves and shop-keepers, Protectionists and Free-traders, government and opposition, priests and free-thinkers, young whores and old nuns, under the common cry for the salvation of Property, Religion, the Family and Society. The working class was everywhere proclaimed, placed under a ban, under a virtual law of suspects. [Emergency Laws]. The manufacturers had no need any longer to restrain themselves. They broke out in open revolt not only against the Ten Hour Act, but against the whole of legislation that since 1833 had aimed at restricting in some measure the 'free' exploitation of labour-power."[130]

Marx describes in detail how capital, in open class struggle, applies each and every means, in a terrorist and cynical fashion, against earlier compromises with the working class, e.g., by firing large segments of the working class protected by the Act, shortening the legally established lunch hours, splitting up the children's working hours, explicitly disregarding certain provisions of the Act, etc. Manufacturers frequently found support in the Courts, to which they appointed themselves. In addition, the Ministry of the Interior instructed factory inspectors not to interfere in certain instances where the Act was violated. Finally, the decision of one of the highest courts (the Court of the Exchequer), conceded that the manufacturers were certainly acting against the sense of the 1844 Act, but that this Act itself contained words that rendered it meaningless.

But on this apparently decisive victory of capital, followed at once a revulsion. The workpeople had hitherto offered a passive, although inflexible and unremitting resistance. They now protested in Lancashire and Yorkshire... The Factory Inspectors urgently warned the Government that the antagonism of classes had arrived at an incredible tension."[131]

129. *Ibid.*, p. 285.
130. *Ibid.*, p. 286.
131. *Ibid.*, p. 292.

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(Government Inspection Officials thus carried out directly at the location of class struggle, the same function that today are, or should be, frequently carried out by union functionaries.) Some manufacturers even complained about the arbitrary application of the Factory Legislation, since it seemed to eliminate fair competition. "Under these circumstances a compromise between masters and men was effected that received the seal of Parliament in the Additional Factory Act of August 5th, 1850." This law secured a certain lengthening of the ten hour day, while also eliminating any bypass of the law through the widespread relay-system.[132]

According to Marx, what won out in large industries was the counter tendency against the destruction of the "labor race" through the unbounded and destructive lengthening of the working day, i.e., the preservation of the source of surplus value in capital realization. Obviously, the result was to uplift the "physical and moral regeneration of factory workers"[133] between 1853 and 1866. Even manufacturers, along with their scientific apologists, resigned themselves to the legal limitation of the working day. The victory also involved the eventual expansion of the Factory Acts to all branches of industry, i.e., consistent with the degree to which pre-industrial forms of craft, handwork and domestic industry developed into large industry. Two circumstances brought about this generalization of an exceptional law for particular and industrially developed branches into "a law affecting social production as a whole." "First, the constantly recurring experience that capital, as soon as it finds itself subject to legal control at one point, compensates itself all the more recklessly at other points; secondly, the cry of the capitalists for equality in the conditions of competition, i.e., for equal restraint on all exploitation of labor."[134] This generalized protection of the working class simultaneously accelerated both the destruction of the pre-industrial forms and the concentration of capital, i.e., the factory system as the only form. Thus, it also accelerated the formation of the class antagonisms related to it.

Through the unbounded lengthening of the working day, capital produced

132. The law only applied to women and "young persons" and only within large industries where capitalism was fully developed. The relay-system, i.e., spreading the legal working time of, say, ten hours, over a much longer period through establishing numerous breaks, was totally arbitrary as far as workers were concerned, but made sense in terms of capitalist interests. See Marx, *Capital*, I, pp. 292-293.

133. *Ibid.*, p. 295. Thus, Marx definitely did not understand this counter-movement in the sense of later revisionist interpretations, i.e., as a "regulation of humanity according to human needs" (P. Sering, *Jenseits des Kapitalismus, op.cit.*, p. 50). In this context, he also refers to the "political economy of the working class" (this is within the framework of a political debate in the International Workers' Association: cf. F. Naphtali, *Wirtschaftsdemokratie, op.cit.*, p. 19). What is meant by this really becomes explicit only in the presentation of the Factory Legislation: It is impossible for capital, understood as the control by dead labor over living labor, to take into practical consideration the fact that it derives value from living labor. Ultimately, living labor is the "general wealth opposite to capital." Certain considerations for the "production factor man," i.e., restrictions on the wasteful use of labor power, are forced on capital through the class struggles as a precondition for its own existence.

134. *Ibid.*, p. 490.

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the premature exhaustion of labor power, destroying the health of present and future generations of workers. It caused psychological crippling and brutalization, shorter life spans, even epidemics that threatened the whole population, including the ruling classes. Capital was in danger of destroying its own basis for existence. At any rate, it did increase the value of labor power and, hence, the cost of variable capital by wearing it out too fast. "The value of the labour-power includes the value of the commodities necessary for the reproduction of the worker, or for the keeping up of the working class. If then the unnatural extension of the working day, that capital necessarily strives after in its unmeasured passion for self-expansion, shortens the length of life of the individual labourer, and therefore the duration of his labour-power, the forces used up have to be replaced at a more rapid rate and the sum of the expenses for the reproduction of the labour-power will be greater; just as in a machine the part of its value to be reproduced is greater the more rapidly the machine is worn out. It would seem therefore that the interest of capital itself points in the direction of a normal working day."[135]

Capital, then, appears committed to a normal working day on the basis of its own interest. The fictional—i.e., the non-existent—collective capitalist corresponds to this appearance. For capital is "in practice moved" as much and as little "by the sight of the coming degradation and final depopulation of the human race, as by the probable fall of the earth into the sun." The individual capitalist, who as such is a mere personification of capital, cannot escape from the inherent laws of capitalist production. As external coercive laws, they have power over him in the form of competition. Looking at things as a whole, the "physical and mental degradation, the premature death, the torture of over-work," etc., do indeed "depend on the good or ill will of the individual capitalist. Free competition brings out the inherent laws of capitalist production, in the shape of external coercive laws having power over every individual capitalist."[136] The extent to which the capitalist exploits workers, how much he cooperates in the destruction of society and his own basis of existence, or whether he refuses to cooperate, does not depend on the capitalist's individual moral capacity. The process of capital realization, then, does not provide a moral barrier as such. As personified capital, the capitalist is forced to unlimited exploitation. For him, action as a moral individual is possible only if he gives up his existence as a capitalist. If the social average for a working day is 12 hours, and a capitalist reduces the

135. *Ibid.*, p. 266. Of course, the value of the commodity labor-power includes not only the cost of food, etc., in their actual sense, which are bought by the worker and his family with his net income, but also "educational costs" which serve to qualify labor power, further costs for its restoration while sick, and finally, the expenses for the usually very miserable maintenance of labor power when it is no longer exploitable, up to its natural death. This portion of the value of labor power is redistributed by public institutions, such as public grade schools and vocational schools, health and retirement insurance. This is an essential component of the socio-political redistribution function of the state, a redistribution within wage labor.

136. *Ibid.*, p. 270.

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working day to only 6 hours, he goes bankrupt, i.e., he ceases to be a capitalist.[137]

Why, then, can only the forced intervention of "society" block this tendency? How is it that the working day is forcefully and effectively restricted by the state dominated by the capitalist and landowner if, as Marx explained, the rational collective capitalist is a fiction? "The creation of a normal working-day...is the product of a protracted civil war, more or less dissembled, between the capitalist class and the working-class"[138] (i.e., not the individualized worker as a seller of his labor power). First, the resistance of workers as a class opposed to its own degradation and extinction results from the unbounded motion of capital itself. According to Marx, the labor movement developed "instinctively out of the conditions of production themselves." In this form, the workers must struggle for their existence as workers. The famous statement at the end of the chapter on the working day, therefore, must be interpreted in this sense rather than as a moral appeal: "For 'protection' against 'the serpent of their agonies,' the labourers must put their heads together, and, as a class, compel the passing of a law, an all-powerful social barrier that shall prevent the very workers from selling, by voluntary contract with capital, themselves and their families into slavery and death."[139] The maintenance of the capitalist mode of production requires the organization of workers as a class, since they would not be able to safeguard their existence as individualized sellers of the commodity labor power. This is the source of the state's socio-political functions, the formation and recognition of unions, and the development of reformism in the labor movement.

But in the process of producing surplus value, capital is miles away from seeing the need for workers to organize as a class. Instead, the need is forced upon capital through lengthy struggles. For decades the workers brought about legal controls in the form of the Factory Acts as mere exceptional legislation applicable only to those branches of industry that have fully adopted the factory system. Initially, this legislation was worded so ambiguously that the loopholes seemed planned. Clauses providing for

137. The exploitation in West Germany that until recently has been disguised as an "economic miracle" and a "social partnership" is increasingly moving toward "international standards." The internal law of capital, which only becomes fully explicit in its effect on the world market, applies increasingly to West Germany in part through the agents of invading U.S. capital. The American director of a large West German electrical company taken over by U.S. capital, during a recent crisis suggested to the horrified German management that they release one third of the workers. This would save one third of the wages and result in the same performance as before, through increased "morale" (fear of further lay-offs). During the next crisis, the survival of many individual capitalists will depend on whether they want to "energetically lower costs" in this fashion. Thus, competition dictates the behavior of the agents of capital.

138. *Capital*, I, p. 299. It would require further discussion to evaluate the absence of such collective resistance as an historical possibility in particular instances and to determine the consequences this would have for either the continued existence or the rotting away of capitalist production.

139. *Ibid.*, p. 302.

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official control of their enforcement by inspectors paid by the state were added to the legislation only gradually. But at first the number of inspectors was totally inadequate. The real supervision over legal compliance was similarly ineffective, since courts were packed by representatives of the defendant class. And even the threatened sanctions were comparatively mild. Even already existing laws were not safe against counter-attacks by the capitalist class, particularly during periods of political weakness of workers as a class. At certain times, however, the situation was reversed, and the relative strength of the working class was the basis for concessions from capital.

Thus, historically, the practical enforcement of factory legislation and the recognition of the state's function to protect workers were not the result of an uninterrupted and continuous process during which the working class simply forced its will on the capitalist class (this does not mean, of course, that it was of the state's "socio-political interventions"). Rather, this process was mediated through different struggles, through progress and set-backs, through coalitions, compromises, etc. In this process, several factors determined the working class' economic and political power against the capitalist class. Conflicts with remnants of the pre-capitalist ruling class played an important part. These groups were not yet necessarily integrated into capitalist relations. As is well known, their weight was felt particularly within the state apparatus. More significant were the conflicts between various factions within capital, e.g., on the issue of import taxes on certain merchandise. Privileges for certain groups, e.g., exemption from legal regulations, were rejected by other groups insisting on their general application in the interest of equal competitive opportunities. At times, such conflicts within the ruling classes can significantly increase the weight of the working class. In a milder form, the same applied to the petty bourgeoisie (small-scale manufacturing, distributors, doctors, etc.). And even though the producers of ideologies (preachers, professors, teachers, scientists, journalists, etc.) were not directly in the service of the ruling class, they tended to share the consciousness of the petty bourgeoisie.

Within the context of factory legislation, these groups played a significant part through agitation in the press, the preparation of opinions and research reports through the "Royal Commission," etc.[140] But they enjoyed this "independence" only to the extent to which conflict between the decisive classes permitted them some leeway. This defines and limits the significance of the bourgeois "public sphere" which is usually overestimated by liberals,[141] who exaggerate its role by elevating it to be the moving force in the history of the bourgeois state. Innumerable reports of factory inspectors, quoted by Marx, disappeared into archives for decades without making a dent.

140. See for example, *Capital* I, p. 495: "The Inquiry Commission of 1840 had made revelations so terrible, shocking, and creating such a scandal all over Europe, so that to salve its conscience Parliament passed the Mining Act of 1842, in which it limited itself to forbidding the employment underground in the mines of children under 10 years of age and females."

141. See Jürgen Habermas, *Strukturwandel der Oeffentlichkeit* (Neuwied, 1962).

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Enlightenment has no consequence for reality. The public sphere does have an important function. It can develop a bourgeois-critical consciousness which pinpoints problems that normally escape capital in the course of practical business. Being above direct interests, however, at this level public opinion encounters researchers and opinion producers paid to represent particular factions of capital whose interest they further by press campaigns, expert opinions presented in Parliament, etc. All these factors had their effect on the working class' ability to struggle. Yet, they must always be seen against the background of the need for factory legislation in England at the eime, in order to maintain the "laboring race" as the source of capital realization. Furthermore, at that stage of development, factory legislation was tolerable to capital: in no way did it seriously threaten capital's existence.

A particularly important function of the independent public sphere consisted in drawing attention to the threat to society's basis of existence, i.e., its capitalist mode, and to impending open class struggle. Marx refers to these warnings concerning "incredibly tense class antagonisms" which were communicated to the government by factory inspectors. Here, the latter had a function similar to that of contemporary union officials who communicate the mood at the lower levels to higher-ups in order to pave the way for necessary concessions. An important aspect in the maintenance of labor power as a source of value is satisfaction through social policy. It is well known that Bismarck consciously legislated the stick of controlling socialism [*Sozialistengesetze*] together with the carrot of social security. With this, he substantially affected the orientation of the working class towards the state[142] which was to have significant implications in the future. He did this, furthermore, against the will of the political representatives of capital. At this point, however, it is crucial to warn against the wide-spread opinion that the state, as a wise representative of capital, can always pull rabbits out of the hat in order to manipulate the proletariat through social policy, according to whim. The limits to the state's socio-political interventions are tightly drawn, and even those interventions that are possible at a certain historical level of development (regardless of their potential wisdom) are generally realized only after lengthy conflicts and in the face of actual or potential class struggles.

According to Marx, the antinomy between the rights of capitalists as buyers against the right of workers as sellers of labor power as a commodity is

142. Thus, the accident insurance legislation is justified as follows: "The questionable phenomena necessitating legislation against the efforts of Social Democracy that were dangerous to the public at large" supposedly had to be fought by "positive measures aimed at improving the position of the workers." See O. Vossler, *Bismarcks Sozialpolitik* (Darmstadt, 1961), p. 17. Social policy "drains the goals of the labor movement by developing an alternative to radical solutions." This has been and still is the conception of bourgeois science. Cf. Ch. Ferber, *Sozialpolitik in der Wohlstandsgesellschaft* (Hamburg, 1967), p. 46. In the *Reichstag*, Bismarck addressed himself to bourgeois parties with the following statement (November 26, 1884): "If Social Democrats had not existed, and if a lot of people had not been afraid of them, then the moderate progress that we have achieved in social reform so far would not have existed, either." (This and other statements are in P. Peschke, *Geschichte der deutschen Sozialversicherung: Der Kampf der unterdrückten Klassen um soziale Sicherung* [East Berlin, 1962], p. 278.)

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resolved through power. This antinomy also constitutes the state in its dual character. On the one hand, the socio-political functions of the state can only be realized, if at all, through real or threatening labor struggles.[143] Without them, the existence of the state as the ideal collective capitalist and seemingly independent institution would be impossible. On the other hand, class struggles always constitute workers as a class, i.e., as an acting subject with the tendency to overcome capitalism and its state. This tendency, in turn, is met by the state's function of military oppression. Police, etc., would be superfluous if the working class were not periodically forced to struggle for its right as seller of its commodity, or to at least threaten to struggle. Yet, the "socio-political" function of the state (i.e., to satisfy) would lose its credibility if the ever-present dominating character of the class state would become obvious at the wrong time. The Janus-face of the state apparatus, "welfare" and oppression, is a necessary expression of the antinomy of the capitalist realization process itself, as manifested in the exchange for the labor power as a commodity.[144]

2. Capital as the Prerequisite for the Particularity of the State

The special particularity of social production based on the relation between capital and wage labor is that, under these conditions, people cannot anticipate the way in which they can sustain themselves, nor do they have any part in planning it. Instead, the contradictory inner tendencies anchored in capital relations and mediated by the actions of capitalist agents lead to consequences not consciously willed by the individual functionaries of capital and against which they are helpless as individual capitalists. No doubt, the state exists for the sake of private property and capital. Even so, it is "nothing more than the form of organization which the bourgeoisie necessarily adopts both for internal and external purposes, for the mutual guarantee of their property and interests."[145] But this does not constitute a simple identity between the state and capital. Instead, the bourgeois state is characterized precisely by the fact that it is based on the separation of property as private property from the original unity of common property. On this basis, the state has become "a separate entity, beside and outside of civil society."

143. There is no lack of historical illustrations. In Germany, the greatest push for social policy reforms occurred in 1918-19 at the eve of the threatening revolution. In Italy, after two general strikes, etc., pensions were increased in 1969 from approximately 65% to 74% of the last earnings and, by 1976, should reach up to 80% (in West Germany it is approximately 45%). The question arises, however, to what extent concessions in one area are necessarily counterbalanced through cuts in welfare and wages in other areas. This would be a necessary consequence of the mechanism of capitalist accumulation as it affects individual capitals through the world market. It is well known, for example, that the concessions to the French working class of the summer of 1968 were partially undermined through price increases, etc.

144. See also P. Lapinski, *Der Sozialstaat...," op.cit.*, p. 36.

145. Marx, *German Ideology, op.cit.*, p. 59. The formulation in this early book does not completely preclude the misunderstanding that the bourgeois *qua* bourgeois would be something other than a mere character mask of capital (i.e., that the bourgeois would consciously take on this form of state organization).

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It is important to emphasize that this particularization to an existence "beside and outside of" bourgeois society takes place on the basis of bourgeois society, i.e., on the inherently contradictory basis of capitalist production. The real particularization on the basis of this contradiction thus leads to the "wrong," "mystified," idealist conception which juxtaposes the state as independent *vis-à-vis* society. The state is the real subject, whose object is society. Marx criticized this conceptualization in his critique of Hegel's philosophy of law.[146] Readers of *Capital* will have no problem comprehending the development of the state as a "particular existence beside and outside of bourgeois society" if they remember the dialectical development of the form of value, and, further, the form of money as developed from the contradiction between value and use-value inherent in the commodity. Contained in the dual character of the product of labor as a commodity, this contradiction becomes visible only because it is manifested in a particular commodity, the commodity of money. The value form of the commodity, which cannot express itself in its own use-value, is manifested in the use-value of a particular commodity, which thus becomes money. Money appears as an independent entity, which is attached to either the particular, socio-historical character of value as "natural," or the character ascribed to it by men on the basis of conscious consensus. The form of the state possesses the same kind of "fetishism." According to bourgeois notions, the state has always existed. Man, by nature, "has been created in relation to the state [*auf den Staat hin*]," or the state is a *sine qua non* for human (i.e., bourgeois) life. But the state is also conceived as consciously established through a social contract.[147] The fact that the state is a particularity of a specific capitalist mode of production has been inverted. This reification and objectification of the state is a necessary illusion based on the bourgeois mode of production, just like the illusions concerning the forms of money, capital, workers' wages, profit, production factors, income, etc. The particular mechanisms of the capitalist mode of production force these illusions on the agents of capital and actually determine their actions.

It is precisely for this reason that the bourgeois state is not the "real collective capitalist," but the "ideal," "fictitious collective capitalist."[148]

146. In the final analysis, it already contains the critique of the revisionist theory of the state, even if in an abstract form. It pays lip service to the primacy of society and the antagonism between wage labor and capital, but it turns the state into the subject by postulating its ability to regulate the social contradiction.

147. Up to the present, this fiction applies to all constitutions.

148. Cf. Engels, *Anti-Dühring* (Moscow, 1962), p. 382: "But the transformation, either into joint-stock companies [and trusts], or into state ownership, does not do away with the capitalistic nature of the productive forces. In the joint-stock companies [and trusts] this is obvious. And the modern state, again, is only the organization that bourgeois society takes on in order to support the general external conditions of the capitalist mode of production against the encroachments as well of the workers as of individual capitalists. The modern state, no matter what its form, is essentailly a capitalist machine, the state of the capitalists, the ideal personification of the total national capital. The more it proceeds to the taking over of the productive forces, the more does it actually become the national capitalist, the more citizens does it exploit.

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Capital's concern with maintaining its basis for existence comes about only afterwards when it is faced with the disappearance of the foundation of this mode of production. The essential relation that determines the real behavior of capital is that between individual capital to its individual source for surplus value, i.e., the wage labor it exploits.[149] "What could possibly show better the character of the capitalist mode of production, than the necessity that exists for forcing upon it, by Acts of Parliament, the simplest appliances for maintaining cleanliness and health?"[150] The process of this gradual "forcing upon," mediated by catastrophes and conflicts, victories and defeats, constitutes "state socialism," "state intervention," etc., as a particular enforcing power (*Zwangsgewalt*), extraneously confronting capital in each instance. Only this process creates those struggles of different "interest groups" as well as of fossilized institutions within the state itself and in its forefront, the "formation of the political will" (the latter, as a phenomenon torn from its roots, then becomes the object of political science). Since interventions in the immanent laws of capital realization must be forced upon capital in the form of compulsory legislation by an external institution, this institution requires controlling jurisdiction and effective sanctioning powers. In short, it must be equipped with an enormous and growing bureaucratic enforcement apparatus.

The mere existence of this "state apparatus" subsequently reinforces the illusion of the state's independence and of its ability to "intervene" in "the economy." But the actual existence of this apparatus does not indicate that it could really effectively intervene (let alone provide for the systematic construction of a counter-apparatus for evading or resisting the state's enforcing power, e.g., manufacturers' organizations, lobbies, etc.).

This particular existence of the state is thus not a simple and obvious matter, not even for a class society: the particular existence of an exclusively political enforcing institution, the state, has grown out of two sources which made it possible and necessary. First, the given all-encompassing living sphere, under precapitalist social formations, became individualized. Second, and in conjunction with it, there was the emergence of private as opposed to commercial property. As early as his critique of Hegel's philosophy of law (1843), Marx described the bourgeois "mysticism," which turned "the relationship between the family and civil society" (i.e., "the actual

The workers remain wage-workers – proletarians. The capitalist relation is not done away with. It is rather brought to a head. But, brought to a head, it topples over. State ownership of the productive forces is not the solution of the conflict, but concealed within it are the technical conditions that form the elements of that solution."

149. Marx, *Grundrisse, op.cit.*, p. 419.

150. *Capital,* I, p. 481. The clumsy attempts to push legislation against water and air pollution, the feeble reactions against further increase of noise pollution by cars and planes, etc., demonstrate how this characterization by Marx has remained unchanged and is literally up to date. Recently, there was a report of a study according to which the already planned nuclear power plants, if in full operation, would increase the temperature of the Rhine River water to 122° F, and would destroy the climate, the river environment, exterminate the fish, create air pollution, etc.

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producer"), and the state upside down, thus making a presupposition into a consequence: "the producing [is established] as the product of its product. "It is obvious that the political constitution as such is perfected for the first time when the private spheres have attained independent existence. Where commerce and property in land are not free, not yet autonomous, there is also not yet the political constitution... The abstraction of the state as such belongs only to modern times because the abstraction of private life belongs only to modern times... In the Middle Ages there was serf, feudal property, trade corporation, corporation of scholars, etc., that is, in the Middle Ages property, trade, society, man was political; the material content of the state was fixed by reason of its form; every private sphere had a political character or was a political sphere, or again, politics was also the character of the private spheres."[151]

The point Marx makes here concerning the Middle Ages, applies to every pre-bourgeois social formation; he later repeatedly elaborates this in the *Grundrisse* with regard to the *polis* of antiquity.[152] In the old communal system the tribe, the community, the commune or the state did not exist as a "separate entity side by side with real *social* life," but political organization, e.g., tribal membership, was the prerequisite and guarantee for the appropriation of the objective conditions for life through labor. This labor was engaged in the production of use-values needed by the members of the community. (Slaves or serfs, as a special kind of work animal, were not members of the community, but they received, as instruments of labor, more or less the product of their labor. If their owner wasted them, he knew what he was doing: he was hurting himself, just as if he would hack off his own foot or starve the mule that carried him. This is how Aristotle justified the impossibility of an ethical relation between master and slave.) The relation of the laboring individual to the soil, i.e., his working place and resource as the objective condition for labor, was "instantly mediated by the naturally arisen, spontaneous, more or less historically developed presence of the individual as a *member of a commune*.[153] (This occured early on in the peaceful or agressive appropriation of the soil, which was possible only in the communal system). As ownership of the objective conditions for labor, property did not exist as private property, but was from the very beginning property only insofar as it was socially mediated. The political community of the members of such pre-capitalist communal bodies is particularly evident in the shared organization of tasks, which seemed necessary for its future existence: river regulation, road building, supply storage, as well as the appropriation of land through the shared tasks of war, devotion to the gods thus symbolizing the

151. Marx, *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, op.cit.*, pp. 9 and 32. See also Gurland's dissertation, "Produktionsweise...," *op.cit.*

152. Marx, *Grundrisse, op.cit.*, pp. 471ff. Here, the original unity of labor and its material preconditions as mediated through the community is juxtaposed to their separation through wage labor and capital.

153. *Ibid.*, p. 385.

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unity of the community, etc. Here, the communal tasks did not arise as necessary *ex post facto*, they were not gradually taken on by particular political institutions only after complex arguments within the boundaries set by capital realization. From the very beginning, they were part of social survival through labor (which included the reproduction of the next generation).

The extent to which in pre-capitalist society the whole process of social survival, including the production of material use values, formed a unity, can be most graphically illustrated by the autonomous homestead or the feudal estate. The basic structure of such units of social reproduction of life was the same: from the Big House of Pharoah to the tent of the patriarch Abraham or the household of the free peasant. The only difference was in the structure of the communal unit: whether it was expressed in the form of a single person or the community of more or less free and equal persons (monarchy, oligarchy, or democracy). The respective master had under him the members of the "family," including serfs, etc. Disregarding special forms, all of these units were based on land ownership, i.e., the appropriation of the riches of the soils through social labor. Old handbooks on the art of the "household" ("economics") indicate what is included in such a household or manor. One such handbook from the 17th century[154] instructed the master in the following tasks, among others. (Of course, he could delegate these, but he was ultimately responsible for them, and had to plan them in advance.) In the first place, there was the relation to God (this task he could leave to a priest), then to his wife and children, to the farm laborers and to the serfs. This relation of domination included guidance, instruction and sanctions. Further, there were instructions pertaining to the threat of epidemics, how to watch the calendar with schedules for the various tasks ("Geese should be slaughtered in late fall"), and how to watch the weather. The wife's special tasks included the following: education, especially of daughters, cooking, baking, preparation of food supplies through preserves, smoking of meats, salting, how to make and mend clothes, medication and sick care, the kitchen, herb, flower gardens, etc. Further, there was reference to vineyards, cellars, how to grow fruit, general agriculture, including brewing, milling, keeping horses, cattle, sheep, bees and silkworms; drinking water and the building of dams (for water-mills), fisheries, forestry, and hunting, mills and brick-burning, quarries and mining. This enumeration must appear disjointed in terms of the bourgeois departmentalization of science which splits up this holistic approach into the separate disciplines of theology, ethics, education, medicine, meteorology, sociology, management, etc. But the enumeration can give an idea of the totality of social reproduction which can only be formed and planned again after the abolition of capital relations. There was no separation between society and state, between economics and

154. Hohberg, "Georgica curiosa," 1682; the quote is taken from O. Brunner, "Das 'ganze Haus' und die alteuropäische 'Oekonomik'," in his *Neue Wege der Sozialgeschichte* (Göttingen, 1956), pp. 33-61.

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politics. The master fulfilled the function of total control which, however, was precisely circumscribed by tradition. There was stratification of rank, positioning his wife, the children, and laborers. It included the right to corporal punishment, even the death penalty. If the master was not the only one in control, then the ruler (as the Inca in Peru) could delegate parts of his rights and privileges to lower masters (feudal system). He could also fulfill his rights and duties together with other masters on an equal footing, e.g., in the senate or the tribunal assembly (in principle, these include only free masters on their own soil). The most important task was warfare.[155]

For such pre-capitalist communal systems, catastrophies occured either as real natural events, or through clashes with other communal systems. But they did not happen as social natural catastrophies, as a necessary consequence of capitalism. In *Capital*, after having developed the category of absolute surplus value, Marx immediately turned to catastrophes which occur to living labor as the result of the production of surplus value. From this, he derived the particularity of the state with regard to factory legislation. As long as labor sought the production of use-value and the reproduction of the lives of social individuals, there was no need for a particular controlling and enforcing institution meant to prevent individuals and society from killing themselves through an excess of labor. Only capitalist commodity production that destroyed this web and created the problem of social self-destruction.

The concentration of bourgeois society in the form of the state, i.e., its incorporation in an institution that appears as external to society and seems to float above it, is necessary because it is only in this form that the existence of capitalist society can be assured at all. The direct aim of production is not the social reproduction of life, but the production of surplus value. Thus, the production process is driven by laws which are hidden from the conscious will of individuals and take place behind their backs. Still, because of those individuals' activities, the need arises for this particular social institution contraposed to productive society. This late and most primitive control of the state over the natural form of the social reproduction process is necessary to maintain the production of surplus value: the appropriation of the surplus labor of one class by another. Thus, this control supports the class character of society. It is one of the functions which the state must assume. (In this context, there is no reason to discuss the state's function of *direct* oppression, since it is not a primary function of particularistic society. But a misunderstanding of this crucial fact frequently leads to wrong conclusions concerning revolutionary change and strategy.)

Thus "social policy" (i.e., state activity intervening in society *ex post facto* to solve "social problems") has the character of a supervision disenfranchising the producer: a control down to the specifics of everyday life, called "Welfare." (Every ill or injured worker is familiar with this, because he has to

155. In this context, the meeting (or *thing*) in ancient Germany is an interesting illustration, since it served for the election of the leader (Herzog) of the troops from among equals.

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go back to work: Lining up to wait his turn to see the social bureaucrat behind the welfare desk, getting checked and certified by the official "health service," etc.) While policies of state socialism offer a certain security to individual producers in case of partial or total loss of labor power, they altogether fail in regard to conscious, planned care for the maintenance, innovation and extension of the social labor power of the collective worker, i.e., the associated producers themselves. In a truly communist society such conscious pre-planning would merely be part of a holistic social reproduction process. It will be a public task for every member, just like the rest of social reproduction. Yet, it will not be the object of abstract bureaucratic activity of a particularized political organization.[156]

A certain reduction in state functions is already clearly recognizable for example in East Germany but there it is frequently hidden under the traditional state label ("Staatliche Plankommission"). This is so, because this state professes the right to make decisions on all essential issues of the total social reproduction process. Particularly interesting for the present context are those areas of the process which, in the bourgeois state, are barely taken care of as far as "social policy" goes, and which are marginal to "actual" production. This involves, for example, qualifying labor in accordance with developing the essential conditions for production. (The succeses of East Germany in this area, which are not only more progressive, but qualitatively different, do not require elaboration.) It also involves the pre-planned welfare assuring the health of the collective worker through a comprehensive network of clinics and out-patient care, counselling, preventive check-ups and innoculation, the strict enforcement of regulations to prevent work accidents, and vacation travel for all workers. (It is a well known fact that in West Germany only a few workers can go on a vacation.) Numerous statistics show that East Germany is ahead of West Germany in this respect,[157] despite the

156. See Marx and Engels, "The Communist Manifesto," in Lewis Feuer, ed., *Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy* (New York, 1959), p. 29: "When, in the course of development, class distinctions have disappeared and all production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political character. Political power, properly so called, is merely the organized power of one class for oppressing another."

157. Some illustrations: in 1968, there were 6.9 new cases of tuberculosis per 10,000 (in 1950: 50.4) in East Germany, as against 36.8 in West Germany. During the same year, only 7 years after the borders to West Germany had been closed and hence the emigration of doctors had ended, the ration of the population per physician in East Germany was almost that of West Germany (one to 751 as against one to 677). It must be remembered that the West German total includes a large proportion of plastic surgeons, fashionable high-priced doctors, etc., whose primary concern is to tend to the bourgeoisie. In the socialist camp, whose industry is still partially "underdeveloped," medical care is significantly better than in Western Europe. The number of work accidents in East Germany is significantly lower than in West Germany. These statistics indicate something about the real situation of producers as against the means of production: the constant evasion of, or disregard for, the rules to protect workers confirms Marx's observation in *Capital*. Cf. *Wo lebt man besser?* edited by the Staatssekretär für westdeutsche Fragen (State Secretary for West German Issues—East Berlin, 1970), esp. p. 57; *Statistisches Jahrbuch der BRD* (1969), p. 35; cf. also G. Tittel, *Die Legende von der Bonner Sozialstaatlichkeit* (East Berlin, 1967).

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latter's high standard of living." In East Germany the state insists on planning in this comprehensive manner, and it has the power to do so. In this respect, it differs fundamentally from the bourgeois state. But still, it remains a state to the extent that, to a large degree, individualized producers are still removed from the total social planning of the reproduction process. This is also evident in the fact that producers are not yet really associated, but still rather individualized and are driven to increased output through individual material incentives, just as unconscious parts of a machine are driven by a lever. (In this context, if the control of the individual plants over surplus labor is further expanded so that they can expand their means of production, then there is a potential for increased independence of the plants. Hence, social planning is weakened.) The road to building communism does, however, include revolutionizing the consciousness of the producers in comprehending, and actively planning and controlling the social reproduction process through associeted individuals. Only then can the state lose its political character and really become "civil control" (*oeffentliche Gewalt*). Thus, the realization of a communist society presupposes the full development of the material and human productive forces, i.e., an increase in the material productive forces as well as the comprehensive development of the productive forces of social individuals. As a matter of fact, the overall progress of the material forces of production specifically requires more and more its comprehensive control through associated individuals that are self-conscious and fully developed as social beings. Man himself is the greatest productive force. This comprehensive control also includes aspects of the social reproduction process which is ignored by capital in its production of surplus value, and is safeguarded by the state in a primitive way within the limits imposed by capital.

V. On the Relation between Economic and Political Struggles of the Working Class [158]

1. Materialist Justification of the Illusion of the State

Capital's tendency to destroy living labor, i.e., destroying itself through destroying its basis for existence, is counteracted by the struggles of the workers over the price of their labor power and, accordingly, over the regular working day, which allows the normal maintenance of their labor power. In this sense, the class struggles of workers are moments in the movement of capital itself since they safeguard the existence of capital.

158. In the following, we want to draw some conclusions concerning problems involved in some widely held opinions on the relation between economic and political struggles based solely on a critique of state socialism. The imperialist function of the state, which is purposely ignored here, plays, however, an essential part in the relation between the working class and the bourgeois state, as demonstrated by the discussions of imperialism within the German labor movement before, during, and after WWI. Therefore, we leave open the question as to what extent the character of the relation between working class and state (which we developed exclusively in terms of state socialism), might be altered if the imperialist functions of the state would be included in the discussion. Disregarding the question of imperialism's consequences for

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Thus, class struggles cannot avoid the dilemma of simultaneously functioning to "maintain the system" while struggling to maintain the workers' labor power. The working class and its organizations cannot simply avoid this element of the class struggle through an act of the will. Thus, at this level the distinction between working class struggles that perpetuate and those that explode the system is prematurely idealistic. Whether economic conflicts on the level of subjective demands tend to maintain or explode the system can be conclusively decided only in relation to the reciprocal action of both sides of the struggle—when, for example, unions and management agree from the very beginning in what way profits might best be secured, i.e., if in "sweetheart contracts" the organization of the workers strives at nothing more than to safeguard the condition for capital realization. This means that they, too, treat workers merely as objects used by capital. But even the concerted action is a remnant of institutionalized class struggle: behind it lurks the open struggle. In contrast, so-called economic demands—e.g., 15% more and not one percent less—also take place on the level of the antinomy described by Marx: right against right, the right of wage labor as against the right of capital, both determined by the laws of commodity exchange. This antinomy cannot be resolved through laws: it is the core of the class struggle.

The contradictory character of class struggles, i.e., the fact that they temporarily stabilize capital realization, brings about changes in the organization of the workers during the history of class struggles. As a consequence of struggling, the working class learns that the state takes on socio-economic functions by forcing compulsory legislation onto capital, i.e., the state appears as a particular entity confronting capital. Thus, the illusion is created that state power is neutral with respect to classes—hence the existence of bourgeois reformism within the working class and revisionist theory. The retroactive coincidence of capital's interests and those of wage labor (cf. the Factory Acts), was accomplished by compulsory legislation of

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the working class of capitalist countries, the following can be stated in regard to the relation of economic and political struggles to imperialism's effects on the countries that are kept underdeveloped: the political movements in these countries are also based on the movements of capital. But from the very beginning, this results in a different relation between economic and political struggles, as compared to the working class in capitalist countries. This is especially true for countries that have only recently come into the sphere of direct influence of capitalism, i.e., whose pre-capitalist tradition has hardly been broken. It is here, where the invasion of capital (which always includes the invasion by the corresponding forms of the superstructure, e.g., the creation of bourgeois individuals in missionary schools, who then can be reliable and predictable agents of capital in their own environment), is conceived as an attack on the old unity, which has been torn apart in capitalist society into state and society, i.e., as an attack on national dignity, the indigenous culture, the forms of collective life, etc. This is why the anti-imperialist struggle (which is more than a struggle of a class produced by capital against the capitalist class) is based on the "national liberation" of the "people" and the appropriation of their own history. These struggles are political from their very inception in the sense that they are not at all based on the separation of economy and politics, capitalist production and the particular existence of the state. On the other hand, the special nature of the political struggle does not permit experiences gained from these struggles and the forms derived from them, to be transferred directly to those societies where the relation between wage labor and capital is fully developed.

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the state which, to be sure, contradicted the "practical movement of capital," but still safeguarded capital's existence. Such coincidence forms the basis of the illusion that a reconciliation of class contradictions may be possible, i.e., the eventual transformation of society through the state as a subject.

Yet, precisely because they have different interests, capitalists and the bourgeois state have also found themselves in the position to recognize the organizations of the working classes and to attempt to arbitrate the antinomy between wage labor and capital on the level of negotiations. Readiness for this kind of action emerged primarily on the basis of the interaction between capital and the state, i.e., the experience that capital's laws of motion generate the working class as a contradiction within society. This contradiction arises—and this has also been recognized—from capitalist production itself, and it cannot be even resolved in terms of politics or terror. Only institutionalization can be of some help. This has become particularly evident in the development of working class organization in West Germany.

But since there is a tendency for capitalists and the bourgeois state to recognize the organizations of the working class as partners in the bargaining process—for them, it is the simplest way to regulate conflict—working class organizations, in turn, feel compelled to perceive the state as a subject which is neutral, not hostile to them, and interested in their general welfare. At the same time, they perceive the state as an instrument to enforce the most comprehensive daily demands of the working class. But this, of course, requires a temporary postponement of their revolutionary goals in anticipation of their final task.[159] As soon as social democracy perceives policy reform as the goal of its politics, it necessarily attaches itself and the workers to the existing form of the state and to capitalism: social reforms can only be accomplished through the capitalist state. In this way, the passive relation between citizen and state is reconciled with the concept of the "welfare state," whose earlier versions in revisionist theory already laid the foundation for the idea of "restraint in consumption." Along with the abandonment of the revolutionary *telos*—the overthrow of the old order and the seizure of power by the proletariat—there is also the abandonment of the self-initiated political struggle as a precondition for changing the quality of life. If the goal is social advancement, greater justice in distribution, and social reform, then labor organizations, unions and parties can substitute and take care of it. The road mapped out is one of cooperation between classes through the cooperation between their social and political organizations. But what's more: there really is no other way, since one keeps hoping that a little bit of power and riches can be whacked off the capitalists and the bourgeois state with their consent and that this bit can be distributed among the working classes.

159. Luxemburg, *op.cit.*, p. 60.

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2. Political and Economic Struggles

The Factory Acts were the result of lengthy class struggles. In his presentation, Marx did not specify if he meant by class struggles only those that addressed the demands of the working class directly to the state. Rather, class struggles in this context initially appeared as the collective struggle of workers against capital's arbitrariness. The demands were for governmental, i.e., general and officially sanctioned, limitations on the working day by the state: these demands were developed in the course of the struggle.

The general form of the demand sprang, in turn, from the proletariat's experience: if capital was constrained in one place, it still found another place where it could make the best of it. Nor can it be said that Marx, in the context of the Factory Acts, designated as class struggle only those phenomena carried out by a conscious political organization. The Factory Acts (ten-hour day) originated at a time when the Chartist Movement was destroyed, but when according to the reports of factory inspectors class antagonisms had nevertheless risen to an incredible height. Hence, it is evident that Marx did not go as far as to claim that class struggles occur only in those instances where the proletariat is led by a conscious political organization. Rather, the organizations of the proletariat are themselves essentially the result of struggles that develop from the antagonistic relation between wage labor and capital in the process of capital realization. Of course, Marx, in a letter to Bolte (1871), again summarized this point: "The political movement of the working class has as its ultimate object, of course, the conquest of political power for this class, and this naturally requires a previous organization of the working class developed up to a certain point and arising precisely from its economic struggles. On the other hand, however, every movement in which the working class comes out as a *class* against the ruling classes and tries to coerce them by pressure from without is a political movement. For instance, the attempt in a particular factory or even in a particular trade to force a shorter working day out of individual capitalists by strikes, etc., is a purely economic movement. On the other hand, the movement to force through an eight-hour, etc., *law*, is a *political* movement. And in this way, out of the separate economic movements of the workers there grows up everywhere a *political* movement, that is to say, a movement of the *class*, with the object of enforcing its interests in a general form, in a form possessing general, socially coercive force. While these movements presuppose a certain degree of previous organization, they are in turn equally a means of developing this organization. Where the working class is not yet far enough advanced in its organization to undertake a decisive campaign against the collective power, i.e., the political power of the ruling classes, it must at any rate be trained for this by continual agitation against this power and by a hostile attitude toward the policies of the ruling classes."[160]

160. Marx, "Marx to F. Bolte in New York," November 11, 1871, in *Selected Works, op.cit.*, II, pp. 423-424.

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To summarize Marx's conception: the political movement of the working class grows from its economic movements. Its political organization as a class, no longer directed against the individual entrepreneur, but against the whole capitalist class, is not simply imposed upon it from without. It originates within the context of economic and political struggles. But the political organizations of the class then have the task to push on with the labor struggles by educating the proletariat that it is not the individual entrepreneur who is its opponent. Instead, it is the whole capitalist class and the class state; thus, political organizations must simultaneously create proletarian working class consciousness beyond the individual factory.

In this context, if one follows the political functions so designated by Marx in the history of the labor movement, i.e., struggles to enforce general legislation through the state, with the state as the recipient of the proletariat's demands, then it is no longer possible to make a simple distinction between economic and political struggles in a way that would make economic struggles exclusively economic. Thus, the constant danger of falling into opportunism would no longer be present. On the other hand, political struggles would be conceived as conflicts with the state, i.e., directed against the state. Thus, they would be defined as revolutionary struggles. Against that, it becomes apparant that there is a contradictory tendency as well: i.e., that focusing class struggles on the state could just as easily be the basis of the illusion of the state in the history of the workers' movement, in the sense that the state as a political entity could appear to break the power of capital through compulsory legislation. The conquest of political power as the *telos* of the movement does not result continuously and uninterruptedly from the political struggle of the working class for the enforcement of general laws protecting it from the brutalities of capital. This struggle might instead lose sight of the goal: the dictatorship of the proletariat and the smashing of the bourgeois state. The whole history of revisionism has shown just this.

The previously cited letter to Bolte is not to be interpreted to mean that only struggles that focus on the state directly are to be considered political struggles. The Factory legislation only served as an illustration of the kind of struggle in which the proletariat, as a class, confronts the ruling classes. In contrast to this, the following idea is typical for the contemporary discussion in the Left: "After Marx and Lenin, political struggles have been against capital organized as a class and supported by the state, i.e., struggles against state power."[161] In this context, it is misleading to invoke Marx's distinction between economic and political struggles. And to support such a point by referring to the analysis of the Factory Acts in *Capital* is even more mistaken. There, the claim is made for a natural process, as it were, of the proletariat's constitution as a class through the mechanisms of the capitalist mode of production: "Along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates

161. *Rote Presse Korrespondenz*, No. 48 (1970), p. 2. The letter to Bolte, which is used here to document this point, is quoted in a strangely edited version.

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of capital, who usurp and monopolise all advantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation; but with this too grows the revolt of the working-class, a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined, united, organized by the very mechanisms of the capitalist production itself."[162]

Marx, of course, did not and probably could not see at that time that the struggle of the working class for purely negative interventions by the state is an essential source of bourgeois-reformist strategies and theoretical notions for working class organization. But, on the other hand, the idea of the quasi-automatic constitution of the working class as an historicaly conscious subject seems mechanistic. This becomes especially visible in developments in the U.S. These two faulty judgements may be related: Marx was completely correct in his evaluation of the necessity for the origin of a working class organization in its economic struggles, but he could not foresee the reformist swamp in which such organizations could get bogged down. It is an historical fact that the working class must defend itself against the widespread and daily incursions by capital as a necessary condition for its existence. It is also an historical fact that this struggle creates organizations. But since the working class, in these struggles, often ends up safeguarding the existence of capital, it contributes to the deformation of the proletariat's own organizations. These deformations cannot simply be redirected, as Luxemburg still assumed, by the spontaneous struggles of the proletariat, which would be directed against the plans of its organizers. This applies to organizations that limit themselves to economic struggles, as well as to political organizations. These organizations weigh down the proletariat and they may temporarily suppress its self-initiated and united struggle against capital by gaining specific concessions for wage labor. But they are a burden only because they partially satisfy and represent these demands; this even applies to the fascist German Labor Front (*Deutsche Arbeitsfront*, or DAF).[163] And they could not satisfy the demands without practical concessions by the capitalists—concessions which, however, are by no means a result of the capitalists' good will.

From this perspective, the demand to simply confront a run-down political organization with a new revolutionary organization is voluntaristic as long as the latter is not grounded in the necessary struggles of the proletariat. The conflicts between wage labor and capital are the basis for effective political organization; they must be anchored in the proletariat.

162. *Capital*, I, p. 763.

163. Tim Mason, "Der Primat der Politik," in *Argument* 14, p. 485: "Well into the war, it was vital for the National Socialist system to be sure of the positive participation of the population in its *Weltanschauung* and all of its policies. The attempt to involve the workers in these through propaganda, improvement of working conditions, recreational programs, etc., was a clear and obvious failure. Therefore, their acceptance of the system had to be bought through high wages, paid holidays, etc.... The *Deutsche Arbeitsfront* was given the task of winning the workers over to National Socialism – nothing, not even the uninterrupted preparation for war, was permitted to interfere with fulfilling this task, even though the *Deutsche Arbeitsfront* became increasingly active as representative of the economic interests of the workers, first in a disguised form, but openly after 1936."

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3. The Decreasing Role of the State in the Struggle Between Labor and Capital

Marx began by assuming that state intervention to protect the labor power as a commodity plays an essential part in capital's development to its highest state. The factory legislation is effective in concentrating capital and in destroying the ancient as well as the petty bourgeois modes of production. "Thereby it also generalizes the direct opposition to this sway. While in each individual workshop it enforces uniformity, regularity, order, and economy, it increases by the immense spur which the limitation and regulation of the working class give to technical improvement, the anarchy and the catastrophes of technical production as a whole, the intensity of labor, and the competition of machinery with the laborer."[164]

In a sense, this means that the struggle of wage labor against individual capital under developed capitalism, which now in fact controls large proportions of national and international production, is no longer merely an economic struggle in the old sense. Here, wage labor as a class and capital as the ruling class do, indeed, confront each other. The generalization of the struggle and its quality as a political class struggle no longer hinges on the need that this generalization must be mediated by the state, either as the opponent or a middleman. Today, a strike in a giant company or a branch of industry places political pressure on capital, even if only by what it means for the reproduction of collective capital. The interdependence of production and its centralization make such a strike effective for production itself.

But there is still another element that is significant here: the general regulations of working time, no matter how often they are violated by capital.[165] Frequently in periods of boom, working time was presented as a general demand of the working class, i.e., as a demand that could be fulfilled by the bourgeois state in the form of general legislation. The eight-hour day has nothing to do with the specific nature of the means of production nor with the organization of production in individual enterprises. It can be enforced as a general law. This general limitation by the state of the absolute production of surplus value now directs the appetites of capital to the production of relative surplus value, i.e., the increase of productivity by changes in the technical structure of the means of production and in the organizational structure of the plant, as well as "more tightly filling in the gaps of the working-day" by intensifying labor. "The shortening of the hours of labor

164. *Capital*, I, p. 503.

164. The cyclical variations in the movement of capital alone prevent the enforcement of a general and precisely limited working day. Weekly working hours range up to 60 during boom periods, and down to 30 during a crisis. This is not exceptional even today. Here again it becomes obvious that general state legislation and "intervention in production" must not get to the point where it interferes with the natural movement of capital and the specific use of the labor force that is related to it. Since, in addition, the capitalist must pay extra for overtime, he has all kinds of sanctions in his hands to impose the prolonging of the working day, "gains" such as the 40-hour work week mean for the worker during boom periods little more than an increase in wages.

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creates, to begin with, the subjective conditions for the condensation of labor by enabling the workman to exert more strength in a given time. So soon as that shortening becomes compulsory, machinery becomes in the hands of capital the objective means, systematically employed for squeezing out more labor in a given time. This is effected in two ways: by increasing the speed of the machinery, and by giving the workman more machinery to tend. Improved construction of machinery is necessary, partly because without it greater pressure cannot be put on the workman, and partly because the shortened hours of labor force the capitalist to exercise the strictest watch over the cost of production."[166]

The shift from the absolute to the relative form for extracting surplus value also necessarily changes the forms in which the conflict between wage labor and capital primarily occur. These forms use living labor as a mere object and jeopardize the normal maintenance of labor power. Intensification of labor and the absolute subordination of the worker to machinery, his degradation to its mere appedage, are the forms which constitute the primary incursions of capital under conditions of developed capitalism. Wage labor can no longer expect protection against such encroachments by a general law that the state imposes on capital. In the regulation of work time, the working class already experiences that the limitations on its general form (the 40-hour week) fought for by unions are either circumvanted or broken by individual capital, depending on the fluctuating demands of capital realization. This also applies to other general state laws, e.g., the eight-hour day, laws to protect mothers and children, etc.[167] On the basis of such experiences, workers must consider inadequate the provisions of union demands for their protection, such as shortening work time and extending vacations. While these demands are as important as ever, they cannot prevent the direct encroachments that the workers are most exposed to. In part, they are a direct cause for additional speed-ups.[168]

166. *Capital,* I, p. 412.

167. The system of sanctions and rewards available to the capitalist *vis-à-vis* the workers to get them to work overtime makes it possible for the capitalist to always point to the workers' willingness to work overtime. This is so also because of the fact that wages and hours, as regulated by unions, still provide relatively low incomes.

168. Today, this correct demand to shorten work-time is put forth by unions. During the I.G. Metall meetings, the unions attempted to make this demand attractive to capital by positing an ideal relationship between the shortening of work-time, high wages, and technological progress. See, for example, Otto Brenner, *Automation und technischer Fortschritt, op.cit.,* p. 313: "Management and the Minister for the Economy Schiller, should be grateful to us, because the unions' policy on wages and working hours guarantees them increased turnover and a growing economy." Similarly, the union-ideologue Theodor Prager, in *Wirtschaftswunder oder keines* (Vienna, 1963), p. 100, writes: "The higher the wages, the higher the degree of mechanization and productivity. . . Full employment, increase in productivity, and higher wages are inseparably interrelated. In the long run, an increase in productivity can be carried out only where the worker, as its basis, is interested in it through higher wages. At the same time, increases in wages act as a spur to management that forces it towards technological and organizational progress. Low wages are equivalent to the stagnation of technological progress." And on p. 101: "At the same time, it is as true now as ever that productivity has to maintain its lead over wages, it can develop faster than the latter." Here, what is not recognized is that the shortening of working

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Material and organizational changes appear in the production processes and in the intensification of labor as the primary forms used by capital to subjugate labor. As such, they cannot be dealt with by general rules, unless one can conceive of an immense network which would specify such limitations in thousands of articles and bylaws. But it would nevertheless be outdated the moment of its completion and would contain new loopholes that could immediately be used by capital. In addition, it would require an equally enormous bureaucracy to supervise the application of the rules at each workplace. (Disregarding the form of exploitation, which places an absolute limit on general regulative state intervention, there is also an immanent limitation: where else can capital direct its appetite if, after the length of the working day has been limited, the production of relative surplus value were curtailed as well?) The forms of control to counteract this form of exploitation can, in any case, only be conceived as nothing but the direct control of producers over the production process. Hence the control, as a force external to the social production process, would negate itself.

What is meant by the changed relation between producers and means of production may, perhaps, be stated most clearly if we consider the structure of use value (i.e., the technical aspect of the work precess) in relation to the special qualification of labor power. In a communist society, the producers could establish a rational relation to the objectified means of production only by their creating, from the very beginning, the technical structure of the work process from the perspective of their own abilities and potential, including their development, as well as from the perspective of their concrete needs. For example, producers together with specialists, would plan and implement either the improvement of a specific production process or an altogether novel conception of their shared labor, within the framework of a given company or for a whole branch of production.[169] Thus, from the very beginning, the system of machinery would not apply living labor merely to plug holes, but

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time intensifies the subjugation of workers to machinery; it forces the capitalist to increase the intensity of the workers' labor, just as shortening of the working time, in turn, springs from the intensification of labor. (See *Capital,* I, p. 417.) Nor is there the slightest understanding of the fact that the increase in the organic composition of capital as related to higher labor productivity means the tendential drop in the profit rate, and is, therefore, a basis for the crises and catastrophes of capitalist society. It appears as if there were an ideal coincidence of the interests of wage labor and capital. No longer will there be demands against the intensification of work and its subjugation to machinery. One may wonder why unions do not challenge capital on these grounds for exploitation: Is it because the unions—as the centralized and bureaucratically organized institutions they have become—are incapable of perceiving forms of exploitation that are tied to specific work processes in the factory?

169. One task of this specialist would be, for example, to study the long-term effects of certain work processes on the health and well-being of the workers, or to already suggest relevant changes during the construction of the technical apparatus. Precisely this type of function was presented and elaborated on in some detail by a physician in a TV series in East Germany during March of 1970. Of course, such a development of the productive potential of human labor requires that production progresses within the framework of a holistic social plan, but not—as under capitalism—on the basis of the cyclical movements of capital and the accidental movements of the competition.

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producers would plan and organize cooperation as the interaction between the constant and living labor in the production process.

The reintegration of state functions into society obviously becomes necessary because of the production process. The state, as a separate institution able to achieve a certain protection of labor power through general legislation, becomes increasingly incompetent since the work process itself becomes more and more removed from general regulations. Thus, through this development of production and the material character of the means of production and labor power, and through the methods to which capital resorts in order to extract excessive surplus labor, there is an increased reduction of the basis which once made it possible for the state to constitute itself as an illusory community of society as a whole. It is in this form that the state became a dead weight that restricted class consciousness.

In this context, of course, the question must be asked whether it is justified to speak of a special form of exploitation which will be relevant only to contemporary and future class struggles. After all, the production of relative surplus value has been present throughout the history of capitalism. It is its essential characteristic in the development of its productive forces, and comparatively much more important than the production of absolute surplus value. Here, it must be mentioned that at present, this can only be considered as an attempt to put forth an historical trend. As such, it does indeed refer to wage labor as a producer, for whom it becomes increasingly necessary to control the means of production. In the second place, it should be determined to what extent it may be necessary to distinguish between phases in the concrete historical development of capitalism. Under increasing pressure of competition (on the contemporary world market), which only indicates the increasing problems of capital realization, the current phase calls for an increase in relative surplus value. The crisis of 1967 very clearly resulted in a vehement push towards "rationalization" in West Germany. This push not only involved a rationalization of the technical means of production, but primarily the intensification of labor. (Firing of "superfluous" labor, strict overall cost analysis of the organizational structure of the company as well as of the work place in search of possibilities to eliminate labor. This has reduced what was left to the individual worker in terms of his freedom to determine his work and work time. In particular, these measures apply to employees, clerical workers, but also skilled labor; increased piece-work, evaluation of work-place efficiency, procedures that up-date Taylorism, etc.) Actually, the comprehensive and basic character of this "rationalization campaign" can only be compared to the phase between 1924 and 1929. At that time, with a similar euphoria, the unions were just as intoxicated by the technological progress of capital with the simultaneous possibility to improve the position of the working class, as they are today.[170] At any rate, the

170. As to rationalization after 1924, see Otto Bauer, *Kapitalismus und Sozialismus nach dem Weltkrieg,* vol. I (Berlin, 1931). Concerning the technical aspect of rationalization, it should

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production of relative surplus value has not increased continuously and it does not exert a continuously increasing pressure on wage labor. Instead, there have been phases of increased pressures on the working class, and capital is currently in such a phase. In the third place, it is important in the present context that workers, on the basis of this development, be warned so that they can take care of their interests. Here lies an essential reason for the unions' loss of influence which will continue as long as they are bureaucratically organized and concerned with integration into the capitalist system. This becomes evident from the wild-cat strikes in the U.S. which are directed primarily against the intensification of labor and the total subjugation to machinery. The same is true for the wild-cat strikes in Sweden, which focused on new piece-work rates, together with petty ways to push for more work. The great strikes at Fiat and Pirelli proved the same point in Italy (at Fiat, for example, the speed of the line overpowered the workers: they were pushed so hard by technology that many had to take sick leave for several days during a certain month, simply in order to continue to function and avoid total destruction). Further evidence is the strike movement of workers in West Germany when the workers' disgust over stagnating wages and windfall profits for companies was vehemently increased by the simultaneous increase in the plant's work pressure.

At any rate, it is now out of the question for workers to address demands to the state concerning work speed, counter-measures against the increased rate of piece-work, the struggle against further intensification of labor, etc. The conflict here is exclusively between wage labor and capital. Thus, the basis for the illusion of consciousness, the illusion that the state can improve the position of workers in the relation between wage labor and capital, is on the wane.[171]

From this perspective, the struggles of the workers in Northern Italy during 1969 require thorough investigation. Here, the state essentially remained helplessly in the background. Given these struggles, it becomes less and less believable that the state can always pull from up its sleeve new socio-political devices for satisfactorily manipulating the masses. In order to secure the domination of capital, the state is left with no other means but state power: the police, the army, and criminal justice. In contrast, a material basis for the illusion of state socialism is seen in the state's increasing "tasks" in the area of education policies. Through the usage in production of workers who are

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be noted here that since the crisis of 1967, electronic data processing in industry made a qualitative leap forward.

171. Here, one must question whether the unions are in a position to counteract this development in the long run through singling out demands that can be met by general regulation (sick pay, increase in pensions, wage demands). At least it can be shown that the apparent successes along these lines, e.g., the legislation to continue payment of wages for workers on sick leave (enacted during the summer of 1969), did not bring about a real improvement in the situation of sick workers, since clauses were included in the law that made it possible to avoid making payments, so that the insecurity of the workers in the case of illness has, in part, even increased. (See here *Rote Kommentare*, SDS Heidelberg, ed., March 20, 1970.)

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already qualified through education, the struggle takes place more and more directly between employer and employee, between wage labor and capital. But the role of the state is on the increase in regard to the qualification of the labor force. In conflicts erupting in the area of education and training, the state (as state apparatus) appears as the one and only opponent. Here is the basis for the huge over-evaluation of the state in late capitalism. This over-evaluation characterizes a large proportion of the student movement at all levels. The basis on which this illusion is experienced is, however, not only the result of exposures to battles with the police and legal persecution, but also through the fact that concessions were made and reforms were granted, i.e., the "modernization of the educational system." The extent to which these reforms necessarily result from the contradictions of capital realization itself, how they are implemented only after protracted struggles and often in a half-baked form, and—most importantly, the fact that all plans for educational reform by the state are severly limited, i.e., "don't touch surplus value"—all of this is easily hidden from those who only see the "state apparatus" as the opponent. Thus, a new revisionism can emerge from those who, on the basis of the stark separation of education and production in capitalist society, forget that they get their education only in order to adequately satisfy the appetite of capital. The current political measures of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) (amnesty, lowering the voting age, reducing time in the Army) are tailor-made to prevent recognition of what is really going on. If, on the other hand, this recognition can be communicated to students on all levels (excluding those, of course, who consciously prepare themselves for careers in the state's oppressive functions), by getting them to understand that their struggles with the state do not involve lasting privileges, but that they relate to the contradiction between wage labor and capital, and if the students see the consequences of this for political praxis, then it might be possible that the struggle against the state's production of labor power in the service of capital might become only a partial struggle in relation to the class struggle between wage labor and capital.

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A Reply to Müller and Neusüss*

by Jürgen Habermas

Even in liberal capitalism the market did not alone take on the functions of socializing in the sense of social integration. The class relationship could assume the unpolitical form of the relation of wage labor and capital only under the condition that the general prerequisites for the continued existence of capitalist production were fulfilled by the state. Only state functions which supplement, but are not subject to the market mechanism make possible unpolitical domination exercised through private appropriation of socially produced surplus value. Capital formation takes place in the medium of the (at first) unlimited competition of individual capitals. The supporting conditions of this competition, or the social foundations of the production of surplus value, cannot, however, themselves be reproduced with capitalist means. For this there is required a state which confronts the individual capitalists as a non-capitalist, in order to carry through vicariously the "collective capitalist will" which cannot form in the competitive sphere. With respect to its non-capitalist means, the state *limits* capitalist production. With respect to its function, it *serves* to maintain it in existence. Only insofar as the state *supplements* the economy can it be *instrumental* for it.[1]

This conception is also applied to the state apparatus in late capitalism.[2] According to this thesis, the state cannot, it is true, limit itself today to fulfilling the general conditions of production. It must intervene in the reproduction process itself, i.e., create conditions for utilizing fallow capital, improve the use value of capital, curb the externalized costs and consequences of capitalist production, adjust disproportionalities which restrict growth, regulate the overall economic cycle through social, tax and business policies, etc. But state interventions are still performances, instrumental for capital realization, of a non-capitalist who vicariously asserts the collective capitalist will.

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1. Marx developed this conception in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (New York, 1963). Cf. also N. Poulantzas, "The Problem of the Capitalist State," in *New Left Review* (1969), pp. 67ff.

2. W. Müller and G. Neusüss, "The Illusion of the Social State," in this issue of *Telos*; E. Altvater, "Zu einigen Problemen des Staatsinterventionismus," in Jänicke, ed., *Herrschaft und Krise* (Frankfurt, 1970), pp. 170ff.

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According to *the orthodox position*, the late capitalist state remains an "ideal collective capitalist" (Engels) in so far as it in no way suspends the nature-like development of anarchical commodity production. It limits capitalist production, but does not control it in the sense of a collective capitalist planning authority. In contrast to the liberalist state, the interventionist state is, to be sure, implicated in the process of reproduction. For this reason, it not only secures the general conditions of production, but itself becomes a kind of executive organ of the law of value. Government activity does not suspend the spontaneous working of the law of value; it is rather subject to it. Hence, in the long run, administrative activity must even intensify the economic crisis.[3] Even the class struggle, which can lead to legal regulations in the interest of the wage laborer (as Marx showed through the example of contemporary legislation for the protection of labor), remains a "moment of the movement of capital."[4]

The substitution of governmental functions for market functions does not alter the unconscious character of the overall economic process. This can be seen in the narrow limits on state manipulation. The state cannot intervene substantially in the property structure without setting off an "investment strike;" nor can it avoid in the long run the cyclical disturbances of the accumulation process, that is, the endogenously produced stagnation tendencies; nor can it even control the crisis substitutes, i.e., the chronic deficit in the public budget and inflation.

The *general objection* to this view is that the question, whether—and if so, how—the class structure has changed, can only be answered empirically. It may not be decided previously at the analytic level. Absolutizing the conceptual strategy of value theory deprives the economic theory of crisis of a possible empirical test. Even Marx could ground his claim to have grasped the crisis-ridden pattern of development of the social system as a whole (including political disputes and the functions of the state apparatus) by means of an economic analysis of the laws of motion of capital formation, only by pointing out that the exercise of class domination had assumed the unpolitical form of the exchange of wage labor for capital. However, this improbable constellation has changed, since the socially integrative functions of maintaining legitimate rule can no longer be fulfilled through the system integrative functions of the market and the decrepit remains of pre-capitalist traditions. They must pass over again to the political system. Government activity pursues the declared goal of steering the system in such a way as to avoid crises. Consequently, the class relationship has lost its unpolitical form. For these reasons, the class structure *must* be maintained in struggles over the administratively mediated distribution of increases in the social product. Thus the class structure *can* now be directly affected by political disputes as

3. Altvater, *op.cit.*, p. 181.
4. Müller and Neusüss, *op.cit.*

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well. Under these conditions, economic processes can no longer be conceived immanently as the movements of a self-regulating economic system. The law of value could express the double character of exchange processes (as steering processes and exploitation) only under the condition, approximately met in liberal capitalism, that class domination was exercised unpolitically. How, and to what extent, power is exercised and exploitation secured through economic processes depends today on concrete power constellations which are no longer *predetermined* by an autonomously effective mechanism of the labor market. Today the state has to fulfill functions which can neither be explained with reference to prerequisites of the continued existence of the mode of production, nor be derived from the immanent movement of capital. This movement is no longer realized through a market mechanism which can be comprehended in the theory of value, but is a resultant of the still effective economic driving forces and a political counter-control in which *a displacement of the relations of production* finds expression.

In order to be able to grasp this displacement more precisely, it is meaningful to distinguish four categories of governmental activity as it relates to imperatives in the economic system.

—In order to *constitute* the mode of production and to maintain it as such, the prerequisites of continued existence must be realized. The state secures the system of civil law with the core institutions of property and of freedom of contract; it protects the market system from self-destructive side effects (e.g., through the introduction of the normal working day, through anti-trust legislation and stabilization of the currency); it fulfills the prerequisites of production in the economy as a whole (such as education, transportation and communication); it promotes the capability of the domestic economy for international competition (e.g., through trade and tariff policies); and it reproduces itself through military preservation of national integrity abroad and through para-military suppression of enemies of the system at home.

—The accumulation process of capital requires adaptation of the legal system to new forms of business organization, of competition, of financing, etc. (e.g., through creating new legal arrangements in banking and business law, through manipulating the tax system, etc.). In doing so the state limits itself to *market-complementing* adaptations to a process whose dynamic it does not influence. Thus the social principle of organization, as well as the class structure, remain unaffected.

—These are to be distinguished from the *market-replacing* actions of the state. The latter do not simply take into account legally economic states of affairs which have arisen independently but, *in reaction to the weaknesses of the economic driving forces,* make possible the continuance of an accumulation process which is no longer left to its own dynamic. Such actions thereby create new economic states of affairs, whether through creating and improving chances for investment (governmental demand for unproductive commodities), or through altered forms of producton of surplus value

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(through governmental organization of scientific-technical progress, occupational qualification of labor forces, etc.). In both cases the principle of organization is affected, as can be seen in the rise of a public sector foreign to the system.

—Finally, the state *compensates* for dysfunctional consequences of the accumulation process which have elicited *politically effective reactions* on the part of individual capital groupings, organized labor or other groups capable of organization. Thus, on the one hand, the state takes charge of the externalized consequences of private enterprise (e.g., ecological damage), or it secures the survival capacity of endangered sectors (e.g., mining and agriculture) through structural policy measures. On the other hand, there are regulations and interventions which are demanded by unions and reformist parties with the aim of improving the social situation of the dependent workers. (Historically they begin with the right to organize and extend through improvements in wages, working conditions and social welfare to educational, health and transportation policies.) The beginnings of the state expenditures classified today under "social expenses" and "social consumption"[5] can be traced back in large part to politically achieved demands of organized labor.[6]

Governmental activity in the last two categories is typical of organized capitalism. The proposed analytical distinction is difficult to draw empirically in many cases because the late-capitalist state also manages the tasks in the first two categories. And it does so to a considerably greater extent and, naturally, with the same techniques as are employed in managing the tasks which have recently accrued to it. Thus, monetary policy is today an essential part of a state's global planning, although the securing of international commerce in currency and capital, and the reaction to it, belong to the actions which constitute the mode of production. The criteria of demarcation are not the extent and the technique of governmental activity, but its functions. The liberal-capitalist state takes action, if our model is correct, in order to secure the prerequisites for the continued existence of the mode of production and, as a supplement to the market mechanism, to satisfy the needs of the accumulation process controlled by the market. To be sure, the late-capitalist state does precisely this as well, even to a greater extent and with more efficient techniques. But it can fulfill these tasks only, and only in so far as, it at the same time fills the functional gaps in the market, intervenes in the process of accumulation and compensates for its politically intolerable consequences. In actions of this kind, reaction formations to the changes in class structure, i.e., *other* constellations of power, are realized. As a consequence, the principle of societal organization, which rests ultimately on the institutionalization of an unorganized labor market, is also affected.

5. J. O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State*.

6. The analytical distinctions proposed here have arisen out of discussions with Sigrid Meuschel.

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Three developments, above all others, are characteristic of the change in the relations of production in late capitalism: an altered form of the production of surplus value, which affects the principle of societal organization; a quasi-political wage structure, which expresses a class compromise; and the growing need for legitimation of the political system, which brings into play demands oriented to use values, demands which can in certain circumstances be in competition with the needs of capital realization.

a) The rise of a public sector is, among other things, an indication that the state looks after the production of collective commodities, which it makes available at a savings for private use in the form of the material and immaterial infrastructure.[7] In this function, the state improves the use value of individual capitals, for the collective commodities serve to heighten the productivity of labor. In terms of the theory of value, this is expressed in the cheapening of constant capital and a rise in the rate of surplus value.[8] Governmental organization of the educational system, which raises the productivity of human labor through qualification, has the same effect.[9] With this, the form of production of surplus value is altered.[10] After the raising of absolute surplus value through physical force, lengthening the working day, recruiting underpaid labor forces (women, children), etc., had run up against natural boundaries—already in liberal capitalism, as the introduction of a normal working day shows—the raising of relative surplus value first took on the form of utilizing *existing or externally generated* inventions and information for the development of the technical and human forces of production. Only with governmental organization of scientific-technical progress and a systematically managed expansion of the system of continuing education does the production of information, technologies, organizations and qualifications which heighten productivity become a component of the production process itself. Reflexive labor, i.e., labor which is applied to itself with the aim of increasing the productivity of labor, could at first be regarded as a collective natural commodity. Today it is internalized in the economic cycle. For the state (or private enterprises) now expend capital to purchase the *indirectly productive* labor power of scientists, engineers, teachers, etc., and to transform the products of their labor into cost-cutting commodities of the category referred to.[11] If one holds fast to a dogmatic conceptual strategy and conceives of reflexive labor as unproductive

7. P. Mattick, *Marx and Keynes* (Boston, 1969), pp. 128ff and 188ff; U. Rödel, *Forschungsprioritäten und technologische Entwicklung* (Frankfurt, 1972), pp. 32ff.

8. On this point, most recently, H. Holländer, *Das Gesetz des tendenziellen Falls der Profitrate* (Regensburg, 1972), Discussionsbeiträge zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft.

9. E. Altvater, F. Huiskens, eds., *Materialien zur Politischen Oekonomie des Ausbildungssektors* (Erlangen, 1971).

10. A. Sohn-Rethel, *Die ökonomische Doppelnatur des Spätkapitalismus* (Neuwied, 1972), traces the altered production of surplus value to changes in the structure of production and wages.

11. O'Connor distinguishes absolute, relative and "indirect" production of surplus value.

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labor (in the Marxist sense), the specific function of this labor for the realization process is overlooked. Reflexive labor is not productive in the sense of the direct production of surplus value. But it is also not unproductive; for then it would have no net effect on the production of surplus value. Marx saw precisely "that, even assuming the quantity of functioning capital as given, the labor power, science and land (under which is understood in economics all objects of labor which are available without human addition) incorporated in it constitute *elastic potencies* of this capital, which give it, within certain limits, a scope independent of its own quantity."[12] But he was able to treat "science," like "land," as a free collective commodity without having to consider the reflexive labor expended in its production as a peculiar factor of production. The variable capital which is paid out as income for reflexive labor is indirectly productively invested, since it systematically alters the conditions under which surplus value can be appropriated from productive labor. Thus, it indirectly contributes to the production of more surplus value. This reflection shows, firstly, that the classical fundamental categories of the theory of value are insufficient for the analysis of governmental policy in education, technology and science. And it also shows that it is an empirical question, whether the new form of production of surplus value can compensate for the tendential fall in the rate of profit, i.e., work against economic crises.[13]

b) In the monopolistic sector, a coalition between business associations and unions has come into being, in consequence of which the price of the commodity known as labor power is quasi-politically negotiated. The mechanism of competition is replaced in these "labor markets" by the fashioning of compromises between organizations to which the state has delegated legitimate power. This erosion of the mechanism of the labor market has, of course, economic consequences (shifting the increase in factor-costs to the price of the product). But these are consequences of the suspension of an unpolitical class relationship. Through the system of "political"[14] wages, negotiated on the basis of wage scales, it has been possible—above all in the capital- and growth-intensive sectors of the economy—to mitigate the opposition between wage labor and capital and to bring about a partial class compromise. From a Marxian view, an analysis of price setting in organized markets is also possible in principle within the framework of the theory of value—a good can be sold above its value. But here the price of the commodity labor power is the unit of measure in the value calculation. The quasi-political price setting in the labor market cannot, therefore, be treated in an analogous way. For this determines, in turn, through the average wage level, the quantity of value against which

12. *Capital*, Vol. I (New York, 1967), p. 609.
13. U. Rödel, *Zusammenfassung kritischer Argumente . . . , op.cit.*
14. R. Hilferding introduced this expression.

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deviations of labor power sold above value must be measured. We know of no standard for the costs of the reproduction of labor power which is independent of cultural norms. And Marx too does not start from such a standard.[15] Of course, one can again hold fast to a dogmatic conceptual strategy and equate by definition the average wage to the costs of the reproduction of labor power. But in so doing one prejudices at the analytical level the (no doubt) empirically substantial question, whether the class struggle, organized politically and through unionization, has perhaps had a stabilizing effect only because it has been successful in an economic sense and has visibly altered the rate of exploitation to the advantage of the best organized parts of the working class.

c) Finally, the relations of production are altered because the replacement of exchange relations by administrative power is linked to the following condition: legitimate power must be available for administrative planning. The functions which have accrued to the state apparatus in late capitalism, and the extension of administratively processed social matters, increase the need for legitimation. It is not a question here of some mysterious magnitude. The need for legitimation arises from transparent functional conditions of an administrative system which steps into the functional gaps in the market. Considering the context of bourgeois revolutions, it is understandable that liberal capitalism was constituted in the form of bourgeois democracy. Because of this, the growing need for legitimation must be satisfied by means of political democracy (on the basis of universal suffrage). Once again, a dogmatic conceptual strategy, which admits bourgeois democracy only as a superstructure of capitalist class domination, misses the specific problem. To the extent that the state no longer represents merely the superstructure of an unpolitical class relationship, the formally democratic means for procuring legitimation prove to be peculiarly restrictive. That is, in these circumstances, the administrative system is forced to meet use value-oriented demands with the available means of control. As long as the capitalist economic system begot of itself a viable ideology, a comparable legitimation problem (which sets restrictive conditions to the solution of the problem of capital realizaton) could not arise.

The new legitimation problems cannot be subsumed under an overgeneralized imperative of self-maintenance, since they cannot be solved without regard to the satisfaction of legitimate needs, i.e., to the distribution of use values, while the interests of capital realization prohibit precisely this consideration. The legitimation problems cannot be reduced to problems of capital realization. Because a class compromise has been made the foundation of reproduction, the state apparatus must fulfill its tasks in the economic system under the limiting condition that mass loyalty be

15. Marx speaks of the historical and moral element in the determination of the value of the commodity 'labor power'; *Capital, op.cit.*, p. 165.

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simultaneously secured in the framework of a formal democracy and in accord with the ruling universalistic value system. These pressures of legitimation can be mitigated only through structures of a depoliticized public realm. A structurally secured civil privatism becomes necessary for continued existence because there are no functional equivalents for it. Hence, there arises a new level of susceptibility to crisis which cannot be grasped from the orthodox position.

A *revisionist version* is contained in the economic crisis theory of leading economists of the German Democratic Republic. The theory of state-monopolistic capitalism is not subject to the aforementioned objections because it proceeds from the assumption that the unplanned, nature-like development of the capitalist process of reproduction has been replaced by state-monopolistic planning. The spontaneous working of economic laws is replaced by centralized steering of the production apparatus. The high degree to which production is socialized brings about a convergence between the individual interests of the large corporations and the collective capitalist interest in maintaining the system. This is all the more so as the continued existence of the system is threatened externally by competing post-capitalist societies and internally by forces which transcend the system.

The Mirror of Production

By Jean Baudrillard

Translated with Introduction by Mark Poster

Are the concepts 'labor' and 'production' applicable to advanced industrial society? What does 'pre-industrial organization' mean? To respond to these and other questions. Baudrillard analyzes the Marxism which has created a productivist model of man and promoted a fetishism of labor. He says that it is necessary to break the mirror of production"which reflects the total western metaphysic" and to tear Marxist logic from the constraints of political economy to which it gave birth. Publication date: September 1975. 125 pages. $2.50 paper

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Further Comments on Müller and Neusüss*

by Claus Offe

Recently, there has been a series of formal or informal, published or unpublished discussions and polemics concerning one of my articles.[1] Even if I had been deluded into thinking I had uttered the last word on the power structure of late capitalist societies and the practical problems emerging during the socialist transformation, the responses I received should have taught me otherwise. But since such was not the case, the didactic effect of this controversy on me was all the greater.[2] Although many details, including some important ones, were presented inaccurately, too sharply, or not at all, I have nevertheless been led by these criticisms to revise my original account by providing more precise formulations of a theoretical model which I consider more useful and superior to all others. Thus, I stand by it, at least until I am presented with more plausible arguments for rejecting it.

An extensive polemic and analysis by Wolfgang Müller and Christel Neusüss[3] not only adds to the criticism of my article, but also provides a foundation for further discussion in three respects: First, my approach, is criticized as being representative of a group of divergent analyses to which Müller and Neusüss are opposed. This procedure of summary judgment has the transparent advantage that objections which together do not apply to any specific case, can nonetheless be added up and levelled against a *single* author, so that he becomes the culprit for all the mistakes of an imaginary group—or even a "school"—of people holding the illusion of state socialism. The second device employed by Müller and Neusüss is to lump together members of the group holding the illusion of state socialism, not only with one another, but also with the classical revisionists of the 1910s and 1920s. This, of course, has the welcome result that Müller and Neusüss profit from the unassailable insights that Marxist theory[4] developed against classical

*This originally appeared as the last chapter of Claus Offe, *Strukturprobleme des kapitalistischen Staates* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1972), pp. 169-188. Translated by Robert Hutto and Ruth Heydebrand.

1. Cf. my article "Political Authority and Class Structure: An Analysis of Late Capitalist Societies," in *International Journal of Sociology*, II, No. 1 (Spring 1972), pp. 73-108.

2. Cf. especially S. Herkommer, "Zur Politisierung technischer Intelligenz," Part II, in *Sozialistische Politik*, I, No. 4 (December, 1969), pp. 65ff, and U.K. Preuss, *Neuere Tendenzen der Organisation der Staatsverwaltung*, unpublished manuscript (Berlin, 1970).

3. Wolfgang Müller, Christel Neusüss, "The Illusion of State Socialism and the Contradiction between Wage Labor and Capital," in this issue of *Telos*.

4. Aside from Rosa Luxemburg's "Social Reform or Revolution," in Dick Howard, ed., *Selected Political Writings of Rosa Luxemburg* (New York, 1971), see primarily the rediscovered essay of Lapinski, "Der Sozialstaat, Etappen und Tendenzen seiner Entwicklung," in *Gegen den Strom*, I (August, 1969). For "more recent perspectives" on the same debate, cf. Lelio Basso, *Zur Theorie des politischen Konflikts* (Frankfurt am Main, 1969), and André Gorz, *Strategy for Labor* (Boston, 1967), especially the Introduction with its distinction between "reformist" and "non-reformist" reforms.

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revisionism. After everyone allegedly clinging to the state socialist illusion has been arbitrarily thrown into the same bag, and the heavy stone of the critique of classical revisionism has been conveniently tied to it, there should not be any doubt about its sinking. The problem is that the theoretical camps of state socialism and classical revisionism are totally different. It is obvious that even the minimal goal of productive polemic—i.e., clarifying the conflict for both sides, as well as elucidating its bases and motives, cannot be accomplished in this fashion. Finally, the Müller-Neusüss article puts me into a peculiar position. In their false polemic against things never said or represented, the authors develop an historical analysis which is essentially correct but which in no way contradicts any point I made. However, this analysis takes place within an inadequate conceptual and methodological framework. I wish to briefly comment on these three points.

The collective label "illusion," or "illusionary," which is used to characterize the group being criticized, is certainly a novelty in Marxist theory. Here, a personalist-psychological category is involved[5] which serves no purpose other than the dubious vindication, by inverse reasoning, of the authors' crystal clear view of reality.[6] But for purposes of political analysis, the illusions a person might have are relatively irrelevant. What is really important is the resulting *ideologies*: why, and how they come to be widely accepted under certain periods. The use of the concept of ideology (as necessarily false consciousness) requires, however, reference to the conditions of its genesis, as well as proof that its followers are not aware of the origins of their false consciousness. Müller and Neusüss try to do this. Nevertheless, the irrelevant concept of "illusion" dominates. It relates to the concept of ideology as much as a campaign button does to political analysis.

The empirical attempts to identify the group of theoretical opponents are no more successful and these artifices, sloppinesses and philological disasters are relevant only as symptoms of Müller and Neusüss' lack of understanding of what they really want to criticize.[7] The views of the advocates of the

5. Ironically, this has been emphasized particularly by the leftist critique of Habermas' accusation of the "pseudo-revolution" (*Scheinrevolution*); see *Die Linke antwortet Jürgen Habermas* (Frankfurt am Main, 1969), especially the essay by K. Doerner.

6. The category of an "illusion-free" illusion of state socialism, to which I am relegated, is, of course, completely absurd.

7. Unexplained speculation about who continues what and with whom—e.g., "Habermas and Offe..., the tradition of social-democratic theories [sic] of the state during the Weimar Republic, as well as bourgeois sociology since Max Weber" (note 8 of Müller and Neusüss); analogies "present themselves [sic]" (*ibid.*) and "parallels can be seen" (note 49); the conclusion of A "could also be drawn from B [sic]"—all of this is presented as if it were natural. Further suspicion is raised by Müller and Neusüss' method of citing the authors that are criticized: Offe "relies...on Shonfield" (p. 23) (of whom I have not quoted one word) and then I am used, in turn, as the support for a "technocratic educational economist" (p. 38). My contacts with "union headquarters" are, fortunately, "not so obvious" (note 69). With few exceptions, the position of the people "deluded by the illusion of state socialism" is presented—if at all—only in a piecemeal manner, either in incomplete sentences or in sentences groomed to the purposes of Müller and Neusüss. And the authors of the most feebleminded quotations remain anonymous.

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illusion of state socialism are presented as follows: they believe, we are told, that the state "in capitalism" (?) can comprehensively and consciously (?) regulate economic, social and political processes; they turn "the possibilities of the state, as opposed to economic laws, into an absolute"; they undertake an "absolute separation of the two spheres"; they believe in the exclusively political determination of wages; the state appears to them as an autonomous subject *vis-à-vis* relations of production and not involved in the processes to be regulated—it reigns above the economy and follows if necessary only the directives of how "to realize justice." It is no accident that among these key sentences, there is not a single direct quote. In constantly changing formulations, a given insinuated thesis is paraphrased, which, is not seriously advocated by anyone in bourgeois sociology or in social-democratic "theory." Müller and Neusüss have meta-illusions, so to speak—i.e., illusions about their opponents' illusions.

Far from being a free-floating morality over the economic sphere, "the state" (which in light of all its functions can be better characterized, following Marx, as "state apparatus" in order to avoid subjective analogies) has become one of the most important organizational "productive forces" in the capitalist economy, steadily gaining importance since WWII. Thus, there is no way for the state to withdraw from the functioning capitalist economy, Naturally, the social democrats *know* this (especially the ones in "positions of governmental responsibility"), but they must still try to hide it from themselves and from the masses of their voters, while at the same time spouting slogans like those which Müller and Neusüss ascribe to them as articles of faith.[8]

Here, it is futile to distinguish and develop state socialism as an analytic-descriptive concept apart from its use as mere propaganda. Of course, this propagandistic use corrupted the concept—which explains why I did not use it. But to altogether fail to recognize its analytic content only leads to further confusions. Limited to political law, the concept of state socialism refers to the transformation of bourgeois democratic constitutions and, consequently, the partial restriction of the liberal slate of basic rights, and its partial extension, through the expansion of the discretionary powers [*Dispositions-spielraum*] of formally political institutions. Debate concerning this concept took place mainly between conservative and liberal lawyers, and was resumed in the 1950s by the Abendroth school,[9] so conspicuously absent from the polemics of Müller and Neusüss. This school saw a chance for political democratization in the constitutional corrections of "state socialism" and criticized the Social Democrats from this position. Since its phase as a mass

8. Since most of the objections are not addressed to specific parties (including myself) but are rather lumped against a group or "school," all I want to do here is try to clarify the issues concerning *my* essay alone. Hence, I can only speak for myself, and I reject any advocacy ascribed to me on behalf of Erhard, Altmann, Hennis, I.G. Metall, and others.

9. Sultan and Abendroth, *Bürokratischer Verwaltungsstaat und soziale Demokratie*, and Abendroth, *Antagonistische Gesellschaft und politische Demokratie*.

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party, the Social Democrats have absorbed some slogans about the politics of distribution in their welfare state propaganda, but have disregarded the democratizing intent of Abendroth's critique. Had Müller and Neusüss paid attention to this—which is not altogether irrelevant, albeit derived from "political science"—they would have avoided a major mistake: the equation of "state socialism" (a category of constitutional law which refers to the broadened leeway for intervention by formal political institutions) and "socialist" state (a vague category of social-democratic propaganda which claims that capitalist processes can be reconciled with the totality of social needs and interests).

"Today, it is necessary to develop criteria to determine the scope of the state apparatus' manipulative possibilities, their limitations, where they create new contradictions. . . ." (p. 17). But in order to do so, it is not enough to show that social-democracy is wrong in its rhetoric. Rather, the problem is to determine the boundaries of the state apparatus through an analysis of the functions of the political, organizational and administrative "forces of production" which the state apparatus represents and, while doing so, to also consider its possible reorganizations, such as the one in the direction of "state socialism." Because Müller and Neusüss fail to carry out such an analysis, all of the parallels which the authors so lovingly work out between the paired concepts of production-distribution and economy-state, miss the boat. What is important is precisely that this clear division does not work anymore. The state apparatus is itself meshed with capitalist *production* and the maintenance of its conditions in such a way that it is no longer possible to hold to the fiction of its "autonomy," i.e., its merely negative relation [*negatorischen Bezogenheit*] to the dynamics of individual capitals. Although Müller and Neusüss stubbornly ignore them, the empirical indicators for this are not unknown. The development, qualification, distribution and obsolescence both of the work force and of capital goods (technology); the conditions of competition and exchange of capital within a given industry on the national and international levels; the conditions of sale and realization in existing and new markets; the supply of credit and the regulation of its price; the delivery of infra-structural services and the redistribution of social costs; the regulation of aggregate demand and taking up its slack; the pacification of social and political conflicts; —there is no doubt that all of these are essential economic functions. Neither is there any doubt that these functions are unambiguously guaranteed by formal political organizations—even if all of them have not been taken over by the latter.[10]

10. For a presentation and classification of state functions in the U.S., see James O'Connor, "The Fiscal Crisis of the State," *Socialist Revolution*, vol. I, nos. 1-2 (January-March, 1970; M. Weidenbaum, *The Modern Public Sector* (1969); and Nicos Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Class in the Capitalist State* (London, 1973), especially the distinction between determinant and dominant roles (the economy and the state respectively). Cf. also Poulantzas' critique of Miliband's book in *New Left Review*, 58 (January 1970), and Miliband's response in *New Left Review* 60.

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Likewise restricted is the authors' concept of *distribution* which involves exclusively the redistribution of *profits* to the benefit of the work force. In discussing the distribution functions of a "politicized" economy—i.e., an economy mediated through political organizational functions—at least the following dimensions should be considered: 1. distribution of capital to industries, technologies and regions (the policies of technology, structural policies, control of concentration, manipulation of business write-offs, subventions, etc.); 2. distribution of working individuals in capitals and industries (public defense and construction assignments plus direct and indirect labor market policies); 3. temporal distribution of income through inflation, its control, money and credit policies, loans, public insurance systems, etc.; 4. "international" distribution through foreign trade policies, control of third world markets, "multinational corporations," "terms of trade," organization of supra-national and national economic blocks) and 5. direct and indirect redistribution between classes and income groups through the government's right to regulate wages, the enforced arbitration of strikes, employment policies in the public sector, subventions and social services, transfer payments, etc. None of this is news, so one must wonder why Müller and Nuesüss do not mention these phenomena and mechanisms in their comprehensive theoretical investigations.

"Thus, state action can be seen as purely political, dependent on political power relations, but independent of economic laws governing the reproduction of capitalist society" (p. 22). This reproach is groundless as far as my essay is concerned. But, in addition, and most importantly, it is hopelessly anachronistic and narrow-minded in terms of its own categories, i.e., the disjunction of "political power relations" and "economic regularities." Instead, according to the perspective chosen, either the numerous functions of the contemporary state apparatus must be seen as those of a common super-management of all relevant capital blocks[11] or these blocks must be seen as subordinate administrative arms of a formally political central office.[12]

There is no reason why the *genesis* of this relatively new structure must be explained by claiming "new" historical factors or dynamics. On the contrary, it can be explained in terms of the very same materialist analysis which Müller and Neusüss present in Part IV of their article, where they deal with Marx's investigation of the Factory Legislation and Luxemburg's corresponding comments. Simply stated, the irrational limitation of individual capitals concerning their particularized and short-term realization interests prevents "long-term planning of the conditions for the survival and expansion of the capitalist mode of production." This suicidal capitalist anarchy, while "well-understood," can only be regulated by an "ideal collective capitalist."[13]

11. This is Reagan's perspective in *The Managed Economy* (1963).
12. Cf. M. Weidenbaum, *op. cit.*, Chapter III.
13. Cf. Luxemburg, *op. cit.*, p. 79: "Capitalist development itself essentially modifies the

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The same logic applies not only to 19th century factory legislation, but also to all of the institutional innovations referred to above, which have become established within the framework of the state apparatus: the logic of the compensatory plugging of functional holes which, in the capitalist accumulation process, are the result of the irrational limitation of individual capitals and the pressure to compete. Individual capitals thus endanger the unbroken continuity of this process, whose "anarchic" character precludes correction by genuinely capitalist mechanisms (accumulation and competition). It is inevitable, therefore, that eventually "a higher authority" has to step in (i.e., through the use of public power). The intermittent institutionalization of some areas is necessary in order to provide the needed leeway to political and administrative disposition and coordination. The social democratic parties and the unions usually tend to precipitate this. From an historical perspective, this institutionalization found its *penultimate* expression in constitutional amendments. But since the "end of the post-war period," this process has been reflected in all capitalist countries on the level of technocratic, corporate, and planning experiments, designed to "rationalize" the executive apparatus itself.[14] Of course, this historical process (which can still be analyzed with a concept central to Luxemburg, the "socialization of production" mediated by political institutions)[15] should not be taken to mean that the modified state apparatus has become in any way "conscious," "independent," or "sovereign." On the contrary, its mode of functioning has absorbed the "anarchy" that it partially eliminated from the economy. In spite of all attempts toward urgently needed rationalization,[16] "muddling through"[17] without plan or praxis has become the official program.

But a note of caution has to be inserted here. The expansion of

nature of the state, widening its spheres of action, constantly imposing new functions on it (especially those affecting economic life), making more and more necessary its intervention and control in society."

14. For a clear explication of the approach to the problem from which these tendencies to rationalize originate, see Allen Schick, "Systems Politics and Systems Budgeting," in *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 29, no. 2 (March, 1969). Some of the key terms which designate *today's* revisionist tendencies of political-administrative procedures in capitalist society are: planning, financial planning, concentrated action, structured society, "incomes policy," etc. To this extent, the debate on state socialism is in a certain sense no longer current. For the history and analysis of the French case, see Stephen Cohen, *Modern Capitalist Planning: The French Model* (London, 1969).

15. Cf. Luxemburg, *op. cit.*, pp. 55 ff: and the introduction in O'Connor's essay, *op. cit.*

16. See here the dominating influence of the Lindblom School. C.E. Linbblom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through'," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 19, no. 2 (March, 1959; and his "Policy Analysis," in *American Economic Review* 48 (June, 1958); and D. Braybrooke and C.E. Lindblom, *A Strategy of Decision* (New York, 1963). In view of the fact that the "anarchy" of the "public sector" has become institutionalized, it strikes me as somewhat naive for Müller and Neusüss to mistake Hennis' project of a "management science of the modern state" for a program.

17. A rather pitiful attempt to reconcile the anarchy of "muddling through" with certain rational, internal criteria, is made by C.I. Schultze, *The Politics of Public Spending* (Washington, D.C. 1968).

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administrative "parameters of action" and their increased room for free play as *relatively* independent from the influence of individual capitals, — plus the early warning systems[18] from applied economics and social science have prevented the full manifestations of periodic crises and economic catastrophes. (Thus, the issue is not autonomous, political management, but crises intervention.) This *relative* flexibility of the political system as against isolated capital blocks and their particular interests is *ipso facto* a prerequisite for a global, long-term concession of the political-administrative functions to the existential requirements of capitalist economy, i.e., its "growth." Hence, the issue is not that distribution "follows the regularities of production" there can be no doubt that it does. But production, in turn, follows realization opportunities that have either been administratively allotted to it or at least safeguarded for it. This affects "distribution." Neither is it at issue here that the administration, in its "higher wisdom," could autonomously determine distribution (this is a patently absurd idea). The real point is whether the totality of capitalist reproduction can be maintained within certain critical limits through political-administrative regulations and interventions (concerning growth, real income, volume of investment, effective demand, labor market, the international monetary system, etc.). This point can hardly be challenged either on the basis of an analysis of the leeway that the state apparatus has in its functions and dispositions, or on the grounds of the simple historical experience since WWII.

In particular, as long as it provides access to use values for the labor force, the distribution of created value to labor and capital can no longer be changed "autonomously" and in a politically arbitrary way. Nor does this distribution occur exclusively in the form of income (wages).[19] Rather, distribution can only be *relatively* varied to the extent that the openly antagonistic consequences of production's distributive results can be ameliorated by such measures as absorption, limitation, ideological anaesthesia, institutional bulwarks (and, here, certainly through the unions!). Further, by spreading these measures over longer time periods, by delegating them to the private sector, or finally, if necessary, by the open use of repression, greater complications can be avoided.

In sum, concern for the "general welfare" of capitalist society as institutionalized in the state apparatus reduces economic antagonism — as long as it is pragmatically understood — to a system of limited but sufficient manipulative trade-off functions. Neither systematic analysis nor the practical experience of contemporary capitalism provides any reason to believe that the opposite is more likely.

The only respectable way in which these positions can be related to classical revisionism *à la* Bernstein is through the rejection of concepts such as "laws,"

18. Cf. here the explosively increasing interest in "futurology" and "social indicators" (supplementing the "economic indicators" which are no longer considered sufficient).

19. See *Rote Presse Korrespondenz* 68 (1970), p. 3.

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"regularities," or "necessities" of capitalist production. In fact there is a formal analogy here between the revisionist position and my analytic model. But Bernstein assumed that the regularities of capitalist deelopment (i.e., their antagonist character) have somehow mysteriously ceased to be effective. On the other hand, I started with the assumption that specific reportable institutional and organizational innovations of the capitalist reproduction process function to prevent these "regularities" from sharpening into a catastrophe of economic contradictions and thereby becoming effective. This particular function explains the historical genesis of these innovations (similar to the Factory Acts).

Of course, this significant distinction cannot enlighten an approach that reifies the concept of law in Marxist political economy and equates it with the positivist necessity to think in terms of models adequate to bourgeois economics. In particular, if the contradiction between use and exchange value, work and realization process, individual and collective capital, is taken seriously, then the "laws" of political economy can, in contrast, be perceived only as interpretations, which must always be given new concrete meanings from a practical perspective. They are not positive instructions which would permit, without further analysis, a diagnosis of "illusions," "limitations," and "overevaluations." The objectified application of such laws and general concepts proves nothing; even worse, it prevents the "regularity" from being seen. The revision and reconstitution of the regularities which determine production is a necessary for the continued existence of capitalism which functions as a continuous permutation within the framework of capitalist production itself. Consistent with the assumptions and concrete examples of Marxist analysis (e.g., Bonapartism or the joint stock company), it can be argued that: a) There are necessities and regularities within capitalism itself which consist in the continuous *permutation* of both the technological productive forces and the organizational from of capital, as a way in which capitalist social formation reacts and must continue to react to the contradictions that capitalism brings about; and b) The *identity* of this developmental process *as* a process does not rest on a built-in schedule, but on the fact that development takes place through an "anarchist" and self-contradictory capital realization process bound only to the requirements of its continuous expansion. The analysis of each developmental step, as well as of the contradictions that appear with it, cannot be substituted by a deduction from "laws," if only because contingency factors may be involved.

Now, these methodological considerations are certainly not new and even Müller and Neusüss confirm them, albeit against their will. They talk of laws, regularities, and necessities dozens of times, but it then becomes clear that the authors had nothing more in mind than two relatively modest insights: a) Use values can be produced only as long as they both "contain profit" and are exchange values that realize profit (this is, indeed, a very simple explication of the concept of capitalism); b) Anything that can be distributed must first be

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produced, i.e., no more than what has been produced can be distributed. (Given the limits of international and inter-temporal redistribution, this statement is tautological.) If anything, such "laws" are no substitute for analysis, but they might be a beginning.

Obviously, nobody at present has access to such an analysis. Nevertheless, Müller and Neusüss furnish the grounds for some controversial but justifiable elements from which this analysis could possibly be developed. In order to achieve a consensus about the actual nature of the argument, I would like to summarize some of these elements as I conceived them in my article. Here are my theses on "late capitalism."

1. Since about World War II, with the decisive participation of "revisionist" parties and unions, the antagonistic *appearance* has been stripped from the contradiction between individual capital and the conditions for capital's existence as a socio-economic formation, by instituting the formal means for political intervention and disposition. The contradiction has thus been reduced to the logic of a dilemma, which can be manipulated to the degree that the consequences of economic crises and conflicts, which could explode the system, can be neutralized.

2. This is the main function which occupies the state. Consequently, we can observe a structurally necessary and progressive diminution of all social needs and their chances to be met. *To the extent* that "care" for these needs is of no immediate significance to the capital realization process, they are ignored. (One may call these "disparities," but if the term is objectionable, another one may be used.)

3. The increasing organization of technological progress by the *state*, the predominantly *oligopolistic* organization of both the commodity and labor market, as well as some other factors, all contribute to the same result, i.e., labor and capital saving investments have become the predominant form of the individual accumulation process. This has two consequences. First, there is a permanent (rather than periodic) under-use of capital (constant over-capacity, lack of "investment outlets").[20] Second, a potential of "surplus labor power" incapable of being absorbed has been formed and has therefore been temporarily transferred to the "non-productive," "tertiary" sector of irrationally organized distributive and administrative functions. But as it is increasingly totally excluded from the reproduction process, it tends to be no longer even negatively related to it as "reserve army." This surplus potential of labor power that cannot be realized is then put into repressive institutions and situations, such as the U.S. ghetto;[21] into worthless educational and

20. See Baran and Sweezy, *Monopoly Capital.*

21. Cf. O'Connor, *op. cit.*, p. 14: "Advanced capitalism...creates a large and growing stratum of untrained, unskilled, white, black and other Third World workers that strictly speaking is not part of the industrial proletariat. The relative size of this stratum does not regulate the level of wages, because unskilled labor power does not compete with technical labor power in the context of capital-intensive technology. This stratum is not produced by economic recession and depression, but by prosperity; it does not constitute a reserve army of the

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training programs;[22] it forms the personnel of military organizations;[23] and it is subject to authoritarian welfare institutions.[24] Further, it is inherent in the woman's role in the nuclear family[25] and the notorious *over*qualification of numerous occupational groups.[26] In all of these instances, this problematic labor power is diverted and disciplined at the same time. It is no accident that the political conflicts and revolutionary perspectives relevant in the U.S. today result from the institutional conditions of *non*-realized labor power (and probably *exclusively* from them). This may lead to the conclusion that "disparate" groups, i.e., those that are "uninteresting" to and not realizable by capital, as well as areas of needs that cannot be exploited, tend to spread for economic reasons. It is precisely the point of O'Connor's article that the problems of "planned providing for existence" (in a dual sense)—problems that result from the growth of disparate areas in general, and from non-realizable labor power in particular—objectively confront the state apparatus with an intensifying fiscal-budgetary crisis.[27]

4. The resources ("power") that put the state apparatus in the position of exercising its functions of coordination and the prevention of crises, are, no doubt, not genuinely economic. The device of nationalizing key industry, which allows the state direct access to decisions on investments, is atypical and has been used only in situations of extreme crisis (e.g., the English mining industry). On the other hand, the open support by even the most powerful factions of capital is in many cases not sufficient to effectively apply the regulatory functions which are based on the well-understood interest of collective capital. Each rigid coalition of the state apparatus with particular factions, industries, or corporations would be counter-productive to the careful consideration of the "collective interest." At this point, genuinely political resources come into play, i.e., mass loyalty, propensity for mass acclaim, and, on the other hand, there occurs the transformation of parliamentary, constitutional institutions into "filtering devices" and public relations agencies of the executive.[28] In this situation, mass loyalty (or, more

unemployed for the economy as a whole." A peculiarity of the American situation is merely that the "surplus labor power" that has emerged in this way is distributed in terms of racial criteria and hence, becomees to a certain degree, able to articulate and create conflict.

22. Cf. J. and M. Rowntree, "Youth as a Class," *International Socialist Journal* 5 (1968), pp. 25-58; and also H. Gintis, "The New Working Class and Revolutionary Youth," in *Socialist Revolution*, 1:3 (May 1970), pp. 13-43.

23. Rowntree, *op. cit.*

24. Cf. G.Y. Steiner, *Social Insecurity. The Politics of Welfare* (Chicago, 1966); Marris and Rein, *Dilemmas of Social Reform* (New York, 1969); and Tom Hayden, "Welfare Liberalism and Social Change," in Gettleman and Merselstein, ed., *The Great Society Reader* (New York, 1967).

25. For the most important analyses of the women's movement in relation to class structure and the strategy of "women's liberation," see the publications of the New England Free Press (Boston).

26. Cf. Ivar Berg in *Trans-Action* (March, 1969).

27. O'Connor, *op. cit.*

28. See Agnoli, *Transformation der Demokratie*; in this context, I consider the concept of "non-decision," blind spots that have been systematically built into the system as non-acceptable issues, groups, and strategies, as interesting. This concept is used by the growing critique of

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precisely, the positive balance between repression and mass loyalty, which can partially substitute for loyalty but which cannot replace it) becomes a decisive and critical variable in the total system. "Bonapartism made permanent," as Narr phrases it, has to increase its efforts and readiness for concessions in order to obtain what classical Bonapartism recieved from the mass of peasantry: the appearance of unquestioned legitimation by the masses.[29]

From these four points I derive the following final conclusion, as well as a strategic orientation based on them. The conflicts are structurally anchored, they intensify and thus become politically productive (i.e., they can, at any rate, be only partially organized, they are neither powerless, nor can they simply be coopted). These conflicts do *not* originate in the center of capitalist production and they cannot be expected to come from there. They are triggered by the contradictions that have a *marginal* relation to the sphere of production. But their occurrence can be genetically explained as a consequence of the fact that the function of the political system is directed toward safeguarding capital relations, and the system is strictly tied to *their* undisturbed development (i.e., accumulation). Put differently, this means that there is indeed a novel constellation, which Marcuse,[30] in principle, correctly analyzed, albeit with somewhat different arguments. The empirical processes of the historical dynamics ("empirical" here means accessible to theoretical and practical-political experiences) in developed capitalist systems are determined through relationships of domination, contradictions, deprivations, expressions of alienation and sensual elements. These dynamics are no less "necessary" than the veiled basic contradiction between wage labor and capital. But their importance is of a different nature, because they no longer result from elements that are necessary *for* the system—as, for example, wage labor (and its exploitation) is necessary *for* capital and its development. Instead, they are necessary *within* the system, which does not and cannot have available the mechanisms that could eliminate these contradictions, without eliminating itself as a capitalist system.[31]

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pluralism in American political science, it was introduced by Bachratz and Baratz: *Power and Poverty*, 1970.

29. Some problems that arise from the imperative to maintain a minimum of mass loyalty as a functional requirement at any price, are sketched in my contribution to Claus Koch, ed., *Kritik der Technokratie* (Frankfurt, 1970).

30. See H. Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man* (Boston, 1964), p. 256.

31. The revolt originated *outside* of the production sphere, or—at any rate—outside of its decisive centers (dependent on technology and profit volume) under those special conditions, where the revolt could be mediated back to these centers. This is immediately obvious in regard to the Paris May of 1968. It is interesting to note here that the strikes in Northern Italy a) were led by workers recently arrived from Southern Italy, who escalated them to their militancy, and b) they were led by such slogans that suggested that "we are not workers 24 hours a day," i.e., experiences and conditions external to the working place (also functionally external to it!) were emphasized and set against the union bureaucracy and its mediation strategy. They further suggested that the working place had to become the integrative focus of these experiences. These special attributes do not reduce the extraordinary significance of the Italian strikes, but they give rise to doubts as to their usefulness as documentation in an apparent "non-revisionist" and generalizing analysis.

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Or, phrasing it in still another way: the revolutionary transformation process, if we are dealing with its beginnings, does not have the form of an organized counter-force against this oppression, whose results keep the system alive. Instead, it takes the form of political revolt against conditions which, from the perspective of the capitalist system's mode of operation, are neither "vital," nor can they be "abolished." In fact, even the intensification of these conditions cannot be halted. This statement, in its pointed formulation and its claim to be valid for all developed capitalist systems, is certainly problematic. I shall not elaborate it here any further.[32]

A theory based on these analytic theses, as well as the praxis resulting from it, may be faulty, unsuccessful, or one-sided. But the Müller-Neusüss article only pretends to prove this. Instead, it uses (and corrupts) the concept of revisionism in a way which invites the danger of a double black-out. On the one hand, there is the danger that their article blocks a Marxist analysis of the state apparatus and its stabilizing functions. This would result in a systematic under-evaluation of the process of capital realization that takes place within the frameowrk of capitalism itself. On the other hand, there is the danger that the task of self-enlightenment and guidance of the ongoing political praxis gets stuck in a "non-revisionist-orthodox" analysis cloaked in Marxist terminology.

What is really most amazing about the Müller-Neusüss article are the questions that are *circumvented*, in spite of its length. One of these questions concerns the concept of classes and class theory or, more precisely: the question at what point and under what conditions the proletariat experience transforms itself into revolutionary spontaneity and organization. On the one hand, they indicate that revisionist organizations, theories, theoreticians, the ideologues of state socialism, etc., have corrupted and blocked proletarian consciousness. On the other hand, the authors are above the beyond falling prey to the error "that the state can always pull out of its sleeve new socio-political devices for satisfactorily manipulating the masses." So, what's up? The question remains open, which is both right and wrong. Right, because this question can only be decided by praxis. Wrong, because this praxis includes moments (such as the unions, the social democratic and communist parties and their leverage used for political concessions) that can be analyzed as structural conditions marginal to this praxis and may restrict its objective perspectives. This discussion is left dangling at its crucial point and, as a substitute, there is a reference to the *Illustrated History of the German Revolution* (*Illustrierte Geschichte der deutsche Revolution*).

32. The situation of U.S. capitalism makes especially clear that all conflicts and revolts, which understand themselves as anti-capitalist in terms of their intentions and perspectives, constitute themselves, *without any exception not* immediately from the class contradiction between capital and wage labor, but from a potential for conflict that arises *outside* of production and is directed against the phenomena necessarily resulting from liberal reformism, whose only claim to fame is the safeguarding of the production process against economic crises and against open class conflicts.

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The other obvious gap in the article's reasoning derives from the fact that it fails to produce evidence against the thesis that the state's set of instruments for economic, structural, and boom policy intervention, guarantees stability by preventing economic crises from intensifying and getting out of hand. Today (September 1970), the unemployment rate in the U.S. is 5.1% (and the statistics are a euphemism), the highest rate for the past six years. The rate of inflation is approxiamtely 6% (a 20-year high). At the same time (and this has never before been the case), given the history of the country, there are conditions of a unique politicization. The outcome is *neither* in an articulation of the contradiction in terms of class categories, *nor* in starts toward a manifestly crisis-producing "downward spiral" of the economy. Instead, the result is a "stability" which American capitalism has been and must continue to be able to secure without having to resort to the aid of a social democratic policy, or to Schiller's rhetoric of "bottoming out," "peaks," etc. In the face of such facts, the Müller-Neusüss stubborn denial of even the attempt to reformulate Marx's crisis theory signifies an implicit agreement with the very thesis that they appear to contradict, i.e., the thesis that the political economy of developed capitalism has suppressed its contradictions in the production sphere and has transferred them into the area of social life. From this area, the contradictions can be turned against the basic capitalist structure only with the help of new forms of organization and struggle.

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From 'The Legend of Truth' to a 'True Legend:' Phases of Sartre's Development*

by István Mészáros

Writing on someone is a specific relationship between two distinct "singular temporalizations" in which sometimes affinities, sometimes elements of contrast predominate. In the case of Flaubert, it is primarily the contrast that attracts Sartre's attention: "Flaubert represents for me the exact opposite of my own conception of literature: a total disengagement and a certain idea of form, which is not that which I admire. . . . he began to fascinate me precisely because I saw him in every way as the contrary of myself."[1] On other occasions (e.g. writing on Mallarmé and on Genet), major affinities are in the foreground. But whether confrontations or affinities set the tone, the job of revealing exploration cannot be properly done without combining the viewpoints of "inside" and "outside:" the sympathetic understanding of inner motivations, however sharp the contrasts, and the forward drive of critical transcendence, however close the affinities.

Writing on someone is connecting two socio-historically different "temporalizations," even when Lenin writes about Marx. Such an enterprise sets out from the premise that the first is meaningful for the second, provided that the process of exploration—which is at the same time also a form of clarifying self-reflection—can mediate to the present those features of the original temporalization which objectively contribute to the solution of given tasks and problems. Reflection on the past can only proceed from the meaning the present gives itself—very much in the spirit of the Sartrean "projection" towards the future: i.e. towards the solution of the existing tasks—but the very act of reflection, in virtue of establishing determinate relationships with the past, inevitably also determines its own orientation. Thus reflection and critical exploration become self-reflection and critical self-definition. The meaning of the present is used as a key to unlock the meaning of the past leading to the present, which in its turn unlocks formerly unidentified dimensions of the present leading to the future not in the form of rigid mechanical determinations but as anticipations of aims linked to a set of inner motivations. Thus we are involved in a dialectical movement which leads from the present to the past and from the past to the future. In this movement the past is not somewhere *there*, in its remote finality and "closure," but right *here,* "open" and situated between the present and the

*This is Chapter III of István Mészáros' study of Sartre to be published by Sussex University Press (Chatto & Windus) in the Philosophy series edited by Roy Edgley. Published with permission.

1. "Itinerary of a Thought," *New Left Review* (November-December 1969), p. 52.

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future, paradoxical as it may sound to those who think in terms of the "intellectual order"[2] of mechanical chronology. For the fact is that the present can only have one mediation between itself and the future: not the infinitesimal empty moment that separates it from what lies ahead, but the great wealth and intensity of a past brought to life in the expanded time of searching reflection and critical self-examination.

History is, thus, not simply inalterable but inexhaustible. This is what gives sense to being concerned with the past, and this is what determines the need for constant reinterpretations. Nothing is more absurd, therefore, than the notion of "definitive history"—a "definitive treatment" of this or that period, or a "definitive biography," etc., which, by implication, anticipate a stage when, given the abundant accumulation of definitive chunks, there will be no more need for a constant reexamination of history. For in the event of such "definitiveness," it wouldn't be only the historian who puts himself out of business but man himself who can ignore or routinize his past only at the price of decapitating his own future.

However, there is no danger that such notions might prevail except perhaps in some areas of institutionalized irrelevance. To be sure, the industry of routinized popular history and biography must promise its readers—who are denied the chance of making history beyond the point of abdication through the ballot box—the thrill of authentic voyeurism, providing them with the consolation prize of "definitive" treatments and allegedly great "secret revelations." If one's participation is confined to the horizon of looking in on "history" through the key-hole, the spectacle better be a "definitive" one, so as to give one the illusion of observing history in its finality and massive permanence. But this is of little consequence. For man's relation to the past is no privileged domain of positivisticlly disoriented specialists but an existential dimension inseparable from the dilemmas and challenges of the present. Evaluation of past events and figures, insofar as it arises from the needs of a determinate relationship, has to be as definitive as possible in terms of the *given* relationship. Which necessarily means that the more definitive it is as a *specific* articulation of linked socio-historical temporalizations, the less definitive it can be in its *universality*. Or, to put it more precisely, its universality must manifest itself through a determinate socio-historical temporality. Only the skeleton of pure chronology can have some sort of "mute universality" and neutral validity—in that it extends over all periods—which however, is indistinguishable from sheer immediacy and flat particularity. For the data of "pure chronology" must first be *selected* and arranged in a *structured* order—from a determinate standpoint—before they can acquire any meaning whatsoever.

Thus meaning, at any level and in all contexts, is not simply *found* in the subject of one's enquiry (as some sociological and other "scientific"

2. An expression used by Sartre in his essay on Faulkner. See *Situations*, vol. I, p. 70.

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myth-makers presume, condemning themselves to tottering at the level of generality of a local telephone directory without its self-evident function), but *unfolded* from it through the meaning of the searching temporality. Saying with Sartre that "the important thing is not what one *is* but what one *does*"[3] is one side of a vital interrelationship. The other was spelled out by Goethe when he insisted that "to be able to *do* something one must already *be* something."[4] It is this being in situation at a determinate juncture in history, rooted in some specific social forces with their interests, needs and orientation, which constitutes the necessary principle of selection. How could one without that simply "reproduce" the meaning of Sartre's work short of reprinting his 8 or 9 million words, together with an account of a few million related facts and events? Such an enterprise would be both impossible and amount to doing absolutely nothing. What makes Isaac Deutscher's biographies lasting works is not that they contain everything in a "definitive" form—for how could they—but that they offer a meaningful selection of data, *relevant* to his own quest and to the orientation of his contemporaries. Thus, the most important single factor in the constitution of meaning is the underlying passion that animates the search itself.

All this doesn't mean, of course, that objectivity in history is negated. On the contrary, a precise definition of its nature and limits rescues historical objectivity from the fate of extreme relativism which it suffers through the self-contradictory aspirations of positivism and "scientism." They start from the presumed objectivity of "completeness," ignoring the arbitrariness of the choice of the enquiry itself, whereby the proper relationship between research and researcher is completely overturned. It is not the researcher who looks for data but, on the contrary, the availability of abundant data produces the reified researcher of institutionalized routine. And, of course, the self-justifying ideology of such procedure takes the form of apriori ruling out the need for justification of any research whatsoever, no matter how trivial and irrelevant it might be. Anything goes that can be "researched," i.e. nailed to a display board in a form through which the dead "objectivity" of dusty data is linked to an impersonally "objective" pseudo-subject. For aren't we reassured by the originator of this practice himself that all human facts and events are "equidistant from God" (Ranke)? He spends his life "fighting" historical relativism, only to end up producing the most exasperated form of it. This is supremely ironical. For the methodology of unstructured "completeness" liquidates not only historical objectivity but itself as well. It turns the "equidistant" data into *tokens* of equally meaningful or meaningless equivalence, thus nihilating any need for completeness: its original aim and *raison d'être*. And having succeeded in nihilating its own ground, it turns the activity of producing equidistant equivalences into a form of self-consuming superfluity.

3. "Réponse à M. Mauriac," *L'Observateur* (March 19, 1953).
4. Quoted by Thomas Mann in his *Essay in Autobiography*.

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In truth, the only God relevant to human history is made in the image of living three-dimensional man, and therefore the data of this history are decidedly not equidistant from him. Some are more meaningful than others, and some are more meaningful to one epoch than to another. Objectivity in history is not that of a nail—let alone of a stone—for "man is not a thinking nail,"[5] as Sartre often reminds us. Historical objectivity is dynamic and changing, as is *life* not in and by itself—for that would be still reducible to a set of more or less simplified natural laws—but as it evolves, on a natural basis radically modified by work and self-reflection, in the *social sphere*. The objectivity of the search itself is determined by the conditions of a given temporality which, of course, include anticipations and assessments of future trends of development. Nonetheless, in its dynamic objectivity, every search is subject to criteria of evaluation both as regards its social determinants (including their limitations) and the nature (realistic or otherwise) of its anticipations.

Similarly, in the past itself we are concerned with linking temporalizations, and not with some arbitrary projection backwards onto an empty screen. For while the past is inexhaustible, it is certainly not characterless. It cannot be just moulded, whichever way one pleases, in accordance with arbitrary whim and caprice: the weight and inner logic of its evidence sets objective limits to possible reinterpretations. The past is inexhaustible not in and by itself but in virtue of the fact that it is objectively linked to the future which is never completely made. As man makes his own history, on the basis of temporal and structural determinations—preserving and transcending them—certain characteristics of the past come to the fore which weren't visible before. They weren't visible not because people were blind or shortsighted (though, of course, there is an abundance of such instances too) but because they didn't quite exist in the same form before the objective articulation of determinate *relationships*. The ground has certain features also before the house is built on it, which, however, under certain conditions (of which the house itself is an integral part), are painfully evidenced as "subsidence" by the cracks in the wall. The future doesn't invent or create the characteristics of the past but articulates them in the course of its own self-realization. This is what produces the need for constant reinterpretations, setting at the same time well defined objective limits as to which way and how far they can go.

In the course of such reinterpretations—insofar as they correspond to a genuine movement in the social sphere that generates them, rather than being mechanically turned out by the routine of a reified industry of culture—the previous ones are inevitably *aufgehoben* (not "refuted") in the sense that a more advanced stage can unfold a greater complexity of meaning out of the subject of its linking search. Lukács' assessment of Goethe gives a deeper insight into the great German writer than Hegel's reflections on him, irrespective of the comparative stature of the two philosophers. Nor does his

5. "La temporalité chez Faulkner," *Situations*, vol. I, p. 73.

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evaluation lay claims to definitiveness. For the characteristic feature of a Marxist line of approach is not some attempt to go beyond the sphere of its own transcendability—a petrified absurdity—but precisely its awareness of the temporal determinations of its own quest, not only of its subject's. By leaving the lines of research open, instead of vainly trying to close them, and by reflecting on its own inner motivations and temporal determinations, such an approach, no doubt, radically rejects the illusions of definitiveness and complete finality. At the same time, by acknowledging and exemplifying the dynamism of historical objectivity, it can not only bring to life with greater effectiveness the subject of its search, but also prepare the ground for further interpretations and revaluations, rooted in new existential predicaments which it thus also helps to bring to the fore. No one can realistically aim at more than this linking search which is simultaneously "outside" and "inside"—a preserving transcendence of the past which is also a form of determinate temporality and self-transcendence. This is, precisely, what gives such search its *raison d'être*.

Another myth that needs dispelling concerns the alleged phenomenon of "ruptures" and "radical breaks" in historical and intellectual development. The dialectical interchange of life and work, epoch and writer, make such ideas as an explanatory hypothesis a definite non-starter. The writer, according to Sartre, goes on writing even when he has lost his illusions about the nature and impact of literature, and thus of his own work, for "he has invested everything in his occupation."[6] Even if there was nothing else beside this "ideological interest,"[7] it should be enough to caution one about the dialectic of continuity and discontinuity. For it points to something deeper, namely to the fact that "you have a past that you can't repudiate. Even if you try to, you can never repudiate it completely because it's as much part of you as your skeleton. . . . in the long run you have not changed much, since you can never discard the whole of your childhood."[8] And the man who speaks in such terms, in 1970, is none other than Sartre who is supposed to have radically repudiated his own past.

Considering the relationship of the writer and his epoch, the problem to be explained is twofold: individuality and "autonomy" on one hand, and social determinations on the other. This is how Sartre formulates the issue: "I would like the reader to feel the presence of Flaubert the whole time; my ideal

6. "The Purposes of Writing," in Jean-Paul Sartre, *Between Existentialism and Marxism* (London, 1974), p. 31. The same view is expressed in *Words*: "I have renounced my vocation, but I have not unfrocked myself. I still write. What else can I do? *Nulla dies sine linea.* It is my habit and it is also my profession. For a long while I treated my pen as a sword: now I realize how helpless we are. It does not matter: I am writing, I shall write books; they are needed; they have a use all the same." Penguin edition, p. 157.

7. Sartre quoting Isaac Deutscher in "A Friend of the People," *Between Existentialism and Marxism, op.cit.*, p. 51.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 293-295.

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would be that the reader simultaneously feels, comprehends and knows the personality of Flaubert, totally as an individual and yet totally as an expression of his time."[9] And in more generalised terms: "I believe that a man can always make something out of what is made of him. This is the limit I would today accord to freedom: the small movement which makes of a totally conditioned social being someone who does not render back completely what his conditioning has given him. ...The individual interiorizes his social determinations: he interiorizes the relations of production, the family of his childhood, the historical past, the contemporary institutions, and then he re-exteriorizes these in acts and options which necessarily refer us back to them."[10]

Thus the constituents of an individual's development may be summed up as follows:

1. the formation of his personality and thought in his youth and the interiorization of the institutions he experiences (family, class, etc.);
2. the continued determinations of his social environment, with all its changes, and their interiorizations by the individual;
3. the self-definition of the individual in his social setting through work (e.g. writing), and the response of his social environment to it;
4. the interiorization of his own work and of its social consequences by the individual concerned (of his "ideological interest" as an intellectual, for instance);
5. a possible re-exteriorization of a critique of the last interiorization as a negation of the social bases of the type of work in question (e.g. the negation of the role of the "traditional intellectual").

It is clear that while the first four constituents are characteristic of the development of individuals in general, the fifth represents a form of critical self-awareness which is inseparable from a radical critique of society. Furthermore, since that critique appeals to the perspective of a distant future as the necessary condition of its realization, the negation may remain theoretical only (like Bergson's "liberté intérieure"), coupled with an actual reaffirmation—even if not necessarily re-interiorization—of the mode of existence of the criticised "traditional intellectual" not as an ideal but as an insuperable reality for the individual concerned, thus reasserting the power of continuity over the expectation of a break. We can see this clearly in Sartre's answer to the question: "how do you see the new mission of the intellectual" which begins with the suggestion that 'He must first of all *suppress himself as an intellectual,*" and ends with this confession: "I decided to finish the book [on Flaubert], but as long as I go on working on it, *I remain at the level of the traditional intellectual.*"[11]

9. "Itinerary of a Thought," *op.cit.*, p. 51.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
11. "A Friend of the People," *op.cit.*, pp. 293 and 295.

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Evidently, in a writer's development the crucial question is how can he respond to the conflicts and changes of the social world in which he is situated. This can be differentiated into two basic factors: his own constitution (structure of thought, character, tastes, personality), and the relative degree of dynamism with which the social forces of his epoch confront one another, drawing him in one way or another into their confrontations. To describe the interchanges between writer and his epoch in terms of "ruptures" is extremely naive, at best, and on both counts. For neither socio-historical, nor individual development is characterised by "breaks" alone, but by a complex configuration of changes and continuities. In some epochs (like the French Revolution, for instance) discontinuities are in the foreground, and in others (e.g. the period between 1871-1905) continuities predominate. But there are always changes beneath the surface of continuities, and some basic continuities persist, no matter how radical the breaks in certain regions. (Cf. the Russian revolution and the conditions of agricultural production for decades thereafter, for instance.)

A society is made of multiple layers of coexisting social instruments and practices, each with its own specific rhythm of temporality: a fact that carries far-reaching implications for social development as a whole. This is a major problem which must be treated in its proper setting, namely in the framework of a theory of social transformation and transition. What matters in the present context is that even in the very same sphere—material production, for instance—practices going back almost as far as the stone age may more or less happily coexist with activities requiring the most advanced forms of technology. And this is by no means confined to societies like India where primitive subsistence agriculture is, ironically, complemented by the technology of nuclear arms production. We can find similar instances in our own societies (although the relative weight of the more ancient social practices is, of course, very different in the economic life of our society as a whole). For Stradivarius on the assembly line is a contradiction in terms. The best chisels by far, for sculptors, are made today by an old blacksmith in London who works with tools and techniques of thousands of years ago, but nonetheless he is able to put to shame the most advanced Japanese, German and American computerised chisel production techniques, by tempering steel in such a way that it optimally combines the qualities of hardness and resilience which together constitute the most desirable chisel. Now if we try to think of all the social spheres combined, with their manifold varieties, different degrees of complexity, phases of "uneven development" (Marx), and differences in what might be called structural inertia, as well as their reciprocal interactions, conflicts, clashes, and even antagonistic contradictions under determinate historical conditions, it is obvious that the reduction of this breath-taking complexity to the voluntaristic (e.g. Stalinist) simplification of instant "ruptures" resulting in a "radical bread" with the past, whereafter all problems are caused by the "enemy," can only produce painful social hernias which might take ages to cure.

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Mutatis mutandis, the same considerations apply to the development of the individual. For one thing, his need for and ability to change doesn't necessarily coincide with the dynamism (or, for that matter, social stagnation) of his epoch, and conflicts may be generated from both directions. (This is what produces the individual who is "out of phase" with his time.) Furthermore, certain dimensions of his complex being are *structurally* less readily amenable to change than others. Thus taste, for instance. In some cultures eating chillies constitutes supreme delight, in others a form of torture. The problem to be explained is not only the stubborn persistence of the acquired taste in the individual even when he is transferred into a sharply different culture, but also the fact that the two extremes are constituted on the shared basis of the original experience of sucking the mother's milk. Both problems are possible to explain only by some specific configuration of continuity and discontinuity, with the relative predominance of one or the other. Incomparably more so when we take into account the whole complexity of a "singular individuality." The way in which the various dimensions combine into a coherent whole (and when they don't, we have the problems of a dislocated personality), despite the structural differences and tensions between the respective temporal rhythms—for, thankfully, a man doesn't age in one piece, with uniformity, otherwise he would age with the self-accelerating speed of a steel ball rushing down a steep incline—can only be comprehended through the dialectic of continuity and discontinuity.

The structure of an individual's thought is constituted at a relatively early age, and all its subsequent modifications, however great or small, can only be explained as alterations of the original structure, even if the distance covered is as great as from milk to chillies. But it cannot be explained simply as the structure's "rupture"—which, in and by itself, is just nothing and thus explains absolutely nothing: "rupture" is meaningful only as a well defined interaction of determinate forces—or as the invention of a brand new structure, again either out of nothing, or through a mechanical transference of the determinations of an age onto the mysterious "tabula rasa" (another name for nothing) of a rupturally emptied "individuality" (which is a contradiction in terms). The lifework of an intellectual exhibits many layers of structural transformations, which are intelligible only as increasingly more complex superseding-preservations (or preserving-supersessions) of the original structure.

But to refer to the dialectic of continuity and discontinuity is not enough. To say that history—both individual and collective—manifests itself through continuities and changes should really acquire the status of a truism, were it not that determinate "ideological interests" turn it into hotly debated theoretical propositions. Considering a writer like Sartre the interesting problem is not the unity of continuity and change in his development but its specific form or configuration. Generally speaking, we can think of this problem in terms of a spectrum within which continuities or discontinuities

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predominate more or less extensively and to varying degrees of intensity. (Compare in this respect Modigliani and Picasso, or Kodály and Bartók, for instance.) Nor should one allow to be deceived by changes which are precisely manifestations of a deeper underlying continuity. For an individual's intellectual development is made up of many aspects, some of which are far more weighty than others in determining the articulation of the overall structure. When Sartre exclaims that "on n'est pas plus sauvé par la politique que par la littérature" (one isn't any more saved through politics than through literature),[12] he gives away the key to understanding that the sharply contrasting forms of his *praxis* are different forms of expression of the fundamental underlying continuity: his passionate quest for the "absolute" of a non-religious "salvation."

The salient feature of Sartre's development is the ultimate predominance of continuity through a multiplicity of transformations. His life-activity assumes an extremely paradoxical form. For it is not simply dominated by continuities but, on the contrary, appears to be punctuated by incomprehensible discontinuities, described variously as "radical conversion," lapse into "ultra-bolshevism," "radical break with the past," etc. It is both the paradoxical form of the continuity, and the heterogeneous tensions which determine its relative transformations, which together define the specificity of Sartre's intellectual development.

If we want to follow its particular phases, we have to proceed with great caution. For movements in real life are much more subtle than what might be captured through periodizations which, of necessity, freeze any live movement. On the one hand, changes occur not only between works—let alone between periods or phases—but inside the particular works themselves. On the other, continuities are not broken off at points of transition but persist sometimes throughout the whole of a lifework.

All the same, the relationship between a writer and his epoch cannot be properly understood without fully taking into account the impact of historical events and social transformations on the articulation of his work, even if one must make all the necessary allowances for the existing overlaps on the one hand, and the constant "capillary changes" (which are primarily determined by the inner logic of the chosen subject) on the other.

Keeping in mind these qualifications, we may define the principal phases of Sartre's development as follows:

1. The Years of Innocence: 1923-1940
2. The Years of Abstract Heroism: 1941-1945.
3. Search for Politics in the Key of Morality: 1946-1950.
4. Search for Morality in the Key of Politics: 1951-1956.
5. Search for the Dialectic of History: 1957-1962.
6. The Discovery of the Singular Universal: 1963 onwards.

Let us have a brief look at each of these phases.

12. Interview by Jacqueline Piatier, *Le Monde* (April 18, 1964).

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1. *The Years of Innocence: 1923-1940.*

The year 1923 stands for the publication of a short story[13] and of three fragments of a lost novel,[14] followed after a four year break by the essay on "The Theory of State in Modern French Thought."[15] None of these works has other than purely documentary interest, for they are truly "pen exercises," rather than original works. Sartre's first writings which give a hint of what is to come are his letter contribution to the student enquiry[16] and *The Legend of Truth*: both written in 1929 but the latter published only in 1931. In the same category falls also "L'Art cinématographique"[17] in that all three exhibit significant traits of originality against a background of borrowed wisdom, and they are still far from indicating a viable road to follow.

The situation considerably changes with *The Transcendence of the Ego*, written in 1934 (published in 1936) and three other major essays on problems of philosophical psychology: *Esquisse d'un théorie des émotions, L'Imagination* (both 1935-1936) and *L'Imaginaire: Psychologie phénoménologique de l'imagination*, written between 1935-1940 and published in 1940.[18] According to Simone de Beauvoir, the grand project on philosophical psychology (of which *The Transcendence of the Ego* and *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions* constitute a small part) is abandoned by Sartre because he considers it "little more than an exercise."[19] In truth they are a great deal

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13. "L'Ange du morbide," published in *La Revue sans titre* (January 15, 1923).

14. "Jésus la Chouette, professeur de province," *La Revue sans titre* (February 10 and 25 and March 10, 1923).

15. Published in *The New Ambassador-Revue Universitaire Internationale* (January 1927). Reprinted in Contat and Rybalka, *Les Ecrits de Sartre: Chronologie, bibliographie commentée* (henceforth referred to as CR) (Paris, 1970), pp. 517-530. This is a very conventional academic paper, devoid of originality.

16. "Enquête auprès des étudiants d'aujourd'hui," by Roland Alix, *Les Nouvelles littéraires* (February 2, 1929). Parts of Sartre's contribution are reprinted in Simone de Beauvoir, *Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter* (Penguin, 1963), pp. 342-343. This is a remarkable piece of writing, notwithstanding its brevity. In it Sartre announces a lifelong project for reaching the roots of *being* (italicized by Sartre) through questioning *Man* and *nature*, *mind* and *existence*, *humanity* and *ideology*, *Good* and *Evil*, *freedom* and *adventure*, *death* and *determinism*. With its 'heavy-going' metaphysical concerns, voiced in the relatively trivial context of a student enquiry when others might be content to complain about digs and catering, this letter is quite a maiden speech for a student trying to take off in the world of ideas.

17. First published in a brochure of the Lycée of Le Havre, *Distribution solennelle des prix* (July 12, 1931). Reprinted in CR, pp. 546-552.

18. His *Esquisse d'une théorie des émotions* (*Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions*) was written in 1936 but probably revised before publication in 1939. *L'Imagination* (English title: *Imagination: A Psychological Critique*) was written in 1935 and published in 1936. And *L'Imaginaire* (English title: *The Psychology of Imagination*) was written and in part published in 1939, and as a book in 1940.

19. "Meanwhile Sartre was writing a treatise on phenomenological psychology which he entitled *La Psyché*, and of which in the end he published an extract only, calling it *Esquisse d'une théorie phénoménologique des émotions* (*The Emotions: Outline of a Theory*). Here he developed his theory of 'psychic objectivity,' which had been sketched out in the essay on *The Transcendence of the Ego*. But to his way of thinking this was little more than an exercise, and after writing four hundred pages he broke off to complete his collection of stories." Simone de Beauvoir, *The Prime of Life*, Penguin edition, p. 318.

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more than that. While Sartre later sharply revises some of the most extreme statements made about freedom on the basis of the philosophical psychology articulated in these works, he retains their conceptual framework not only in *Being and Nothingness* but throughout his subsequent development. (See, for instance, "Itinerary of a Thought," 1969, which explains his project on Flaubert with the categories of *L'Imaginaire.*)[20]

To these works we have to add not only the important essay on temporality in Faulkner,[21] but also his fine short stories[22] and a most remarkable novel, *Nausea*. The general trend is clear. After the first years (1923-1928) which produce nothing more than "exercises," out of the gropings of *The Legend of Truth*[23] some philosophical and literary works emerge which define Sartre's quest as the exploration of individual experience at the level of a great existential intensity. The social and political dimensions are almost completely absent, or appear only on the horizon, painted with the colors of resignation and "Melancholia" (the original title of *Nausea*), signalling the triumph of reification and alienation. This absence of the social and political dimensions, before the "fall" of commitment, give a marked unity to Sartre's first phase of development as the years of sinfully self-oriented innocence.

2. *The Years of Abstract Heroism: 1941-1945.*

The war brings commitment of a certain kind. "What the drama of the war gave me," explains Sartre, "as it did everyone who participated in it, was the experience of heroism. Not my own, of course—all I did was a few errands. But the militant in the Resistance who was caught and tortured became a myth for us. Such militants existed, of course, but they represented a sort of personal myth as well. Would we be able to hold out against torture too? The problem then was solely that of physical endurance—it was not the ruses of history or the paths of alienation. A man is tortured: what will he do? He either speaks or refuses to speak. This is what I mean by the experience of heroism, which is a false experience. After the war came the true experience,

20. Cf. for instance the following passage: "The third reason for choosing Flaubert is that he represents a sequel to *L'Imaginaire*. You may remember that in my very early book *L'Imaginaire* I tried to show that an image is not a sensation reawakened, or reworked by the intellect, or even a former perception altered and attenuated by knowledge, but is something entirely different – an absent reality, focussed in its absence through what I called an *analogon*; that is to say, an object which serves as an analogy and is traversed by an intention. For example, when you are going to sleep, the little dots in your eyes – phosphenes – may serve as an analogy for every kind of oneiric or hypnagogic image. Between waking and sleeping, some people see vague shapes pass, which are phosphenes through which they focus on an imagined person or thing. In *L'Imaginaire*, I tried to prove that imaginary objects – images – are an absence. In my book on Flaubert, I am studying *imaginary persons* – people who like Flaubert act out roles. A man is like a leak of gas, escaping into the imaginary. Flaubert did so perpetually; yet he also had to see reality because he hated it, so there is the whole question of the relationship between the real and the imaginary which I try to study in his life and work." "Itinerary of a Thought," *op.cit.*, p. 53

21. "La temporalité chez Faulkner" is one of Sartre's most important early essays.

22. "Intimacy," "The Wall," "The Room," "Erostratus," and "The Childhood of a Leader."

23. *The Legend of Truth* is a strange mixture of philosophy, myth and literature of which only a fragment has been published. Cf. *Bifur* (June 1931), reprinted in CR, pp. 531-545.

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that of society. But I think it was necessary for me to pass via the myth of heroism."[24]

The experience of heroism is abstract not only because Sartre has to contemplate it from the sideline but also because the whole complexity of the epoch —for even a period of historical emergency has its "ruses" and "paths of alienation," however different they may be from those of the post-war world—is reduced to a moral dilemma, in accordance with the horizon of a problematic subjectivity and very tentatively self-transcending individuality. The main philosophical work of this phase is *Being and Nothingness* (1943) which announces the possibilities of such transcendence in the extremely abstract categories of "phenomenological ontology," structured around subjectivity. Sartre's three early plays—*Bariona* (1941), *Flies*(1943), and *Huis Clos* (1943)—fit well into this intellectual framework, and so does *Roads to Freedom* (its first two volumes written in 1941-1944 and published in 1945), apart from some aesthetic considerations.[25] 1945 is also the year of writing

24. "Itinerary of a Thought," *op.cit.*, p. 44.

25. *Roads to Freedom* remains peripheral in Sartre's lifework. He has to tear himself away from it, as late as 1949, extricating himself from the consequences of a false choice, in order to continue his quest in other directions. Ten years after abandoning work on the fourth volume, he gives his reasons as follows: "The fourth volume was to speak of the Resistance. The choice was simple in those days—even if one needed much strength and courage to stand by it. One was for or against the Germans. The choice was black or white. Today—since 1945—the situation is complicated. One needs less courage, perhaps, to choose, but the choices are much more difficult. I couldn't express the ambiguities of our epoch in a novel situated in 1943." In an Interview by Robert Kanters, *L'Express* (September 17, 1959). These are what Sartre calls elsewhere his "internal difficulties" ("A Friend of the People," *op.cit.*, p. 295) for abandoning *Roads to Freedom*.

In reality the issue is much more complicated. For it is not only the fourth volume which is problematical but the project as a whole. Reaching 1943 means only that things become more visible, at a point of climax, but they are there right from the beginning. The problematic character of the work manifests itself formally-structurally in a disturbing tension between straightforward everydayness, depicted in its immediacy, and an abstract rhetoric which tries to project everydayness onto the plane of universality. In other words, it is the missing intermediary of character 'condensation' that renders the work structurally abstract and problematical in the framework of Sartre's totalizing quest. The perception of a whole epoch within the parameters of an extremely simplified conflict of 'black or white' is in fact the *consequence* of this abstract structure rather than its massively objective *cause* as Sartre curiously suggests—very much out of character with his dialectical conception of subject and object, author and work, cause and effect in literature. Examining the conditions under which *Roads to Freedom* is written we find that Sartre allows himself to be manoeuvred into the adoption of its abstract structure. First by the scandal that follows the all-pervasive negativity of his early short stories and *Nausea* which makes him unwisely promise a positive continuation ("*Nausea* has been accused of being too *pessimistic*. But let's wait for the ending. In a forthcoming novel, which will be the continuation, the hero shall redress the machine. We shall see existence rehabilitated, and my hero act, tasting action." Interview by Claudine Chonez, *Marianne,* [December 7, 1938]). And second, by the 'abstract heroism' of his perception of the Resistance movement in which he cannot assume more than a very peripheral role, no matter how hard he tries. While it is true to say that his dramatic work as a whole is free from this structural abstractness, it would be quite wrong to see the reason for it simply in that here we are concerned with a novel or prose. It is the *type* of prose which is in question: one that resists the necessary condensation of characters and situations and thus tempts the author to repeatedly intervene, in the form of abstract rhetorics, in order to compensate by producing some 'philosophical condensation.' Prose showing affinity with Kafka—or with the works of E. Th. A. Hoffman, if one wants an earlier example—would be a very different proposition.

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two important programmatic essays—"A propos de l'existentialisme: Mise au point"[26] and *L'Existentialisme est un humanisme*[27]—in which the tone is more positive but the conceptual framework remains the same, despite the new "experience of society." The work in which the problematic features of Sartre's abstract heroism break to the fore, without however resulting in an aesthetically or conceptually viable alternative, is *Morts sans sépulture*:[28] his "failed play."[29]

And yet, when we notice the distinguishing characteristics of this phase, we should also be aware of some important continuities. We should notice not only the fact that the "ontological structure of individual praxes" remains the framework of orientation of Sartre's later writings on morality, including "Determination and Freedom" (1966), but also the structural affinities with the *Critique of Dialectical Reason* where the contrast is supposed to be the sharpest. For implicitly in *Being and Nothingness,* and explicitly in *Huis Clos,* "hell is the other." Now one of the central themes of the *Critique* is what Sartre calls "the pratico-inert:" the reign of the other and of his instruments and institutions. And we are confronted with the same gripping definition: "*hell is the pratico-inert.*"

3. *Search for Politics in the Key of Morality: 1946-1950*

If the first phase is characterised by the predominance of self-oriented subjectivity, and the second by the assertion of an abstract moral heroism (freedom as inherent in the ontological structure of being), the third phase is under the sign of the pursuit of a morally committed politics while retaining the sovereignty of the individual. It follows naturally from the earlier phases of which the third represents an extension towards real socio-historical problems, without paying much, if any, attention to institutional realities which are necessary conditions of any possible solution of those problems. Even *Les Mains sales* and *L'Engrenage* (both from 1948) which directly confront some major political issues, do this in the form of *moral dilemmas* that apparently are not amenable to a solution.

Sartre's reflections on commitment in literature are articulated with great intensity and coherence in *Baudelaire* (1946), "Forgers of Myths: the Young Playwrights of France" (1946), "The Writer's Responsibility" (1947) and, above all, *What is Literature?* (1947). His articles on politics are full of imperatives, even in their titles: "Jeunes d'Europe, unissez-vous! Faites vous-mêmes votre destin;" "Il nous faut la paix pour refaire le monde;" "Il

26. *Action* (December 29, 1944). Reprinted in CR, pp. 653-658.

27. A lecture delivered on October 28, 1945, and published as a volume by Nagel (Paris, 1946).

28. Written in 1945 and published in 1946.

29. Sartre himself condemns it, insisting that "It is a failed play. . . the destiny of the victims is absolutely determined in advance. . . The cards are already on the table. It is a very sombre play, without surprise." Interview by Jacques-Alain Miller, *Les Cahiers libres de la Jeunesse* (February 15, 1960).

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faut que nous menions cette lutte en commun,"[30] etc. He defines the fundamental task of the R.D.R. (Rassemblement Démocratique Révolutionnaire)—a shortlived political movement with which he is associated for a while—as the unification of "revolutionary demands with the idea of freedom"[31] but he has nothing to say on how to achieve it, except by unrealistically appealing directly to the consciousness of individuals, irrespective of their political affiliations.

The R.D.R. soon collapses, but Sartre's conception of politics as a moral imperative persists for quite some time. He sees the essence of the Yugoslav experience as "subjectivity...not as a formal ideal but as an effective reality."[32] And in an Introduction to Roger Stéphane's *Portrait of the Adventurer* (1950) he sings the eulogy of Lawrence of Arabia for "living to the limit an impossible condition," an "unbearable tension" of antinomies and contradictions.[33] And this is how he defines morality too: it is "for us simultaneously inevitable and impossible."[34] Should one be surprised therefore to learn that in the same period he abandons not only volume IV. of *Roads to Freedom*, but his *Morale* as well, after 2,000 pages of struggle with its "insurmountable impossibility."[35]

4. *Search for Morality in the Key of Politics: 1951-1956.*

The frustrations of the previous phase—the exasperations of the Cold War period and Sartre's feeling of impotence to make an impact in a positive direction by means of his moral-political appeals to the concerned individual—bring a major soul-searching. Its outstanding results are *Saint Genet* (1950-1952) and, above all, *Le Diable et le Bon Dieu* (Lucifer and the

30. "Youth of Europe, Unite! Make your own destiny!"; "We ought to have peace to remake the world!"; "We ought to lead this struggle together!"; etc.

31. "Le R.D.R. et le problème de la liberté," *La Pensée socialiste* (Spring 1948).

32. "Faux savants ou faux lièvres?" (1950), *Situations*, vol. VI, p. 28.

33. "Pourtant, après avoir applaudi à la victoire du militant, c'est l'aventurier que je suivrai dans la solitude. Il a vécu jusqu'au bout une condition *impossible*: fuyant en cherchant la solitude, vivant pour mourir et mourant pour vivre, convaincu de la vanité de l'action et de sa nécessité, tentant de justifier son enterprise en lui assignant un but auquel il ne croyait pas, recherchant la totale objectivité du résultat pour la diluer dans une absolute subjectivité, voulant l'échec qu'il refusait, refusant la victoire qu'il souhaitait, voulant construire sa vie comme un destin et ne se plaisant qu'aux moments infinitésimaux qui séparent la vie de la mort. Aucune solution de ces antinomies, aucune synthèse de ces contradictoires... Pourtant, au prix d'une tension insupportable, cet homme les a maintenus ensemble et tous à la fois, dans leur incompatibilité même; il a été la conscience permanente de cette incompatibilité... Je pense qu'il témoigne à la fois de l'existence absolute de l'homme et de son impossibilité absolue. Mieux encore: il prouve que c'est cette impossibilité d'être qui est la condition de son existence et que l'homme *existe* parce qu'il *est* impossible... Une cité socialiste où de futurs Lawrence seraient radicalement impossibles me semblerait stérilisée." "Portrait de l'aventurier" (1950), *Situations*, vol. VI, pp. 20-21. It is worth remembering that in 1945, in his lecture *Existentialisme est une humanisme* Sartre characterized Lawrence as an existentialist. No doubt as a result of criticism received from his socialist friends, Sartre omitted such references from the published text.

34. *Saint Genet* (Paris, 1952), p. 177.

35. *Ibid.* A substantial part of *Saint Genet* appeared in 1950 in several issues of *Les Temps Modernes*.

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Lord—1951), a magnificent play—perhaps his greatest single work: a drama we might call Sartre's *Guernica*.

The objectivity of history is discovered obliquely, under the threat of nuclear self-annihilation: "In order to prevent the world from following *its own course,* they threaten with the suppression of History through the liquidation of the historical agent."[36] Sartre throws himself into feverish political activity, in order to help prevent such ultimate disaster. He becomes a prominent figure in the World Peace Movement (writing articles, and making numerous public speeches on the subject of world peace), and on the plane of internal politics he is a passionate advocate of a new Popular Front.[37]

There are still moments when he maintains the illusions on the political power of independent individuals,[38] but he is trying to establish a close relationship with the French Communist Party. Two major publications mark this trend: *The Communists and Peace* (1952-1954), and *L'Affaire Henri Martin* (1953), apart from the play *Nekrassov* (1955) and the film scenario *The Witches of Salem* (1956). And in the field of literary studies his passionate interest is with those who consciously commit themselves. He makes this clear in an interview: "Mallarmé and Genet—they are both conscious of their commitment. . . .[Mallarmé] is our greatest poet. A wild, impassioned man. . . .His was an all-embracing commitment—social as much as poetic."[39]

Sartre's political radicalization brings also his clamorous break with Camus, and then, not so clamorously but with equal finality, with his much closer friend and collaborator, Merleau-Ponty. He is accused of abdication, which is very far from the truth. In reality, he is trying to influence the Party from the outside (as witnessed by an important critical article, "Le Réformisme et les fétiches,")[40] while insisting that in France the only viable force of mediation of working class politics is the Communist party.

As he later realizes—after the shock of the Hungarian upheaval in October 1956—he is trying to do the impossible. His characterizations of the Party are often straightforward projections of his conception of morality which needs tangible historical agencies for its realization. In the end, his effort to unify his moral ideals with political reality, despite his willingness to make some

36. "La bombe H, une arme contre l'Histoire," *Défense de la Paix* (July 1954).

37. Cf. "Ce que j'ai vu à Vienne, c'est la Paix," *Les Lettres françaises* (January 1-8, 1953); and an interview by Marcel Saporta, *Cuadernos Americanos* (January-February 1954).

38. "La pensée et la politique d'aujourd'hui nous mènent au massacre parce qu'elles sont abstraites... Chacun est l'*Autre*, l'ennemi possible, on s'en *méfie*. Il est rare, en France, mon pays, de rencontrer des hommes; on rencontre surtout des étiquettes et des noms. Ce qu'il réunit neuf et d'admirable dans ce congrès de la Paix, c'est qu'il réunit des *hommes*... Nous avons résolu, non de nous substituer à nos gouvernements, mais de communiquer entre nous, *sans eux*." Sartre's intervention at the opening session of the Vienna meeting, on December 12, 1952. Published in *Congrès des Peuples pour la Paix, Vienna, 12-19 dec. 1952* (Paris, 1953).

39. "The Purposes of Writing," *op.cit.*, p. 13.

40. *Les Temps Modernes* (February 1956).

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concessions, founders and a new crisis sets in. And just as he characterized our moral predicament earlier as ruled by "insurmountable impossibility" and simultaneous "inevitability and impossibility," he later sums up the dilemmas and antinomies of our political predicament in the same terms: "Collaboration with the C.P. is both *necessary* and *impossible*."[41] Thus Politics in the Key of Morality, and Morality in the Key of Politics—however different their emphases in determinate historical situations—come structurally to the same thing: the assertion and reassertion of fundamental antinomies.

5. *Search for the Dialectic of History: 1957-1962.*

The disappointment of his political expectations—passionately denounced in the book-length essay, "Le Fantome de Staline"[42]—raises the questions "why?" and "what are the hopes for the future?" The answer requires a searching investigation of history: its structures and determinations vis-à-vis the possibilities of individual praxis. This calls for going back to the foundations, in order "to provide a philosophical foundation for realism. Which in my opinion is possible today, and which I have tried to do all my life. In other words, how to give man both his autonomy and his reality among real objects, avoiding idealism without lapsing into a mechanistic materialism. I posed the problem in this way because I was ignorant of dialectical materialism although I should add that this later allowed me to assign certain limits to it—to validate the historical dialectic while rejecting a dialectic of nature, in the sense of a natural process which produces and resolves man into an ensemble of physical laws."[43]

This "foundation and validation" is a monumental enterprise of which *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, massive as it is, constitutes only a small part. Indeed, in an interview by Madeleine Chapsal in 1959, he optimistically announces: "The first volume will be published within a month, and the second within a year."[44] However, the second volume is abandoned after some early chapters, and the project is altogether displaced a few years later by a close investigation of "singular individuality" through the life and work of Flaubert.

Naturally, Sartre's contacts with politics are not broken off, but they assume a very different form. This is the time of the Algerian war, and he is fully involved, as an individual, in the fight against the danger of fascism, against torture, the O.A.S., etc. Similarly, the victory of the Cuban revolution is greeted by him with great enthusiasm, and he continues to defend it against all kinds of attacks. But he is a loner supporting worthy

41. Interview by Simon Blumenthal and Gérard Spitzer, *La voie communiste*, new series (June-July 1962).
42. *Les Temps Modernes* (November-December 1956-January 1957), pp. 577-697.
43. "Itinerary of a Thought," *op.cit.*, p. 46.
44. "The Purposes of Writing," *op.cit.*, p. 9.

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causes, rather than a member or associate of a political movement.

Critical self-examination—in the essays on Brecht, Gorz's *Traitor*, Nizan, and "Merleau-Ponty vivant" (1961)—takes the form of a severe indictment of his whole generation, together with its "schlerotic" institutions. The overall picture is rather sombre (likewise in his *Critique*), and *Altona* (1959)—one of his most powerful play—fits organically into it, with its examination of historical determinations in relation to human responsibility. History is questioned with a hopeful eye towards the future, but no reassurance seems to be forthcoming—at least not for the time being.

6. *Discovery of the Singular Universal: 1963 onwards.*

The publication of *Words* (1963) signals a form of peace, expressed with serenity also in the lines we have seen on salvation in literature and in politics. It goes without saying, Sartre takes a keen interest in the world of politics, especially in the "Third World," from writing an introduction to a collection of Lumumba's essays to presiding over the deliberations of the Russell Tribunal. And he defends Régis Debray—in danger of execution in Bolivia—with the same passion with which he condemns the Russian intervention in Prague. There is even a moment of great positive enthusiasm—May 1968 in Paris—when his best dreams about "imagination in power" seem to come true in his own homeland. All the same, politically he remains an isolated figure even when for reasons of solidarity he accepts the nominal directorship of the persecuted paper, *La Cause du Peuple*.[45]

Realising that the "concrete universal" is possible only in a society which is made of the same stuff, he accepts the limitations of the intellectual—in *Words*, in the essays on "L'Universel singulier," in "A Plea for Intellectuals," etc.—while questioning the conditions of his existence. By far the most important project in this respect in *The Idiot of the Family* (volumes I and II —1971, volume III—1972)—an immense work of which nearly 3,000 dense pages are already printed, and still seems to be very far from the end.

Sartre's *Critique* was supposed to be continued in the following way: "The difference between the first and second volume is this: the first is an abstract work where I show the possibilities of exchange, degradation, the pratico-inert, series, collectives, recurrence and so on. It is concerned only

45. Echoing his own earlier hopes about a broadly based yet effective political *rassemblement* (cf. his participation in the R.D.R.), he sees the militancy of *La Cause du Peuple* in a similar light: "the militants of *La Cause du Peuple* do not constitute a party. It is a political group [*rassemblement*] which can always be dissolved... This procedure allows a way out of the rigidity in which the Communist Party has imprisoned itself... Today, the Maoists criticize and break out of the notion of *leftism: they want to be the left* and to create a broad political organization." Interview by Michel-Antoine Burnier, *Actuel*, no. 28, and *Tout Va Bien* (February 20-March 20, 1973). Translated by Robert D'Amico in *Telos* (Summer 1973). Quotations from pp. 93 and 95 of the latter. It doesn't matter here that leftism is often characterized precisely by a voluntaristic 'wanting to be the left' which disregards the objective relation of forces. Nor are we concerned with the question whether or not the reality of French Maoism corresponds to Sartre's description. What matters is the reassertion of Sartre's ideal of a broadly based and extremely flexible political organization: a *rassemblement* of individuals as opposed to a highly disciplined and structured political party.

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with the theoretical possibilities of their combinations. The object of the second volume is history itself. . . .my aim will be to prove that there is a dialectical intelligibility of the singular. For ours is a singular history. . . .What I will seek to show is the dialectical intelligibility of that which is not universalizable."[46]

It is extremely difficult to imagine how one can comprehend "history itself" through these categories, since the problem of history is precisely how to universalize the singular without suppressing its specificities. By contrast, however, it is very easy indeed to see the natural transition from history to biography, namely from this Sartrean conception of history to the project on Flaubert. For the intelligibility of the non-universalizable singular calls for lived experience as the basis of its comprehension. And the reconstruction of the personage through *l'imaginaire* necessarily involved in it, gives us a "True Legend,"[47] at the highest level of complexity. Some of the fundamental structures of history itself, thus, remain hidden away in a second volume that never comes, for they don't seem to fit into the framework of Sartre's quest. But, by compensation, the existential dimensions of "singular universality" are brought to life, with great richness and penetration.

As we can see from this necessarily sketchy account, the particular phases of Sartre's development are not simply the result of external determinations, but of a complex interaction between the internal determinations of his structure of thought, and the social and political events of his epoch. The fatal immobilism of pre-war years; the immense human drama and suffering of the second world war; the cold war inaugurated by Churchill's Fulton speech after the short interval of serene rejoicing over the shared victory over Fascism; the menace of a nuclear devastation in the aftermath of the establishment of NATO soon followed by the outbreak of the Korean War; the explosion of the inner contradictions of the Stalinist system; and the new dynamism of the "Third World" gathering its own momentum (with Algeria, Cuba, Vietnam, etc.)—each coincide, roughly, with a phase in Sartre's development for which they provide a broad historical and political framework. But the *way* in which Sartre proceeds, and the *distance* he is able to travel, is determined by the innermost nature of his vision itself, as we could clearly perceive in his transitions from self-oriented subjectivity

46. "Itinerary of a Thought," *op.cit.*, pp. 58-59.

47. Sartre calls it a "true novel." "Writing on Flaubert is enough for me by way of fiction—it might indeed be called a novel. Only I would like people to say that it was a *true novel*. I try to achieve a certain level of comprehension of Flaubert by means of hypotheses. Thus I use fiction—guided and controlled, but nonetheless fiction—to explore why, let us say, Flaubert wrote one thing on the 15th March and the exact opposite on the 21st March, to the same correspondent, without worrying about the contradiction. My hypotheses are in this sense a sort of invention of the personage." "Itinerary of a Thought," *op.cit.*, p. 55. In this "totalization of a singular temporalization," Sartre proceeds from the material available on Flaubert, filling in the gaps, as they appear, with the novelist's imagination. Paradoxically, however, the more 'totalizing' his aim, the more scarce and inadequate the documentary evidence appears and, consequently, the more the fictional-novelistic elements tend to predominate.

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ultimately leading, through the intermediary forms of active (one might even say activist) moral and political commitment, to the problematic individuality of the "singular universal."

On the surface, changes not only are in evidence, but they assume the striking form of apparently radical breaks: every phase is *abandoned* in its turn, with conscious public declarations by Sartre as to the "why?" of the clamorous discontinuities. But if we look closer, we realize that the succession of striking changes unfolds a fundamental *continuity*. Trying to understand Sartre through his breaks—which on the whole are confined to the political level—is like explaining the nature of the tides by the prevalent currents of wind. Just as the tide is understood through the force of the moon, and not by the power of the wind even if hurricane strong, Sartre's development is explained by the stubborn continuity of his fundamental quest. If the "breaks" were the determining feature, how could one account for the lasting validity of the works produced in the preceding phases? The fact is, however, that Sartre's advances do not "invalidate" his earlier results but essentially preserve them, both in his world of literature and in his philosophical thought. He is a man who perceives the contradictions of the world around him in the form of *dilemmas, antinomies and paradoxes*. His praise of the "adventurer" is not a temporary lapse but an expression of his inner tensions which remain a permanent dimension of his lifework. He is the man who "keeps together the unbearable tension" of the perceived contradictions as *insuperable antinomies*. For the unresolved tension—through all its transformations—drives him forward and produces the lasting validity of his major works: *Nausea, L'Imaginaire, Being and Nothingness, Flies, Huis Clos, Les Mains Sales, Lucifer and the Lord, Saint Genet, Altona, Critique of Dialectical Reason*, and *The Idiot of the Family*.[48]

48. Of course Sartre's works are inherently problematical. But not in a way that the later works might be considered less problematical than the earlier ones. *Roads to Freedom* is not a more 'mature' novel than *Nausea* (in the sense in which Thomas Mann's *Magic Mountain* is incomparably more mature than his *Royal Highness*), nor is *Critique of Dialectical Reason* more 'mature' than *Being and Nothingness* in the field of philosophy, or *The Idiot of the Family* than *Saint Genet* in the field of biography. In the later works there are some new principles at work—alongside with a great many they share with the earlier ones—that's all. It is Sartre's lifework as a whole that is problematical, and not one or two of its limited phases that might be characterized in relation to one another in terms of 'radical breaks.' We cannot stress enough, Sartre—in some ways like Picasso—produces not so much 'representative works' as a *representative lifework*. Thus it does not matter that the particular works are not paradigm summations of the writer, in the sense in which *A la recherche du temps perdu* and *The Magic Mountain* certainly are. It does not matter that the particular works (even *Guernica*) are more problematical than the ones which, by contrast, are constituted on the basis of a most careful sifting and elaboration of the given moments of reality. If Picasso and Sartre have to move on from a particular kind of synthesis to something on the face of it quite different, it is because what is involved in their quest is a type of totalization which always refers to the artist's lifework as its immediate ground. Theirs is a singular form of subjectivity in comparison to Proust and Thomas Mann. The former produces his synthesis by dissolving the world of objects in his 'interiority' and subjectivity; the latter makes the writer's subjectivity quietly recede behind a carefully reconstructed objectivity. In Sartre and in Picasso subjectivity is always in evidence but uses as its vehicle the world of objects—not to subjectivize it but to 'nihilate' it (to use Sartre's expression) in the course of depiction. As a result of this dialectical process of 'objectivization-

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In 1945 he declares: "Mathieu's childhood...doesn't matter"[49]—namely in *his* vision of the world; which means that however much it matters in real life ruled by "Bad Faith," it *ought not* matter. In 1959, through the play *Altona*, he shows how the past conditions the present, commenting on the sad reality whereby "the characters are all the time commanded and held back by the past, as they are by the others. It is because of the past—of their own and of all the others'—that they act in a certain way. *As in real life.*"[50] The contrast is as striking as it is misleading. For again he appeals to the "viewpoint of the future," and urges men to look at themselves "from outside," in order to be able to notice that it *ought not* to be like that at all. As he tries to demonstrate also in "Determination and Freedom" six years later, there is absolutely nothing in the "ontological structure of being" to make them behave like that. If they do, it is because of social and political determinations and their "interiorizations" by individuals—but they *ought not* to. Witness and participant, he warns us that "we shall be judged"[51] by the future, our future. Thus we *ought to act* in accordance with the "ontological structure" of our being (in relation to which Mathieu's or anyone else's past really "doesn't matter"), and not the way we actually do. The most striking continuity beneath the surface of an apparent break.

The moon that determines the movements of Sartre's tidal waves is his radical quest for unfolding the fundamental dimensions of being, in a world of distracting compromises and temptations, offering lines of "easy resistance" which lead towards disaster through unfounded self-reassurance and the promise of comfort. This is not his way, and ought not to be ours, he

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nihilation'—a first cousin of Brecht's 'Verfremdungseffekt'—the lifework is enriched, paradoxically at the expense of the particular work which it uses 'to stand on its own shoulders,' so to speak. We are captivated by the *process* of nihilating objectification that produces the lifework and not necessarily by the particular *results*. Just how many of the individual works survive in the long run is quite irrelevant. What matters is the constitution of a representative lifework: a singular fusion of subjectivity and objectivity. If we want a parallel from the past—keeping in mind, of course, all the necessary differences and specificities—we may think of Voltaire, with his all-embracing and overpowering negativity. Situated at another juncture of great socio-historical transformation and transition, Voltaire subjects the old order to the most devastating criticism and satire—quite unlike Rousseau, who complements his radical negativity with anticipations of a new order to come. As we all know well, only a tiny fraction of Voltaire's immense lifework is read today. But if we try to imagine the eighteenth century without his contribution, we must immediately realize how much the poorer it would be for that.

49. Interview by Dominique Aury, *Les Lettres françaises* (November 24, 1945).

50. Interview by Madeleine Chapsal, *L'Express* (October 10, 1959).

51. Interview by Robert Kanters, *L'Express* (September 17, 1959). The theme of 'being judged' appears many times in Sartre's writings, including an interview with Kenneth Tynan in which he says: "The point is that we know we shall be judged, and not by the rules we use to judge ourselves." And he adds: "in that thought there is *something horrific.*" Kenneth Tynan, *Tynan Right and Left* (London, 1967), p. 304. Thus there is always something threatening, sinister, tragic on the horizon. Even when Sartre declares that he has "always been an optimist, indeed too much of an optimist," he does this in conjunction with sombre metaphysical statements: "The Universe remains dark. We are sinister animals." And although he insists that alienation, exploitation and hunger are the evils we should be concerned about because they "relegate to the second plane the metaphysical evil," the latter remains menacingly looming in the background in the Sartrean "dark Universe." Interview by Jacqueline Piatier, *Le Monde* (April 18, 1964).

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tells us, pursuing the task of persuasion with tireless passion.

"*The marvellous unity of this life is its intransigence in the quest for the absolute*"[52]—writes Sartre about his great friend, Giacometti. There can be no better way of summing up the movement and the direction of his own lifework. Such a quest for the absolute is not something mysterious and transcendental. On the contrary, it is very precise and tangible. It means a radical definition of a man's fundamental project in a sense which necessarily implies going *to the limit* whatever the limit may appear to be to the individual in question at any particular time in the course of his development.

Sartre's heroes—Mallarmé, Genet, Nizan, Fucik, Giacometti, Hikmet, and in fiction, Julien Sorel—are men who explore their predicament to the limit. Similarly, his anti-heroes—to name but Baudelaire and Flaubert—are those who refuse to do so, thus condemning themselves to the consequences of their fundamental choice: an escape into the imaginary and the acceptance of alienation. "What interests me about Flaubert is that he *refused to go to the limit*"[53]—writes Sartre, clearly indicating the moral sense of his painfully long involvement in the subject. It is "going to the limit" he himself opts for and champions with single-minded determination and intransigence, insisting that *the* question is: "what have you made of your life?"[54] Success is measured by one's ability to establish "the *real connection* with others, with oneself and with death"[55] as opposed to "the reassuring, dreary world of the inauthentic"[56] in which men are trapped by "a moiling of flabby, many-tentacled *evasions*" [57]

Whatever one may think of Sartre's achievements, no one can accuse him of evasions. Probing the limits, irrespective of the consequences, this is the essential defining characteristic of his lifework. His road—from self-oriented subjectivity to the problematic individuality of "the singular universal"—leads over territories full of explosive dilemmas which he depicts in the most paradoxical form. "There is a morality of politics—a difficult subject, and never clearly treated—and when politics must betray its morality, to choose morality is to betray politics. Now find your way out of that one! Particularly when the politics has taken as its goal bringing about the reign of the human."[58] Much of Sartre's lifework is spent on identifying such dilemmas and paradoxes, even if he cannot offer solutions to them. For, again, the innermost nature of these dilemmas and paradoxes is that they require facing up to the limits as the vital condition of their identification and possible solution. It is this passionate search for the limits which determines the fundamental continuity of Sartre's lifework through all its transformations.

52. "La Recherche de l'absolu" (1948), *Situations*, vol. III, p. 293.
53. Interview by Michel-Antoine Burnier, *op.cit.*, p. 99.
54. "La Question" (1965), *Théâtre vivant* (September 1965).
55. Preface for *Portrait of a Man Unknown* by Nathalie Sarraute (1948), English translation by Maria Jolas, *Situations* (Greenwich, Conn., 1965), p. 139.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 141.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 139.
58. "Merleau-Ponty" (1961), *Situations, op.cit.*, p. 185.

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Anamnestic Solidarity: The Proletariat and its *Manes*

by Christian Lenhardt

The thesis to be explored in this paper comes dangerously close to being a violation of the Marxist "prohibition of graven images." The tendency toward that sort of apostasy is intentional. While accepting in principle the taboo Marxism has traditionally put in the way of speculative idealizations and idolizations of a post-capitalist future, I think it is justifiable, even necessary, to look at the notion of solidarity by deliberately choosing a vantage point that transcends the limits of both contemporary action and historical retrospection. Finding out what solidarity is for socialist theory and practice, requires a teleological perspective to a much greater degree than determining, say, the shape of economic production and circulation under socialist auspices. The latter greatly depends on contingent elements governing particular places and times, to the point where it is becoming increasingly difficult to speak of socialism as a unitary phenomenon. The many roads to socialism are in fact not only that: different roads to the same goal; they are probably roads to eventually many stable (but never terminal) states. That inevitably affects the status of Marxism as a unifying theory of economic development. Marxist theory finds itself less and less capable of keeping intact the universalistic nature of its economic propositions, tending as they do toward diferentiation and ad-hoc modification.

What remains of Marxism as a theoretical system, therefore, is the residue of philosophy, which "stays alive because the moment of its realization was passed up" (Adorno). The existence of what is loosely called Hegelian Marxism gives proof of that entropy. It is this necessary historical regression which enables us to reopen the discussion of solidarity in the context of the Marxian philosophy of history rather than in the context of a pragmatic theory of action.

The juxtaposition of teleology and action theory is meant to be polemical. I believe that only a small minority of Marxist theoreticians have had a correct understanding of the complexities and hidden meanings of the idea of solidarity; most of them have subordinated it to considerations of effective revolutionary strategy. In particular, I will try to provide an immanent critique of the concept of solidarity, as it has emerged in Marxist thought, assimilating and systematizing a handful of sporadic remarks by Walter Benjamin and Max Horkheimer. The term immanent critique denotes the fact that *by Marxian standards* the notion of solidarity must take on a different shape from that which it has been given in mainstream Marxism. The upshot of this re-examination is a kind of spiritualistic revision. This is a

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loaded phrase, but one which I do not particularly fear because the argument advanced here has no truck with theology or Hegel's absolute spirit. It is materialistic in that the focus remains on human beings whose interrelations, *even* those between the living and the dead, are seen to be mediated by economic givens. Just as the theologians did not succeed in discrediting Marx's positive humanism by labelling it a "religion of mankind," so it will not be enough for orthodox Marxists to try to discredit the following analysis by dragging out the epithet of "religious Marxism." To do so, would be to evade the issue.

Looking ahead, I will argue that conventional understandings of what solidarity is all about in the context of a secular theory of man and history have implied a wholesale erasure of memory. No compelling theoretical reasons have been advanced why this should be so. In fact, the amnesic posture has hardly been noticed at all, let alone defended, by those adopting it. Marxism is a case in point. I will argue that while the official text of the Marxian oeuvre is hostile to what we may term an anamnestic concept of solidarity, the deeper motives of historical materialism favor it. One word of caution, however, to the reader. What follows is not in the first place or mainly supposed to be a contribution to Marx scholarship but a systematic piece which is fearlessly revisionistic, as I mentioned before. However, I am quite aware that the argument put forth here has something distinctly unfinished about it. Much additional probing is required to bring out and decipher the faded inscription on the palimpsest of historical materialism.

I.

Whoever defines socialism as a social system based on a principle of universal brotherhood, or something to that effect, is immediately put on the defensive by Marx himself who in no uncertain terms castigated that "gibberish about universal love of man!"[1] Nonetheless, this must not prompt the socialist to abandon that notion, for Marx's often tactical remarks on the subject tend to obscure his position. What communism needs now—at a moment when it is no more than an idea—is an upsurge of hatred, not universal love: that is why any abstract affirmation of brotherhood meets with Marx's disapproval. Fundamentally, the identification of universal brotherhood or solidarity as a defining characteristic of socialism is of course acceptable to Marx. The pathos of the terms is absent from most of his works, but not the pungency of the idea itself. For instance, the conclusion of the review of Bauer's *The Jewish Question* is a disquisition on solidarity, and so are the conceptual adumbrations of communism in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*. To put it simply, socialist man *qua* collective personality will identify, not with his family, not with his nation, not even with his class, but with the whole of mankind. It is the proletariat which effects this change from a particularistic to a universalistic identification, a

1. Section on Saint Max in the *German Ideology*.

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change which the ideologues of the French Revolution had falsely believed to have achieved. The objective precondition of such a change is that all the forces of egoism (particularism) are focused in one social entity, opposed by the forces of universal emancipation. In Marx's own terms, "For a *popular revolution* and the *emancipation of a particular class* of civil society to coincide, for *one* class to represent the whole of society, another class must concentrate in itself all the evils of society, a particular class must embody and represent a general obstacle and limitation. A particular social sphere must be regarded as the *notorious crime* of the whole society, so that emancipation from this sphere appears as a general emancipation."[2] The proletariat is, emphatically, "a class which is the dissolution of all classes" because it suffers "wrong in general." And just as it suffers no particular wrong, so it seeks no particular redress. Marx concludes by saying: "There must be formed a sphere of society which claims no *traditional* status but only a human status; a sphere...which is, in short, a *total loss* of man (*der völlige Verlust des Menschen*) and which can only regain itself by a *total recovery of man* (*durch die völlite Wiedergewinnung des Menschen*)."[3]

Bottomore intuitively translated "total recovery of man" as "total redemption of humanity," thereby committing himself to an interpretation which I favor but which cannot be taken for granted at the outset. The term redemption has religious overtones which *Wiedergewinnung* does not have. To the limited extent, then, to which the present paper has any philological and text-critical ambitions, they turn on the question of what it meant for Marx to speak of the "total recovery of man." It is tempting to foreshorten the complexities of a materialist notion of total emancipation by reducing it to a phenomenology of liberated man, who is yet to be, but who, once he is, will embody all characteristics of the human species in himself. In reality, mankind is an ensemble of concrete historical beings, both living and dead, of whom only the lucky few achieve the status of emancipated samples of a species which has matured to full growth.

To elaborate on this point, let us introduce a simple generational typology where G_1 stands for the generation of enslaved predecessors (*Vorwelt*), G_2 for the generation of enslaved contemporaries who, according to Marx, will emancipate themselves, (*Mitwelt*), and G_3 for the generation of emancipated successors (*Nachwelt*).[4] It is quite conceivable, albeit not likely, that Marx saw the solidarity of a liberated mankind simply in terms of an interpersonal principle of harmony amongst the members of G_3. This would reduce the exploited predecessors (G_1) and those who struggle for the revolutionary cause (G_2) to the status of nonentities or dead wood in the evolution of

2. "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right," in Karl Marx, *Early Writings*, edited by T.B. Bottomore, New York: McGraw Hill, 1964, p. 56, Marx's emphases. Cf. *Marx-Engels Werke*, Berlin, 1965-1972, v. 1, p. 388.

3. *MEW* v. 1, p. 390, Marx's emphases, my translation. Cf. Bottomore, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

4. The terms are borrowed from Alfred Schutz (e.g. *The Structures of the Life-World*, Northwestern University Press, 1973, pp. 84-92), but not much else is, as the reader will readily notice.

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mankind, primitive stages which had to be overcome, and whose existence had better be forgotten. Many contemporary readers of Marx, scientistic and humanistic ones alike, pretend that this ahistorical view of human liberation is Marx' own. By not reflecting on the problem, they imply that total oblivion is the precondition of bliss. According to this view, the human species can only actualize itself when it overcomes the debilitating ballast of remembrance, i.e. when it *forgets* its historical genesis. The progressive, forward-looking humanist who deems himself inspired by Marx projects a state of affairs in which men can enjoy without remorse the fruits of becoming history has laid at their door-step.

Is Marxism really the theory and practice of emancipation from remembrance? Is it a synonym for a pervasive world-historical amnesia? Is it so entranced by the prospects of the future that it believes an emancipated mankind could accept the sacrificial self-abnegation of "prehistoric" man without sadness and without scruples? Or is there not in it, must there not be, a deep sense of remorse, perhaps guilt, which is apt to spoil the joy of living in the good society? As far as I know, one of the very few Marxists of note who was more than tenuously sensitive to this retrospective-traditionalistic implication of Marxism was Walter Benjamin. He writes in his *Geschichtsphilosophische Thesen*: "The repository of historical knowledge is the oppressed and struggling class itself. In Marx's work this class appears as the last of the enslaved classes, as a vengeant class bringing to an end the work of emancipation in the name of generations of slain human beings. This awareness, revived once more for a brief time by the Spartakus movement, has always been objectionable to democratic socialism. Within a span of three decades, social democracy succeeded in wiping out the memory of a Blanqui whose iron rhetoric had shaken up the last century. This same social democracy wanted nothing more dearly than to assign to the working class the role of a redeemer of future generations. In so doing it severed the sinew of the proletariat's greatest strength. Under the auspices of democratic socialism, the working-class soon forgot what it is to hate and to sacrifice oneself. Both hatred and the will to self-sacrifice are fueled by the image of enslaved ancestors rather than by the ideal of emancipated grandchildren." [5] If one reads it quickly, this passage seems to contain nothing remarkable. The emphatic evocation of hatred has been part of the socialist vocabulary since the *Communist Manifesto*, so much so that the fiercer socialists of the nineteenth century paradoxically put their poetic inspiration in the service of this idea.[6] Nor was it exactly unheard of in the 1930's to berate democratic

5. Walter Benjamin, *Schriften*, Frankfurt, 1955, vol. 1, p. 501, my translation. In English: Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations*, New York, 1968, p. 262.

6. Thus G. Herwegh sublimated revolutionary affect in a programmatic poem which seems to herald not only a revolution of hatred but also the coming of socialist realism: "Die Liebe kann erlösen nicht, die Liebe nicht erretten. Halt du, o Hass, dein jüngst Gericht, Brich du, o Hass, die Ketten...Wir haben lang genug geliebt und wollen endlich hassen." Quoted in Joseph Dietzgen, "The Religion of Social Democracy," in *Philosophical Essays*, Chicago, 1914, p. 127.

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socialists for treading too softly. What distinguishes Benjamin's aphorism from all other Marxist broadsides against the democratic left is the manner in which he transcends the level of instrumental considerations (how to generate hatred) by putting the question back squarely into a teleological context.

In addition, Benjamin raises a philological issue, only to drop it instantly with uncharacteristic *hauteur*: there is, he says, a notable contrast between Marx and Blanqui, on the one hand, and democratic socialism, on the other, with respect to their opinions of the world-historical meaning of revolution. One will search in vain for even the most tentative endeavor by Benjamin to substantiate this thesis textually. And, given some understanding of Marxian texts, one will of course doubt for good reasons that such an interpretation can ever be documented. Except perhaps in his early years, Marx never would have stopped to think about such an inflated question as whether the proletariat would make the revolution for the dead or the yet-to-be-born. If asked, he probably would have replied that they make it for themselves. And this would take care of Mr. Benjamin's niceties.

Fortunately it would not. Benjamin's concern for apparent subtleties must not be brushed aside with a gesture of impatience. He was not able to quote Marx, but he may have understood Marx better than many a professional Marxologist. He sensed that what he called remembrance (*Eingedenken*) and redemption were cornerstones of a materialistic depth-structure which had yet to be unearthed and shown to exist.[7]

The question of orthodoxy apart—I will return to it later—Benjamin addresses the fundamental problem of the relationship between generational types. According to him, there is little virtue in the contemporaries sacrificing themselves for posterity. Rather their proper outlook and motivation is an empathetic regard for the exploitation of the dead predecessors. And if G_2 feels that it has a debt toward G_1 because the ancestors provided, however blindly and unknowingly, the historical opportunity for a great cataclysmic overthrow of the aggregate conditions of unfreedom, how much greater must be the debt owed by G_3 to the memory of G_1 and G_2, and yet G_3 cannot pay it off in the same self-sacrificial manner in which G_2 pays off its debt to G_1. The members of the humanized socialistic society enjoy their social praxis, their labor becoming creative, and so on. But how can this daily routine give rise to the same kind of intergenerational redemption of debts which G effected by making a revolution of vengence? If a redemptive attitude is part and parcel of the idea of emancipated mankind, is it not rather an unenviable destiny to belong to the successor generation (G_3), for what can it do, practically and existentially, to equalize the burden of injustice borne by its predecessors (G_1 and G)? Must it not passively accept the gifts of the dead, as

7. It still remains something of a mystery how Benjamin, who otherwise had an almost compulsive bent for compiling quotes—to the point where he could seriously conceive a major work on bourgeois thought and art in the 19th century that was to be a monumental collage of quotations was able to be so cavalier about sources when it came to expostulating on as controversial a figure as Marx.

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gods were said to accept the hecatombs of those who believed in them? If that were the point of the revolution, its alleged humanization would be tantamount to the deification of man: a perversion of the notion of species being. All conceptions of a "truly humanized" collectivity, which do no more than project a systematic synthesis of labor and play, of plenitude and self-restraint, of desublimation and a new morality, and what not, are plainly a-historical and, I believe, un-Marxian. They operate with the premise that only visible suffering creates a barrier to happiness, and once this visible suffering is gone, a boundlessly affirmative appropriation and understanding of the world become possible.

I should not want to be understood as reiterating the old saw about how Marx' idea of historical emancipation is so discontinuous—i.e. when he posits the possibility of a post-history—that he must have been an eschatologist to believe in it. I am saying that it is unconscionably glib to impute to Marx the view that the man of the future can be *ingenuous* in his practical appropriation of the world. The evils of prehistory may have been overcome, but they will linger on in the collective *anamnesis* of liberated mankind. They must so linger, or else the achievement of true solidarity is just another form of one-dimensional experience where enjoyment of the Thing and the Other is as unreflective as it is under conditions of late-capitalist affluence. For posterity, gratification is mixed with the guilt of those who "have made it." In class-society, such a sense of guilt does not exist; even charity is dispensed only because it saves taxes. But only a-historical humanists believe that charity becomes superfluous in a society in which all are free and equal. Even in this society there are those who did not make it. Their presence is that of shadows. To pretend that these ancestral shadows have no place in the sun-lit world of solidarity is to be unkind, inhuman.

II.

The critical theory of the Frankfurt School has often been described as being pessimistic in outlook. All too often this essentially correct, albeit banal, assessment is based narrowly upon critical theory's analysis of contemporary society, its belief in the ineluctability of commodity fetishism and technological domination, as well as its reluctance to encourage or side with revolutionary causes. From what I have argued so far, it follows that the pessimism emanating from the works of the Frankfurt School has a more recondite source than that. Besides the intellectual factors just mentioned, there are others which while not so noticeable are at least as powerful. One of these is the aporia of redemptive solidarity.

On the surface the reason why critical theory refuses to break with the posture of "mere" thought is that reflection is still the only form of resistance, the union of theory and practice being a facile slogan by which critical intellectuals must not be seduced. Below the surface there is the much more harrying realization that, not only must we not hope for anything, but we cannot even imagine what it is we should hope for. For instance, and this I

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take to be crucial, a state of human solidarity to whose realization collective energies, be they reformist or revolutionary, might be devoted defies conception. Affirmative thought is anathema because consistent dreams are impossible, quite apart from the sorry fact that, if they were possible, they would be "mere" dreams. The mankind of the future with its inherited memories of the past cannot even begin to think about what it means to correct historical injustice. The past is fundamentally incorrigible because, as Horkheimer puts it, "there can be no *quid pro quo* for past injustice. The suffering of dead generations will find no recompense."[8] In the last analysis, Benjamin's idea of world-historical revenge is only another variant of the same pessimism. For how on earth can those shadowy ancestral figures be made to share in the triumph of the revolution? Moreover as I have pointed out repeatedly, the difficulties of the problem become compounded when we look at the deplorable situation of G_3, the successor generation, which has everything, and owes nothing, and which in order to live nobly must *learn* that it owes everything and possesses nothing.

Horkheimer himself vacillates between the recognition that "the solidarity of all living beings,"[9] however distant and utopian it appears to us at present, would still be a *pis-aller* when we finally achieve it, and the progressive forward looking attitude of the secularizer in the Marxist tradition. It is in the latter spirit that he writes: "...Good will, solidarity with the poor, and striving for a better world—all these have cast off their religious appearances. The typical attitude of the martyrs is no longer that of suffering but that of the deed which wants to bring about the happiness of human beings coming after them and for which they are ready to die."[10] In this passage Horkheimer wants to illustrate the importance of religious and spiritual forces, i.e. martyrdom, for revolutionary praxis. No sooner has he spoken affirmatively of good will, solidarity, and sacrifice than he redresses the balance by denouncing the idea of perfect justice. Perfect justice, he writes, "can never be completely realized in history. For even if a better society takes the place of the present disorder...it will not redress the penury of the past nor the injustice done to non-human nature. We are dealing here with an illusion, a kind of artificial inflation of conceptions deriving in all probability from primitive exchange. That every man should have his own and that each is born into the world with the same right to happiness, these are generalizations of economic rules beyond any reasonable limit. However, the motive for going beyond the possible and rebelling vainly against reality is constitutive of man, as he has come to be in the course of history. What sets progressive man off from his traditionalistic predecessor is not that he rejects that image (of

8. Max Horkheimer, "Materialismus und Metaphysik," in *Kritische Theorie*, Frankfurt, 1968, vol. 1, p. 47.

9. Horkheimer, "Zu Theodor Haeckers 'Der Christ und die Geschichte'," in *ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 373.

10. Horkheimer, "Gedanke zur Religion," in *Ibid.*, vol 1, p. 375.

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universal happiness) but that he knows it cannot be realized."[11] Again, beyond the problem of realizability there is the even more intractable difficulty of an impasse in the notion of universal happiness itself. There is no consistently materialistic way of conceiving an ideal collectivity which would not belie its name. It is one thing to agree that the ostracism of the predecessors is a wrong requiring redress, but it is another to marshal the intellectual powers of imagination by which ways of redress would first be construed in thought. For so-called scientific socialism, it was a matter of deep concern that some socialists stooped to day-dreaming. They were branded as utopian socialists, purveyors of escapism, whose lack of practicality had to be tirelessly exposed. Now if we follow Horkheimer's reasoning, to utopianize is to succumb to an irrepressible compulsion with which man can and must live reflexively. But even this is putting it too positively. In truth, secular man's fantasies turn into nightmares, puzzles which haunt him, for the good is unthinkable, undreamable. Critical theory does not articulate this last point in so many words but the message is clear. We have reached a nadir of despair. And let no one say that there is an easy way out.

Horkheimer sums up his own views on the paradox of anamnestic solidarity in an interpretive statement, which asserts that "a metaphysical sadness pervades the writings of the great materialists"[12] and that these materialists knew something of the "unlimited loneliness of man."[13] As in the case of Benjamin's forthright imputation to Marx of an anamnestic rationale for the revolution, the authenticity of Horkheimer's reading of materialism may be debatable. However, the kind of stylistic quality both are talking about may not announce itself in so many words and in bold-face type. If it is indeed present, for instance in Marxism, then it is so as a latent and implicit dimension at most. Emancipated man is a historical totality, a particular encapsulating the history of his species. This is a rather monstrous and unbelievable conception at first glance. For how can man, the man of the end-time, live in the knowledge of his privileged historical status without going mad? By materialistic standards, this man is emphatically secular. Can his concept of the redemption of *others* be anything else but secular? "What has happened to past generations, no future can mend. They will never be called up to be rewarded in eternity. Nature and society have left their evil imprint on them and the idea of a Last Judgment, reflective though it may be of the infinite longing of the repressed and the dying, is but a residue of primitive thought which fails to understand the insignificant role man has been playing in natural history and which falsely humanizes the universe."[14]

If one were to single out one prominent feature that typifies humanist thought as it has come down to us through the Enlightenment and the 19th

11. *Loc. cit.*
12. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 372.
13. *Loc. cit.*
14. Horkheimer, "Zu Bergsons Metaphysik der Zeit," in *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 198.

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century, it would have to be the emphasis on self-reliance and the denial of otherworldly salvation. However, we can see now that the refusal to believe in redemption after death does not redound to the humanist's unmixed advantage. There is no eschatological drift in history any more which redeems the dead and the living. Instead, for the humanist there is progress which has left many victims behind lining its path. But with his chiefly prospective vision he is in danger of committing the sin of amnesic pride. By contrast, the humanist of true inspiration does look behind himself. What he sees are desolate scenes of human degradation. Unable to administer to his ancestors the traditional comfort of redemptive certainty ("you will be saved"), he cannot but feel utterly helpless and hopeless. Somehow the compass of his acquired sense of solidarity is too narrow to embrace what has disappeared from view.

In this situation, the maturing of historical consciousness is one of the possible remedies. "Amid this vast indifference, human consciousness can become the repository of past injustice. It alone will not accept past suffering in a posture of resignation. . . Now that the trust in the eternal will soon be gone, history represents the only means whereby the contemporaries can listen to the accusations of their predecessors."[15] Our linear progress-conscious minds are wont to consider relevant only that kind of historical consciousness that helps us build an allegedly new world. Progressivists of all ages and shades, and this includes Marxists, were interested in developing a historical consciousness solely for the instrumental purpose of arming themselves for evolutionary or revolutionary change. What we can learn from neo-Marxist critical theory is that it becomes imperative, especially for Marxists and especially under materialist auspices, to reflect upon the power of remembrance, which is the power of the historical being called man. Perhaps the task of the historian is not to provide us with ammunition and lessons to learn but simply—or rather not so simply—to lend an ear to the plaintive voices of ancestors, thus creating a basis for anamnestic solidarity with them.

Benjamin made a similar point in discussing the historical methodology of Dilthey. Benjamin takes a dim view of the role Dilthey assigns to empathy in historical research. Unless Verstehen is taken to mean that we keep alive the knowledge of how badly the predecessors have been victimized, it is a spurious approach. Identifying the the victor, Dilthey's historian "enjoys" the history which he selectively understands, thus "transforming the desire to redeem the past into a desire for intellectual pleasure."[16] Benjamin realizes the hybrid quality of true historical consciousness. It is rational-reconstructive, on the one hand, and emotionally and sympathetically committed, on the other. "Remembrance can make of the unfinished (i.e. happiness) something that is finished and, conversely, it can make the finished (i.e. past suffering) into

15. *Loc. cit.*
16. Rolf Tiedemann, *Studien zur Philosophie Walter Benjamins*, Frankfurt 1965, p. 118.

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something that is unfinished. This is theology. Yet in remembering we gain the knowledge that we must not try to understand history in fundamentally a-theological terms, just as we would not want to write history in straightforwardly theological terms."[17] Whether Benjamin is right in using the loaded term theology in this context seems to be a matter of debate. Is he not putting before us a contradiction in terms: a theology without god, a religion without supernatural cult objects? Benjamin is right at least in the sense that the kind of anamnestic redemption he has in mind is not only poles apart from the ordinary business of the average historian, past or present, but full of traces of ancient "paganism." The new historiography is theological in so far as it has a sense of good-and-evil which informs the materialistic plot and colors the redemptive telling of the story. Much more than Dilthey's interpretive empathizer, Benjamin's anamnestic historian—which is everyone in a state of freedom—cannot grasp the past unless he literally grasps and shoulders its ancestral burden of martyrdom and repression. With this, we reach the highest possible stage of a materialistic unification of theory and practice.

III.

Ancestor worship is considered to be a primitive, but not entirely primordial form of religion. It has been found to exist, at one point or another, in many cultures. For economy's sake, I will single out the case of Roman antiquity. In Ancient Rome before the Republic and well into Republican times, the belief in the *di manes* was widespread. The word is almost a *plurale tantum* in latin, the singular form *deus manis* emerging only quite late. This is significant because it points to the collective nature of the ancestral dead. They were not considered to be individuals but belonged to, and were effective as, a group. The Romans generally thought of them as good Gods. Not that they were beneficent in the literal sense of the word, but they were not tricky and malicious either. As time went on, this view of the *di manes* changed to include a greater element of fear. From then on propitiation was indicated, for the *manes* did tend to meddle in the affairs of the living.[18]

In its earliest stage, however, Roman ancestor worship seems to have been

17. From the unpublished manuscript entitled "Passagen," Copy-book N 8, quoted in Tiedemann, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

18. "When a man died he went over into the *di manes*. . .entering their ranks and losing all individuality and all specific earthly relations, except that when the *manes* returned to earth they visited the living members of the family to which they had belonged on earth; and thus the family idea, so fundamental in the social structure of Rome, triumphed over the grave, and possessed an immortality which the individual failed to obtain. The inclusiveness of the term *di manes* is seen in the fact that the gods who ruled over the dead, as well as their subjects, the dead themselves as gods, were all included in the phrase, though it is equally significant of the mass-idea that the actual gods of the dead. . .never rose to great individual prominence until the Greek Pluto-Persephone came into Rome as *Dis-Proserpina*." *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, New York, s.a., vol. 1, p. 462.

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inspired more by pity for, than fear of, the dead. Like the Greeks, the Romans believed that since the dead were somehow restlessly roaming about the lower world, something had to be done to bring them tranquillity. Various forms of ministrations were being practiced to achieve that state of rest. Once a dead person was safely housed in the lower world, his spirit could not return except during special festivals marked off for this purpose in the Roman calendar. One of these holiday periods was called *dies parentales* or *parentalia*. The *parentalia*, which began on February 13, lasted nine days. During this time temples were kept closed, marriages could not take place, people decorated the gravestones of their departed and made small offereings to them (*parentationes*). The last day of this holiday season was the *feralia*, which unlike the previous eight days was a public holiday, the others being private ones.[19] A somewhat more propitiatory attitude surrounded a similar three-day festival called *lemuria* which was observed in May.

It is only at the end of the Republican period that the term *di manes* begins to refer to the soul or spirit of one individual. Under the Empire, this individualization of the *manes* concept continues and becomes more pronounced.[20] Epitaphs now tend to begin with the dedication *Dis manibus illius*. . .(to the *manes* of that particular man. . .), which points to the fact that soul or spirit was attributed to a particular person.

Historical scholarship has been very sceptical toward the hypothesis that the Romans possessed a vivid conception of life after death. This scepticism is legitimate, as far as the pre-imperial Roman cults are concerned; and even later under the Empire, it is difficult to determine whether the individualization of the concept of *manes* entailed the idea of immortality of the soul, such individualization being the logical precondition of any belief in immortality. To what extent Christian spiritualism was anticipated by the Roman phenomenon of *manes* worship remains an open question. Most philologists realize that there is a clear distinction between *genius* and *manes*, both of which are terms designating the soul. The first term refers to the soul of the living person, the second to the soul of the dead. To the Roman, these spiritual entities were not the same. Therefore, if the spirit of the dead is something distinct, there can be no clear-cut belief in immortality, as in Christian religion.[21]

To sum up, the case of Roman ancestral worship is perhaps atypical of ancestor worship in general in that the Romans—the earlier the more—invested their vision of the *manes* with benign and lovable qualities.

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19. For the significance of this distinction see Georg Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, Munich 1902, pp. 187ff.

20. Walter F. Otto, *Die Manen*, Berlin 1923.

21. "With respect to spiritual belief Levy-Bruhl has shown that a number of concepts of primitive religion which we tend to translate as 'soul' denote no more than a feeling of belonging-together or oneness, be it with animals or places or objects. Nor should we expect our intellectual framework of perception ever to be able to do justice to these relationships." Otto, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

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For the most part, religions in which ancestor worship plays a role depict the departed relatives as much more threatening and unfriendly. But even where they are seen as unfriendly, the living hope, through propitiatory ritual, to establish friendly relations with them. That is why they supply them with food and other necessaries. The main consideration is to maintain the dead "in the new state of life on which they have entered. The latter is probably the most primitive, and is certainly the most general attitude adopted by the survivors."[22] Rarely, if ever, are the deceased capable of protecting or supporting the living. Generally the relationship of giving and receiving is the other way around: the living minister to the needs and sometimes to the whims of the dead. The life of the shadows is believed to be only a pale facsimile of life on earth. And while many of these attitudes may not amount to worship in the narrow technical sense (because they do not necessarily imply propitiation and fear of the dead), this form of ministration was extremely widespread, according to historical records and anthropological reports.[23] In this primitive and widespread form, I think ancestor worship is a serene and dignified cult. It is free of fear and terror, yet inspired by a sense of duty and obligation to the dead on the part of the living descendants.

Now, this was ancestor worship in a world which has no consciousness of progress or regress. If one adds the element of progress to this primitive spiritualistic configuration, the rationale for *manes* worship becomes so much stronger because, as in a dynamic situation of absolute or relative immiseration, the cleavage between the haves and the have-nots keeps on growing. The felicity of the lucky successors will have an admixture of displeasure owing to the exclusion of the ancestors from the feast of their grand-children. Dead and gone, the predecessors have a rightful claim to being remembered. Perhaps that will make their lower world habitable—if it exists and if they exist. If not, then the anamnestic homage of the living at least serves the purpose of assuaging their own guilt. Posterity will have to maintain that hypothesis (that it owes its existence to the *manes*) in the face of all evidence of science to the contrary.

It may be interesting here to comment briefly on Hegel's treatment of ancestor worship in the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*. It is most likely that Marx had read this work, which was first published in 1832. Likely, because of the general strength of theological preoccupations at the Doctors' Club. Likely also, because Marx's friend Bruno Bauer had been doing leg-work for Marheineke's second edition of the *Lectures*. Indeed, when the edition came out in 1840 Marx was interested in reviewing it in connection with a general critique of the publication of Hegel's collected works.[24] Since this project was never begun it is anybody's guess how deeply Marx had studied

22. *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. 1, p. 426.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 427.
24. B. Bauer's letter of March 30, 1840, to Marx.

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the *Lectures*. Obviously they were less important to him than the *Philosophy of Right* and the *Phenomenology*, on both of which he commented in writing during his student days at Berlin. However that may be, Hegel's ideas on the subject of worship, especially the cult of the *manes*, are interesting in themselves irrespective of whether Marx knew them.

Hegel begins with the observation that religious belief is abstract in itself. What completes it is *Kultus* or worship, which can take all kinds of forms from prayer to taking the sacraments to making a sacrifice. "At first, belief only has being in itself. But abstract belief must be made complete: it must be felt and enjoyed."[25] This is accomplished by *Kultus*. Religious consciousness is only reconciliation in general, whereas worship is reconciliation in the particular individual, reconciliation for me. For Hegel, it follows that *Kultus* can only be found within a conception of god. "What is produced by worship is what used to be called *unio mystica*. It is the feeling or satisfaction of my being in god's grace, of sensing his spirit in me, of my consciously being one and reconciled with god."[26] In philosophical terms, worship is "the eternal process of the subject seeking to become identical with its essence."[27] It is a process whereby diremption is being continuously negated even though, as Hegel remarks, that process goes on "only in the subject."[28] Nevertheless, this process of reconciliation could never get started were it not for the absolute unity of god's essence with his own being. In other words, Hegel links the incidence of cultic phenomena with the evolution of a mature religious consciousness in which the notion of an absolute god has become paramount and where *Kultus* is merely the affective concretion of belief.

Still, Hegel conceives that there are primitive forms of religion having a kind of cultic lore without the requisite understanding of religion *qua* absolute spirit. These may be atypical aberrations today, but Hegel realizes that historically their importance for the development of religion was crucial. In fact, at one point Hegel tries to formulate a naturalistic theory of the origin of worship (almost) without resorting to an extraneous spirit. This goes as follows: "Natural man must die...Fate consumes him, and it does so pitilessly...The reconciliation of the innermost core will not come about as long as the subject does not perceive itself as infinite, as the nonsensuous spirit itself. Instead, natural man takes his natural existence to be something essential and affirmative rather than thinking of it as something negative. Consequently reconciliation and unity are not yet the union of the innermost core. Conversely, the diremption has not yet progressed to an extreme point,

25. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, ed. G. Lasson, 1925-29, reprinted Hamburg 1966, vol. 1, p. 257. The English translation of the lectures (London, 1895) follows the second German edition and is therefore plainly inadequate. Especially the discussion of *Kultus* is much more extensive in the Lasson version.

26. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 235.

27. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 232.

28. *Loc. cit.*

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rather the natural and the spiritual continue to be in a state of unity where the former has retained an affirmative determination. It is this affirmative moment which death destroys. However, this final and most extreme negation, represented as it is by the 'fateful' reconciliation through natural death, must be superseded by a subjective reconciliation in consciousness, it must be subjectively reshaped by our imagination into something afirmative. Thus the *manes* are the unreconciled dead who must be avenged; they must be avenged against death. And thus the *worship of the dead* becomes an essential aspect of cultic life."[29] According to Hegel, the worship of the *manes* is a primitive form of religious practice. It is necessary but unreconciled, for it lacks the consciousness of infinity which comes with the ability to conceive of human consciousness as a moment of trans-subjective spirit.

As one among a number of Young Hegelians, Marx denied that a true consciousness of infinity really mattered or could be achieved. Hence, unlike Hegel, he was unable to see anything progressive in the historical mutation of *manes* worship into Christian monotheism. Still, neither Marx nor any of the other atheists with whom he collaborated could just as easily deny that the *manes* are the unreconciled legions of mankind. If their fate can be avenged, it would require that we believe them to be still in some manner with us. They have not departed in order to be forgotten. For ancestor worship to be, as Hegel put it, an essential aspect of cultic practice requires that the dead are credited with some ability to survive in our midst. In other words, as far as Marx is concerned, the question is: was Marx really so consistently atheistic that he rejected primitive religious ideas along with contemporary forms of belief? Is not total rejection undialectical? Does not the negation of religious consciousness imply the preservation of its essence? I believe so. What is more, I am arguing that perhaps the closest thing to a Marxian religion (if the word cannot be avoided) may be the practice of ancestor worship.

IV.

What about the link which is supposed to exist between Marxism and the idea of anamnestic solidarity according to Benjamin's teleological thesis? The problem of textual analysis cannot be avoided much longer although intuitively I would prefer to leave it alone because it is not an easy one to solve.

One of the few places where Marx speaks directly of the function of historical reminiscence is in his *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (1852), where he discusses in passing the relationship between contemporaries and predecessors, characteristically leaving out of account any reference to successors. After the well-known remark about how men make their history but not as they please, rather under inherited circumstances, Marx lashes out at the "tradition of all the dead generations" which weighs like "a nightmare

29. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 275.

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on the brain of the living" even at the moment when they bestir themselves to become revolutionaries. He comments on the "borrowed language" and the conjured-up "spirits of the past" typical of modern revolutions, suggesting that this kind of retrospection passes with the unfolding of revolution, giving way to a more contemporary style.[30] Thus the English Revolution was made in the name of the Old Testament, but soon "Locke supplanted Habakkuk."[31] The same goes for the French Revolution of 1789: "The new social form once established, the antediluvian colossi disappeared and with them resurrected Romanity—the Brutuses, Gracchi, Publicolas, the tribunes, the senators, and Caesar himself."[32] The temporary harking back to the images, prepossessions and hopes of familiar historical paradigms has been at times a healthy, at other times an inhibiting factor in the course of these revolutions: "The awakening of the dead in those revolutions served the purpose of glorifying the new struggle, not of parodying the old; . . . of finding once more the spirit of revolution, not of making its ghost walk about."[33] As far as the contemporary class-situation is concerned, this pattern of revolutionary *anamnesis* has lost its usefulness entirely. The social revolution of the present, says Marx, ". . . cannot draw its poetry from the past, but only from the future. It cannot begin with itself before it has stripped off all superstition in regard to the past. Earlier revolutions required recollections of past world history in order drug themselves concerning their own content. The revolution of the nineteenth century, however, if it wants to arrive at its own content, must let the dead bury their dead. There the phrase went beyond the content; here the content goes beyond the phrase."[34] For someone who expects Benjamin's hypothesis to be confirmed the Marxian language is disappointingly insensitive, although the analysis itself might be called technically sophisticated. I can see nothing else here but an instrumentalist concern with revolution. Essentially Marx is spelling out the law and preconditions for successful revolutionary action in his time. Historical recollection is conceptualized, in a rather conventional way, as learning-one's-lesson-from-past-experience and also learning-that-there-is-nothing-to-be-learned-from-past-experience. While Marx admits that recollection was a part of all previous revolutionary undertakings, he remains ambivalent about whether such remembrance was valuable by instrumental standards, or whether it was merely a compulsive pattern of behavior.[35]

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30. Marx and Engels, *Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*, ed. L. Feuer, Garden City 1959, p. 320. Cf. *MEW* vol. 8, p. 115.
31. Feuer, p. 322 (*MEW* 8, 116).
32. Feuer, p. 321 (*MEW* 8, 116).
33. Feuer, p. 322 (*MEW* 8, 116).
34. Feuer, p. 323 (*MEW* 8, 117).
35. Engels in the *Peasant War in Germany* seems more favorably inclined toward the idea of developing a sense of revolutionary *tradition* by keeping alive the memory of lost causes. In one of his letters to Ruge of 1843, Marx, too, stresses the fact that mankind's dream of freedom has always been the same, and that it only needs to be implemented.

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There is nothing redemptive about the suggestion to let the dead bury their dead, or about a point of view which holds that the dead are a nightmare on the brain of the living. Marx was too preoccupied with incisive praxis to allow his reflection to languish in the midst of the exigencies of action. How else can one explain the mechanical juxtaposition, in the *Communist Manifesto*, of communism as a society where "the present dominates the past"[36] to bourgeois society where the relation is the reverse? Again, this notion betrays a kind of unsentimental amnesic means-ends thinking which does not match the depth of Marx's real but submerged intentions.

If we want to follow up Benjamin's intuition, we must not look for direct evidence of anamnestic sensitivity in Marx's writings. This will only lead to the not so striking discovery that his style of thought is abrupt and irreverent, if not callous, in any case, marked by the same reification which he denounced uncompromisingly. The ancestors are not expressly assigned the role of avengeable predecessors in the Marxian scheme of things. Their tendency to interfere with the really serious business of the living is counterproductive, as the modern phrase goes, and hence they had better be forgotten. Marx's analysis, then, of 1848 and the counterrevolution which followed it begins with a plea to embrace modernity resolutely, a plea which starkly disavows the exposed thesis of Benjamin on the true meaning of Marxist revolutionary theory.

Although I am sure that using a philological fine-tooth comb will not turn up any evidence favorable to Benjamin's rendering of Marx, I am equally convinced, despite passages like those just analyzed, that it would be difficult to refute that rendering conclusively through chapter-and-verse citation. Small comfort indeed.

In his extant writings, Marx for all intents and purposes failed to speak to this issue, even though one gets the message which resonates through his thought as a kind of *obligato* accompaniment. I will now try to spell out by a more roundabout approach, and by way of exemplification, where exactly in the Marxian theory it is that the *manes* rear their heads. For Marx, a convenient vantage point for talking about the ancestors would I think have been the labor theory of value, whose deeper implications Marx was reluctant to bring out. It is of course well known that Marx opposed any prescriptive reading of his value theory as abusive.[37] The labor theory of value was not supposed to yield a basis for a normative critique of commodity distribution in capitalist society. It was to be strictly a scientific tool for analyzing the *production* of value under market conditions.

The briefest of reviews will do here. According to the Marxist analysis, the reproduction of capital in modern society takes the form of commodity

36. Feuer, *op. cit.*, p. 22 (*MEW* 4, 476).

37. See for example Ronald Meek, *Studies in the Labour Theory of Value*, London 1956, pp. 124-130; Robert Tucker, "Marx and Distributive Justice," in Tucker, *The Marxian Revolutionary Idea*, New York 1969, pp. 37-53.

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production. Exchange-value, the essence of commodities, is produced by physical human labor. If we ignore nature herself, there are no other value-producing agents or forces besides man. Whatever fixtures like machines and buildings appear to contribute to commodity value are really just embodiments of labor ("coagulated labor-power") and therefore reducible to commodities of the first kind. The exchange-value of labor itself (wage) and the exchange-value of the commodities it produces (price) are not the same. Their difference is surplus-value or, roughly, profit. Where such surplus-value is being appropriated by nonproducers we have a condition of economic exploitation. As I have remarked, the Marxian value theory by design has no intrinsically critical clout; capitalism cannot be accused of failing to "correspond" to that theory because capitalists do not return to the worker the full value produced by him. Nor is it expected that communist society will enshrine the value theory more literally. The real point of the labor theory of value is rather that in determining the value of commodities it matters to look at the process of production, and not at demand, as has been emphasized by marginalist and neoclassical economists in direct opposition to Marx and classical political economy.

The idea of coagulated labor-power poses what I will call the problem of succession or inheritance within the Marxian value theory. It suggests that tools, equipment and infrastructural support systems represent stored-up human energy, which is being released into active use over time until the machine or building wears out. Many of these coagulations of labor-power survive their producers to become a gift or inheritance for anyone who lays his hands on them. Nobody can acquire them by his own effort, nobody has a right to them by virtue of an ethically misconstrued labor theory of value—they are there for the asking.

The point is clear, but as yet trivial. To be sure, there are overlapping generations who work with the same means of production. But is not the turnover of capital equipment so fast that inheritance of the sort mentioned weighs rather lightly in the balance? It does perhaps, although I am sure that most of the turnover speed is a result of competitive forces at work in capitalism: Machines are thrown out before they have been completely de-coagulated. Still, even under capitalism some things belonging to the infrastructural level of the means of production such as hydroelectric power installations, office buildings, transportation systems, etc., may turn out to be quite long-lasting. Certainly a rational system of economic production and distribution would lengthen the life-expectancy of consumer goods and capital equipment thus producing a significant increase in the size of that legacy of coagulations which is being handed down to succeeding generations. However, even this point may not make the matter of inheritance one of primary importance. What really establishes this sort of testamentary perspective as being something more than trivial is the consideration that the interminably renewed legacy of the ancestors, besides consisting of, lastly,

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perishable material means, has an ideal component of productive-technological know-how which is also handed down from one generation to the next, and unlike the material part of the legacy, the ideal coagulations have a considerable longevity. There are echoes of this in the average (or perhaps not so average) man's resignation that the world of material objects has become so complicated that if he were left to his own devices, he would perish instantly. It is out of sentiments like that that reflection and consciousness must try to build anamnestic solidarity.

By tossing the notion of coagulation into the debate Marx accomplished two things. He protected the labor theory of value against the objection that material means of production are capable of generating value, and he established a claim for proletarian succession whose premises, however, he thought to be too self-evident to require examination. Marx does imply that the proletariat *hic et nunc* is the *rightful* heir of the ideal and material legacy embodied in the present state of the means of production. While the proletarian contemporaries have not produced these means, they are justified in appropriating them so as to make them the basis of their present and future productivity. Come the revolution, the ownership of these ancestral means of production will be up for grabs. But only the proletariat, which has contributed no more than the bourgeoisie to bringing them into existence, will take possession of them. In other words, the world-historical expropriation of the expropriators also constitutes an expropriation of ancestors, or to put it more euphemistically, it constitutes the appropriation by default of an ancestral legacy. Only by default? I think Marx intended *that* appropriation to be as legitimate as any other form of appropriation in communist society. How could it be rendered legitimate, how could the smell of expropriation be expunged? What title do the contemporaries have to the wealth of the predecessors? In considering these questions, we finally enter the lower world of Marxism with its unstated beliefs about proprietary and emotional relationships between generational types.

Marx was tremendously adept at invoking the unity of the species by using terms like man and mankind, thus unwittingly covering up the problem of inheritance. Typical of the confusion he thereby created is the following statement from his polemic against Karl Heinzen in the *Deutsche Brüsseler-Zeitung* of October 1847: "Men (*die Menschen*) build themselves a new world...out of the historical achievements of their declining world. In the course of their development, they themselves must first *produce* the *material conditions* of a new society..."[38] The ambiguity in the term *die Menschen* derives from the fact that it variously refers to individuals, a species subject (mankind qua biological species and qua historical totality) and to a generational subject (e.g. the present laboring class). In effect, Marx is saying

38. "Die moralisierende Kritik und die kritisierende Moral," in *MEW* 4, 339, Marx's emphases.

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(a) that, as a principle of historical progress, one generation builds on the achievements of its predecessors; (b) that mankind as a historical entity produces the material conditions of freedom; which means (c) that "human beings" do not by any means produce the material conditions of their own new society themselves, as Marx literally says, but that some men (the dead) have produced them for others (the living) or that some men (the living) will produce them for others (the unborn successors), or in other words, that the self-emancipating proletariat does not come out of the blue or spring from the head of Zeus. Just as some people cannot help dawdling when they get hold of a piece of paper, so Marx seems to have had a compulsive need to juggle the term "man" in a way which is apt to make the onlooker dizzy. However, what sustains the juggling act is the tacit belief that the unity of the species is mediated through intergenerational loyalties, bequests and acceptance of bequests—in a word, by anamnestic solidarity.

By recognizing that the victorious proletarian contemporaries would be *de facto* heirs of legions of exploited slaves and workers of the past, Marx illuminates in a flash the essence of anamnestic solidarity. The unity of repressed mankind is the solidarity of the living with the dead. Marx calls for an understanding of class in terms of the continuity of exploitation across the ages. If the impending revolution goes forth without being informed by this larger historical solidarity with the dead, then it will only wipe out one injustice by replacing it with another. The historical meaning of such a spurious revolution would be that of a second, posthumous expropriation of those who spent their lives in slavery. A revolutionary working-class which takes for granted that its predecessors sacrificed themselves for its own well-being is a working-class without heart. The rules of the game are very demanding indeed. Morally, the danger facing the revolutionary contemporaries is that they may be self-righteous in demanding restitution for injustices they did not suffer. If their amnesia ignores the *manes*, the revolution risks effecting a transformation which is merely mechanical.

The pragmatists and technicians of any revolution will tend to shun this responsibility for retrospection by asking: "What can we do for the dead?" Common sense is on their side. But in this instance, as so often, common sense is the worst enemy of reason. If the revolution is to be consummated, it requires the redemption of those who suffered so that suffering would be abolished. Socialism with a human face, then, would mean among many other things the revival of a more spiritual mode of appropriating the past. That is why one of the more poignant criticisms one can make of contemporary state-communist practice in Eastern Europe and the Far East is that it has the wrong cult objects: Marx, Lenin and Mao, instead of dead slaves.[39] Historical materialism has to be the realization that socialist society,

39. It is now fairly well accepted among critical Marxists that Soviet Russia is in most respects an unrevolutionary society. Nothing illustrates better the traditionalism in Russia than the mummification of Lenin and Stalin (the latter's corpse having been demummified when he fell

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like any other, is built, not on the shoulders of giants, but on the dead bodies of anonymous ancestors.

Our digression on the Marxist labor-theory of value and its implicit ethical theory of inheritance has given us some insight into the discussion of certain, if you will, religious issues of Marxism. With regard to the labor-theory of value itself, it is quite impossible to conceive of it only as a substitute for bourgeois supply-and-demand concepts of price formation. This cannot have been Marx's intent. There is deeply imbedded in this theory a principle asserting the solidarity of the living with the dead by virtue of a bond of inheritance. The revolution is an act of appropriation whose justice is of human scale. If the proletariat acted without awareness of that ethical principle, its appropriation of the material world would have little legitimacy indeed. Unfortunately, Marx remains silent on these points, to say nothing of the related but so much more intricate issue of the qualitative nature of intergenerational solidarity. These have remained blank spots in the Marxian literature.

V.

A few years ago, Martin Jay began the salutary job of destroying a legend spun by English and American scholars like George Lichtheim and Daniel Bell to the effect that the Frankfurt School was a variant of "humanist Marxism."[40] Jay's polemic made it very clear that a Marxist who is not a "scientific" Marxist need not be a "humanistic" one, except in the vaguest of connotations. What goes by the name of Marxist humanism today is an ontological model of self-actualization through labor, which hypostatizes man and "denigrates nature into an external other."[41] The Frankfurt School has had no truck with that kind of conventional humanistic totalization at the expense of the object. The misunderstanding, by the way, that so-called humanist Marxism and critical theory are somehow the same is typical of the fate befalling anything foreign in the process of its Anglo-American reception.

Jay does not mention remembrance. I believe he could have strengthened his case by referring to it, since it is at the center of the theoretical differences separating Marxist humanism from the anamnestic revisionism of the Frankfurt School. A creature of the Renaissance, humanism became, in the 18th century, amalgamated with various ideologies of progress. Henceforth

from grace). In Russia, immortality still belongs to the architects of history. Lest their memory wither their dead bodies are being preserved as though they were still alive. And all of this in the midst of an official belief in the finality of physical death. There is much room here for sheer satire! But when we keep in mind how difficult it is to *visualize* what exactly the alternative, i.e., an anamnestic cult of the pedestrian and unheroic, might look like in logical and psychological terms, we may be inclined to view the state-socialist personality cult with less abhorrence and bafflement.

40. Martin Jay, "The Frankfurt School's Critique of Marxist Humanism," in *Social Research*, v. 39, 1972, pp. 285-305.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 296.

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its outlook was to become strictly unidirectional: forward. By the same token, the past was an uninterrupted dark age unworthy of compassionate attention. This is the prevalent anthropocentrism of today, including the anthropocentric humanism of some Marxists. As I have noted above, such humanism represses the fact of mortality of the particular (the individual) in view of the immortality of the universal (the species). But once the universal has become concrete in the shape of liberated posterity, this repressed historical content will come back with a vengeance, demanding its due. It is in recognizing this claim that Benjamin, Horkheimer and Adorno part company with so-called Marxist humanism while at the same time fulfilling the latter's aspirations to a degree of consistency not reached by theorists like Fromm, Kolakowski, and other self-styled proponents of social humanism.

The link connecting the materialism of the Frankfurt School with Jewish theology—a link Benjamin fondly cultivated without the slighest fear of ostracism—is represented by the concept of remembrance. Thus Jakob Taube's remark that in Jewish religion "recollection explodes the limits of nature which is doomed to die"[42] strangely enough sums up that central tenet of critical theory which sets it apart from every other radically secular philosophical creed. Any humanism without an anamnestic dimension is just another ideology of pseudo-liberation, for "the idea of happiness always goes hand in hand with that of redemption."[43] When the anamnestic facets of critical theory have been given the emphasis they deserve, the question will be posed anew as to the strength and kind of relationship between Marxism and religious thought. Customarily, a strong affinity has been seen to exist on two levels. First, many observers, and not only hostile ones, have pointed to the resemblance between a tendency in Communism toward ideological closure and the dogmatization of Christian beliefs during the post-Patristic period. To the extent that Marxism has become totalitarian such parallels are quite interesting, for they make plain the common structural feature of Marxism (or what calls itself such) and religion, their enmity toward each other notwithstanding. Although the term is used mainly by anti-communist zealots, it is not entirely mistaken to speak of bureaucratic Marxism as a state religion, provided one keeps in mind the dialectic of dogmatism and thaw in countries like Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, etc., which has scarcely any counterpart in Church history until very recently.

While these similarities are interesting, they tell us nothing about the philosophical status of the issue. Marxism is not a religion simply because its principles of social praxis bear some resemblance to life in medieval monastic

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42. *Abendländische Eschatologie*, Berne 1947, pp. 13 f. The passage continues: "To forget, in Israel means: apostasy and death."

43. Benjamin, *Schriften*, v. 1, p. 494. I cannot possibly give a reliable account here of the Judaism of Benjamin. This is an intricate problem of reconstruction to which Gershom Scholem has devoted careful attention. See his essay "Walter Benjamin," in *Neue Rundschau*, v. 76, 1965, pp. 1-21; English: *Year Book of the Leo Baeck Institute*, vol. 10, 1965, pp. 117-136.

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orders or because some operational truth claims are treated as though they were questions of exegesis. The second widespread way of looking at Marxism and religion as two phenotypes with the same depth structure is to assign Marxism a place in the millennial tradition of religious thought. It is generally felt that the very idea of a classless society, placed as it is at the conclusion of centuries of antagonistic human history, smacks of divine intervention. The real historical evolution, which we can grasp in terms of a real historical dialectic of social conflicts, leads only to the threshold of the new where the old takes on a distinctly obselete *appearance*; it does not lead across that threshold. In other words, whatever insight a Marxist may have into the historical determinism of class-struggle will not, according to this view, suffice to constitute *foreknowledge* of an *eschaton* where the springs of historical development are unwound and then tensed in the opposite direction. It is with respect to this leap into millennial faith that Marxism has often been likened, mainly by its detractors,[44] to messianic prophecies of Jewish and Christian origin. One accomplishment Marxist humanism has to its credit is to have questioned the adequacy of this philosophical rapprochement, and to have reemphasized its secular, contingent foundations.

The postulate of anamnestic reflection has little in common with these two types of religious interpretation of Marxism. Obviously ancestor worship, or something structurally similar, does not logically imply a belief in a miraculous second coming, let alone the sanctity of a dogma. In the eyes of Hegel, *manes* worship would be a logical monstrosity: a cult without an absolute, without an orthodoxy. But in the eyes of Marx, it might well have taken on the significance of a concrete fleshing out of the Feuerbachian idea of a religion of man, which Marx found suspect only because it was stricken with a lamentable blindness and inherent ahistoricity. Amnesia threatens to be the most capital of sins among emancipated posterity, unless properly conservative habits are implanted in the minds of the successors. In one of his sullen observations about the present age, Ortega y Gasset noted "the disproportion between the profit which the average man draws from science and the gratitude which he returns—or, rather, does not return—to it."[45] If we substitute the term ancestors for science, we get a quintessential description of amnesic humanism, Marxist or otherwise. Words like gratitude and worship have an embarrassingly moralistic ring. But if I gauge the true spirit of Marxism correctly, it would rather swallow the embarrassment of appropriating these categories and what they represent than leave the successors in the absurd position of having to enjoy a life not of their own making. True critical theory must not fear the stigma of conservatism, least of all in an age when a wholesale revaluation of what is critical and what is conformist seems to be gathering momentum.

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44. E. Bloch and W. Benjamin are notable exceptions.
45. José Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, New York, 1957, p. 87.

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Bloch and Lukács: Two Radical Critics In a 'God-Forsaken World'

by Sandor Radnoti[1]

The subject of the following short essay is the disclosure of the great philosophical friendship between the young Georg Lukács and the young Ernst Bloch, a friendship which is in its details still completely unexplored. Closer examination shows it to be a question of a representative confrontation—the conflict between their respective world views and conduct—which evidently developed mostly in the unconscious thought of the two men. The only explcit proof of this is, at the moment, the critique of Lukács in Bloch's *Geist der Utopie*. That is why the following remarks cannot undertake to present a coherent picture of Lukács' fantastically rich and antinomially composed youthful writings. I would like to stress what Bloch himself stressed: the problem of the "world abandoned by God," the identical term used by Bloch and Lukács but not with the same meaning.

We can initially formulate the controversy as: ethics or religion? But as soon as this alternative is stated, we must qualify it extensively. For, while Bloch's revolutionary philosophy of religion presupposes a whole series of moral expectations and decisions, Lukács neither can nor wants to eliminate faith and God from the horizon of his thinking. Nor can religion detach itself from ethics in the sense that it can be conveyed unconventionally only by some ethic or other, or by mystical "meta-ethics." But if we do contrast faith and ethics, we must, of course, mean by the latter an *immanent* ethics. Yet even Bloch does not relegate the desire for celestial bliss beyond earthly existence: "...the soul must become guilty in order to eliminate the stupid *status quo*, in order not to become even more guilty by a withdrawal into the idyllic, or by hypocritical toleration of wrong..."[2] "Categorical imperative with revolver in hand" is the appropriate ethical standpoint for the present world situation, or as added even more sharply in the revised work: "guided tactically by Jesus with the whip and only teleologically by the Jesus who loves mankind."[3] This statement is akin to Lukács' moral-philosophical pronouncement of the year 1919. The words of Hebbel's Judith "And if God had set sin between me and the deed I must do—who am I to shirk from it?" are as valid for Bloch as they are a summary of the ethical content of Lukács' *Tactics and Ethics*.[4] The judgment passed in his *Theory of the Novel* upon the world that has, in Fichte's words, entered "the age of absolute sinfulness"[5] is considered valid by

1. Part of a chapter of a longer essay on Walter Benjamin, entitled: *Credo und Resignation*. English translation by David J. Parent.
2. *Geist der Utopie* (Cassirer, 1923), p. 324. Cf. also *Geist der Utopie*, first version (1918, reprinted 1971), pp. 403f. When the ideas are essentially the same, I usually quote the early version (1918) and refer to the other (1923).
3. *Op.cit.*, pp. 325, 324. Cf. first version, *ibid.*
4. Georg Lukács, *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* (Luchterhand, 1968), p. 58.
5. *The Theory of the Novel*, trans. Anna Bostock (M.I.T. Press, 1971), p. 153.

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Lukács in his entire early period. One of the possible conclusions that follow from this, as formulated by Lukács, is that only the individual person who does not merely live but lives his life through to the end, identifying with its essence—but only with it—and transcending everything individual chooses a "way" that rises above the commonplace; "their ethic must establish perseverence-unto-death as a categorical imperative."[6] So he sees it in *The Metaphysics of Tragedy*, his theory of tragedy, which is at the same time the theory of tragic ethics: "The deepest longing of the human soul is the metaphysical basis of tragedy: man's longing for his selfhood, his longing to transform the apex of his existence to the plane of his way of life, its meaning into a daily reality."[7] The paradox of tragic ethics is that it cannot be achieved. By nature this is a lonesome way; it cannot be striven for, "the miracle of chance" lets man fly up and it begins at the point where the "mysterious powers drive the essence out of man."[8] Lukács establishes the immanence of the tragic form and also of tragic ethics—God is left out of this entire area, reduced to a mere observer. But man himself becomes God—his solitude, his chosenness, his crossing of the waters of life with dry feet re-introduces numerous elements of religious consciousness. Re-introduces them, for he creates an innerworldly ethics, but one that is unachievable. He creates an innerworldly ethics which, from the first, fatefully includes the destruction of everything innerworldly—death. Thus the great work written a few years later, *The Theory of the Novel*, gives central position no longer to selfhood, the "assertion" of life, but to "the supporting positive meaning of life, totality,"[9] summing up from the vantage-point of life, the content of *The Metaphysics of Tragedy* in a single categorical statment: "The ought kills life."[10] *The Theory of the Novel* seeks the perspective of the transformation of the entire life, of the building of a new totality, and the last sentence of the book leaves the undecidable question undecided: "whether we are really about to leave the age of absolute sinfulness or whether the new has no other herald but our hopes: those hopes which are signs of a world to come, still so weak that it can easily be crushed by the sterile power of the merely existent."[11] When a man registers hope instead of a historical force, the idea of redemption inevitably returns. Therefore Lukács defends the immanence of his ethics-closer-to-life as follows: "The normative man has achieved freedom from God, because the high norms of works and of substantial ethics are rooted in the existence of the all-perfecting God and in the idea of redemption; for in their innermost nature they remain unaffected by the ruler of the present, be it God or demon. But the realization of the normative

6. *Metaphysik der Tragödie*, Paul Ernst. Georg Lukacs, *Die Seele und die Formen* (Luchterhand, 1971), p. 231.
7. P. 233.
8. P. 223.
9. *Die Theorie des Romans*, p. 27.
10. Bostock trans., p. 35.
11. Bostock trans., p. 153.

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in the soul or in the world cannot detach itself from its substratum, from the present (in the historico-philosophical sense) without endangering its most specific strength, its constitutive appropriateness to its object."[12] Thus man's freedom lies ultimately in redemption, in the perfecting God, but since man acts in actual life, this remains unexpressed. God must stand behind every action, behind every work, otherwise action and work disintegrate, but this must remain unexpressed, for its disclosure would be a hopeless detachment from the God-forsaken world. The most fatalistic dessication of action and work on the one hand, and the Utopian insubstantiality of action and work on the other.

God-mythology and religious consciousness are thus not as far apart as one might think in the young Lukács' trend of thought. Yet he seeks the other pole and it is depth of thinking that compels him to sum up the religio-transcendental elements which must necessarily creep in, under given circumstances, into the mythology of the demon *or* of the redeeming God.[13] The fact that in both of Lukács' above mentioned works the hero is counterposed to the mystic, shows the nearness of religion and simultaneously of the opposite direction of quest.

This is the other relevant way of life. Loss of self in contrast with selfhood, the suffering of the universe in contrast with its creation; surrender instead of struggle. "These are the two poles of the possibilities of life. . . each is the only true overcoming of the other."[14] So it says in *The Metaphysics of Tragedy*. The mystic is free when he has surrendered himself and been dissolved in God; the hero is free when he has, in Luciferian spite, perfected himself in himself and by his own power, when he—for the deed of his soul—has banished every half-measure out of the world dominated by his destruction."[15] These are the words of *The Theory of the Novel*. The change of view from one work to the other naturally also transformed the mystic. While in the first piece he is timeless, formless and softly contoured, in the second his experience can be perfected into a work and if that is the case, it is perfected in him too "in the categories prescribed by the historico-philosophical position of the world-clock."[16] For a more comprehensive description of the mystic by Lukács we must go back a little further in time. In an article from the year 1909 he distinguishes contemplative mysticism—that of Bela Balazs—from the militant mysticism of Ady.[17] He associates the mysticism of the great poet Ady with socialism[18] and sees the socio-psychological bases of religiosity—in a manner enlightening for our

12. P. 91.
13. In Bloch, too, the lord of the world of today is the dark demiurge, the unilluminated Jehovah. Cf. *Geist der Utopie*, p. 324. First version, p. 405.
14. *Metaphysik der Tragödie*, p. 230.
15. *Die Theorie des Romans*, p. 90f.
16. P. 91.
17. "Ady Endre," *Uj magyar lira* (New Hungarian Lyrics). *Magyar irodalom—magyar kultura* (Gondolat, 1970), p. 53.
18. "Ady Endre," p. 46.

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whole discussion—in a revolutionary spirit deprived of revolution. "Endre Ady's socialism is religion (in lesser men, a narcotic), the voice of a preacher in the desert, the call for help of a drowning man, the desperate clinging to the only possibility that is left (worshipping and sometimes cursing it), feeling it to be unknown, mysterious and yet close by, the only true reality."[19] Herewith the conflict between religion and ethics already fathoms deeper regions. It is evident from the above remarks that the problem of religion and of God is neither for Bloch nor for Lukács a sterile question of the mere existence or non-existence of God. It is always a question of man and man's destiny and if of God, then not of predestination but of man's needs. How can the existing world be radically changed? This question can perhaps be answered only in practice, by pointing to the subject, to the radical community by which it is changed. But what if such a community cannot be discovered empirically? For necessity is no answer. For two reasons it is not: because while destroying the old it cannot build up the new, and because—that is a point of knowledge today—there is no such necessity. The answer can be only a practical one, but still an answer *must* be given, even if there is no possibility for this sole answer. Thus the "ought" enters the picture, though—as we already know—it "kills life." The—radical—religious necessity and—radical—religious consciousness reacts to this threat: hypostasizes a community where there is no real community. It seeks truth—as Bloch says—contrary to the empirical.[20] Religious consciousness *presupposes* this quest in the empirically given masses of men: without proof it is sure that the terrible temptation to goodness exists *equally* in the masses of men, to use Brecht's beautiful expression. In one passage of his book Bloch expresses the foundation of the compulsion of religion with deep pathos: "What has us here in its clumsy and then vengeful hand: hampering, persecuting, blinding, the spider, the eating and being eaten, the poisonous scorpion, the angel of destruction, the demon of chance, accident, death, the homelessness of everything meaningful, the fat, banal, hardly penetrable mountain of separation from all providence, the magician of 'pious' panlogism—all that cannot be the same principle that will once hold judgment..." This antithesis necessarily implies twofold principles, "duality in God, our depth."[21] Of the 19th century God-seekers, with the exception of Ady, none expressed the earthly basis with such sharp definition as Bloch. "God, as the problem of the radically new, absolute solution, as the phenomenality of our freedom, of our true content, is self-aware in us only as a shadowy occurrence, objectively not happening, only as a combination of the darkness of the experienced moment and the inconclusive self-symbol of the absolute question. That means: the last, genuine, unknown, ultradivine God, the revelation of us all, lives even now, although he is not 'crowned,' not

19. *Ibid.*
20. Cf. *Geist der Utopie*, p. 251.
21. P. 360. First version, p. 441.

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'objectified'. . ." "The subjects are the only thing that cannot be extinguished in all external and higher darkness; and that the Saviour lives and *wills* to come again is evidenced intangibly now as always: but He and God himself have, like everything objective, lost their own power to come and be visibly effective. . . Thus there is here only one single salvation, and that is the rebellious alliance between the moral self, which alone can still burn in the night of external and higher light, an alliance, sought above everything extraneous, between this self and the silent God who forsakes us and hesitates to be transformed into the Holy Spirit, as the cries, prayers and the deep naming power of heroic-mystical atheism itself."[22] After the long quotations we have before our eyes the interesting metamorphosis of the critique of practical reason, precisely what Bloch misses as companion piece to a Marxist work approximating a critique of pure reason.[23] The metamorphosis consists in the determination of the thing-in-itself (which in Kant, as is known, remained undetermined), in what-is-not-yet, in the still spiritual longing and in the perspective existing in music.

It is not my goal to engage in an extensive critique of Bloch, since I am examining the mutual effect of two, in my opinion, representative alternative theories and attitudes. So I allow myself only two remarks. Bloch has nothing in common with the usual correctors and completers of Marxism. Lukács himself fails to understand Bloch on this problem, when in his *History and Class Consciousness* he raises an accusation of this sort against him.[24] For others, to protect the *status quo,* degrade Marx into a specialist who expresses partial truths, while Bloch's every idea and every emotion is aimed against the existing world. From the viewpoint of the demands of the day, he is an orthodox Marxist, and the political morality of his book—as is shown unmistakably by the quotations at the beginning of this essay—is identical with the political morality of the greatest personalities of radically leftist-oriented parties and factions of this epoch. But the pre-revolutionary character of his presentation cooperates with the post-revolutionary day of debris-removal, the first inspires the second, and the question which in the fever heat of revolutionary action would perhaps be a cowardly question, harmful to action: What will happen tomorrow? How does man change "after the change of his conditions?" becomes the most important question in the context of involuntary inactivity and the lack of the longed-for but barely even germinating revolution. Here it means the "completion" of Marx, as opposed to the slogan of the morons: "Marx says it all." No doubt in Bloch's Kantianization there is hidden a fundamental problem of the Marxist theories

22. P. 246, and 189f. Cf. First version, p. 372 and 341f.

23. Cf. *op.cit.,* pp. 322ff. First version, p. 408. Though this statement is doubtful even as concerns the works of Marx known to Bloch at that time, it is absolutely accurate for the Marxism of Bloch's contemporaries, whose social-democratic theory had gone from Utopia to an objective science.

24. "Reification and the Proletarian Consciousness," in *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein,* pp. 379f.

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of the period, namely that "what is to come in the economy is certain."[25] But this results in an extremely practical consequence of dualism for today: "to think purely in economic terms like the merchant but against the merchant implies the homogeneity of the detective and the criminal."[26] The readers of *Tactics and Ethics* do not have to be reminded of the obvious affinity—I would like merely to note that Bloch is more open, for his conception, not focusing on moral borderline situations, also shapes more openly the inner problematics of the vantage point. This is natural, since in Bloch it is only a precondition: a precondition to his philosophical theory. We must also note that we are here dealing not with an identity but an affinity of Lukács' and Bloch's thinking, since the extreme readiness for self-sacrifice necessary for orientation in the labyrinth of tactics and ethics, this aristocracy of Lukács' ideas heated by revolutionary pathos, does of course provide a line of demarcation.[27] And the second remark: the fecundity, beauty and immortality of Bloch's book is ascribable to the fact that it is a book on the philosophy of religion. This revolutionary theology gives a coherent answer to Bloch's real formulation of the question under the conditions of the revolutionary spirit deprived of revolution.

For, to repeat the point, the question is contained in the paradox of revolutionary spirit without revolution. And when Bloch—in the revised book, where he explicates his polemics with Lukács—exaggeratedly and unjustly, though not without cause, accuses *The Metaphysics of Tragedy* of the following: that "... Lukács' immanence of tragedy in just this apparently self-perfective form somehow amounts to a transcendental philosophy of the friendliness and godliness of existence that is completely incongruent with it,"[28] the basis of the accusation—and also the cause for their parting of the ways—is that Lukács in this work sees that the unbearableness of the given empirical existence can be recognized at all only at the pinnacles of tragic ethics, and only by the chosen few. Therefore in *On Spiritual Poverty* he speaks of "castes" and therefore, too, in the second part of *The Metaphysics of Tragedy* he says: "The all-decisive word has been said about a man and his fate when it has been determined what form his life-expressions bear and what their peaks require... Our democratic age has sought in vain to promulgate equal rights to tragedy; every attempt to open this heavenly

25. *Geist der Utopie*, First version, p. 406. Cf. 1923 edition, p. 325.

26. *Ibid.*

27. It would be impossible, in this brief comparison, to elaborate on every detail of the relationship between Bloch and Lukács—anyway, it is philologically unclear on many points. Even the extensive analysis of the differences between the two versions of *Geist der Utopie* is impossible. It is at any rate characteristic that to the turn of destiny to which Lukács reacted with a radical break with his entire early period, Bloch merely revised and gave further stress to the secularizing tendency of his original conception and merely deepened further his knowledge of Marx. From our viewpoint, it is important that in the rewritten parts we repeatedly discover an open polemic against the ideas of Lukács' early period. In my opinion this does not at all contradict the conception of the first version. In 1915-16, Lukács and Bloch thought that their philosophical standpoints were so close that the individual antitheses would have to be collected in a separate booklet. In reality the deep disagreements which at first were hidden behind aesthetic "sub-questions," were only made conscious in the second version.

28. *Geist der Utopie*, p. 282.

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kingdom to the poor in spirit was in vain. And democrats who thought through to the end their demand for equal rights for all men always contested tragedy's equal right to exist."[29] But on this basis, redemption is inconceivable. Just this distinguishes *spiritual* aristocracy from base, narrow-minded, decadent aristocracy, that it is privileged not by a separate future, a separate solution but by a view of essences, suffering and death. The only humane sense of perspective even today is a perspective that embraces all mankind. "The very stones will be redeemed," answers Lukács—in accord with his *Theory of the Novel*, to a naively beautiful question by Anna Lesznai.[30] But however much the quest for perspective forces Lukács toward the direction of religion, he is unwilling to go Bloch's route. His quest goes in other directions. In part—on the model of Wilhelm Meister in *The Theory of the Novel* he seeks the existing or, at any rate, conceivably possible ideal community, which is no naive enrootedness and no mystical experience.[31] In part he speaks, after Fichte's example, of the progressive ethical idealism that subordinates politics to itself and thus at the same time includes it, and that now extends to every single human being.[32] But these are episodal solutions, and the real insolubility is confirmed by the decision made at the end of 1918. For a historical moment the problem of perspective found its practical solution, the real possibility of a transformation of society, as soon as its subject seemed to draw himself up out of hardship and catastrophe, as soon as the revolutionary proletariat went into motion. Lukács' development—from then on always presupposing the existence of a real community and movement—was first a thinking through of the antinomic moral change, the dialectical abolition of the entire moral problem. In *History and Class Consciousness* "Class consciousness is the ethics of the proletariat."[33]

To emphasize development we have digressed from our actual problem, i.e., the early theoretical contrast between Bloch and Lukács. The question whether the precondition of this philosophy of class consciousness is still tenable *after* the abolition of the movement cannot be further discussed in this context. Thus we return to the Bloch-Lukács controversy, which can be reformulated in terms of what has been said above.

On the second attempt, the question is worded as follows: spiritual

29. *Metaphysik der Tragödie*, pp. 248f.

30. *Gespräch mit Anna Lesznai—Irodalmi Muzeum I. Emlekezesek* (1967), p. 13.

31. *Die Theorie des Romans* (Luchterhand, 1963), p. 136.

32. Cf. "A konzervativ es a progressziv idealizmus vitaja" (Debate between Conservative and Progressive Idealism), in *Utam Marxhoz* I, pp. 177-186.

33. "Rosa Luxemburg as a Marxist," *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein*, p. 215. Mihaly Vajda, in his study entitled "In Search of Dialectics—Lukács 1918 to August 1919," analyzes the decisive significance of the change and the manner in which Hegel replaces the influence of Fichte. Likewise the essay by Ferenc Feher: "The Alliance between Bela Balazs and Georg Lukács until the Revolution." The first-mentioned study repeatedly gives proof of experimentation with the idea of socialism in Lukács' early works. The letters written by Lukács to Paul Ernst offer further proofs in this question. These findings should remind the future historian of Lukács' development that the philosopher's rejection of his splendid early work—a gesture which he maintained virtually during his whole life—should be taken symptomatically rather than considered as an objectively absolute break.

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aristocracy or democracy—but on a religious foundation. In his book Bloch polemicizes with *The Metaphysics of Tragedy* and *The Theory of the Novel.* And as we saw in one of the remarks above and will see below, the alternative thus formulated is the heart of the controversy. It develops in the sphere of the judgment of works and art. Decisive for the young Lukács and later, though somewhat modified, for his whole life work, are the objectifications: the completed work as such signifies the struggle against the baseness of life and the great objectifications, as well as their fate, describe the historico-philosophical course and possibilities of man. Our quotations showed that Bloch's central category is the subject. In his thinking objectifications—God and art—have the role of giving a basis to the spiritual community of isolated subjects, to the existence and the identity of radical hopes and desires, and thus to their perspective. This is not the place to consider how far and with what qualifications Bloch's God, and his concept of art are to be regarded as objectifications, nor for the very interesting comparison that results from the fact that for Lukács the form-transformation of the long epic became the medium for his philosophy of history, while for Bloch this came to be the history of music. At any rate one could in Bloch's case prove that he adopted and reversed the musico-philosophical heritage of Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. But we must on the contrary speak of why precisely art is this medium. In Lukács art has a function similar to that which it has in German classical philosophy.[34] "The visionary reality of the world appropriate to us, art, has become independent: it is no longer a depiction, for all models have vanished; it is a created totality, for the natural unity of the metaphysical spheres is shattered for ever."[35] The idea of created totality is identical but its place in theory is different. For the principle of art can no longer have analogous meaning and the philosopher who looks around him at the world which has ceased to be a totality, perceives with resignation the only totality's insignificant role in life as it is. He knows that art also cannot be active in the transformation of the world. "But this change can never be carried out by art: . . . every attempt to shape the Utopian as something existent, ends in destruction rather than creation of form."[36] Bloch draws from this limitedness of art practically the opposite conclusions: ". . . to honor the colorfully darkened visionary clarity of expressionistic art with its radical orientation toward objective content as the last stage before the Second Coming. Yet it must be said in closing that the artist, including the one who wants to be artistically the most eruptive in preaching, knowledge and content, always stands in the realm of appearance. Aesthetic constructs in their islandlike existence are exciting but at first only virtually glowing glass paintings which men interpret, allude to, reinterpret, but then again dismiss. And such is therefore the criterion of the aesthetic clarification seen from the viewpoint of its ultimate category: how could things be perfected without

34. This philosophical role of art was proven by Lukács himself in his essay "Reification and Proletarian Consciousness." *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein,* pp. 317f.

35. *Die Theorie des Romans,* p. 31.

36. P. 157.

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coming to an apocalyptic end?"[37] This especially interesting part of Bloch's book, which incidentally—like *The Theory of the Novel*—begins with the times of blissful proximity to God and similarly arrives at Dostoyevsky as an emergent perspective, shows precisely by the astonishing correspondences—in all probability influences—the greatness of the contradistinctions. In Lukács, Dostoevsky goes beyond the limits of the novel as genre, in Bloch beyond the limits of art: "so that is no longer art, a still immanent, virtual perfection, but it is I, an internal, imageless, indeed actually workless quest for God, in which objectivity occurs as little more than an auxilliary construct, so that only I myself, the rebirth, the adjustment of the heart appear as work..."[38] For Bloch art is important in that it does not belong to this world—in that it discovers the first signs of the transcendent in the works, in their gift of prophecy. In Lukács a man's work outgrows him; Bloch crowns man, the true man who has been released from his duality. Therefore the problem of form that for Lukács is decisive, plays no role in Bloch. And if at this point of our analysis we look back at what has been said, the justification of the problem formulation: "ethics or religion" is again confirmed. "Ethics, or—as we now say of art—form, is at every moment and in every mood an ideal outside the self," writes Lukács in one of his very earliest essays.[39] Lukács always sought a standard *outside* the self, Bloch *in* the self. Only a standard outside the self can give a basis to an ethics, but with this statement we have still said nothing about whether this ethics is appropriate for the current generation of men. Bloch asks about these men and can assure their future revolutionizing of society only through the religious doubling of their self, through the theological construction of good and evil.

And now on the art-theoretical side of this antithesis: Bloch is one of the first to give a philosophical basis to avantgardism. The general determination that precisely a theory of this sort has found a place for the avantgarde must suffice us. At that time Bloch's criteria, as concerns the masterpieces, do not yet deviate essentially from Lukács'. Only—and that is the point—they differ as to the function of the work of art. Bloch's functional subordination of art assigns a place to the avantgarde but Habermas at times, and quite rightly, contrasts Bloch with Walter Benjamin, since in Bloch the symbolic remains the central category of aesthetics.[40] The preestablished harmony of the vision and form remains the specific characteristic of artistic creation, however, the specification loses its significance and the entire question is reduced to a merely technical problem. Art as art interests Bloch very little in the philosophical context of *The Spirit of Utopia*. "More important than that the outsiders hear song when a man screams in the hot belly of the Pharsalian

37. *Geist der Utopie*, p. 141. I am convinced that the insertion of the contrasting views of art between *Die Theorie des Romans* and *Der Geist der Utopie* would cast a new light on the Expressionism-debate that was held between Bloch and Lukács in the thirties.

38. *Op.cit.*, p. 142.

39. *Reichtum, Chaos und Form: Ein Zwiegespräch über Lawrence Stern. Die Seele und die Formen*, p. 214.

40. "Zwischen Philosophie und Wissenschaft: Marxismus als Kritik," in Jürgen Habermas, *Theorie und Praxis* (Luchterhand, 1967), p. 207.

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bull, and still more important than the mechanism by which his screams, transformed into song, are transmitted, are the screams themselves, their undiverted genuineness and depth."[41] So Bloch summarizes his views of art.

And not only of art. For when he raises a dismayed protest against the form-centered conception of *The Theory of the Novel*, what crops up is not the academic discussion of the priority of form and content, and his dismay is not the result of not understanding Lukács. Our last proof—a critical remark on *The Metaphysics of Tragedy*—sums up the basis of the antithesis paradigmatically: "Thus one can well admit that great tragedy can most genuinely ensue in this age of remoteness from God and of the heroic atheism active in it; but that does not at the same time mean, as in Lukács, that the emptiness of external life must be powerless, and so that misanthropy or at least the murky, gelatinous, unpredictable, arbitrarily retarded, falsely conceived, moody, maliciously fortuitous and intermittent element of the causal nexus can merely be disregarded as simply and randomly alogical."[42] We can safely disregard the somewhat exaggerated accusatory accent relating to Lukács' indifference toward empirical life, because of the picture we have formed of the young Lukács *post festum* after his revolutionary turn. The debate which was formed in the period before the revolution, and greatly exaggerated in the period after, now stands before us.

The final basis of the two philosophies—the rejection of the existing world (and not in an indirect apologetic manner) and the necessity to transcend this world—is the same. "Does hope (which sees itself as justified and philosophically perhaps also is—though not in a positivistic, verifiable sense) in a future essentially and radically different from this present, which men must create by their actions, have the negative character of ideology and false consciousness or rather the positive character of a historically creative Utopia?"[43] So Lucien Goldmann formulates the contrast. The basis of this seminal Utopia is religious need. Therefore the contrast between transcendence and immanence in the philosophy of history, in ethics and aesthetics, develops on a common foundation. In a late interpretation Lukács speaks about what Bloch and, in the twenties, Benjamin and Adorno have in common with *The Theory of the Novel,* but his interpretation—rightist epistemological theory, leftist ethics, as the basis of this common ground—is problematic.[44] In my opinion the terminological pair *right-left* can deal *only* with the practical—ethical and political—effects of a theory. The possibility exists that someone, despite the practical consequences of his theoretical viewpoint, is still leftist-oriented in practice. But the practical consequences of the theory formulated in *The Theory of the Novel* and in *The Spirit of Utopia* are themselves leftist-oriented. And yet they are antinomical: each is the only true overcoming of the other.

41. *Geist der Utopie*, p. 133.
42. P. 284.
43. Lucien Goldmann, *Das Denken Herbert Marcuses. Kritik und Interpretation der kritischen Theorie* (T.W.A. Reprint Editions), p. 194.
44. Cf. *Die Theorie des Romans*, Foreword, pp. 16f.

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NOTES AND COMMENTARY:

Talking with Ernst Bloch: Korčula, 1968*

by Michael Landmann

From 1964 to its recent folding, owing to governmental and bureaucratic pressures, the Yugoslav journal *Praxis* has worked to circulate knowledge of "Eastern" philosophy in the capitalist countries and of "Western" philosophy (at least such as is appropriate and ready for dialogue) in the socialist countries. In pursuit of this dual objective, the editors of *Praxis* established a summer school (also now defunct) on the South Dalmation island of Korčula, which met for the fifth time on August 14-24, 1968 and, in honor of Karl Marx's 150th birthday, was entitled "Marx and the Revolution." On that island, I had the pleasure of spending twelve days with Ernst Bloch, attending the convention and conversing with him. The following discussions were taped on that occasion.

Korčula, August 13, 1968. I find Bloch with his wife Karola and his daughter Mirjam in the dining hall. Even in the most difficult times I have never seen Bloch ill-tempered or despondent, but now he seems more cheerful than ever, free of the burdens that have sometimes weighed down on him. That may be partly because his book *Atheism in Christianity* is finally finished. At this congress Bloch is as indefatigable as ever. He attends meetings for long hours each day. After dinner, when I recline paralyzed with exhaustion, the irrepressible Bloch is jovially telling anecdotes over his cup of coffee.
Landmann: "Goethe's insistence (on the greater importance of his treatise on color than his literary works) was only a defiant reaction because his treatise on color was received with less success than his literary writings. Fantasy was not proclaimed a poetic power until the 17th century with the modern discovery of the subject. Since then, realists have coexisted with the baroque-romantic praisers of the imagination. In antiquity and the renaissance, the theory of *mimesis* prevailed: the artist was equated with the knower; he clung rigidly, if not to reality, then to the idea. From the perspective of such an aesthetics, which modern man no longer accepts, fantasy appears to be a falsification. Only its negative side is seen. Hesiod, in the foreword to his *Theogony* opposes purely inventive literature, when he has the muses say: 'We can speak much falsehood that looks like reality; but when we wish we can also proclaim the truth'."
Bloch: "And what is the truth that they proclaim? Myth. As long as myth prevails, there is no tension between art and philosophy. Despite Hesiod, it is Plato and Epicurus who first made the Greeks aware of the unreality of literature. Since then literature has had to be on the defensive. Even Baumgarten apologizes for a special science of aesthetics, which treats of material intended for children and old wives."
Landmann (that evening): "I didn't realize you were a close friend of Döblin's. Could you tell us something about that?"
Bloch: "I read Döblin long ago. He was one of the most interesting men alive. For a

*This discussion has not appeared in any language. Translated from the German by David Parent.

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time we used to meet every week or two and were one heart and one soul. I first called his attention to Gerstäcker. He inscribed a book for me: 'To my friend E.B. the other tree from the same root.' But I could not go along with his pantheism. Finally, we parted ways because of his neo-Catholicism. In 1920, when I picked him up at the railroad station in Paris, he didn't know a word of French; in 1945 he came to Baden-Baden with the French army as a colonel and had become a totally reactionary right-wing French Catholic who believed in the Virgin Mary. I said to him: 'You're a doctor of medicine, yet I know more about these things than you do. How can you think that way?' He was a Jew from Stettin, but even the finest magnifying glass couldn't discover anything Jewish about him. The Expressionists claimed Döblin for themselves, but everything he writes is saliently objective. He could more properly be called a late-born baroque writer, a baroque naturalist. His *Wallenstein* begins with a banquet at Hradschin Castle: 'Softly the harp played, the German fife snorted.' Brutally and sadistically he traces the chicken breasts of the courtly ladies down in their guts; he also depicts the burning of Jews with gruesome precision and relish for cruelty. The natural scientist won out: biology interested him more than literature. His last work is a *Hamlet*, but I wonder if he knew Shakespeare at all before then? In addition he always had a penchant for mystical extravagances, probably drawing some ideas from case histories of the insane which he came across in his work as a neurologist. He wrote verses about the migration of souls and a story about a patient who thought himself to be Goethe reincarnated and at the age of 47 rewrote everything Goethe had written up to that age, in his own opinion 'much better,' but actually in a low provincialist niveau, including a drama *Werther's Sorrows*. But the fact that he was the reincarnated Goethe interested him less than the proof that it offered that the migration of souls does exist. Döblin wrote one Utopian novel, though a somewhat boyish one, called *Mountains, Seas and Giants*, which deals with the de-icing of Greenland and the origin of new organic forms...

"Formerly, in the cold war period, I sometimes lectured on the unity of our time and believed with Adolf Löwe that technocracy could harmonize many of the differences between East and West. Today in the period of appeasement, I no longer have much faith in this rapprochement because even appeasement is obviously a caricature. Capitalism stems from Adam Smith, the Soviet System from Lenin. In 1940 we (the leftist emigrants) in the USA all thought that fascism was the inevitable last stage of capitalism and that Russia would never become fascist. This prognosis turned out to be false. The *citoyen* of the French Revolution became the *bourgeois* of capitalism. Who knows what the Soviet *comrade* will become?

"In the new edition of *Traces* I have now, in the age of organ transplants, included the parable of English scientists exploring Indian caves, who discover amid antedeluvian fauna and flora a real Polyphemus with a single eye in his forehead. He comes roaring at them and immediately devours one Englishman. While he is sleeping off his meal, another Englishman, an anatomist with experience in trepanning, implants the brain of his dead victim into him. When Polyphemus awakens, his roaring muzzle takes on an Oxford accent. Now he is an inseparable member of the expedition. But soon he again lets out primitive roars: the tremendous juices of the animal body absorb the English brain. Only later do they discover that they had landed not on the Indian but on the Russian coast...

"One revolution is hardly enough to transform tsarism. Russia experienced neither Scholasticism, nor Renaissance, nor Enlightenment, nor bourgeois revolution. So if

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Marx's brain is implanted into it, it will be reabsorbed or accepted only externally. This same mistake was made by a banker who said to me: 'We Americans are the only ones who have learned anything from Marx, for our economy is already better-planned than the Russian one'—but this is true only of the techniques, not of the foundations. Russia does contribute a splendid human type with great credulity, but the foundations of Marxism, an English economy, the French revolution, and German philosophy—all three are missing in Russia. It is like setting a roof on the ground. But that means: genuine socialism has not yet existed, it has not yet begun."

Korčula, August 14, 1968: the convention opens. Bloch: "What is the difference between the bourgeois and the Marxist revolutions? The bourgeois revolution purchased the emancipation of the entrepreneur at a great price, but it did represent a real gain. What was stifled in 1815 and suppressed on its reappearance in 1848 proved to be inevitable; even Austria became a bourgeois state, and Bismarck introduced universal suffrage. Marxism too had a hard birth, and not everything about its beginnings was good: Stalinism distorted it beyond recognition. This presents a diagnostic problem. Capitalism, it was thought, necessarily decayed and led to fascism. That was false: liberal capitalism still exists. As a result the SPD (German Socialist Party) has chosen to become bourgeois. What is now happening in Prague may be a breakthrough in Eastern Europe. Ten academies of sciences would not suffice to get to the bottom of this hard fact: the old does not die and the new is not born.

"In Marxism a cold stream and a warm stream run parallel. It is a new edition of the Enlightenment. The economic explanation of ideas by interests, of the superstructure by the wealth of power in feudalism and the power of wealth in capitalism is not the only conclusive explanation but it does have value for detection and clarification: the real gold is left as residue. The bourgeois revolution brought about only freedom *of* acquisition, the Marxist one seeks to bring freedom *from* acquisition by abolishing the market system, so that man will no longer have to sacrifice his days to obtain the external means of existence. The first revolution only reshuffled the power structure, the second hopes to cause the state to die out and to replace power over men by administration of things. This is the fulfillment of what heretics have strived for since the Middle Ages. But what for them was an abstract fantasy is now a concrete Utopia that accords with reality without losing sight of the ideal. The great ideas of mankind are finally converging. Yet, what a difficult birth! To bring it about power and freedom must go hand in hand."

Korčula, August 15, 1968. Bloch tells how at the age of 23, in Vienna without money for three days, he wanted to seek help from Baron Rothschild's niece, a relative of a Budapest family who were close friends of his. But she had left on a journey just the day before. "Would you care to speak with the Baron himself?" But Ernst Bloch could not picture himself mooching on Rothschild, even if only to borrow five guilders for a short term—it would have been simply too grotesque. He decided to continue starving and left; the next day his check arrived. Bloch, who now often accepts lecture invitations, never gave a lecture or participated in discussions until his fiftieth year, when he addressed the Brecht Club of the Prague emigrants.

Bloch: "I had the trait of hardly ever speaking of my own affairs, at least not in conversations with strangers. When ideas came to me while talking, I kept them to myself and wrote them down later. I have no explanation for this. It was probably a

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subtle mixture of modesty and arrogance, but I didn't reflect on it. It was like not ordering any food when one isn't hungry. But when as an older man in Leipzig I first stepped to a speaker's platform, it actually seemed as if I had already stood there 'in ancient times.' But even there, at the same time as *The Principle of Hope* and my Hegel-book were being written, I lectured pedantically in the style of the 19th century handbooks for sixteen whole semesters on 'The History of Philosophy,' once also on 'Formal Logic,' and dealt quite extensively with all periods including the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. There ensued six typewritten compendia of about 800 pages each, in which not one idea is my own. Any new ideas came only implicitly in my analyses of Cusa or Leibniz' ideas. But no one noticed this. I was comfortable in this *incognito*."

Bloch tells me of one of the greatest surprises of his life: "Ages ago I knew an industrious and intensive student. His dissertation was rejected several times. Each time he gave it a new title but, confident of the ubiquity of philosophy, he left the main part unaltered and changed only the first and last pages. The titles read in succession—to caricature it somewhat—: 'The Relations between Paralysis and Paranoia,' 'A New Stratification of Quartzes,' 'The Special Motive Factors in the Expeditions of the Marcomanni as Forerunners of the Migration of Nations,' 'On the Melting Point of Bauxite,' 'The Fate of Average Rates of Profit in Underdeveloped Societies.' Finally he passed his doctoral examination with one of these dissertations. This same man who as a student looked like a young prince playing the dilettant in philosophy and accomplishing nothing, decades later wrote and spoke extremely well. In old age a butterfly came out of the caterpillar. Formerly he was the fifth wheel on the cart, later he became important—maybe that's why in the age of the automobile the fifth wheel in the trunk can be very, very important..."

The phenomenon of such a sudden burst of growth reminds Bloch of the cabalistic term *ibbur*:[1] "All religions except Judaism and Christianity believe in metempsychosis, in which the soul is united with a new body after death, in the cabala only marginally as *gilgul*. But *ibbur* is something quite different: pregnancy of the soul. This doctrine is the Jewish competitor with the theory of reincarnation. According to it, already in life especially favored persons have a new soul joined to their previous one. The new soul dwells not in the body but in the soul, i.e., not incarnation but inanimation. It means not the reaping of the fruits of one's own earlier deeds but the acquiring of something new that one did not have before. Where does this new soul come from? Perhaps it is a future soul that casts itself ahead.

"*Ibbur* can explain how many artists suddenly achieve a great breakthrough. It is as if their genius were born just then. Not only have they laid aside the old Adam, they have put on a new soul. What a leap from Shakespeare's *Titus Andronicus* to his mature works! Hölderlin was a minor imitator of Schiller. Even the young Beethoven is later unrecognizable. Who, except the historian and the special Wagner-enthusiast, still recognizes his *Rienzi*! He began so small."

Bloch then tells me also about the external upturn in Wagner's life: "At fifty years of age, he was poor as a pauper, for his work was considered unplayable; he was wanted by the Viennese police for passing counterfeit checks, was entangled in a

1. Cf. *The Spirit of Utopia*; already in high school, in his studies of Reuchlin and Knorr von Rosenroth, Bloch had found passages from the cabala in the Mannheim Castle Library of Bishop Franz Hartmann.

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hopeless, unrequited love, and was living in Biberach in a furnished room. Suddenly a court carriage arrived and a courier handed him a letter with royal crown and seal, in which Ludwig II, the 19-year old King of Bavaria, with great respect, invited him to the royal court at Munich."

Korčula, August 16, 1968. Bloch's lecture. Theme: "Marx as the Thinker of the Revolution." *Bloch:* "Rebellion or at least dissatisfaction have existed in all ages. But for every ten revolutions there are a hundred thousand wars. Still, there have been ten, fifteen, or twenty revolutions (the more, the better). But the first man to *think* revolution was Karl Marx. So we have the following questions which I would like to formulate as theses:

"1. The key-word, 'Dissatisfaction.' Dissatisfaction is easy to have, widespread everywhere and no doubt better than nothing. How good it is can be seen in our days, in the student uprisings. But what road leads from the initially psychological state of dissatisfaction to revolt? Dissatisfaction is not enough. One must know not only what one does not want, but also what one wants. Logic has the concept of *limes* (threshold). When a limit is sensed, it has already been crossed mentally. The prisoner's longing for freedom contains the idea of freedom.

"Karl Marx, the discoverer of dissatisfaction, who set short and middle-range goals without ever forgetting the ultimate goal implicit in them, demanded the abolition of all conditions in which man is an oppressed, lost, contemptible, forgotten being.[2] That is formulated not only negatively, but very positively. The leap from the realm of necessity to that of freedom is made clear, indeed with poster-like provocativeness, by the equation of philosophy and action. The point through which Marx refracted dissatisfaction was contradiction in two forms: in the subjective factor and its limits, but above all in the objective factor, whereby the psychologizing of the revolution and the exclusively abstract Utopia meet their downfall. Contradiction is subjectively 'contradictory,' and thus rebellious; objectively it is an incongruity, namely between the forces of production and the conditions of production. There exists a basic contradiction between the collective mode of production of the factory, which would suggest socialized ownership, and the private appropriation of the produced surplus value in the form of profit. This basic contradiction, brought to light most sharply by Marx, is retained in advanced capitalism, even when concealed with a lot of clever mumbo-jumbo about social partnership, especially in West Germany. The words 'exploiter-exploited' are no longer in vogue, and we can no longer speak of the misery of the proletariat. Therefore, Brecht suggested another antithesis: 'enterprisers-enterprisees.' But the enterprisees are the same poor devils as the proletarians once were; they merely have a nicer name.

"2. The first problem is: how does dissatisfaction become positive? How far does it go as an indicator of what one could be satisfied with? The second problem is that of violence. Marx not only stood Hegel's dialectic back on its feet, he taught it how to march. When the 'authorities' exercise violence, it is not called violence. But if the oppressed resort to even the most pitiful act of self-defense, then this 'violence' is considered a crime and put down by the police. Hypocritical indignation about it appeals to the Sermon on the Mount. But Jesus said other things too: 'I have not come to bring peace, but the sword!' Not to resist evil may be possible in heaven but not here in practice.

2. Cf. Marx, *Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right.*

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"The problem of violence is falsely played up nowadays as the main thing. Marx and Engels at the end of the 19th century expected the great catastrophe almost any minute. They believed that the conditions would ripen by themselves until the incidental and artificial, outmoded and obsolete obstacles would merely have to be cast aside like so much dead wood, for the new society and freedom to emerge. It does not look like that today. The world and social conditions are immersed in a sort of objectively real fog that exists not just in the mind. This fog will lift, no doubt. But for the moment the idea does not seem to be emerging into reality, nor does the direction of events seem to be set automatically. If we remain inactive we allow what has already been attained to be extinguished. The blood shed in revolutions is very little compared with that shed in wars.

"3. The role of the final end. What socialism wanted as its ultimate goal must be present at all stages, otherwise the short-range goals become boring. The idea of the 'better future' and the enthusiastic mass movement in the struggle for it have dimmed and died out in the entire Marxist discussion since 1918, though the goal is much closer. Hereditary socialist land has been surrendered to the enemy, abandoned to the Nazis and to ecclesiastical propaganda.

"What goal and what purpose? What do we really want? We must reflect on that. No longer out of context in an abstract Utopia, but in the new idea of a concrete Utopia as Marx has shown it, a Utopia which is no less a Utopia for being concrete; it has just not lost sight of reality. It cannot afford to, until we finally have among us the great peace which Thomas Münzer—and all the other great revolutionaries—foresaw in the symbol of the rainbow, without laziness and without betrayal at the fronts. This is what I call the warm current of Marxism that requires our liveliest reflection and discussion."

Korčula, August 17, 1968. Marcuse's lecture. Marcuse: "It is with joy that I speak in the presence of Ernst Bloch; already in the early twenties I learned from Bloch and read his *Spirit of Utopia.*

"During the May disturbances in Paris someone scrawled on the walls of the Sorbonne the words: 'Let us be realistic, let us demand the impossible.' The student movement as a 'militant minority' (Cohn-Bendit) redefines socialism. Only through it are factors and forces of advanced capitalism amalgamated into Marx's theory and strategy. It is no longer today only a question of a 'socialist humanism.' That still smells of repression and sublimation, belongs to the 'affirmative culture' which mutilates man. That is still the expression of the bourgeois cosmos of value which tells a man to be good while others are bad and so the whole remains bad. Marx is still thinking in terms of the duality of a continuing realm of necessity, of alienated labor, and of a realm of freedom that begins only after the former is abolished, a freedom in which man may rejoice and find his fulfillment as an individual. Contemporary capitalism keeps intact this condition of two realms artificially by the defense industry and by an industry of superfluous luxury goods. We are living in voluntary servitude and believe that we must buy the most modern TV set because our neighbor does. If we shook off this servitude, then the realm of freedom could grow tremendously within affluent society. Since machines do the work for us, man would only have to be their supervisor and developer and could, beyond that, live essentially in fulfillment of his need for knowledge and beauty. Industrialization is the weapon for overcoming the ugly features of capitalism. We are at a crossroads where we must rethink our

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priorities. Man is now capable, for the first time, of creating a world around him that is appropriate to his nature. A new science, politics and morality, a new type differing from the old one not only in degree but in quality. The student movement, unlike the unions, is interested in more than higher wages and longer holidays, it is the bearer of a new vision of socialism which can overcome the contrast between the two systems of East and West."

Bloch: "We are all impressed and moved and, I assume, instructed by Herbert Marcuse's fiery yet precise statements. He has truly arrived on time. This time of the student uprisings needs formulations which one can hold on to, but not in a static way such as the establishment gives us, and I hope will soon stop giving us. With the student uprisings something new has come into the world, the likes of which probably never existed before, namely a revolt without urgent economic causes. Of course, there is nothing in which the economy is not in some way involved. Therefore, every protest is implicitly a protest against the prevailing economy. But, for the student revolters, economics is not primary, at least not in their minds. They are revolting against more than the economic side of social reality. This is a revolt of men who no longer want to or will endure: tutelage, supervision, harassment, power in its most abhorrent form and arrogated authority.

"This is a breakthrough of what could be called 'upright stature' or the will to it—a concern that was already an ingredient of classical natural law and that has been seeking new formulations since natural law declined in the 19th century but one which has not been sufficiently cultivated in Marxism, especially not in Marxist theory. There are men who toil and are burdened, those are the exploited. But in addition there are also men who are degraded and offended. Of course the exploited are also degraded and offended, but a distinction must be made between these two aspects. The abominable web, the horrid straitjacket of exploitation has gained a new thread. The factor of degradation and vexation urgently deserves a name and a concept. Stalinism was able to impose itself without resistance because this term was hardly heard in Marxism after 1917. This factor therefore now requires a theory of its own, so that it can regain its place in the history of the liberation of mankind, where it is most urgently needed. Otherwise, enslavement will not die out and will always be reestablished under ever new names.

"All this has been recalled and revitalized by Marcuse during his lifelong activity, though with other words and in other contexts. And so we owe him our gratitude as well as our attention for what has happened through him. It is far from over and will not be over until it is victorious.

"My next point is a critical question about the category of 'humanism.' The historical efficacy of humanism has not, it seems to me, been given its full due, for humanism is dealt with as a criminal offense by every Stalinistic state absolutism [*Verapparatlichung*]. At the end of the Stalin era, it was enough to say the words 'humanist socialism' to be in danger of prison. Can then a concept be so invalid, if it was considered so dangerous by the repressive, degenerate nonfulfillment of socialism? Does it really coincide with the empty phrase which Marx so rightly criticized in Feuerbach? In Feuerbach, so Marx charges, the genus *man* is absolutized, a dull dew of love pours out with repetitious 'man' and 'humanity' and blurs all opposites and distinctions in false toleration. This genus *man* can go chase himself, Marx says: we are interested only in the failure of social conditions. Marx's critique was necessary and it may here and there still be necessary. But 'man' remains a category with a great

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revolutionary past and it still retains great explosive force against all state absolutism, and against self-alienation, as can also be seen in art.

"What then is the self from which man is alienated? It is the unknown man, the *homo ignotus* in us, whose wings are still immobilized, who from Spartacus on has at all times resisted oppression of every sort, not only economic oppression, and who must at least stand 'with upright stature' in a vast social orthopedics. This promise has not yet been fulfilled. The genus *man* loses its harmful abstractness when it is made clear that its only valid concrete occurrence is the individual. All fountains of social wealth should flow (Marx), so that the individual is liberated. Not the universal but the ideal man is a democratic concept, lost or undeveloped, yet again and again knocking at the door seeking to enter.

"But there is another type of man. The word 'son of man' hinted at this mystery, in contrast to the son of the great lord, the son of God. This suggests possibilities, horizons, undiscovered land. What we have not yet discovered on earth is pre-formed in our concepts. They are expeditions into a dark unexplored continent. The words 'man' and 'humanism' are so rich in meaning that any caricatures and trivialities they have been reduced to cannot decide their fate or reduce them to obsolete slogans. 'Humanist socialism' itself meant so much that it damned all the prisons and concentration camps of Stalinist Russia. And the jailers and camp directors, sensing this, persecuted and repressed those who used the term.

"Marcuse mentioned the concept 'possibility.' That is the undiscovered, as I see it. Not only our external reality but our innermost human and social reality as actually existent is surrounded by a far greater sea of objectively real possibility. Realism means to do what is objectively and really possible, mobilizing the good as it germinates and locking in oblivion the extremely numerous bad and base possibilities. This is socialist politics as it explores the new. The new is our mission as a possibility, and thus it is partially conditioned. It is not fully conditioned, otherwise it would be real, indeed even inevitable. The possible is what is only partially conditioned; one more conditioning factor is needed for it to be realized, and that subjective factor is action, i.e., the transition from theory to practice. All these Marxist categories have as background the so far insufficiently explored category of objectively real possibilities, and so ultimately man himself. Everything that was once attributed to and personified in *deus absconditus* (the hidden god) is latent in man himself and was taken from him. That is the undiscovered land we are journeying to, and the means to do it is socialist society.

"Another point that also should be shouted from the rooftops has to do with the futile competition between the two systems, capitalism and socialism. What a stinking contradiction it is to speak of corrupt capitalism and yet to organize five-year plans to catch up with and surpass the West, i.e., capitalism, thus increasing the putrefaction! This leads to capitulation to the capitalist mode of production, thought, and trade, so that socialism becomes only a small new invention to procure the blessings of capitalism in a socialist manner, and nothing more than that. If that is the goal, then Kerensky too could have attained it, and the revolution of 1917 would not have been necessary. No Lenin, no October revolution, and no Marx would have been needed. Bewitched by the glittering phenomenon of capitalism, one seeks to achieve the same thing with inadequate means, with means that Marx built for other purposes and that are unsuitable. And so socialism misses the mark. It was not invented to emulate capitalism. Its goals are different.

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"Marcuse stressed this significant point at the end of his speech. Socialism must at last stand by itself, not in a sectarian manner but with the pride, responsibility and awareness that it is creating something totally different from the previous world, though it was anticipated in its best and noblest dreams. Socialism has now reached the point where it can leave behind a wishy-washy dream world, and ally itself irrevocably with the objectively real possibility contained in the tendency and latency of the social process, indeed of the world process. No more side glances at the obsolete world, the obsolete prosperity with its horridly dehumanizing consumer-industry, but eyes set on the one thing we need.

"What we need is implicitly contained in the pathos of the concept of the individual. It is more than implicit in the negative tone of 'self-alienation;' it emerges to the surface in the challenge that emanates from this word. What then—and that brings us back to humanism—is the self? A being that is not yet born and is hindered, hampered and harassed from appearing, the unknown individual humanity in us that finally takes its place when its hour has arrived. We known precisely what it is *not*; if we analyze that we are already halfway to a concrete idea of what it might be—like an inventor, statesman or scientist who intimates what can and should be done; and so the time of alienation, resignation and deterioration of the means and goals can be overcome. Thus, on the difficult road we are on, we must have an idea of the land we seek at least in its broad contours. We must survey the terrain carefully so that we take the right course and are not deceived by false fulfillments. What was meant in the old Utopias and in the most beautiful and richest dreams of mankind can help us get up again after disappointed hope (and what would hope be if it could not be disappointed?) and teach and correct us by disappointment. To correct hope, to hope again after disappointment, that is our mission, a mission that has been entrusted also to intelligent youth.

"I was also glad to see that Marcuse has corrected the misunderstanding he had fallen into for a while, where he seemed to accept a sectarian separation between intelligentsia and proletariat, and that this correction has brought him back squarely on the mark. A movement of the intelligentsia without the masses remains sectarian. For the goals of the two groups are the same and can be revealed as such to the unknowing eye. Therefore, they must combine not only out of expediency, for greater power and to make victory more probable, but from a self-evident comradeship and solidarity.

"A free-floating intelligentsia, as Karl Mannheim calls it, is neither free nor does it float. It must come down and ally itself with all those around it who suffer a common hardship and with whom it feels the same longing for *omega*, the undiscovered land of possibility and the goal of common freedom, toward which it goes."

That evening, we converse again on the subject of *ibbur,* as we had done two evenings earlier. *Bloch:* "It is not the same thing when a boy at puberty is given a new name in the initiation rites of primitive tribes, nor is the 'new man' in the rebirth of the mystics the same (*nihil nasci nobis profuit, nisi renasci profuisset*—it was of no use to us to be born, unless we were also reborn). For in the second case the 'new man' is either only the latent core of the soul that was only covered over and now emerges or is transformed by contact with the divine Spirit. A perhaps closer observation from life might be that sometimes a son whose father, or a subordinate whose superior dies, attains his ultimate growth only then: he assumes the functions of the deceased man,

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and it is as if some of his spirit and strength entered him. We refer to the *Dybbuk* legend: but there the spirit of a dead man exercises an obsession and must be cast out. . . .

"I am interested mainly in distinguishing *ibbur* from metempsychosis, in which we are determined by a former life, whereas *ibbur* on the contrary adds something new to what already exists and changes the character and abilities. In Judaism the idea of reincarnation is eliminated, for God creates each life new; in Christianity also, for after death He redeems or damns it. The doctrine of reincarnation is reactionary and linked with inheritance law: there is no change of the property relationships, whoever has it good inherits, as it were, the bank account of his former life, and the burden-bearer and unskilled worker must remain so because he has inherited nothing from his past. Steiner spread metempsychosis to the horizon of housewives and made the idea of the migration of souls as commonplace as beer against thirst.

"In Hebel's tale, *The Remarkable Tavern Bill*, two rascals try to convince the inn-lady that they come back every 6000 years and that they would pay her back then. She answers, that is all the more reason for them to leave their watch and jacket as security, since they still owe her from the last time. And of Nietzsche who wanted to begin a new calculation of time starting with the date on which he first got the idea of the 'eternal recurrence.'

"The union of souls in *ibbur* leads to the union of the sexes: does the intensification which one gets from the other person result from similarity or difference? We are happy to have found a wife who is close to us individually in character and inclinations; yet through her femininity she remains different, and perhaps that makes her so enlivening. A color-blind person gives an exact description of red and green in words that seem to fit our sensation exactly, although he does not see them and red for him is only a dark brown (similarly Dutch words that seem to be identical with German have a different meaning and this very fact makes Dutch so hard to learn). So we don't know female inner life: they say 'light bulb' but it does not mean the same as for us. Women seem inferior because our language is not made for them, yet they are no more inferior than the Indian is for not adapting to the capitalist system. The assimilation of females is far worse than that of Jews. Women see our world with a similar strangeness and often certainly a similar aversion as St. Peter looking upon Roman temples and palaces (described with great empathy by Spengler). Their adaptation to male forms of jurisdiction hides their alienation but it also prevents them from being what they could be. In a conversation with Margarete Susmann I reached the point where each admitted we did not understand the other—and it was not caused by our personal peculiarities."

Landmann: "One could also speak of an objective *ibbur* of works. Plato's *Republic* is complete with Book 9; his addition of Book 10 with the final myth opens a whole new dimension that gives the book its ultimate greatness. The same is true of the crowning of Beethoven's *Ninth Symphony* with a chorus, which is not normally prescribed for a symphony (i.e., something from an entirely different *genre* is added). These works were already genial up to that point, but a double geniality is not satisfied and adds still more, opens the finished circle into a still larger one. The last step is the most impressive. Most people, nations and ages are too easily satisfied and only a few experience what could be called the 'grace of the last step'."

Bloch: "All that is fine. But it is not *ibbur*! In addition to the new start you are speaking of, works can become really good only in their later parts or, on the contrary,

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excellent expositions can have bad executions. Two types of men parallel this: the late-developer (Kant) or the precocious man (Schubert). Christian Morgenstern would be an example of *anti-ibbur*. As a grotesque poet he was good, in his anthroposophic later period his muse failed completely.

"Two weeks ago I was invited to lecture before a church synod. Would that have been possible formerly? 'The Hebrew current' is what some theologians today call the eschatological vein in the New Testament, while formerly it was still undiscovered even in the Old Testament."

Since the catchwords "eschatology" and "future" have fallen, I tell of an essay by Hans Heinz Holz who, starting from Blochian ideas, states that a symbol can exist only because the symbol and the thing signified ultimately coincide.

Bloch: "Possibly. But there is no ultimate. The object of signification is only a line extrapolated by us. Yet, at the same time, the symbol is not something merely subjective. God speaks directly—to use Heraclitian language—in signs. Real categories and real hopes are contained in the world itself, not only for our limited understanding and our weakness, but objectively (*an sich*). Precisely the unfinished world is full of real symbols, real allegories, real models. Nature is the veiled image of itself, a symbol from within and not only for us, an allegory of her hidden future. The mountain and the sea are objective, real symbols. They hide something which they themselves know nothing of, they are hidden from themselves, are concretely Utopian to themselves; in tendency and latency something is present though not actually existent. Everyone longs for the Romantic 'blue flower.' Tendency is the objective counterpart to intention, which is subjective. Tendency inclines toward what has not yet happened, intention toward what is not yet known. The only interesting part of ontology is the ontology of the 'not yet.' Empirical truth extends only to what already exists; it does not encompass what will be (*das fieri*)."

Korčula, August 18, 1968. The evening with Bloch is spent together with Agnes Heller. She explains the ideas of her forthcoming book, *Philosophy of the Everyday World* (*Philosophie des Alltags*) to Bloch. The everyday need not be as Heidegger describes it. She praises Bloch for taking categories from everyday life and tracing them to more sublime regions, just as *The Principle of Hope* does not start with the great Utopias but with the day-dreams of a middle-class person. To determine the nature of the everyday more precisely she seeks a general principle that is added at a stage just 'above' it.

Bloch: "One must distinguish between the everyday and the private. The everyday is not private, for about the same conversation on the weather and the hotel food goes on between tourists from Oslo to Sicily. The everyday is so pitiful precisely because it stands between the two more meaningful strata, above the private, which can be very moving, and below the political and social, where the same event affects the fate of millions. Compared with the political, the everyday resembles the private in that both affect only the individual, but it concerns him not as a person but generically. The everyday is always typical. Therefore the common man—I have this from Simmel—remains unchanged through the ages. From the days of Pericles till now the vegetable woman always has about the same worries and joys. But the great man is stamped by his age in every fibre of his being. He embodies or resists the intention of the age.

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Napoleon would have been impossible just a decade later. One might think: the average man reflects his epoch, the exceptional man towers above it. But the opposite is true. The highest reality grows out of the unique. Whoever wants to last must be conditioned by his time. These are paradoxes."

The conversation shifts to a participant at the convention whom Bloch considers intelligent but unproductive. To Agnes Heller, a pupil of Lukács, he says: "Formerly Lukács and I used to say to each other: 'you are much more intelligent than I!' The compliment was meant seriously but not given cheaply, for both knew that intelligence is only a precondition, and substantial value is totally independent of it. Who would praise Hegel and Schopenhauer for their intelligence? Intelligence becomes a value only by contrast with stupidity. Later Lukács said of the Communist Party: 'Anyway, among us intelligence is already a deviation'."

Bloch then discusses his theory of possibility: "When I first formed it, it seemed like a tremendous paradox, for in all philosophy reality is higher and possibility only its weaker preliminary stage. But in truth the hierarchy of modalities possibility-reality-necessity is quite false. Possibility is logic's neglected step-child. Aristotle seems to be an exception; at least he opposes the Megricans, who deny independent possibility. But he conceives of possibility only from the perspective of the goal (*telos*) and thereby narrows down its ubiquity. Only in Euclidean geometry does necessity rule: the sum of the angles of a triangle must be 180°. Even in physics necessity has today been shaken. Logically—not actually—anything is possible."

Landmann: "Necessity is surely not the highest modality. In Harmann it pervades the lower layers of reality, while higher on the scale possibility and freedom are dominant. For that very reason possibility is not universal and even if declared so, it would still remain a modality. You can't play logarithms on the violin. Husserl gives examples of combinations that are intrinsically excluded by their meanings."

Heller: "Just as there are infinite possibilities at all times, so infinite possibilities are excluded. Brutus cannot become a Fascist, and Rosenkranz and Güldenstern cannot stop being swinish rascals."

Bloch: "Tragic heroes are no objection because they are fixated in the mind of their inventors. They are 'long dead before they die' (Bela Balacz). As Freitag says in his *The Journalists:* 'So much happens in the world and so tremendously more does not happen. . . , that if Africa suddenly became rectangular, I wouldn't be a bit surprised!'

"In a more serious vein: Possibility does not become reality by itself; man must seize it. Marx himself believed in a 'trend' but not that history inevitably leads to a classless society. If the proletariat believes that, then it can perish in the same barbarity as the bourgeoisie. Possibility contains not only a happy outcome and liberation (*Heil und Erlösung*); terrible possibilities also exist. A second Hitler could come. *Mutabor* (I will be changed)—'How beautiful,' one thinks, yet one could be changed into a dog. But only possibility keeps the world from dead rigidity and allows a better world to be born.

"The demonic reverse of possibility is chance. Kuno Fischer gives a good example. That a tree grew on this hill was necessary, if we follow the chain of causes backward. That later a tornado touched down in this vicinity was also necessary. Both had to happen that way. But that the tornado reaches the tree and uproots it, is for both things chance. Thus chance can arise from the convergence of two necessities."

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Korčula, August 19, 1968. A conversation with Karola Bloch. *Karola:* In 1948 a letter arrived from Werner Kraus, the Romanist and Auerbach student (who had belonged to the anti-fascist resistance group Red Chapel), offering Ernst a professorship in philosophy there. I found it hard to consent to returning, for my parents and my dear brother had been murdered by the Nazis. But Ernst's willingness to accept such a professorship and the hope of helping build a socialist Germany were decisive. Even Adolf Löwe advised him to accept the teaching post 'so that others will finally know what you know.' Ernst's letters which he wrote to me from Leipzig (I stayed in the USA for a few months) were wonderfully optimistic and full of joyous expectations.

"Until 1957 things went well there. I too had interesting work at the German Academy of Architecture in East Berlin. But as early as 1951, after the Slansky trial, a precarious situation arose: the book on Hegel was criticized as too idealistic. But the attacks were still muted, and after June 1953 a liberalization came about in the German Democratic Republic. In 1955, on his 70th birthday, a *Festschrift* was dedicated to Ernst, he was honored at a university reception and even Pieck and Ulbricht congratulaged him. In the fall of the same year he received the National Prize and became a full member of the German Academy of Sciences in Berlin.

But in October 1956 Ernst sided with the anti-Stalinist Gomulka. Wolfgang Harich was arrested in December, his trial was held in March 1957, we were known to be his friends. Now daily attacks were made against Ernst's 'imperialistic' philosophy. I lost my position and after 25 years of party activity I was thrown out of the party. We were also threatened with arrest. Still we did not flee. That would generally have been regarded as a betrayal of socialism.

"On the morning of January 19, 1957, the doorbell rang and a student active in the party brought a letter: The party leadership of the Institute of Philosophy declares its mistrust of Ernst Bloch and forbids him to set foot on the grounds of the university. The order had come directly from Ulbricht to the Institute, bypassing the rector, who was appalled, but of course Ernst no longer went to the Institute. Years before in Leipzig, Ulbricht had engaged in a conversation with scientists, and Ernst, who was never careful, had finally said of Ulbricht: 'He may be a good politician, but he lacks the sex appeal for such a discussion.' Since that time Ulbricht had a personal hatred for Ernst. In a speech he called him a 'seducer of youth.'

Our arrest in 1957, which was demanded by the Melsheim state's attorney, was probably prevented only by Kurt Hager. Though Hager had written an article against Ernst, entitled 'A Pirate under the Wrong Flag,' he still respected him. On November 14, 1956, Ernst had given the ceremonial address in honor of the 125th anniversary of Hegel's death at the Humboldt University in Berlin. This lecture, against the background of the 'Polish October' and the Hungarian revolts was politically explosive. The sentence 'We've been playing tic-tac-toe for too long, now its time to play chess!' unleashed a storm of applause among the students. After the lecture Hager came up to me and said, 'Though I don't agree with everything your husband says, he is as exciting to watch as Jupiter casting thunderbolts!'

"Two unpleasant years followed. Only after 1959 did signs increase that many regretted to see Ernst removed from office. He was still not going to the university, but he was welcome at the Academy of Sciences and held a lecture there on "Differentiations in the Concept of Progress.' One March day he took his coat along, saying 'I don't trust any thaw any more.'

"In 1961 our son Jan obtained his diploma in chemistry. In the social-sciences

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section of the exam, he was asked the question: 'Name a revisionist.' Question: 'And in Germany?' The examiner wanted Jan to name his father. When he remained silent, he got 'unsatisfactory' which was later changed to satisfactory. All his other grades were 'very good.'

"In May 1960 Ernst gave a speech in Tübingen at the invitation of the Gastl bookstore and the Student Senate (ASTA): the lecture was a great success. He then was invited as visiting professor for one semester. In 1961 we got the news about the building of the wall just when we happened to be in West Germany. We decided to accept the invitation to remain in the West otherwise we would have undergone the danger of never being able to leave East Germany again. We also feared that Ernst might be prevented from continuing to publish his works with the Suhrkamp Press under the new political situation. The visiting professorship in Tübingen was changed to a permanent assignment."

Korčula, August 20, 1968. Already in earlier conversations the catch-word *anagnorisis* (recognition) was used. Today we make it the main topic. I ask Ernst Bloch why he finds this idea so fascinating and always returns to it, although he so opposes the Platonic *anamnesis* (recollection) which is also a form of *anagnorisis*, though, as far as I know, Plato never drew the analogy to the recognition scenes in myths. It was an Orphic idea that some souls before incarnation drink from the fountain of memory. Whoever drinks there always remembers his divine homeland and remains aware of his divinity. Plato may have transposed this.[3]

Bloch: "We always have to make it hard for ourselves! A bishop ordered the medical investigation of Therèse of Konnersreuth. He considered a miracle possible but did not skip the skeptical stage. We are against *anamnesis*, and precisely therefore we must investigate it.

"The doctrine of *anamnesis* claims that we have knowledge only because we formerly knew. But then there could be no fundamentally new knowledge, no future knowledge. The soul merely meets in reality now what it always already knew as idea. That is a circle within a circle and just as inaccurate as the other theory (*anagnorisis*) is revealing: that the new is never completely new for us because we bring with us something to measure it by. We always relate what we find to earlier experience or to an image we have of it. As a result it often happens that we misjudge it upward or downward, but still it becomes richer for us, and is colored with history. It approaches us from our own past and must prove that it is genuine. *Anamnesis* provides the reassuring evidence of complete similarity; *anagnorisis,* however, is linked with reality by only a thin thread; it is therefore alarming. *Anamnesis* has an element of attenuation about it, it makes everything a gigantic *déja vu*, as if everything had already been, *nil novi sub anamnesi*. But *anagnorisis* is a shock: he whom they cast into a pit suddenly stands there, powerful and handsome before them (Joseph and his brothers)."

Landmann: "In *The Principle of Hope* you deal with the motif of recognition in connection with *The Magic Flute*, using an image that contained an erotic promise. Can the loving Pamina compete with her image? Tamino, seeing this girl whom he has never known before, says 'She is the one... It is no dream.' That is a problem analogous to asking whether post-revolutionary reality corresponds to the Utopian

3. According to Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (1951), p. 210; the shaman's recollection of prior earthly lives is the source for Plato's remembrance of bodiless forms.

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preconception. *Anagnorisis* is something completely different from reality to reality—Eurykleia recognizing Odysseus, Electra and Orestes, the brothers and Joseph."

Bloch: "The image-motif is peripheral to *anagnorisis.* Pamina can easily be recognized by her picture, but not Joseph, whom his brothers have not seen for 20 years. First, he has changed, and second, they can no longer remember exactly after so long a time—as often happens with witnesses in court—and thirdly, they are not expecting to meet him as Pharoah's deputy. Electra knew Orestes only as a child, now he is a broad-shouldered young man. In *anagnorisis* there must always be a distance between the former and present reality otherwise it would not be so difficult and astonishing. But in these examples the distance is only in external appearances. That between idea and reality, demand and realization reaches far deeper."

Korčula, August 21, 1968. A bitter day. The East Bloc countries—except for Rumania and Yugoslavia—have invaded Czechoslovakia. We are all as if paralyzed, speak little and if at all, about hardly anything else. The lectures are cancelled and instead various resolutions are composed and a telegram is sent to Tito that he should protest, which however we later discover he has already done on his own. Newspapers in West European languages arrive only after a few days. So we must rely on radio messages and the reports of Yugoslavian friends, which are often contradictory and lag behind the events.

Bloch: "Here we are speaking about all sorts of things and neglecting history. 'Prophecy is unreliable,' stands daily in the Itzehöer *Stadtanzeiger* (City Bulletin)—but no international consequences result from the Russian invasion. The Czech experiment was a great hope for all of us, but if the little plant had been allowed to grow, would more have come of it than a Kadar or Gomulka? All Eastern Marxism contains a bitter-tasting herb. The real chances for a more advanced socialism are paradoxically greater in the West."

The topic shifts to Marcuse. *Bloch:* "That he is in the leadership of the student movement shows that he is not only a scholar but a man of courage and principle. We were together in recent evenings and understood each other well. He considers a new Utopia necessary because capitalism and industry are no longer the same as at the time of the classic socialists. His diagnosis is right and also his demand that we not let prosperity in a consumer society talk us into false needs. His positive message includes traces of Bakunin's anarchism and Epicureanism. My two main objections are:

"1. According to Marcuse, capitalism today is no longer developing contradictions which it cannot overcome; therefore the contradiction must come from the outside. That is why Marcuse was so disappointed by the outcome of the disturbances in Paris in May. In reality Marx is right that the contradictions now as always are immanent in capitalism. It may succeed in suppressing crisis and war for a long time but never definitively. All it has are palliatives.

"2. Marcuse wants the future without the mediation of history. Something radically new is to come, breaking in Jacobinistically like a thief in the night. In truth, a new good is never completely new. Most of the past is interrupted future, future in the past. The world does have a dream. We late-comers—that is an old thesis of mine—can reach back to and utilize our origins only insofar as they reach forward to us. The unfulfilled past is an obligation on us. We must take up its standard and carry it on. Marcuse, however, has an historicist view of the past. He has no allies in the past, no

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noble wellspring of revolution. When I said this to him the other evening, he agreed evasively."

Korčula, August 22, 1968. A continuation of the conversation on *anagnorisis*. We seek to discover the point at which it links with the philosophy of the Utopian. Or is this the point of departure in experience for a second philosophy which did not germinate in Ernst Bloch because he chose the former?

Bloch: "*Anagnorisis* fascinates us all, but I don't know why. That the poets so often use this motif is an indication that something is hidden in that theme that goes beyond scenic effects. Sudden remembrance is one of the strongest romantic emotions. The first story containing the motif of recognition that deeply moved me already as a child of nine or ten is the Scottish story translated by Hauff, *The Steenfall Cave*. For months the fisherman Falke heard a voice in his ear before falling asleep, but did not understand a word. Once he is caught at high tide in a cave avoided by the fishermen. A boat scoots through the tide, piloted by a withered little man who tells him that a ship called Carmilhan, laden with gold, sank here 100 years ago. 'Carmilhan!'—that was the word he heard each night. 'Lift the treasures of this ship,' the voice was trying to tell him. He tries to do so, but never returns. On stormy nights when cloud-tatters slip by the moon he is seen in the train of the drowned crew of the ship, singing a hellish choral.

"As an adolescent I wanted to write an opera entitled *Carmilhan*. But I didn't really know what was so moving about the story until much later when I was writing *The Spirit of Utopia*. As a child one often senses what will come much later. Carmilhan: that is a word pregnant with the *not-yet*, the sign that Faust pronounces mysteriously before the earth-spirit appears, the *verbum mirificum*, the key to a true world. But the man who knows that word vanishes into the esoteric and the treasure is never discovered. What I took from the mystics as a departure point for my further thinking already moved me as a child.

"Again and again as a child I had the passage of the Odyssey read to me where Polyphemus says: 'My name is No One' (in the Greek: 'I *am* No One'). I was enthralled each time. That we are not the people we seem to be, that we contain unexplored land—I must even as a child have sensed how much this idea would mean to me.

"The cabala too knows quite a different mode of childhood anticipation of future events. Later life is, for it, only an inadequate fulfillment of the mission originally assigned to us. While our mother is pregnant with us, an angel leads us into the realm of ideas and shows us what we are expected to accomplish. When we die he returns as the angel of death and asks whether we have fulfilled the predesignated tasks. Only now do the ideas come clearly to us, and so we die with a scream of guilt unheard by the living, in the realization: I am a failure, hampered by the body and the senses I betrayed the ideal I was supposed to remember.

"Recognition is an image in *The Flying Dutchman* as well as in *The Magic Flute*. Senta has grown up with the 'picture of a pale man with a dark beard,' and is prepared for her fate by a demonic ballad. But there is no turning point, no lovers' duet, they both stand like statues and the Dutchman sings in sad Tristan-like tones. Likewise in the first act of *The Walküries*: 'Whom I have first seen today/My eye saw you already,' and: 'O silent: let me listen to the voice: I think I heard its sound as a child.' The present is an echo of a certain earlier experience that had been forgotten and now

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returns in a burst of memory. The *anagnorisis*-scene in Hofmannsthal's *Electra* matches that of Sophocles, but only with the help of the magnificent music that gives it resonance and depth. Orestes enters just as Electra, who believes him dead, is digging up the axe of Aegsth to take revenge. 'I must wait here,' he sings in a deep bass (that is good, for it marks the distance from the child she had known, and shows his strength). His 'Who are you?' already proclaims their recognition. A little later, she too, moved by his tone, asks: 'Who are you?' Orestes answers: 'The dogs in the courtyard recognize me but not my sister?' Electra exclaims: 'Orestes!'

"*Anagnorisis* is a symbol that the present is never completely new, that it has historical depth, that it had prior existence in another form and was preparing itself. It doesn't mean merely that I recognize A which I see before me, as the B (Orestes) I formerly knew, but also the opposite: that I only now recognize the B I knew as the newly known A, that what I previously did not understand (Carmilhan) is made essentially clear by a new experience. Nature and our own self are hidden from us. We are surrounded by signs which we do not understand. At rare moments, however, the signs become clear. An *incognito* is lifted. . . .

"In the *Traces* (Pippa Passes) you can read how I once was travelling with Benjamin in Autobus E from the opera to a café on Montparnasse when a woman sitting opposite stared at me with a puzzled expression, struggling for memory as if we had lived a whole life together and she knew every trait of my being. She was speechless, for a sign is silent, it must be unveiled by the one for whom it holds promise and in whom it arouses a premonition. I drove back once at the same hour on the same bus but never met the woman destined for me. Irreparable."

Korčula, August 23, 1968. I pose the following issue to Ernst Bloch: "As a young professor I became known through my textbook.[4] For some time now students have known that they can work with me on Ernst Bloch, and now a second one wants to write on 'Ernst Bloch's Anthropology'." However much Bloch has defended philosophical anthropology, he does not stand by it when questioned directly on the subject.

Bloch: "I once discussed the problem of anthropology with Wolfgang Harich who wanted to dedicate his book on the subject to me. There are philosophers who restrict themselves to man or at least use him as their point of departure. Windelband has the 'anthropological period' among the Greeks begin with Socrates. Feuerbach calls man his 'third and last idea' and so draws dangerously close to Existentialism: one could do a thesis on 'Feuerbach and Bultmann'."

Landmann: "But there is also a tension between Existentialism and anthropology. Jaspers accused philosophical anthropology—as Bergson had done to classical psychology—of failing to see the unfinished openness and possibility in man; it solidified, objectified him, he claimed."

Bloch: "Jaspers has the least right of anyone to make this reproach. I myself witnessed how all these terms—including that of cipher—first took root in him. 'Possibility' and 'future' were not invented by him, and so they always remain foreign inclusions within his work. He lacks a Utopian, revolutionary passion. Instinctively he moved to bourgeois Switzerland, where he finds great acceptance. Whoever really sees the possible, sees himself as a soldier of the possible, just as the Storm and Stress movement was rebellious and Herder seeks to 'promote' humanity, not only an awareness of it,

4. Cf. my *Philosophical Anthropology* (Westminster, 1974).

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but the thing itself. But when Hegel says that history is progress in the mere awareness of freedom—not of freedom itself—his view contains a reservation that risks nothing, just as parliament for him exists to make the people *aware* that they are ruled well! The two things are interdependent, of course: as the awareness can lead to actual freedom, so *vice versa*. But Hegel never makes this quite clear, and so he is just as unrevolutionary as Jaspers. Awareness must be a challenge, it must become a theory that can bring concrete change. Hegel's awareness, however, comes too late, at nightfall, and when he does occasionally speak of a prior-going awareness, the philosophers are only announcing the edicts of the world spirit, which they themselves have not contributed to, and which merely reveal the next step and not the goal.

"Man's place is actually at the battlefront of the world processes. That could be called an anthropological theorem, just as it is a cosmological one. But this theorem postulates the incompletion of man, whereas anthropoogy stabilizes him. Animals carry their face before them like a shield; it always remains expressionless and unchanging. But man can hardly assume the same expression twice. We do not know who we will become, not even whether we are humans. In the Apocalypse we can see ourselves as we are in the far-off image of Christ, who is already now what we could be. But until then we are, as St. Paul knows, masked fragments of ourselves, and our perfection consists in the fact that we are incomplete, 'never finished.' Man is the most indefinable creature on earth. 'Man is an abyss; one gets dizzy if one looks down on it' (Büchner, *Woyzeck*). Anthropology ought not to give a fixed definition of man: it ought to classify him in an open system as suggestive, symbolic, fragmentary. In the theory of progress too man is a transition, but the goal is already known. In reality, it is not known what will ultimately become of man, for the ultimate is only the object of our hope and is produced by our efforts.

"Anthropology is not a key word for me. It is a false key that locks more doors than it opens. It sets a part for the whole. What is special about man does not exist in him exclusively. A mountain can have a greater future than a man. 'Man' is therefore too narrow a category. Comprehensive categories that open cross-sections must be discovered. The category 'man' does not present a cross-section. But in another direction it is too broad. Man cannot be understood without history and society (without the group, no solitude—those are correlatives). Categories must again be smaller; the detail must constitute their criterion.

"I would advise your students not to start with the concept of man but with that of awareness. Just as the awareness, in repression and memory, contains an element of the past (the no-longer), so it also reaches into the future (the not-yet). This results in strata and dimensions. Bodmer and Breitinger were seeking a categorical system for the imagination. Against Gottsched they defended the possible, the unexpected and the unforeseen, which they found in fairy tales, myths and adventure stories. But the not-yet illuminates still other concepts such as youth, turn of the times, productivity, pregnancy (the last defined not from the goal, the child, but in the sense of an open condition)."

As always, Bloch is full of jokes at this convention; his stock of humorous anecdotes seems inexhaustible even when one has known him for years. *Bloch:* "As the result of a faulty translation, in 1921 a noodle factory wrote asking me to write advertising copy for them. 'You were called to our attention by your excellent investigations on the Utopia of the Spirit.' An autograph hound assured me that my book *The Hope of Principle* had a place of special honor in his library."

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Late in the afternoon there is an interview with a Yugoslavian student magazine. First Ernst Bloch is asked to take a stand on the thesis that before the revolution the artist expresses only himself, but in a socialist country the impulses come from the public. The artist is then the representative of groups and their needs. *Bloch:* "A complex problem. 'Public' is not a class concept. Do dramatists, directors and actors really formulate what the theater-goers want? The public is only an aggregate of individuals who want to be entertained; they see their private cares portrayed on the stage only in an alienated form. The belief that the substructure already knows what it wants, that it sets the direction for the intelligentsia and activates the artist, stems from a naive democratism; actually Voltaire and Rousseau *precede* the French revolution, and Marx that of 1917. These men of the superstructure first raise the questions. They bring clarity to the amorphous mass. Democratism—to which Brecht is inclined—overestimates the receivers and underestimates the teachers. Thinkers and authors are anticipatory not reflexive. One reason the people cannot already know what is best is that they have been stultified by the ruling class. So the cataract must first be removed from their eyes. The cult of the proletariat can even lead to retrogression. Russian architecture was at first progressive, but under Stalin the poor taste (*Kitsch*) of the seventies regained ascendency—as it did under Mussolini and Hitler. Why? Because the needs of the so-called people were taken into account, and they wanted plush and gold frames. Brecht first was ridiculed by that same 'people,' then they tolerated him as a clown, and only later was he recognized for the advanced writer that he was."

Objection: "But the people which we believe should be co-determinative of art in the socialist state is not this kind of people."

Bloch: "It could exist only at a later stage. The cult of the proletariat revered a class that had been held in barbarism, and this unfortunately has little to do with a future liberated proletariat. Therefore petit-bourgeois taste dominated. If the new architecture of the revolution had been retained, then the mass would have been educated to the apex of its awareness. It is individuals who increase the insights of society. Someone has to communicate its creative ideology to the proletariat.

"The much-vaunted solitude of the artist does not contradict his unity with society. One artist is alone and depicts his rafters or speaks for a small circle who feel as he does, the other is alone and expresses great human concerns, in which he speaks for millions. For he is also a member of society. In Hegelian terms: the individual comes to the rescue of the world spirit. This is true especially in drama, which has always depicted society.

"But a writer may never be just a spokesman. Art must be original and striking. The scream must hum through the harp of a particular man. In East Germany no one went to the plays though they closely depicted the society and problems of the time. They were dull, versified editorials. 'Banality is the counter-revolution!' (Isaac Babel). Moreover, the concept of the 'group' or 'collective' has been distorted by Nazism. The worst crimes in history were committed in the name of the people. The only light in Nazi Germany was a few individuals. There must be solidarity between the individual and society, but the solution will not come from society alone.

Question: "What is the difference between culture before and after the revolution?"

Bloch: "I am not the Pythian oracle. In every age two threads intertwine, first 'the cultural heritage' (Engels), i.e., religion, art and philosophy; and second, ideology. Ideology is just a coloration of the awareness that stands and falls with the ruling

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power. 'The dominant ideas of an age are the ideas of its ruling class' (Marx). The Bible is made an excuse for its cheap imports; preservation of the purity of communism is a pretext for the occupation of Czechoslovakia. Nothing has changed. The slogans and alibis circulating in the Soviet Union today are pure ideology and the best that can come from them is the warning: this is not the way to act. What has cultural value expresses more than the goal of one age or one class: it speaks for the future. Any significant philosophical or artistic work contributes to future maturity. Therefore great achievements in the superstructure no longer belong completely to their age. The parthenon cannot be written off just because it was built by a slave-holding society. Its social mission at the time is no longer the important thing. What interests us now is its meaning for later generations living under a changed general situation.

"Only progress and the progression of time therefore bring out the full value of the past heritage—and that never completely. Sometimes objects of contempt emerge to a position of respect, are appreciated and develop influence. When Hegel placed Greek art as an eternal paradigm he was exaggerating, but he did at least see the significance of Greece. The 18th century had no eye for Gothic art; we understand it because the parallax is greater from where we stand. But in the future we will see yet more. The receptive subject of culture grows with socialism; his entire richness will flourish only in socialist society."

Question: "What is the relationship between aesthetics and practical action in the revolution: Does art still have a mission or does it lose its purpose?"

Bloch: "Aesthetics should not be confused with contemplation or considered disinterested. Often, certainly, the true, the good or the beautiful, or rather what is proclaimed as such, has nothing to do with daily life and so serves the purpose of deception, as an opium of the people. In the time of the Holy Alliance operas kept the audience in a mood of elation until the curtain fell, but the next morning reality had not changed. Even Bach—though that was not his intent—can serve as deceit. Piety is conducive to civic peace: God will take care of everything. But revolutionary art does exist. What tremendous postulates issue from Grünewald! In Brussels in 1830 there was a riot after the presentation of Auber's *The Dumb Woman of Portici*. Lenin claimed to find justification for his revolutionary activity in Beethoven. Stage and story can be either a protective park or a laboratory; sometimes they console and appease, sometimes they incite; they can be flight from or prefiguring of the future. The state is not just illusion; it can also be an anticipation of what is to come, for in it the resistance of the empirical world is eliminated. Brecht made the stage a laboratory for new models. On the problem of whether a man can be sacrificed to the group, he first writes a 'Yes-sayer' then a 'No-sayer' and he could have added a 'Maybe-sayer.'

"Art retains its anticipatory function even after the revolution. The image of Greek man, the citizen, was first delineated in art. Likewise, architecture first creates real space against the obstacles with which the earth is full. Were the inflammatory elements of art eliminated in the classless society, that would be proof that reality had remained a petit-bourgeois society in which art becomes a palliative ideology instead of a clarion call. True art, including non-revolutionary art, is always a clarion call and a challenge.

"A hierarchy of the arts could be established from this perspective. Literature, which is read, has a stronger impact than silent sculpture or the painting hanging in a gallery; and the stage, which combines sight and hearing and vibrates with dramatic

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tensions, is even more provocative. A speech on the stage can have as far-reaching consequences as one before a public assembly. Lenin ranked the cinema highest in influence. But in leisure time, during rest from work, a different hierarchy may be possible, and art's nature as a challenge could be transfunctionalized.

"*Waiting for Godot* shows the great danger of our era, nihilism, which is only temporarily hidden by revolutionary enthusiasm. Nihilism is inevitable when all mankind attains excessive leisure without due preparation and boredom results. To point this out is not 'decadent' but is just as important as to light the way to the peaks of socialism. Are there only peaks? There are interruptions along the way, and one must be ready to meet them."

Hungarian Marxism*

by Joseph Gabel

Why speak of "Hungarian Marxism"? This term originated in a discussion I had over ten years ago with Lucien Goldmann, for whom the term simply referred to works by Hungarian Marxists. However, it is also possible to define Hungarian Marxism as a "school" from a more sociological standpoint, i.e., as an intellectual trend containing one or more basic themes which can all be deduced from the specificities of the socio-historical context.

A "school" so defined is a social fact in the Durkheimian sense; "belonging" to it means to be under its influence. Thus, the frontiers of a school do not necessarily coincide with any geographical or linguistic boundaries: we can distinguish the Marxism developed in Hungary, understood as works written by Marxists in Hungary, from Hungarian Marxism, understood as a political and philosophical school characterized by certain specific orientations. Ultimately, this allows us to compare two forms of non-dogmatic Central European Marxist thought—Austro-Marxism and Hungarian Marxism—without any blurring of differences. In this respect, the latter is more Hegelian, has a more dialectical orientation, and is more concerned with the problem of alienation, while showing much more doctrinal homogeneity and coherence. It is an explicit form of historicist and humanist Marxism, more dialectical than materialist. It focuses on the problem of alienation and related subjects, but shows little interest in Marxist economics.

This trend is diametrically opposed to Althusserianism which focuses on the "reading" of *Capital* and de-emphasizes the value of the theory of alienation: it is thus anti-humanist, anti-historicist and profoundly anti-dialectical. Hungarian Marxism can help us understand the present success of the Althusserian school and the decline of humanist and historicist Marxism.

This may be seen as corroborating my interpretation of the general problem of alienation conceived as a process of de-dialecticization (reification). Leaving aside the problem of "de-dialecticization" at the individual level, the mechanisms of collective

*Translated by David Pugh.

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de-dialecticization—false consciousness—can be reduced to two components of the dialectic: historicism and the *totality*.[1]

Balandier's recent book has some excellent ideas on these matters.[2] One of his main goals is to show that traditional societies to which European anthropologists had denied any political or historical dimension actually do have a political life and history. Therefore, they may be confronted with ideological problems not very different from those of our societies. Thus, Balandier discusses a "fundamental social illusion" which is practically the same as "false consciousness." All societies, including traditional ones, experience a "temporal" conflict and deal with it in two ways: either by perpetuating the past or, in an eschatological perspective, postulating a fictitiously given future in which history is abolished.[3] Either way, societies produce the a-historical illusion.

The dialectic of the "totality" is radically different. "Detotalization," unlike the a-historical illusion, is not associated with social conservatism but is one of the consequences of the process of "egocentrization" of political thought—more generally of all forms of fanaticism even when they express the political thought of exploited classes. One can say that in the latter case there is a kind of "de-dialecticization" characteristic of Left thought, whereas the occlusion of history is a de-dialecticization characteristic of the Right. Thus, the social strata most resistant to alienation are not the working classes but the *less politically committed* social groups, i.e., Mannheim's free-floating intellectuals. Mannheim's theory has often been strongly criticized, even ridiculed; nevertheless, I think that it makes sense. If no mention is made of the alienating, de-dialecticizing (reifying) action of egocentrism[4] that Mannheim implicitly denounces, Marxist attempts to explain Stalinism will not succeed. In this connection, Althusser's much discussed *Réponse à John Lewis* fails to explain the fundamental aspect of Stalinism, i.e., that it is a genuine *ideology* in the Marxist sense. Stalinist consciousness was a "split consciousness" with a dialectical terminology and an un-dialectical essence. That holds true for Althusser, whose anti-Hegelianism is an occluded form of undialectical thinking. *Authoritarianism cannot be dialectical.*[5]

In any case, Mannheim's theory is helpful in explaining the dis-alienating character of Hungarian Marxism. Hungary's central geographical and sociological position made possible a synthesis of the various existing tendencies so that alienating aspects tended to demystify each other. Such problems do not arise in countries where alienating tendencies are relatively weak; e.g., Sweden during certain periods of its

1. Goldmann's concept of "genetic structuralism" falls within this problematic, but "structuralism" calls for a reference to a school whose dialectical character is far from evident, and "genetic" is too closely associated with the Marxism of the Second International.

2. G. Balandier, *Anthropo-logiques* (Paris, 1974).

3. *Ibid.*, p. 206.

4. Cf. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (New York, 1967), p. 90: "It would... be a mistake to look at reification as a perversion of an originally non-reified apprehension of the social world, a sort of cognitive fall from grace. On the contrary, the available ethnological and psychological evidence seems to indicate the opposite, namely, that the original apprehension of the social world is highly reified both phylogenetically and ontogenetically. This implies that an apprehension of reification *as* a modality of consciousness is dependent upon an at least relative *de*reification of consciousness, which is a comparatively late development in history and in any individual biography."

5. Cf. L. Althusser, *Réponse à John Lewis* (Paris, 1973), and the articles by E. Terray and J. Rancière in *Le Monde*, August 17, 1973, and September 12, 1973.

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history. But within a social situation where there are strong ideological tendencies having a demystifying effect, such problems find ground for discussion and development. This holds true for Hungary until 1933, in terms of geography, language (polyglotism), and religion (Catholics and Protestants are almost in equal numbers, while Jews are also well represented). When half of the population accuses the other half, over centuries, of heresy and of unpatriotism, conditions are created for the transcendence of religious alienation as such.[6] Of course, there are other aspects, such as the ambiguous situation of Hungarian nationalism torn between loyalism to the monarchy and the desire for independence;[7] the divorce between university life and intellectual radical life in the large cities;[8] and the artificially preserved isolation of a capital oriented towards western culture within a country primarily feudal in structure.[9]

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6. Evidently the case of Hungary is not unique: the same religious structure holds, e.g., in the Netherlands. But this "religious centrality" is only one aspect of the situation of Hungary, and Marxism in Holland (especially the Pannekoek circle) is somewhat analogous to "Hungarian Marxism."

7. Hungarians are patriotic, often chauvinistic. But, like French nationalism in the early period of the Vichy Government, this patriotism is profoundly divided. Hungarian patriotism favorable to the Habsburgs has been ambiguous. The "Kossuth" party, of course, had to seek alliance with a strictly internationalist socialist party opposed to nationalist rhetoric. This resulted in a political situation analogous to the religious context: two alienating tendencies demystifying each other.

8. Hungarian universities used to be a world of their own. Although there have been relatively significant accomplishments in the natural sciences and technology, ideological discrimination in the humanities has hurt them. In the country of Roheim, Ferenczi, Varga and Lukács, the teaching of psychology and political science (the term "sociology" was taboo) was in the hands of unknown but powerful scholars. No one dared to adopt a Marxist perspective or refer to psychoanalysis. However, an active and brilliant intellectual life coexisted in Budapest alongside this stultified trend. Composed in large part of Jewish scholars, this marginal intelligentsia had organized scientific societies of its own and published various periodicals. As there was no question of these scholars entering the university, nothing could impinge on their anti-conformism. In Hungary, a young leftist—often Jewish—of the Horthy period had absolutely no career prospects. For this reason, if he lacked political freedom, ideologically he had no taboos to respect. A typical case is that of Attila Joszef, a noted poet who in 1930 was a student in the Faculty of Letters at Szeged. He published a poem which was considered sacrilegious and was summoned by a *mere professor*, A.H., who held a chair in philosophy. He calmly advised Joszef to abandon his studies because as long as he (A.H.) held a chair, he would prevent Jozsef from being appointed to a lycée. He kept his word. For his part, Jozsef related this misadventure in a small, very bittersweet poem which is still read in Hungary: "Professor H. is happy to know that his poet will never be a professor in a Lycée. But this good fortune is ephemeral and petty because I will be a professor of all my people, and this, at a level superior to that of a secondary teacher." He also kept his word.

9. The situation of Paris in relation to the major part of France (in particular, under the Third Republic) is an approximate image of Hungary before 1933. The decadent Hungarian capital, "Judified" and very open to Western influence (especially French) was spurned by the landed gentry who nevertheless enjoyed it when it came to private life and pleasure. In 1919, one of the slogans of the counter-revolutionary "national" army of the future regent Horthy, was: "chasten the corrupt capital." Afterwards, the institutionalized counter-revolution succeeded in making this "corrupt" and "Judified" capital a democratic show-case for Western countries whose economic assistance Hungary needed and for whom parliamentary democracy retained its prestige. Beginning in 1921, the large Hungarian cities elected their representatives by secret ballot. All of the parties (with the exception of the Communist Party) had their own clubs and their electoral polemics were just as zealous as in the Western democracies. A strong socialist group sat in the Parliament as well as in the Budapest municipality. In the provinces, however, people "voted" in a "public ballot" under the watchful eye of the governmental judge. This genial

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The most relevant exponents of Hungarian Marxism are Georg Lukács,[10] Bela Fogarasi,[11] Erwin Szabo,[12] Paul Szende,[13] Oscar Jaszi,[14] and Karl Mannheim.[15] Among the new generation, authors such as István Mészáros[16] and Aurèle Kolnai[17]

system made it possible for the Government to maintain a pseudo-democratic and parliamentary administration and to follow closely the evolution of opinions in crucial areas, while arranging to preserve a comfortable parliamentary majority. Thus, secret elections in large cities played practically the same role as the Gallup poll in the West! Nevertheless, while continuing to increase the isolation of the capital from the rest of the country, this system contributed to the maintenance of an irreverent spirit in Budapest which, many years after, was to provide so much trouble to a new authoritarianism.

10. The central chapter of *History and Class Consciousness*, "Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat," is *the* classic work on the problem of alienation. It also contains a good explanation of Lukács' well-known difficulties with the Party around 1950. In order to divert attention from the true reasons, these difficulties were explained by a phony account that Lukács had not shown much enthusiasm in recognizing the superiority of Russian literature. In fact, Stalinism *could not* accept *History and Class Consciousness*. Lukács' 1923 theory of reification is an anticipatory and practically irrefutable critique of the theory which claimed to make man "the most precious capital."

11. Probably the second great figure of Hungarian Marxism, Fogarasi translated Bergson and wrote a small *Introduction to Marxist Philosophy* (Vienna, 1922) which outlined the main Lukácsian themes (before the publication of *History and Class Consciousness*). At a Conference on "Conservative and Progressive Idealism" he opposed the claim that philosophical materialism is the only progressive philosophy. His *Marxizmus es Logika* (Budapest, 1946) includes an attempt to elaborate a logic of alienation in the chapter on "False Identification."

12. Szabo was a Marxist, trade unionist, and an admirer of Bakunin. The *Leitmotif* of his work and activities was a keen criticism of the bureaucratization of the socialist party and trade unions. Presently, his works can be read in Hungary: his *History of the 1848 Revolution* has been published in Budapest with a very polemical preface by Joseph Revai.

13. A bourgeois leftist close to the New Republic tendency in the U.S., Szende has been a very active Freemason. He was State Secretary of the Treasury in 1918 and a bold reformer of the fiscal system. He became a Marxist after his departure from Hungary and published a social theory of abstraction, a study of the sociological meaning of Einstein's theory of relativity, and a book entitled *Mystification and Demystification*. These writings, which Karl Mannheim certainly read, make Szende the real pioneer of the sociology of ideologies, as distinct from (although related to) the sociology of knowledge. The volume *Aliénation aujourd'hui,* Actes du Colloque d'Amiens (Paris, 1974), contains an appendix (pp. 321-248) with lengthy passages taken from *Mystification and Demystification*.

14. Former Minister of National Minorities in the 1918 Republic, Jaszi is actually the first Hungarian sociologist. Although not a Marxist, he strongly contributed to the spread of Marxism in Hungary through his doctoral thesis, *The State Theory in Historical Materialism* (1903). He was rather Durkheimian and very influenced by French sociology. His study on *Inductive Verification of Historical Materialism* is now available in *Aliénation aujourd'hui, op.cit.*, pp. 349ff.

15. In my unpublished doctoral dissertation on *Mannheim et le marxisme hongrois* (Paris, 1962) and in *Idéologies* (Paris, 1974), pp. 255ff., I argued that Mannheim's contribution to the sociology of knowledge is only secondary in his work. His main writings, *Ideology and Utopia* and *Das konservative Denken*, are studies of ideological critique (*Ideologieforschung*) with little relation to the sociology of knowledge. Sociologists such as Werner Stark and Gerard Namer increasingly tend to consider the sociology of knowledge as a discipline of its own, yet the best of Mannheim's work belongs to the sociology of ideologies and relates to the problematic of false consciousness and of alienation. Thus, we are perfectly justified to consider Mannheim a Hungarian Marxist. The Budapest Jewish intelligentsia has no doubt been the model for his theory of free-floating intellectuals.

16. Cf. I. Mészáros, *Marx's Theory of Alienation* (London, 1970), and the fundamental *Lukács' Concept of the Dialectic* (London, 1971).

17. The case of Aurèle Kolnai (1900-1973) is peculiar. He was a writer of Jewish origin who converted to Catholicism and during the second half of his intellectual journey he was considered

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can be seen as typical representatives. The unity of their works shou : suffice to show the existence of an autonomous Hungarian Marxist trend, distinct from Austro-Marxism.[18] I have used the term "Hungarian Marxism" since 1965 to designate an independent trend of Marxism which comprises mainly, but not exclusively, theoreticians of Hungarian origin,[19] while the expression "Budapest School" first appeared in a letter of Lukács' dated 1971.[20] Although there are analogies between the two, there are also significant differences. Above all, the Budapest School must be seen as an ideological and political trend within the left aiming at disalienating socialist construction from the bureaucratic process with the help of popular control, thus clearing the path towards "socialism with a human face."

As defined here, "Hungarian Marxism" is a sociological and philosophical school which focuses on the problem of alienation and the political project of seeking a concrete solution to it. This allows us to include Lukács in this school, Fogarasi (whose interests are very similar, though he was never too independent from the bureaucracy), Karl Mannheim (who sought a solution within neo-capitalism), and even, *horribile dictu*, Arthur Koestler, the authentic "ideal type" of the free-floating intellectual. Some thinkers of Hungarian origin who were influenced by Marxism but who would not recognize it can also be considered Hungarian Marxists. Lately, the

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a conservative and a Catholic scholar. But his early debut as one of the intellectual leaders of the Budapest student left and his choice of studies (ideological critique, utopian conscience, "erroneous" conscience, alienation, etc.) is curiously similar to those of his ex-colleagues who remained in the Marxist fold. Cf. A. Kolnai, *Erroneous Conscience*, Conference of the Aristotelean Society of London, February, 1958 (published as a monograph), "Eloge de l'aliénation," in *L'Aliénation aujourd'hui, op.cit.*, pp. 257-269, and several other articles on the problem of utopia in *La Table Ronde*, September, 1956.

18. Future historians will probably include in this school two great contemporary figures: Karl Korsch and Lucien Goldmann. Korsch, it should be remembered, was one of the authors best known by Marxist groups in Budapest between the two wars. He maintained a regular correspondence with their principal theoreticians. In France, the impact of the Hungarian school developed along two main paths: the works of Lucien Goldmann and of the group *Arguments*. Goldmann has probably had some influence on Merleau-Ponty, on Henri Lefebvre and perhaps even on Jean-Paul Sartre. Members of *Arguments* made known Korsch's and Lukács' works and published a "pirated edition" of *History and Class Consciousness*. It might be interesting to trace Lukács' influence on the work of some members of this group such as Kostas Axelos, Georges Lapassade, Edgar Morin or Robert Paris. There seem also to be connections between Christian Personalism and Hungarian Marxism. As early as 1946, Mounier was interested in the problem of alienation along the same lines as those of Hungarian Marxists. Cf. E. Mounier, *Qu'est-ce que le personnalisme?* (Paris, 1946), and especially J. Lacroix, *Le personnalisme comme anti-ideologie* (Paris, 1972), which paradoxically seems to show an Althusserian influence. Also Christian Personalism is connected to the non-orthodox psychoanalytic circle of I. Caruso, one of the most dialectical currents in contemporary psychoanalytic thought. Cf. I.A. Caruso, "La réification de la sexualité," *Psyché* (Paris, 1952), where the influence of the Lukácsian thematic is evident. Also relevant in this context is Berdyaev's work, where we probably have the first non-Marxist positive interest in Lukács' writings, and perhaps the link between the *Esprit* group and the Hungarian Marxists. Cf. N. Berdyaev, *The Origins of Russian Communism* (Ann Arbor, 1966). In the original, Berdyaev spells Lukács' name "Luckács" which suggests that he had only indirect knowledge of him. The fact remains that the Christian perception of Marxism generally focused on the problem of alienation. Cf. J.L. Calvez, *La pensée de Karl Marx* (Paris, 1956).

19. In an article honoring Karl Korsch published in *Les Lettres Nouvelles* (July-September, 1965), p. 179.

20. *Times Literary Supplement* (February 2, 1972); reproduced in the Yugoslav journal *Praxis*, nos. 2-3, in *Aut Aut* (March-April 1974), and in *Les Temps Modernes* (August-September, 1974).

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school has experienced a loss of momentum but we might say that it is almost to its credit. The disappearance of Goldmann, Merleau-Ponty, and Lukács, and the decline of Sartre's influence can be considered marginal in this process. The real socio-historical cause of this development lies in the shift in international politics. Mannheim's and Lukács' historicism was optimistic and open to progress. Today, history does not offer very promising prospects. Ernst Bloch's positive Utopia is losing impetus and the occlusion of the *Prinzip Hoffnung* may account for present anti-historicist trends. At the same time, the demographic explosion is producing a neo-reification[21] through the denigration of human beings.[22] Althusserianism is both the expression and the ideological justification of this "neo-reification." This is the reason for its historical impact and success.

The Althusserian School's positions on the problem of reification are not precise, and usually incoherent. Yet, they remain significant in spite of their incoherence. For Althusser, the critique of reification appeals to anthropological idealism:[23] "Marxist or not, those who denounce the reification and the alienation of objectivity are but petty bourgeois ideologues...no doubt because they have no trouble embracing the very opposition which constitutes the foundation of bourgeois philosophical and juridical ideology: the opposition between the *person* (liberty equals will equals law) and the thing."[24] This is all very well, but if the opposition between "person" and "thing" is characteristic of bourgeois ideology, proletarian ideology would consequently tend to associate them both, either by personalizing things, or, more probably, by reifying persons.

Elsewhere, Stalin's statement: "Man is the most precious capital," is said to be a "cruelly humanist statement,"[25] which is of course a ridiculous remark, since the emphasis is not on "precious" but on "capital." This is not a humanist remark at all, but a surprisingly candid acknowledgement of reification. To a stable owner, horses are "the most precious capital." Of course, it is not the horse as such which is precious, but its performance at the track, its market value, etc. Thus, according to Althusser, Marx's anti-humanism fulfills an ideological function: it theorizes and universalizes the tendency to de-humanization and depersonalization present in some political regimes and offers a kind of perhaps unconscious ideological justification of "anti-humanist" practices developed in these regimes.

At the same time, the hope for a "capitalism with a human face" mastering market

21. The notion of neo-reification requires some clarification. "Reification" in Lukács' sense has an axiological dimension. It means in a sense "devaluation" in the process of experiencing the world. However, its source is economic. The process of reification and alienation must be considered as a "totality" which can be set in motion in various ways. Thus the cause of reification and alienation as the main aspect of the Stalinist phenomenon must be sought in political rather than in economic factors.

22. Cf. H. Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York, 1951), who, without using the term "reification," nevertheless underlines this phenomenon of demographic devaluation and its relation to the process of ideologization: "The totalitarian attempt to make men superfluous reflects the experience of modern masses of their superfluity on an overcrowded earth. The world of the dying, in which men are taught they are superfluous through a way of life in which punishment is meted out without connection with crime, in which exploitation is practiced without profit, and where work is performed without product, is a place where senselessness is daily produced anew" (pp. 430-431).

23. Althusser, *Réponse à John Lewis, op.cit.*, p. 58.

24. Althusser, *Eléments d'autocritique*, p. 36; cf. also *Réponse à John Lewis*, p. 32.

25. Althusser, *Réponse à John Lewis*, p. 96.

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mechanisms seems to lose ground. Lukács, who never believed in the historical possibility of this form of capitalism, wrote that "...indeed the highest degree of unconsciousness, the crudest form of 'false consciousness' always expresses itself in the accrued illusion that economic phenomena are well known and dominated."[26] Although until recently developments in the capitalist economy appeared to contradict this remark, events now seem to confirm its validity. Thus, the fact that "humanist Marxism" has likewise suffered a loss of momentum is not surprising nor does it constitute a refutation. De-humanization is an existing fact: acknowledging it is a matter of evidence. To approve or deplore it is a question of political choice. Placing this approval under the posthumous sponsorship of Marx is an abuse.

In reality, Marxism as it has been conceived by Marx is undoubtedly a humanism. Ironically enough, now even the Althusserians are acknowledging this. In his recent work, Balibar—who is the "Madame Sans-Gêne" of this school, who states what his friends only dare to think—indicates that the term "humanist Marxism" is synonymous with "Marxist Marxism." He implicitly admits that the roots of the theory of alienation in Marx's own work are deep enough to account for the fact that the well-known "rupture" between the young and the mature Marx does not permit denial of the possibility of further developments of this theory. Moreover, Balibar cuts right into the heart of the matter at the level of the theory of the fetishistic character of commodities. "Is this theory really materialist?... Without raising serious contradictions, is it compatible...with the problematic of historical materialism? *I do not think so*, for two reasons: first, because of a carefully isolated 'fetishism' which, based on Marx's texts and repeatedly exploited, can be found repeatedly in humanist philosophy, social psychology and anthropology; and second, especially because of the *internal* character of the problematic in Marx's theoretical explanation. In the last analysis, this problematic is only a variation determined by a pre-Marxist *philosophical* problematic which is all the more interesting as it is more unreliable and contradictory. [Marx's theory of fetishism was] taken over and developed enthusiastically in a humanist problematic (cf. the philosophies of 'reification' and of 'alienation' which are philosophies of 'consciousness' and of social awareness)."[27]

These are strange remarks. If the philosophies of "reification" and "alienation" are philosophies of consciousness and of social awareness (*prise de conscience*), then should we not draw the conclusion that Althusserianism is the expression of "false consciousness"? This should not be overlooked: humanist Marxism is a Marxism of awareness and, consequently, Althusserianism is a self-acknowledged expression of false consciousness.

Balibar indicates at least two things: a) In the most Marxist part of Marx's work there is an important non-materialist nucleus which nullifies the theory of the rupture; and b) there is a legitimate connection between this nucleus of non-materialist thought and the humanist trend. It is quite possible, even probable, that sooner or later, humanist, demystifying Marxism, Marxist Marxism, will give way to apologetic ideologies of a new Middle Ages. Whatever the case may be, this will not have anything in common with the Marxian heritage but the name.

26. Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, trans. R. Livingstone (London, 1971), p. 64.
27. Etienne Balibar, *Cinq études du matérialisme historique* (Paris, 1974), pp. 220 and 223.

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Introduction to the Kosik-Sartre Exchange*

by Andrew Feenberg

Western Journalist: Why is the Czech normalization such a failure when the Hungarian one was so successful?

Hungarian Official: Kadar was not a fascist.

Even the Russians are embarrassed and have lately put some pressure on their Czech minions to "liberalize" a bit. Yet, this is doubtlessly impossible for a regime which has, according to a recent poll, the support of only about 10% of its people—not to mention the hostility of the Hungarian and Polish governments and the Italian Communist Party (which is about to enter the government in Italy). It is said that the East Germans also have recently begun to have their doubts.

In short, what worked in Hungary and Poland—the authoritarian succession within the perspective of de-Stalinization—is not working in Czechoslovakia at all. Hence, Dubcek's willingness and ability to make very damaging public statements. Hence, also, the scandalous seizure of Karel Kosik's private manuscripts.

Only a desperately insecure regime would feel the need to confiscate the working notes of a philosopher. Stronger governments in Hungary and Yugoslavia have at least the indecent decency of waiting to see the published work and submitting it to public criticism before banning it or depriving its authors of their academic positions.

To us the situation is clear. Yet, the appeal to Sartre may seem somewhat artificial. Can Kosik really doubt, as he says he does, his innocence? Need he ask for Sartre's sanction? An accused citizen of a socialist country, even one in the unhappy condition of Czechoslovakia, may wish to entertain at least the fiction of a doubt about his innocence as an indication that, ideally, his relation to the state ought to admit of a high degree of personal responsibility. It is not useless, then, for Sartre to reply in the name of basic individual rights that in principle no state, socialist or otherwise, can overstep elementary decencies in the name of the higher responsibilities of the citizen. This way of posing the question Kosik's methodological refusal to absolve himself—begins to raise the discussion above the level of liberal formalism.

Still, why appeal to Sartre? What qualifies him to give a response? To the extent that the appeal is more than that of one friend to another, it too has the quality of a symbolic fiction. For, Sartre stands for certain human and moral qualities that should survive in *any* system. It does not matter whether Sartre truly or best exemplifies the sense of commitment with integrity, the independence of spirit in solidarity that is attached as an almost mythical aura to his name. The very fact that he is so identified - even scoffers pay him the tribute of demystifying precisely these qualities—makes him the correct recipient of the appeal. And Sartre seems to have accepted it in this light, as addressed not just to himself as an individual, but still more to a certain idea of what an individual should be in contact with living history.

*The following letters were translated by Andrew Feenberg from *Le Monde*, June 29-30, 1975.

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This is an exchange many Czechs, and not just intellectuals, will understand. It says a lot about the meaning they sought to give the word "human" in their slogan, "socialism with a human face." Yet the regime is so thoroughly discredited already that one wonders if it need fear the consequences of its persecutions anymore. If things are as bad as they seem the regime has no more legitimacy to lose and can gain none from "liberalizing" in response to foreign appeals. Only a revolution can restore legitimacy to a Czech government at this point.

This, however, is an unlikely possibility. Yet, for Kosik's sake and for the sake of socialism, let us hope that the "worm in the apple," as one Czech described it to me, will soon be removed.

The Kosik-Sartre Exchange

Dear Jean-Paul Sartre,

The event of which I will tell you in this open letter is of the most banal sort and without any interest for the sensationalist press. But it is not to the devotees of the sensational that I address myself. It is to you. And, through you, to my socialist, democratic and communist friends who are also friends of Czechoslovakia. I am not addressing you an appeal or a protest, but one single question which has a vital importance for me:

Am I guilty?

This question haunts me since April 28, 1975, that is to say, since the day the police searched my apartment for six hours and confiscated more than one thousand pages of my philosophical manuscripts.

Given the fact that the search was made under the pretext of a suspicion that I had hidden in my apartment writings which would constitute evidence of a criminal activity, "subversion of the Republic," I must assume that I am threatened with a prison term of from one to five years, as provided by Article 98 of the penal code. I do not underestimate the significance of this threat, but what troubles me more is the eventual fate of the manuscripts confiscated from me.

For the last six years I have had to live in a very peculiar situation: my existence has taken two forms—I am and I am nothing. I am dead and, at the same time, I am alive. In the domain of the elementary rights of the citizen and the man, I have been reduced to a mere nothing, and at the same time, I have been graced with an exceptional existence as far as the overabundance of care and attention from the police is concerned. I am a mere nothing and that is why I cannot teach philosophy at the Charles University, nor be employed anywhere or elsewhere in accordance with my qualifications and in my specialty. I am dead, and that is why I cannot participate in any of the scholarly meetings to which I am invited, nor accept invitations to teach in European universities. As someone who is not and never was, I must not lead my readers into error and that is why all my publications are banned, kept out of the libraries in Czechoslovakia. And my name has been censured in the list of authors. I do not exist and that is why official institutions are under no obligation to answer my complaints and protests. From another point of view, I exist, even in excess. As is shown by the police searches and interrogations which are becoming ordinary events.

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As a philosopher and an author, I am stripped of basic rights and I live as an accused and a permanent suspect.

I am a suspect although I have committed no criminal act. Why then am I suspected? Because I consider the exercise of thought to be an inalienable human right and exercise this right. Because I consider inalienable the right of every man to have his own opinion and to be able to express and communicate it. Because I consider that every man should be able to keep a spine as a basic human right.

Why am I a suspect? Because in an environment of generalized suspicion, the most specifically human values and the most commonly shared ones, such as for example, friendship, honor, humor, the sense of politeness, spontaneity and sincerity, become provocations; normal words and the simplest things take on a subversive meaning. The simple sentence: "I twisted my ankle and I limp," seems to the ears of the police to be a password for a conspiracy. And he who really limps is in the eyes of the police a mere faker who hides a "dark" activity. In such an atmosphere, publicly proclaimed rights are immediately limited or even completely denied: everyone has the right to think, but he who reflects without permission and without being ordered to, or who does not think as he ought to think, awakens suspicion. Everyone can have his opinion, but he who refuses to accept opinions that are imposed and unjustified, that are foreign to his own—which latter have some basis—and who persists in demanding a rational and free discussion, becomes suspect. Everyone has the right to have a spine, but if he does not "voluntarily" and without dignity make a *mea culpa* which defiles him, he has no hope of being able to publish or to find the sort of work for which he is qualified.

The manuscripts seized by the police were not even destined for publication. In the event it is a matter only of unelaborated working notes, preliminary studies relating to the preparation of two works which will be titled: the first, *On Practice*, and the second, *On Truth*. These manuscripts contain only opinions, opinions expressed by others in whom the police are not interested, and mine, which the police already know from my previous books and my articles. I would like to be able to believe the officer of the State Police when he told me that after examination these manuscripts would be returned to me. But, well, how much time does the police need to "study" a thousand pages of a philosophical manuscript?

To that, other much more serious facts must be added. The police have also confiscated the manuscripts of my friends, the writers Ivan Klima and Ludvig Vaculik. And I must ask the question: April 28, 1975, was I not the witness to events which foreshadow the gravest consequences for Czech culture? On that day did they not make a trial run of the effectiveness of new perfected methods in comparison with which the censorship in force up to then was only a pitiful liberal game? Does not April, 1975, mark the attempt to impose on society a new habit, a new "normality"—the regular confiscation of manuscripts? Might this habit not very rapidly become—in the country of Franz Kafka—so natural, so necessary a consequence of indoctrination that the writers themselves will call the police to take away completed works?

I am not a partisan of these innovations.

Up to today I have not received a reply to my request for the return of the manuscripts. Up to now I have kept silent about the discriminatory measures of which I have been the victim, because my person alone was attacked and this did not endanger the basis of my existence—the possibility of thinking and writing. This time, in the case of the confiscation of my philosophical manuscripts, I do not want to remain silent.

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Because I do not want to be guilty!

I would be complicit if I limited myself to watching silently the way a sword of Damocles is held over the heads of all the writers of Czechoslovakia—the threat that the police can take away at any time from any writer a manuscript in progress or completed.

There is still time to eliminate this threat. I have not lost all hope in the rationality of the responsible leaders in Czechoslovakia. I count on the lucidity and the conscience of the socialist, democratic and communist friends of Czechoslovakia.

Accept, dear friend, my most cordial regards,

Karel Kosik

Dear Friend,

If I have taken so long to reply to you, this is because your letter did not reach me. I read of it only a brief fragment in *Le Monde* and I had some trouble finding it. That's been done now.

I will reply immediately to your question: no, you are not guilty. Your letter would suffice to prove your innocence, not only to me, but to all the friends of invaded and humiliated Czechoslovakia. If there is a thing of which I am certain, it is, as you put it, that every man has the original right and duty to think for himself; and if I, like everyone, have often defended collective ideas, it was because they had penetrated me and because I had compared them to my personal ideas, evaluated and judged them true, in short, because they had become mine. No government is qualified to judge the thoughts of a citizen. It would do so, in any case, not in terms of thoughts but of pseudo-thoughts. I call true thoughts those which are born from you, or ideas which you have freely examined, found right and made your own. I call pseudo-thoughts the theses supported by your government, and which have never been produced or examined by the thought of a free man, but which are made up of words collected in Soviet Russia and thrown over activities in order to hide them and not to discover their meaning.

These false thoughts are nothing but forces which can only impose themselves with the support of that other—real and material—force: the police. It is to this taht criminal leaders wish to reduce Czechoslovak culture. This abomination, or rather this stupidity, cannot last long while there are men like you, my dear friend, to denounce it. For, free thought can be suppressed for a moment by police violence, but as such thought constitutes the only means by which man can grasp his situation and the procedures that can change it, it would be necessary either to suppress man or to reject definitively false thoughts.

I cannot commit anyone but myself; but I have discussed your precious and unhappy country sufficiently often and at length to be able to assure you that you have numerous friends who will say with me: "If Karel Kosik is guilty, then all men (not only intellectuals, but farmers and workers) who think about what they do are equally guilty." It is on the basis of this simple idea that we will have to consider activities by which, in helping you, we will help ourselves.

I assure you, my dear friend, of my fraternal sentiments,

Jean-Paul Sartre

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REVIEWS:

Russell Jacoby. *Social Amnesia. A Critique of Conformist Psychology from Adler to Laing.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1975. xxiii plus 191 pages.

The purpose of this book as announced by its subtitle immediately engages one's sympathies, both for its significance and its scope. Jacoby tells us that his "book is an effort to remember what is perpetually lost under the pressure of society" (xviii). Specifically his concern is "the forgetting of psychoanalysis" (xx) and his aim is to criticize the "present practices and theories in psychology" (xviii) which result from this forgetting. Jacoby's thesis is that "the inability or refusal to think back takes its toll in the inability to think" (3-4) and in the consequent (albeit unintentional) acceptance and repetition of the prevailing ideology. The effort to remember, then, is more than a personal predilection for the past; it is a necessary venture in social theory.

The forgetting of psychoanalysis is not a problem of individual psychosis; neither is it a phenomenon peculiar to psychology; it is rather part of the built-in obsolescence that characterizes monopoly capitalism. "Social amnesia is society's repression of remembrance..." (5). The reification which expresses itself in the forgetting of the past is simultaneously the mystification of the present.[1] Accordingly Jacoby's attempt to recall and re-present the critical insights of psychoanalytic theory is an immanent critique, not only of the present practices and theories in psychology, but of the social dynamic which masks both past and present.

The first step towards countering the oblivion of psychoanalysis and towards undoing the damage wrought by social amnesia is to expose the pseudo-originality of the self-proclaimed innovators in psychology. This exposé proceeds on the basis of a re-examination of the notions of orthodoxy and revisionism which is one of the best sections of the book.

The concepts of orthodoxy and revisionism belong ostensibly and peculiarly to the Marxist tradition and it may at first seem odd that Jacoby should open his discussion with them. But Jacoby is by no means a scholastic thinker; he rejects artificial boundaries between thought, and is able to appropriate and synthesize insights from a wide variety of "disciplines." Jacoby is well aware that the debate between orthodoxy and revisionism is a long and tangled part of Marxist thought, and he correctly acknowledges the importance of Lukács' contribution in recasting the terms of the discussion. Indeed Lukács' reformulation of the concept of orthodoxy may well have been the model for Jacoby's presentation. In any case, the merits of Jacoby's discussion of orthodoxy and revisionism can best be brought out by a brief review of Lukács' achievement.

Lukács' great contribution was to reject the "crude antithesis" between orthodoxy, defined as the exegesis of holy texts, and revisionism, defined as an " 'impartial' study of the 'facts'."[2] Refusing this abstract dichotomy, Lukács argues that orthodoxy is not a matter of unwavering belief in a particular set of theses; rather it "refers exclusively to *method*" (1). The essence of orthodox Marxism is the dialectical method; any modifications (revisions) of Marxism which attempt to supplant or "improve"

1. "The social loss of memory is a type of reification – better: it is *the* primal form of reification" (4). Jacoby quotes Adorno's and Horkheimer's remark: "All reification is a forgetting" (157-158 notes).

2. Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), p. 1. Further references to this work appear in parentheses in the text.

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dialectical thinking with the methods of "modern criticism" "have led and must lead to over simplification, triviality, and eclecticism" (1).

"Materialist dialectic is a revolutionary dialectic" (2). Lukács' insistence on the dialectical method as the criterion for orthodoxy is bound up with the view that Marxist theory has a "revolutionary function;" its task is "the emergence of consciousness" (2). The revolutionary function of theory dictates the strict unity of theory and practice. The purpose of theory is to demonstrate that the revolution is now on the agenda. The task for orthodox Marxism is then "to discover those features and definitions both of the theory and the ways of gripping the masses which convert the theory, the dialectical method, into a vehicle of revolution" (2).

Lukács of course is concerned with the issue of orthodoxy only as regards Marxism; Jacoby is concerned with revisionism in psychology, but his discussion of the nature of orthodoxy and revisionism has wider scope and significance. Jacoby has extended the range and increased the fruitfulness of these terms. As does Lukács, Jacoby rejects the definition of orthodoxy as simple adherence to a creed or a set of theses. He retains the notion of orthodoxy as loyalty to the central concepts of a theory but he takes these to be those that have a critical content. To qualify as an orthodox Marxist or Freudian requires more than recognizing the centrality of certain concepts. Orthodoxy is loyalty, but it is "*dialectical* loyalty" (11-12). To take critique as the criterion of orthodoxy imposes a continuing task on later thinkers in that tradition. As loyalty to the critical content of past thought, orthodoxy demands not simply a repetition but a re-thinking and re-articulation of this critical content.

It is here that Jacoby's discussion reveals both its indebtedness to Lukács and its progress beyond Lukács. The concept of dialectical loyalty enables Jacoby to break the dichotomy of method (form) and content which plagues even Lukacs and which shows itself in his insistence on a particular content for the dialectical method. Lukács' rejection of orthodoxy as belief in a particular set of theses goes part way towards emancipating Marxism from a frozen content, but his definition of orthodoxy as loyalty to the dialectical method is itself burdened by a particular content. The unqualified insistence on the revolutionary function of theory and the concommitant insistence on the strict unity of theory and practice may well constitute a new dogmatism. Jacoby's definition of orthodoxy as dialectical loyalty avoids this difficulty.

The concept of dialectical loyalty enables Jacoby to reject the abstract polarity of dogma versus change as the boundary between orthodoxy and revisionism in psychology. Orthodoxy is not a matter of upholding Freudian dogma; revisionism is not simply a matter of making changes. What is at stake, Jacoby points out, is "the content of change" (11). To the extent that the changes preserve and extend the original critical thrust of psychoanalytic theory they are orthodox and radical: to the extent that the modifications tend to smooth out, absorb, or forget the original critical dimensions of Freud's thought, they are revisionist and conformist. The psychological thinkers who are the subject of Jacoby's critique are not taken to task because they seek to "improve" Freud; it is rather the improvements they advocate which turn Freud's critical insights into conformist concepts.

Jacoby's critique of conformist psychology centers on the "post Freudian" existentialists and humanists, Allport, May, Maslow, and Rogers among others. His discussion is not exhaustive; he is not aiming for completeness. He seeks rather to sketch the main features of a general tendency in psychology whose beginnings he finds already in the work of Adler and his school. Adler is the first example of a

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thinker whose attempt to liberalize and modernize psychoanalysis results only in its trivialization. Jacoby's discussion focuses on Adler's substitution of conventional wisdom for what Freud himself termed "the *revolutionary and embarrassing advances of psychoanalysis*" (20).

The characterization of Freud's thought as radical and of Adler's as conformist depends upon a "disjunction between the political, social and truth content of concepts and the political-social outlook of those using the concepts" (25). Jacoby is not concerned with the psychological or political make up of Freud or Adler as individuals. He seeks to demonstrate that the conformist trend of Adlerian psychology, as well as the subversive cast of the original Freudian theory, derives not from the stated political convictions of the respective thinkers but from the concepts they employ. The radical *concepts* of psychoanalysis are the notions of repression, sexuality, libido, and the insistence on the "essential antagonism between the individual and a repressive society, between pleasure and reality...." (23). By contrast, Adlerian psychology operates with bland notions of 'society,' 'social interest' and 'common sense.' The conformist cast to Adler's revision of Freud is revealed most clearly in the Adlerian assumption that the unhappiness of individuals is due to their failure to adjust to society. The norms and values of society are taken here as the given to which the individual ought to adjust; there is no suggestion that these very norms and values are destructive to individuals.

Jacoby's critique of the post Freudian psychologists focuses on the extent to which they continue along the Adlerian path and "repress and forget" (18) the subversive dimensions of Freud's thought. Their forgetting allows them to suppose that their "insights" are startlingly new. Jacoby does a masterful job of exposing the pseudo-novelty of their discoveries. His use of examples is brilliant. He presents us with a sampler of post Freudian banality at its best: Maslow's suggestion that one assign a monetary value to an intimate friendship in order to decide whether the value of this friendship outweighs the value of an increase in salary in a new job (72), Gordon Allport's discovery (in 1953) that "the best way to find out what a person is trying to do is to *ask* him" (56), or Carl Rogers' enthusiastic sanction of the "imaginative uses (of encounter groups)...in dealing with the psychological problems that develop when two companies merge" (67).

The pseudo-novelty of the post Freudians reveals itself in their self-proclaimed distance from behaviorism and positivism. Positivism, as Jacoby notes, "exists in more than one form" (60). The distance between the post Freudian or "third force" humanists and their behaviorist opponents is the distance between a coin and its flip side. In spite of the apparent (surface) differences between behaviorism and third force humanism, they share a common ground. Both are marked by an acceptance (and ultimate glorification) of the immediate, and by a refusal of critical thought.

In the case of the post Freudians this refusal is the result of a double forgetfulness. The post Freudians forget "what [they] never knew" (71), the radical concepts and critical content of the original Freudian theory—hence their mistaken attempt to "humanize" psychology by adding the notions of 'personality,' 'being,' 'becoming,' and 'health' to its vocabulary. Their humanism is naive and abstract; it forgets what Freud revealed: the manner in which society ingresses into the most 'private' depths of the individual's 'being.' Abstract and unanalyzed, the positive humanism of the post Freudians incorporates (unintentionally) the values of the prevailing reality. Secondly, the post Freudian humanists forget the social dynamic in and through which

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individuals live out their lives. The post Freudians celebrate the values of being and becoming quite unmindful of and undisturbed by the nature of the society in which one is to realize the adventure of existence. Their cheerful humanism perpetrates a dangerous deception. It smooths over the inhumanities intrinsic to a social reality the existence and workings of which it ignores. The post Freudian humanists are so eager "to find humanity" that they see it "everywhere, forgetting and so perpetuating the social manufacture of inhumanity" (66). It is not surprising that their remedies and prescriptions are both fatuous and incongruous in terms of the real evils. Thus Rollo May advises us against rebellion in favor of "the more difficult task of struggling through to one's own autonomy, to new beliefs" (51). And he assures us that we need not worry about the control which economic oligarchies exercise over our lives: they "need not destroy our freedom if we keep our perspective" (51).

The dual aspect of post Freudian forgetfulness takes its toll. The consequence of oblivion, if not farce, is at least triviality. In the guise of profundity the post Freudians repeat the banalities of the established society. "Inward courage, discipline, strength, humility are proffered by these homespun philosophers as a patent medicine for a lethal society" (51). A final irony: the post Freudian humanists prescribe the very values whose destructiveness Freud was concerned to criticize.

Readers of Jacoby will recognize that his critique of the post Freudians echoes Marcuse's critique of the neo-Freudians developed in his exchanges with Erich Fromm in the mid-1950s and summarized in the epilogue to *Eros and Civilization*. Given that Jacoby fully accepts Marcuse's interpretation of the neo-Freudians, and that he views the post Freudians as an extension (and worsening) of the neo-Freudian lead, this similarity is perhaps to be expected. And yet the likeness is so marked that it is often striking.

Marcuse's critique of the neo-Freudians takes place in the context of his own discussion of the "socio-historical content" of Freud's thought which he argues is an implicit critique of society and culture.[3] Because the neo-Freudians fail to perceive the inherently critical content of Freud's thought, their attempt to add sociological or cultural factors *to* Freud's concepts results in a flattening out and a weakening of the Freudian critique. The neo-Freudians succumb to the illusion that 'society' or 'culture' are neutral givens. They perceive "the societal institutions and relationships as finished products, in the form of objective entities—given rather than made facts" (274). Thus in spite of the critical intentions and pretensions of the neo-Freudians themselves, their thought remains conformist, superficial, and moralistic. Marcuse's critique points out the relation between the neo-Freudians' goodnatured optimism, the "laboring of the obvious, of everyday wisdom" (250) and the "false but easy solution" (251) they proclaim. "The social issues become primarily spiritual issues and their solution becomes a *moral* task" (264). "The individual is held responsible for the failure of his self realization" (265). He is told that the solution to his unhappiness lies in his willingness and "courage to be himself and to be for himself" (266).

Marcuse is perhaps most concerned to expose the neo-Freudian focus on interpersonal relations and the concommitant glorification of the 'total personality' and its self realization as ideological. "In a repressive society, individual happiness and productive development are in contradiction to society; if they are defined as values to be realized within this society, they become themselves repressive" (245). Marcuse

3. Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization* (Boston, 1966), p. 5. Further references to this work appear in parentheses in the text.

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argues that the neo-Freudians take over from the established society the content of their notion of the realized personality. They do not see the dynamic between the so called 'higher values' (embodied in the realized personality) and the society for whose functioning they are necessary. Accordingly, the neo-Freudians unwittingly sanctify the dominant values of this society. Their recommendations as to how to realize one's personality amount to preaching the values of this society "without revealing their forbidden content, without showing what they have *denied* to the individual" (261). Lastly, and most importantly for Jacoby's own book, Marcuse argues that the neo-Freudian emphasis on the personality and its realization is deceptive in that the neo-Freudians promote as a possible goal what has already been rendered socially obsolete. "The 'personality' and its creative potentialities are resurrected in the face of a reality which has all but eliminated the conditions for the personality and its fulfillment" (240).

My point in showing how Marcuse's critique of the neo-Freudians anticipates Jacoby's discussion of the post Freudians is not to chastize Jacoby for failing to be 'original.' It would be absurd to make a fetish of originality. Jacoby's own reformulation of the nature of orthodoxy and revisionism has shown us that novelty *per se* is not the issue. Furthermore, it is certainly instructive to realize that the post Freudians make the same mistakes for the same reasons as the neo-Freudians, and that for the same reasons as those cited by Marcuse, their work remains conformist and ideological—if anything they are more fatuous in their empty profundities. Neither do I want to claim that Jacoby has failed to make clear his indebtedness to Marcuse's earlier discussion. If anything, Jacoby is almost too eager to anchor and justify his own critique by referring to Marcuse's. In fact, his work is studded with references to the Frankfurt School and particularly abounds with citations from the writings of Adorno and Marcuse.

The problem is that Jacoby's own critique of conformist psychology is itself too heavily dependent in a *dogmatic* way on the work of those thinkers he so obviously admires. Jacoby has failed to take seriously his own excellent discussion of orthodoxy and revisionism. He has failed to re-think and re-articulate the 'critical theory' of the Frankfurt School and has instead simply taken over the categories and the conceptual framework of the critique they developed in the late 1950s. As a result, the problematic nature of their thinking reappears in his own work. This is particularly and crucially important in the concept of subjectivity which underlies his entire project.

Jacoby's thesis, announced in the first pages of the first chapter and reiterated thereafter is unequivocal: the focus on subjectivity (the concern with the self, the individual) both within American establishment psychology and among the New Left, is not a sign of progress in liberation but an instance of increasing mystification. "The convergence from contrasting directions on the importance of the subject as an emotional and psychic entity points to a real development of society; not, as the apologists would have it, that society has fulfilled the basic material needs and is moving on to the higher reaches of liberation, but the reverse: domination is reaching the inner depths of men and women. The last preserves of the autonomous individual are under seige" (17). Jacoby rejects the smug satisfaction of those who claim that the basic material needs have been satisfied and points out that the satisfaction of material needs for a minority of the world's population takes place in and against a context of "absolute need and suffering that serve as the means for such satisfaction" (17). Jacoby maintains that the emphasis on subjectivity is an attempt to "compensate for the

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damages of an external reality. . ." (63). He claims that the concern with the self and its (allegedly) autonomous actions is a "reflex response to a society that is eliminating them" (64). For Jacoby, the emphasis on subjectivity in psychology is inversely proportional to the lack of subjectivity in the social or objective sphere. "The more the development of late capitalism renders obsolete or at least suspect the real possibilities of self, self-fulfillment, and actualization, the more they are emphasized. . ." (64). "The subjectivity that surfaces everywhere, be it in the form of human relationships, peak-experiences and so on, is but a response to its demise. . ." (17-18).[4]

This is a very neat schema. That it is in part the schema adopted by Adorno and Marcuse in the mid-1950s may render it "orthodox" in some sense, but this does not constitute an argument for its correctness—either then or now.

It is revealing that Jacoby chooses to characterize the concern with subjectivity as a "reflex response." It is as if the disappearance of the subject in one area automatically causes its surfacing (in mystified form) in another. Jacoby never argues this point: he simply asserts it and assumes throughout that it is entirely unproblematic. In fact, it is not.

Jacoby is right to decry what he calls "the fetish of subjectivity" (64); he is right to insist that the beguiling promises of "liberation now" (47) be subjected to critical scrutiny, but his own analysis of the significance of the emphasis on subjectivity reveals itself as simplistic and undialectical. There is no suggestion in Jacoby's discussion that the focus on subjectivity is not only an ideological response to its absence in late capitalism, but that it is equally an indication of the genuinely radical possibilities of liberation today—possibilities which are thwarted by the very workings of the system which makes them apparent as alternative. Jacoby's discussion thus fails to do justice to the ambiguous nature of late capitalism, which indeed "renders obsolete or suspect the real possibilities of. . .self-fulfillment" and happiness, but which does so in a specific way: it presents them as possibilities while simultaneously blocking their realization. Seen in this context, the focus on subjectivity among the New Left and in the Women's Liberation movement takes on an entirely different meaning. It may indicate the emergence of new instinctual needs—the roots of radical social change in the individuals.

To be sure, Jacoby's critique of the emphasis on subjectivity among the left seeks to show that even the left "has not escaped the ravages of social amnesia. . ." (101), which he sees in such phenomena as the hostility to theory, the instant sloganeering, and the resentment of exclusive romantic relationships expressed in the battle cry "smash monogamy." What is at stake here is not Jacoby's acute critique of these tendencies, but the nature of his analysis as a whole. In spite of his attempt to rescue his discussion from its rigid schema by granting that "against a Marxist dogma that proscribed all subjectivity in the name of science, its articulation on the left was progress" (103-104), Jacoby fails to incorporate this insight into the framework of his analysis and it remains as an isolated remark. This is not surprising. Jacoby's discussion of the "politics of subjectivity" is an instance of his penchant for regarding late capitalism as strictly "a one dimensional society" (71).

Jacoby acknowledges that his analysis of the eclipse of subjectivity relies on a "crucial ambiguity" (81) in the concept of subjectivity, but his discussion of this ambiguity is altogether too brief and profoundly disappointing. "It [the concept of

4. See also the following: "the intensification of subjectivity is a *direct* response to its actual decline. . ." (115, italics added).

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subjectivity] seems to refer at the same time to two very different phenomena: the proletariat as (potential) subject of history and the bourgeois subject as the problematic individual tossed up by the market" (*ibid.*). Jacoby grants that "it may seem misleading to speak of the eclipse of the individual as if this were true both of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat—an eclipse of subjectivity per se" (*ibid.*). But he contents himself with the remark that "the form of individuality that prevails in the bourgeoisie is not confined to the bourgeoisie; rather it seeps into the proletariat and cripples the process of the proletariat which seeks to constitute itself as the historical subject" (81-82). We are left with the impression that it is not misleading to speak of the eclipse of subjectivity *per se* because the "proletariat...is partially composed of bourgeois individuals..." (82).

A possible explanation for the inadequacy of Jacoby's analysis may be that he has not corrected his own earlier work. The two chapters of his book which most strongly express his one-dimensional conception of the role of subjectivity in late capitalism appeared in print several years earlier and Jacoby has incorporated them virtually unchanged into the book.[5] This is more than a scholarly nicety. Jacoby's analysis would have benefited had he taken account of some of the discussions of the problem of subjectivity by members of the New Left itself, but he writes as if no one among the New Left has even considered the topic.[6] He fails to acknowledge, for instance, the very good discussion of the ambiguous nature of the emphasis on subjectivity among the New Left by Greg Calvert and Carol Neiman.[7]

Like Jacoby, Calvert and Neiman criticize the dangerous tendency of substituting "ideological phrase-mongering" (107) for serious discussion; they recognize the insufficiency of what they term "anti-system consciousness" (16) as a radical political outlook. Again, like Jacoby, Calvert and Neiman do not hesitate to criticize certain aspects of New Left rhetoric and practice: the romantic posturing and the mystified militantism which issued in "the politics of self hate and life-deferral" (153). But their critique of what one might call the "repressed and repressive subjectivity" of the New Left is informed by a recognition of the genuinely subversive significance of the search for a "new selfhood" (119), a search which they see as integral to the enterprise of the New Left. It is the absence of this recognition that limits the usefulness of Jacoby's discussion.

Given that Jacoby's critique of conformist psychology seeks so much support in the writings of Herbert Marcuse, one can only be puzzled by his failure to mention either the *Essay on Liberation* or *Counterrevolution and Revolt*.[8] Jacoby's omission is the more significant inasmuch as these works represent Marcuse's attempt to reformulate

5. "The Politics of Subjectivity" first appeared in *Telos* 9 (Fall 1971). It appeared again in *New Left Review* 79 (May-June 1973). "Negative Psychoanalysis and Marxism" appeared in *Telos* 14 (Winter 1972). The final chapter of the book appeared in essentially the same form in *Telos* 17 (Fall 1973).

6. The documentary history edited by Massimo Teodori contains ample material on this topic in terms of the American New Left. Massimo Teodori, *The New Left. A Documentary History* (New York, 1969). The best discussion and documentation of the New Left in France is to be found in the *Journal de la Commune Etudiante*, edited, with a long introduction, by Alain Schnapp and Pierre Vidal-Naquet (Paris, 1969).

7. Greg Calvert and Carol Neiman, *A Disrupted History: The New Left and the New Capitalism* (New York, 1971). See especially pp. 15-16 and pp. 111ff. References to this work appear in parentheses in the text.

8. Herbert Marcuse, *Essay on Liberation* (Boston, 1969); *Counterrevolution and Revolt* (Boston, 1972). References to these works appear in parentheses in the text.

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the problem of subjectivity in terms of the prospects for radical change inherent in late capitalist society.

Hardly one to be accused of a cheerful positivism, Marcuse is fully aware of the dangers of a falsely happy consciousness. Like Jacoby, he sees the focus on subjectivity among the New Left as a response to objective social conditions, but, unlike Jacoby, he does not view this in a monochromatic fashion. While Jacoby argues too neatly that "the cult of subjectivity is a direct response to its eclipse" (105), Marcuse's discussion is truer to the ambiguous reality. Whereas Jacoby sees the focus on subjectivity simply as the abstract and impotent negation of advanced capitalist society, Marcuse sees the subversive potential of the "new sensibility."

Marcuse's thesis developed both in the *Essay on Liberation* and in *Counterrevolution and Revolt* is that the focus on subjectivity indicates the emergence of needs which cannot be satisfied by capitalist society (or indeed by any current form of socialist society). These are aesthetic and moral needs, the need for "...human relationships no longer mediated by the market" (*Essay*, 27), the need for a natural and social environment in which "the sensuous, the playful, the calm...become forms of existence" (25), the need for a self determination wherein "the beautiful would be an essential quality of...freedom" (46). The fact that these aesthetic and moral needs are now experienced as primary needs, as "vital needs," is a development whose importance cannot be neglected or minimized by Marxist theory. The emphasis among the left on subjectivity, however inadequate its form and expression,[9] is reminder for Marcuse that socialism "as a qualitatively different *totality*...is the historical answer to the actual development of capitalism" (*Counterrevolution*, 3). Whatever critical remarks one might want to make about Marcuse's analysis, it has one virtue which Jacoby's lacks. Marcuse has at least made a start in making comprehensible a dialectic of liberation.

I turn now to the sections of Jacoby's book which are at once the most promising and in a sense the most frustrating: the discussions of the relationship between theory and therapy. Jacoby devotes two chapters to this problem; the first is largely a report of Freud's views on the matter; the second is a critique of the claims made by David Cooper and R.D. Laing. It is to the latter that I turn first.

Jacoby makes a number of trenchant criticisms of the mystifications in Laing and Cooper's family therapy, a major source of which is the significance they attribute to 'communication.' The focus on the sphere of communication as the real locus of trouble assumes "a parliamentary notion of reality where there are no real antagonisms..." (143). A therapy which treats all problems as essentially the results of a breakdown in communications pretends that these problems will vanish "if we talk about them." One is reminded of the ending of the movie "Cool Hand Luke:" "what we have here," says the warden cynically as he surveys the defeated prisoners, "is the failure to communicate." The warden knows what communications therapy forgets: "a breakdown in communications...is rooted in other tensions and antagonisms" (143). Similarly as Jacoby notes, "endless talk on I and thou forgets that neither can be created out of endless talk" (150). The communication model is shot through with

9. Commenting on the use of drugs among the Left, Marcuse notes that "the dissolution of the ego" in the 'trip' is "artificial and short-lived..." (*Essay*, 37). But he points out what Jacoby forgets, that "the artificial and 'private' liberation anticipates, in a distorted manner, an exigency of social liberation: the revolution must be at the same time a revolution in perception which will accompany the material and intellectual reconstruction of society..." (*ibid.*).

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passivity; its mode of appropriating reality is that of the spectacle, which is not surprising, given that for it self identity is determined by variations of the look. Jacoby quotes Cooper: "Self identity is constituted not only by our looking at ourselves but also by our looking at others looking at us..." (148). It is no accident that a therapy which deals only with the echoes of real conflicts becomes involved in a play of mirrors.

Jacoby claims that Laing and Cooper go wrong most fundamentally in supposing that family therapy is *eo ipso* social change. This mistake results from their identifying the family with society itself, confusing family relations with social relations, and forgetting that the family is itself a social product, "as much victim as victimizer" (139). Failing to understand the mediations between family and society, and intending to be radical and political, Laing and Cooper make the mirror image of the mistake made by the post Freudians. The conformist psychologists glorify "health" and confuse it with social well being; Laing and Cooper glorify madness and represent it as a strategy of liberation (132).

The distinction between family relations and social relations requires the distinction between therapy and social theory. Correspondingly, there is an absolute disjunction between progress in therapy and progress in social change. One kind of therapy may be better than another *as therapy*, but this has no significance for the social dimension. "If family and extrafamily therapy is progress over clinical therapy and analysis, this is progress in therapy, not in social theory or praxis" (142). Jacoby uses the example of a doctor treating an automobile accident victim to illustrate this distinction. The doctor treats the victim's injuries, not the social unreason which makes automobiles into death traps. His concern is the results, not the social causes, of automobile accidents. The point of this example is that one should not confuse "psychic first aid with liberation" (150). In Jacoby's view, therapy is therapy, and *nothing more*. Therapy, no matter what kind, is "a choice in how to treat the individual that leaves untouched the social roots" (139).

Jacoby's discussion of the relationship between theory and therapy in Laing and Cooper exemplifies his claim that "the dialectic and divergence of theory and therapy are...crucial to a negative and political psychology" (xxi). To be non-ideological psychology must be 'negative.' "Negative psychoanalysis" is Jacoby's characterization of the attempt by Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse to "think Freud" and to elaborate what Jacoby calls "an objective theory of subjectivity" (80).

The problem for negative psychoanalysis is to think about the subject, the individual while resisting "subjective notions of subjectivity, conformist in their capitulation to the immediacy of the subject's own perceptions" (99). This is perhaps not the most illuminating explanation. In slightly less jargonistic language one might say that the task of psychoanalytic theory is to think about a *mutilated* subjectivity without assuming (inadvertently) the existence of a healthy subjectivity (an autonomous individuality) whose non-existence is precisely the topic of investigation and exploration. (The theorists of the Frankfurt School were grappling in their own terms with the difficulties alluded to by Jacoby in his discussion of "negative facts.") Negative psychoanalysis is an objective theory of subjectivity in two senses. Firstly it "explores subjectivity till it reveals its social and objective determinants," and secondly, this exploration reveals that "there is only an objective configuration to subjectivity. Today there is 'no' subjectivity" (80). Hence the negativity of negative psychoanalysis; "it explores a subject whose subjectivity is being administered out of existence" (99).

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Jacoby recasts the relationship between psychoanalytic theory and therapy in terms of the broader relationship between theory and practice in an unfree (antagonistic) society and maintains that the relationship can only be one of "conscious contradiction" (120). Jacoby does not argue this point; he simply asserts it, and claims that psychoanalysis shares this general fate. "Psychoanalysis as individual therapy participates *within* the realm of social unfreedom, while psychoanalysis as theory is free to transcend and criticize this same realm" (*ibid*). Jacoby seeks support for his assimilation of the relationship between theory and therapy to the relationship between theory and practice from Marcuse's early essay "On Hedonism." Marcuse argues that there is an inevitable disjunction between knowledge (insight into social reality) and happiness (the satisfaction of the individual's immediately given needs and wants). The dilemma as posed by Marcuse and quoted by Jacoby is as follows: "Knowledge destroys proffered happiness... Knowledge does not help him [the individual] attain happiness, yet without it he reverts to reified relationships" (130). By way of interpretation, Jacoby amplifies: "This is a historical configuration, not a natural one; it is the configuration of happiness and freedom in an unliberated society —a society in which the modes of happiness are unfree and the modes of freedom unhappy. Today one vies with the other; every solution is the wrong one" (*ibid.*). I take it that the point of these remarks is to assimilate the theory-therapy relation to the relation between knowledge and happiness as portrayed by Marcuse. If so, Jacoby is in effect identifying therapy with "unfree happiness," and theory with "unhappy freedom." Given this identification one might wonder what is meant by a *dialectic* of theory and therapy, for Jacoby's comments suggest only that there is an absolute dichotomy between them.

The view that there is an absolute dichotomy between theory and therapy depends upon the assumption that therapy is devoid of the liberating insight of theory; further it assumes that the role of therapy (seen from the perspective of social theory) is necessarily conformist and pacificatory. Jacoby seems to assume that therapy can play only one role, that of participating "within the realm of social unfreedom." To see psychoanalysis only as therapy he says "is to blunt psychoanalysis as a critique of civilization, turning it into an *instrument of individual adjustment and resignation*" (120, italics added). For further support Jacoby relies on Adorno: "In adjusting to the mad whole the cured patient becomes really sick" (121).

Jacoby's discussion of the relationship between theory and therapy assumes that the only context in which to discuss this problem is that formulated by Freud and in a sense repeated by Adorno and Marcuse, a context which poses the problem as a conflict between the immediate gains of therapy and the objective insights of psychoanalytic theory. The conflict thus articulated is between (vulgar) pragmatism and truth. Given this choice, it is not difficult to take sides. Jacoby cites Freud on the dangers of reducing psychoanalytic theory to a method of cure and thereby 'destroying' psychoanalysis as 'science.' And he reports Adorno's and Marcuse's view that the critical insights of Freudian theory were lost by the revisionist replacement of therapy for theory. "The most serious objection of the Frankfurt School to the neo-Freudians [was that] they weakened the theory of psychoanalysis in favor of therapy" (120).

Jacoby's exposition of the thinking of the Frankfurt School is more than adequate. He has been equally thorough in assembling Freud's remarks on the relationship between psychoanalytic theory and therapy. Indeed, his discussion is much more

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complete than Marcuse's treatment of this issue in *Eros and Civilization*. The objection to be made to Jacoby's discussion is that in spite of his praise of the Frankfurt School for their attempt to "think Freud," he himself has not ventured to do so. Jacoby has again failed to take his own discussion of orthodoxy and revisionism seriously. He has accepted the effort of Adorno and Marcuse as it stands and has neglected to subject their formulation of the issue to the critical scrutiny and re-articulation which it both requires and deserves.[10] This undermines his claim to have discussed the dialectic of theory and therapy.

In spite of Jacoby's assertion that there must be a dialectic between theory and therapy (121), there is no attempt on his part to formulate one; the terms in which Jacoby presents the problem preclude the possibility of such a dialectical relationship. Jacoby notes that "both theory and therapy exist within Freud in contradiction" (120), but he seems to have understood the contradiction in terms of a diametrical opposition, similar to that between knowledge and happiness as formulated by Marcuse in the essay on hedonism. Given this understanding of 'contradiction' there cannot be a dialectical relationship between theory and therapy.

Jacoby admits that it is important and even urgent "to work out a relationship between psychology and social theory" (xxii) but he seems to have considered this relationship only in negative terms. He never raises the question as to whether progress in therapy or therapy itself might have any positive (progressive) implications for social theory. There is no suggestion in Jacoby's discussion that therapy today might have a possible role in social liberation. He warns us only not to confuse "psychic first aid with liberation" as indeed we should not, but to identify all therapy with such first aid suggests that therapy has nothing to do with social change. "When one is loyal to [the social] analysis, there can be no talk of therapy. More precisely: there can be talk of therapy, but therapy as therapy—not as radical therapy or social change" (134). Jacoby seems to think that the dialectic of theory and therapy requires only that one not confuse the two. This is indeed a necessary but hardly a sufficient condition. To suppose that social theory precludes consideration of the possible role of therapy in social change is to foreclose a genuine dialectic between social theory and therapy.

An attempt to formulate a dialectic between theory and therapy would require that one go beyond the simple assertion that therapy "functions *within* the realm of social unfreedom" (120). If to follow Adorno, "the whole is the untruth," then everything functions within this realm. The issue is not whether some activity functions within this realm, but whether and to what extent it works to sustain or to subvert this realm.

An attempt to understand the relationship between theory and therapy dialectically would require a rethinking of the role of therapy—not as an "instrument of adjustment and resignation," nor as "education in. . . conscious repression" (121), nor even, to cite again Freud's famous remark, as a method for "transforming [one's] hysterical misery into everyday unhappiness" (122), but as an agent of social liberation. To be sure, the consideration of the role of therapy in the process of liberation would entail that one reject with Jacoby the easy wisdom of the purveyors of instant sensitivity, health and happiness. But we need not accept as the only alternative, the exploration (by negative psychoanalysis) of "a subject-less subject"

10. There is thus a certain irony in Jacoby's remark that one cannot "claim that the old texts —be they Marx or Freud—are as valid as when written and need no interpretation or rethinking" (10). If Marx or Freud are important enough to be 'rethought,' so are the theorists of the Frankfurt School.

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(80), an exploration which seems to envision no role for therapy in the struggle for radical social change.[11] In other words we refuse an undialectical opposition. But in rejecting as abstract polarities both negative psychoanalysis and 'positive' (conformist) therapy, we are taking as a model Jacoby's own refusal of the abstract opposition between dogma and change, a refusal which forms the basis of his discussion of orthodoxy and revisionism. Indeed, as Jacoby writes, "here as elsewhere the way out is through" (80).

A re-thinking of the role of therapy in social liberation today would consider the possibilities of an emancipatory therapy, and to this end it would be necessary to distinguish between the various kinds of therapy—not only in terms of their techniques, but also in terms of the *social implications* of their theoretical commitments and goals. Jacoby does not bother to do this. Had he taken the effort to do so, he might have discovered the difference between the Rogerian Sensitivity or Encounter groups on the one hand and the various kinds of "radical therapy" projects on the other.[12] Again had he made the effort, he might have seen the subversive

11. Arguing against Erich Fromm's ideological glorification of the development of one's personality, Marcuse writes: "Considering what civilization has made of man, the difference in the development of personalities is that between an unproportional and a proportional share of that 'everyday unhappiness' which is the common lot of mankind. *The latter is all that therapy can achieve*" (*Eros,* 257-258, italics added). But to rethink the role of therapy in radical change does not mean that one should make Fromm's mistakes. At one point in his critique of the neo-Freudians Marcuse comes close to the notion of a socially subversive therapy, but he shies away from it almost as soon as he mentions it. Claiming that a non-ideological understanding of self-realization would require defining 'personality' and 'individuality' in terms of "their socially denied potentialities," Marcuse remarks, "this would mean 'curing' the patient to become a rebel or (*which is saying the same thing*) *a martyr*" (*Eros,* 258, italics added). Compare George Thomson's remark in *Aeschylus and Athens,* cited by Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich, on the radical social potential of psychoanalysis: "The psychoanalyst would become a revolutionary." Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich, *The Inability to Mourn. Principles of Collective Behavior* (New York, 1975), p. 256 note. [Original German edition published in 1967.]

12. Jacoby notes that much of what bills itself as 'radical therapy' fails to concretize its analysis of mental and emotional illnesses in terms of their class origin and base. Thus although radical therapy assumes that society (rather than the individual) is at fault, it interprets society "either in immediate human terms (the family and friends) or [in] abstract universal ones—or both" (139). We are given to understand, however, that these failings stem from radical therapy's attempt to be *radical* therapy (instead of simply therapy). Jacoby implies that the only way for therapy to be radical (and not self-mystified) is to limit itself to the realization that "mental illness and treatment are class illness and treatment" (139). Therapy could then in good conscience concern itself with "aiding the victims" in which task of course "there is no shame" (*ibid.*). With the caution that "biological (and psychical) disorders are subject to a social dynamic of class, stratification and so on" (140), Jacoby argues that the medical-biological model "can serve as a final clarification of the theory-therapy dialectic" (*ibid.*). Jacoby uses the following analogy to exclude the possibility that therapy could have a role in radical change. "The victim of an automobile accident is not to be turned away by the politically aware doctor with the remark that he or she is not a victim of a specific car accident, but a victim of an obsolete transportation system. . ." (141). Of course not. Jacoby's example depends upon the abstract opposition of two perspectives. The example assumes that (granting its social or class content) medicine itself as a body of curative procedures is theoretically neutral, a matter of biological or psychical technology; the example implies that medicine as a practice is only a practice as therapy can only be therapy, not radical therapy. But no technology, no procedure is theoretically neutral. Suzanne Arms' excellent book, *Immaculate Deception,* provides striking evidence against the neutrality of medical technology with respect to women giving birth. Arms demonstrates that hospital procedures are by no means simply procedures, but that they themselves reinforce and implement the social powerlessness of women at a most intimate physical and psychical level. Suzanne Arms, *Immaculate Deception* (Boston, 1975).

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implications of the various "self-help" groups in the women's liberation movement.[13] Jacoby correctly criticizes the "ideology of sensitivity groups that work to desensitize by cutting off human relations from the social relations that have made them brutal" (105, but he fails to notice the genuinely political significance of the "support groups" in which women and men have discovered precisely the "social roots" of what they took to be a purely private problem. "More sensitivity today means revolution or madness" (105). Unfortunately the issue is not quite that simple.

The point here is not the empirical one that therapy can sometimes also have beneficial results; the point is rather a more theoretical one. To formulate it in its most provocative form would mean not only denying the remark attributed to Freud that the revolutionary does not need therapy, but more: one would have to ask whether some sort of therapy may not be a necessity in order to uncover or plant the roots of radical social change in the individual. That is, to the extent that human beings have introjected the needs and values of a repressive mass society, precisely to this extent therapy (as a way of undoing this introjection) may be required in order to escape from what Marcuse has called a "*psychic* Thermidor."[14] The consideration of this possibility is well within the range (tradition) of critical theory, for it is the development of capitalist society itself that forces one to rethink the role of therapy and subjectivity.

If one of the achievements of negative psychoanalysis was to explore the eclipse of a certain form of subjectivity (that appropriate to the classical period of developing capitalism), and if we distinguish the eclipse of this form of subjectivity from the eclipse of subjectivity *per se*, we might ask whether a genuinely dialectical psychology should not concern itself with the indeed "not yet liberated subjectivity" (80) which expresses itself in the "new sensibility." And we might then raise the question whether therapy today might not have a significant and socially progressive role.

To be sure, this question assumes other forms and content for therapy and other goals than those ascribed to it by Jacoby. What is here envisioned is a *counter-therapy*, not practiced by the psychiatrists and psychologists of the establishment but in an on-going fashion by individuals with and for each other, even, and perhaps especially, among individuals and groups who are already politically active (already engaged in radical political activity). Such a counter-therapy would not assume that "with a little self-help alienation will be washed down the drain like dirt in a sparkling sink" (67); it would not suppose that the troubles of individuals are purely "subjective," a matter of their attitude alone. Consequently a counter-therapy would not dispense "cheery advice on inner strength and self-actualization" (58) in the face of the evils of unemployment or those of a brutal and stupid employment. Counter-therapy as emancipatory therapy would combat the internalization of the needs and desires desires of a destructive society; it would seek to facilitate and support the difficult process of *unlearning* repressive and repressed instinctual patterns. Insofar as possible it would seek to create a space, an area of non-identity between individuals and their society, a space which is indeed the counterpart if not the prerequisite of any attempt to find and sustain an alternative political practice.

13. Jacoby comments on Rollo May's notion of self help as the gaining of "new light on [one's] own problems of personal integration:" "One helps oneself because collective help is inadmissible..." (51). But he neglects the parallel between the self-help initiatives in the women's movement and auto-gestion in the work place. The collective practice of demystifying one's own body is also an aspect of radical change.

14. Herbert Marcuse, *Five Lectures* (Boston, 1970), p. 38.

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In claiming that a dialectic of theory and therapy today would imply the concept of an emancipatory therapy, I in no way intend to suggest that such a counter-therapy supplant social theory. Inasmuch as theory and therapy have different functions, the distinction between them remains. It remains true that "for subjectivity to attain itself, to become subjective, it must achieve self-consciousness: insight into the objective reality that falsifies the subject" (128). Neither do I want to suggest that counter-therapy is identical to social and political practice. To raise the possibility of an emancipatory therapy is not to confuse therapy and social change.

Rather, the concept of a counter-therapy is suggested by the need for preserving and protecting, in the individuals, the subversive and transcending dimensions of the revolt against advanced capitalist society; it is suggested by the question as to the possibilities of any radical social and political practice today. This is a problem that forces itself willy-nilly into the content of critical theory. Its presence is obliquely testified to by Jacoby; it haunts his critique of contemporary psychology. Jacoby rejects the pseudo-liberation wrought by conformist psychology and appeals instead to "the realm of social and political praxis" (51). Similarly, he maintains that "there is no such activity as radical therapy—there is only therapy and radical politics" (139). What is left wholly unconsidered in Jacoby's claims is the content and direction of the social and political practice; what is left unanswered are the crucial questions as to what aspects of radical politics are emancipatory and what conditions *in* the individuals emancipatory politics might presuppose. The disjunction in Jacoby's claim "there is only therapy and radical politics" not only leaves unconsidered the possibility of an interplay (not an identity) between therapy and radical politics; it ignores the problem of developing and protecting the instinctual needs required for a liberated society.

In the *Essay on Liberation* Marcuse notes that the possibility of radical practice today depends on undoing the introjected needs which force the victims of this society to perpetuate it. In fact, Marcuse's appeal to "radical enlightenment" and to "political education" points implicitly to the need for a counter (emancipatory) therapy, although such a concept is nowhere explicitly developed by him.[15] The task of radical enlightenment as Marcuse sees it is to "develop, in the exploited, the consciousness (and the unconsciousness) which would loosen the hold of enslaving needs over their existence—the needs which perpetuate their dependence on the system of exploitation. Without this rupture which can only be the result of political education in action. . . the most immediate force of rebellion may be defeated" (*Essay,* 57). But no political education, however it may express itself in action, can by itself, effectively

15. In a recent German essay, "Theory and Practice," Marcuse mentions the need for what he calls a *counter*-psychology (*Gegen-Psychologie*], but he seems to have in mind psychology only as social theory, not as therapy. Arguing against the anti-intellectualism of the left, Marcuse emphasizes the importance of theory as an "enlightening and educating intellectual practice." In this connection he writes, "When ideology itself, reason itself become means of domination which are reproduced by the individuals themselves, then the necessity exists for a *counter*-psychology, a *counter*-sociology, a *counter*-rationality, a *counter*-education. In contrast to the capitalist fusion (*Verschmelzung*) of intellectual and material culture, of reason and ideology, what is now required is the freeing of intellectual labor for its proper autonomy: intelligence as contradiction" (32-33). Herbert Marcuse, "Theorie und Praxis," *Zeit-Messungen* (Frankfurt, 1975), pp. 21-36. Similarly, in "The Failure of the New Left?" Marcuse writes: "the insistence of the New Left on a new *subjectivity* bestows a decisive political meaning on psychology" (*Zeit-Messungen* [40]), but again he seems to consider psychology only as social theory, not as therapeutic practice.

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undertake the task which Marcuse sets it, that of loosening "the hold of enslaving needs." The lengthy *unlearning* of repressive and repressed desires and patterns of behavior is a therapeutic task. In fact, precisely to the degree that domination has ingressed into the instinctual structure, and individuals reproduce their own enslavement (thereby subverting a possible rupture, and making the emergence of a liberated society *a priori* impossible), precisely to this degree, emancipatory therapy may be a vital factor in radical social change.

Social Amnesia is a provocative work. It is not the least of the many merits of Jacoby's book that it has provided us with a criterion, that of "dialectical loyalty," in terms of which we can rethink even the critical theory of the Frankfurt School.

Erica Sherover

Jürgen Habermas. *Legitimation Crisis*. Translated by Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press, 1975.*

In *Legitimation Crisis*, his latest work to be translated into English, Jürgen Habermas returns to issues central to the Marxian tradition, a tradition he has increasingly distanced himself from. While modest in size, *Legitimation Crisis* is ambitious in scope: confronting a variety of hypotheses about crisis tendencies in "late capitalism," Habermas proposed to sort out competing claims and establish a model of his own, to guide further empirical research. The book marks his contribution to the ongoing discussion of capitalism's fate among post-war social theorists.

The leading themes of *Legitimation Crisis* are familiar enough, even if their systematic formulation is novel. Following such mentors in the Frankfurt School as Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Habermas argues that contradictions within the economic order have been displaced to the political and cultural orders. Within late capitalism, the economy is increasingly regulated by the state, with the consequence that class conflict according to the classic Marxian scheme is rendered latent. In place of the blind anarchy of boom and bust engendered by entrepreneurial competition, there emerges a welfare economy, administered by the state.

This displacement of contradiction, however, does not spell its elimination. Rather it is the sphere of administration itself that becomes the new locus for crisis tendencies in advanced capitalism. Planning for public services is rarely adequate, the quality of urban life decays, and inflation becomes endemic, while the state becomes the site for conflicting claims by competing power groups. In a depressed economy, the state may even prove unable to deliver the goods as promised—a catastrophic eventuality, given the roots of the contemporary "class compromise" in a generalized access to commodities.

This crisis of administration comes to consciousness in the real of culture, according to Habermas. Attempts at rational planning in all areas of life, from education to housing to medicine, challenge traditional forms of life and modes of legitimation by dissolving inherited professional codes, and weakening such institutions as the family and the neighborhood. When such traditional forms are

*Thanks are due Langdon Winner, whose suggestions, criticism and encouragement have been invaluable in focusing the arguments of this review.

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undermined, voices for a different way of life become audible: the "threshold of emancipation," as Habermas puts it, is potentially lowered.

A rising tide of expectations—such as, for example, demands for participation at the workplace or in government—can only be stalled by delivering a continuous flow of commodities and services, in an attempt to dissipate discussion over the means and ends of public life in a purely private hedonism, revolving around passive consumption. According to Habermas, "as long as the welfare-state program, in conjunction with a widespread technocratic common consciousness. . . can maintain a sufficient degree of civil privatism, legitimation needs *do not have to* culminate in a crisis." [1]

Whether or not challenges to the social order's legitimacy do arise ultimately depends, in Habermas' view, on the viability of traditional patterns of motivation. Yet, precisely to the degree that planning becomes the rule, traditional forms of motivation are thrown into jeopardy. Specifically, Habermas notes that such venerable ideological supports as religion are being progressively uprooted; the work ethic itself rings hollow when labor, even at the level of the white collar professions, becomes so routinized that it can no longer afford the laborer any sense of achievement or excellence. Similarly, the image of an autonomous individuation at the basis of society seems archaic when faced with the reality of mass production and the necessity of developing collective services. Those remnants of bourgeois thought that do survive, such as a universal ethics and art, no longer offer much support for the system of mass consumption in any case.

As Habermas sees it, there are only two ways around this nascent crisis in motivation: either a modification of the "latent class structures" (through some form of socialism, one presumes), or the establishment of an expertly administered form of life, that, rejecting the need for a social order to legitimate itself according to public norms, would obviate the problem entirely. Such a new form, reminiscent of the type of social organization envisioned by technocrats, is analyzed by Habermas in the conclusion to *Legitimation Crisis*, where he entertains the possibility that the individual, as an autonomous judge of norms, may be vanishing, becoming instead a mere cog in the wheels of administration; in the technocratic scenario, the state would execute the imperatives of complex technologies and administrative systems, rather than acting in accordance with publicly sanctioned norms. Systems theory assumes that this liquidation of human norms has already occurred. Before the claims of systems theory, however, Habermas falls oddly mute: advocates of an emancipated society can in his view only invoke a "partiality in reason." And it is on this note of resignation, rather than on alternative proposals for social organization, or a call for political action, that *Legitimation Crisis* closes.

Habermas here resurrects the pessimistic motif of the Frankfurt School's "critical theory" of society. Like the later Adorno and Horkheimer, he cannot find any group or class within contemporary society that would have an inherent interest in emancipation. Instead, the critical theorist describes a social order that, in tendency at least, seems to integrate without remainder the very individuals who might critically confront it.

His method, however, raises serious problems that are unique to his own brand of critical theory. On the most obvious level of prose style, for example, Habermas, unlike his predecessors in the Frankfurt tradition, exploits the jargon of current social

1. Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 74.

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science. We read of "input" and "output," of "value systems" and "rationality deficits," even of meaning as a "scarce resource," all turns of phrase that would have appalled Adorno.

But this linguistic eclecticism is merely a surface manifestation of a deeper phenomenon, namely Habermas' manner of assimilating the theories he criticizes. Ironically—and despite a sharp divergence in the theories they so assimilate—his method here echoes Horkheimer's, as presented in the seminal essay "Traditional and Critical Theory." Horkheimer there explains that the critical theorist interprets "the economic categories of work, value and production exactly as they are interpreted in the existing order." On one level, then, the critical thinker leaves the world of theory (in this case Marxian theory) as he encounters it: "traditional theory," structured along models of verifiable insight into facts, persists as an acceptable mode of explanation for the realms of physical nature and "second nature," society as an object exhibiting statistical regularities. According to Horkheimer, "since society must come to grips with nature in future ages as well, this intellectual technology will not become irrelevant but on the contrary is to be developed as fully as possible."[2]

Habermas implicitly endorses this assessment of "intellectual technology." Thus in *Knowledge and Human Interests,* he assigns a relative validity to the "empirical-analytic" sciences, which incorporate a "technical cognitive interest" in explaining and controlling "objectified processes." Critical theory, in distinction, is organized around an interest in emancipation, or, as Horkheimer put it, "a concern for reasonable conditions of life." This concern, which guides reflection on the possible forms of human life, only attacks the empirical-analytic method when the latter claims an absolute validity, as in the case of logical positivism. Indeed, after reconstructing and classifying the fields of human knowledge and interest, critical theory integrates the empirical-analytic sciences within an emancipatory perspective, without necessarily advancing an immanent critique of their specific methods or understanding of the world.

In *Legitimation Crisis,* the difficulties with this approach emerge most clearly in Habermas' treatment of systems theory. On the one hand, Habermas, in criticizing the German systems analyst Niklas Luhmann, decries Luhmann's assumption of "an unlimited extension of administrative steering capacity," a construct of social reality that takes for granted the "end of the individual" as an autonomous judge of norms.[3] The systems theory argues that complex societies have already rendered problems of legitimation obsolete: the real issue of rationalization lies in the proper "steering" of societal development. In advanced industrial societies, this steering can only be rationally accomplished by experts trained to solve the specific problems of the various social and technical sub-systems. From this perspective, to grant democratic participation in decision-making would be sheer folly.

Not surprisingly, Habermas rejects this aspect of systems theory. But on the other hand, Habermas states at the outset of *Legitimation Crisis* that "both paradigms, life-world and system, are important. The problem is to demonstrate their interconnection." He continues: "From the life-world perspective, we thematize the normative structures (values and institutions) of a society. We analyze events and states from the point of view of their dependency on functions of social integration (in

2. Max Horkheimer, *Critical Theory,* trans. O'Connell et. al. (New York, 1972), pp. 216, 208.

3. Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis,* pp. 138, 142.

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Parson's vocabulary, integration and pattern maintenance), while the non-normative components of the system serve as limiting conditions. From the system perspective, we thematize a society's steering mechanisms and the extension of the scope of contingency. We analyze events from the point of view of their dependency on functions of system integration (in Parson's vocabulary, adaptation and goal-attainment), while the goal values serve as data."[4]

With this passage, Habermas buys wholesale a large slice of systems theory. He has in fact accorded it a relative validity, in describing the administrative and economic aspects of late capitalist societies. And not only that: the jargon of systems theory crops up in Habermas' own social topography. For example, the argument of *Legitimation Crisis* advanced by referring to three social "sub-systems," the "socio-cultural," the "political," and the "economic." Each system, to be sure, manifests a "normative structure" as well as a "limiting substratum;" but a cardinal concern of critical theory now becomes "a historically oriented analysis of social systems, which permits us to ascertain for a given case the range of tolerance within which the goal values of the system might vary without its content being critically endangered."[5] And Habermas goes further: social conflicts that are described without recourse to "communications theory" (i.e., Habermas' own theory of symbolic interaction within the "life world") or "systems theory" are "empirical phenomena without relation to truth."[6] Systems theory, according to Habermas, tells us what "the limiting conditions and functional imperatives" of a society are—conditions and imperatives that must be respected even in an emancipated society.[7]

Yet despite the drift of his thought in the direction of systems analysis, Habermas remains very much his own theorist. In part, this results from the scope of his interests: if his concluding sections in *Legitimation Crisis* dwell on Luhmann, his discussion of the economy leans on Marx (the "tendency of the rate of profit to fall" even puts in a brief appearance). But what most radically distinguishes Habermas is of course his continuing commitment to a "critical theory" of society. In this respect, it must be remembered that *Legitimation Crisis* represents a small aspect of a much larger project. On the other hand, this book's dilemmas are symptomatic of the problems in Habermas' broader approach. If, after all, he can acquiesce so easily in so much of systems theory, what must be the status of critique in his work?

Habermas' larger project involves an attempt to solve a central difficulty in the critical theory he inherited from Horkheimer and Adorno, namely the difficulty of the theory's grounds. On what basis does the critical theorist found his hopes for the future? Since the critical theorist refuses merely to describe and analyze the world as it is, and since the critique of contemporary institutions seems to require a standpoint, how does the theorist justify that standpoint?[8]

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4. *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
7. See *Ibid.*, p. 113. A social theory "critical of ideology" should ask, writes Habermas, "How would the members of a social system, at a given state in the development of productive forces, have collectively and bindingly interpreted their needs (and which norms would they have accepted as justified) if they could and would have decided on organization of social intercourse through discursive will-formation, with adequate knowledge of the limiting conditions and functional imperatives of their society?"
8. This problem has been discussed briefly by Martin Jay in "The Frankfurt School's Critique of Karl Mannheim and the Sociology of Knowledge," *Telos*, 20, Summer, 1974, pp. 86-7.

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In Horkheimer's original conception, critical theory was inherently historical: it grasped history as a process embodying potential avenues of social and personal development. From an historical analysis of the "goals of human activity," Horkheimer derived the "idea of a reasonable organization of society that will meet the needs of the whole community," an idea that reformulated Marx's concept of communism. On this interpretation, the objective possibility of a rational future became the "Archimedean point" for the critique of contemporary conditions. This projection of a rational image of society became plausible to precisely the extent that men spoke and acted "in such a way as to justify it... All this will be made clear," wrote Horkheimer, "only when the idea [of a just society] is brought to realization... If the proof of the pudding is in the eating, the eating here is still in the future."[9]

The road leading to this future signified, for Horkheimer as for Marx, "not only a logical process but a concrete historical one as well." If the critical theory's standpoint could only be justified through its implementation in practice, then the theorist, of necessity, addressed himself to "the development of the masses... The theoretician and his specific object are seen as forming a dynamic unity with the oppressed class."[10] The validity of critical theory was thus linked to the struggle to institute a rational (i.e., socialist) society.

In the sequel, this scenario proved unquestionable. By linking the critical theory's plausibility to concrete historical factors, Horkheimer had left open the possibility that its hopes might prove groundless. And indeed, confronted with the events of World War II and the cold war era, Horkheimer became extremely pessimistic, resorting in the end to paeans to Schopenhauer.

Faced with an apparently docile proletariat in the West, and Stalinist regimes in the East, other critical theorists looked elsewhere for support. Herbert Marcuse, for one, elaborated a psychoanalytic variant on philosophical anthropology, focusing on man as a creature of repressed libidinal needs; on this "biological basis," Marcuse rested his hopes for a revolution driven by "the vital need to be freed from the administered comforts and the destructive productivity of the exploitative society."[11]

Theodor Adorno, by contrast, unflinchingly faced the ultimate implications of the practical impasse in critical theory: grounded as it was in history, the theory could claim no ultimate or transcendental foundation. Rejecting the pursuit of "first philosophy," specifically in the Heideggerian form of fundamental ontology, Adorno in *Negative Dialectics* denounced the spell of "identity theory" on philosophy: "Dialectics is the consistent sense of nonidentity. It does not begin by taking a standpoint."[12] Enduring the vertigo such a position implied, Adorno depicted the theory as a revolving series of critiques, based only on relative standpoints which reflected the disintegration of modern life; the possibility of transcendence was now locked in "the fragments which decay has chipped, and which bear the objective meanings."[13] The concept of freedom in Adorno "can be defined in negation only, corresponding to the concrete form of a specific unfreedom."[14] As for historical materialism, and hopes for a communist future, they are reduced to an imageless

9. Horkheimer, *Critical Theory*, pp. 220, 213.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 214-215, 211.
11. Herbert Marcuse, *An Essay on Liberation* (Boston, 1969), pp. 18-19.
12. Theodor Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, trans. Ashton (New York,1973), p. 4.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 360.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 231.

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desire for "the resurrection of the flesh... The perspective vanishing point [N.B.] of historic materialism would be its self-sublimation, the spirit's liberation from the primacy of material needs in their state of fulfillment."[15]

Habermas finds fault with Adorno's formulations, however, precisely because they tie critical thought, in its negative definitions, to the reality it analyzes. "Then, however, our problem is merely deferred. For the structure of distorted communication is not ultimate; it has its basis in the logic of undistorted language communication."[16] The contrast could hardly be starker: where Adorno finds the only basis for defining freedom in unfreedom, Habermas asserts that the concept of freedom can only be grounded positively, in an "undistorted" logic of communication. By rejecting Adorno's proposal for a "dialectics without standpoint," however, Habermas has been forced to confront anew the issue of grounding the critical theory.

In the process, he has moved away from history toward a transcendental anthropology. In *Knowledge and Human Interests,* in many respects a brilliant *tour de force*, he seeks to secure the grounds of critical theory by identifying a special "interest in emancipation" that governs critique. This interest, which is to be distinguished from the interest in control guiding natural scientific inquiry, and the interest in understanding guiding interpretation in the cultural sciences, springs from a basic anthropological posture rather than a constellation of historical forces, according to Habermas. Not only in critical Marxism, but also in psychoanalysis, he claims to uncover a primordial urge to self-reflection, undertaken in the hopes of liberation from misunderstanding, delusion and domination.[17]

In this way the method and aims of any critical theory are to be discriminated from the methods and aims of natural scientific and cultural theory. For example, the "verification" of the critical theory's goals is only accomplished through the process of emancipation itself: just as the cure in psychoanalysis confirms the proffered interpretation of pathological behavior. Habermas thus defines a special realm of critical inquiry, tied directly to interaction and the process of enlightened self-reflection.

But what is the medium of this interest in emancipation? Is it simply an anthropological datum, or is it rooted in a specific aspect of human existence? What, indeed, is the specific *aim* of emancipation? Or is the end state an empty desideratum, which affords regulative rules of method without yielding substantive insight into what being emancipated might actually entail? What, finally, are the criteria by which we may distinguish an emancipated person or society?

Taking leave from the psychoanalytic dialogue between analyst and patient, in which the patient attempts, with the analyst's help, to work through a web of distorted self-understanding, Habermas in recent years has turned to a more inclusive attempt to found critical theory in a linguistic philosophy of the conditions governing "undistorted communication." To this end, he has asserted that "reflection on educative processes [with an interest in emancipation] is at least tacitly supported by the reconstruction of definite systems of rules which are anthropologically very deep-seated."[18]

15. *Ibid.*, p. 207.

16. Jürgen Habermas, *Theory and Practice,* trans. Viertel (Boston, 1973), p. 17.

17. Cf. Jürgen Habermas, *Toward a Rational Society,* trans. Shapiro (Boston, 1970), p. 113: "The reflection that the new [technocratic] ideology calls for must penetrate beyond the level of particular historical class interests to disclose the fundamental interests of mankind as such, engaged in the process of self-constitution."

18. Jürgen Habermas, "Summation and Response," trans. Matesich, *Continuum,* Vol. 8, 1-2

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Specifically, Habermas asserts that every instance of human communication involves an "inevitable anticipation" of an "ideal speech situation." This situation subscribes to the "principle of rational speech according to which truth would be guaranteed only through a consensus which was achieved under the idealized conditions of unlimited and control-free communication, and which could be permanently maintained."[19] Habermas therefore believes that the very act of speaking invokes an interest in emancipation, for it is only in a situation of undistorted communication that truth claims, which Habermas thinks are tacitly embodied in any form of speech, can be redeemed; to this extent, the theory "will permit us to derive from the logic of colloquial language the principle of rational discourse as the necessary regulator of every conversation, even if it is still distorted."[20] Moreover, the analysis of undistorted communication yields, according to Habermas, "linguistic-theoretical designations for what we customarily apprehend under the notions of truth, freedom, and justice."[21]

These are clearly large claims. They even figure prominently in a work of general social analysis such as *Legitimation Crisis*, where Habermas announces that "only communicative ethics is universal...; only communicative ethics guarantees autonomy (in that it carries on the process of insertion of drive potentials [sic] into a communicative structure of action)."[22] Such claims have in fact become the basis for Habermas' brand of critical theory. The question is: How persuasive are Habermas' arguments on this point? To what extent does his linguistic account solve the dilemmas of grounding a critical theory of society?

Let us begin by stating Habermas' position in his own words. "If, first of all, each conversation has as its meaning that at least two subjects come to an agreement about something; if, secondly, agreement means the inducement of a true consensus; if, thirdly, the true consensus can be distinguished from a false one only through reference to an ideal speaking situation, i.e., through recourse to an agreement which is contra-factually thought of as if it had come to pass under ideal conditions—then, in this idealization of the speaking situation, an anticipation is being considered which we a) *must* undertake in every empirical speaking situation if we want to communicate at all, and b) which we *can* undertake with the help of the means of construction which every speaker has at his disposal by virtue of his communicative competency."[23]

As stated, the argument rests on two conditions being met by ordinary language. First, Habermas holds that any conversation involves two speakers in reaching an "agreement." Now there are two senses in which we might take the word "agreement" here. On the one hand, Habermas may intend to claim that conversations embody

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(Spring-Summer, 1970), p. 124. The relevant transitional article is Jürgen Habermas, "Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence," in Dreitzel, ed., *Recent Sociology No. 2* (New York, 1970), pp. 114-48. The *Continuum* piece, however, states Habermas' case more succinctly, so we shall focus on this.

19. Habermas, "Summation and Response," p. 126.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 127.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 132. See also "Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence," where Habermas attempts to specify just what these "linguistic-theoretical designations" are. In the ideal speech situation, freedom, for example, appears as "the mutuality of unimpaired self-representation (which includes the acknowledgement of the self-representation of the Other as well)," where "it is possible to achieve subtle nearness along with inviolable distance among the partners, and that means communication under conditions of extreme individuation."

22. Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 89.

23. Habermas, "Summation and Response," p. 131.

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propositions, observations and judgments which the two speakers can (at least potentially) mutually affirm. But taken in this sense, the notion of two subjects "coming to an agreement" fatally simplifies the variety of speech acts a conversation may consist of. For example, conversations may embody what J.L. Austin called "illocutionary" and "perlocutionary" speech acts—questions, warnings, requests, admonitions, comments, expressions of emotion and reports of feelings—not the sort of speech act to which one would normally apply the notion of "coming to an agreement." (What relevance does the notion of "agreement" have if I report that I am hungry?)

Habermas must intend, then, that the notion of "agreement" here means "coming to understand each other."[24] Now modern linguistic analysis has indeed suggested that understanding arises in a context of *shared* rules governing linguistic usage and hence meaning. But what does it mean to say that two speakers "agree" on these rules? This shared context is the precondition of any communication whatsoever: it is not the subject of a conscious agreement, as if two natives, meeting on an island, were to decide to abide by the rules of the German language. The notion of "coming to an agreement" is misleading here, even if the "agreement" in question is a matter of sharing linguistic norms.

As for the second condition, that "agreement means the inducement of a true consensus:" admittedly, if it is an issue of adjudicating an argument, consisting of propositions, observations and judgments, then the problem of a "true consensus" may legitimately arise. We might want to know, for example, if a consensus in an argument resulted from coercion or not, and whether in this sense the argument between the two parties was genuine. But if, on the other hand, by "coming to an agreement" we are to understand simply the process of coming to understand each other, then the notion of a "true consensus" appears of as dubious applicability as the notion of "agreement" itself. For in colloquial communication, we often understand one another without invoking any notion of truth at all. Thus I may quite clearly comprehend the utterances of an acknowledged liar without admitting the truth of what he says, and without agreeing with what he says. Faced with such observations, Habermas merely reiterates his own belief that "every speech, even that of intentional deception, is oriented towards the idea of truth."[25]

To recapitulate: If the agreement supposedly involved in every conversation is a question of arriving at a mutual understanding, then this understanding involves reference to a shared body of rules governing linguistic utterances. In colloquial conversation, the question of "agreeing" to follow these rules ordinarily does not arise; we are born into a linguistic community, and our competence to speak within that community is measured in terms of our ability to use the language properly—our ability to follow the rules governing whatever "language game" we happen to be playing.

If these observations are correct, then Habermas' first two conditions are of questionable relevance in describing the experience of ordinary language. Where, then, has Habermas gone wrong? It seems plausible to suggest that he has conflated two different problems: the problem of accounting for everyday communication, and the problem of establishing ground rules for rational discourse. Now rational

24. On this point, cf. Habermas, "Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence," p. 140.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 144.

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discourse, that is arguments involving propositions, observations and judgments, delimits a rather special realm of speech acts; and *within this context*, Habermas' discussion is not without merit. Indeed, in an argument, it is frequently relevant to ask whether one of the parties submitted out of force, exhaustion, disinterest, or because they were authentically convinced by a better argument; and here, as per Habermas' third point, reference to something like an "ideal speaking situation" may well be relevant.

But does speaking according to previously assimilated and shared rules entail subscribing to norms arrived at discursively? As yet, Habermas has only asserted as much: the connection remains to be demonstrated. His argument for assuming an "ideal speech situation" as a critical tool in assessing the rationality of a discourse, while relatively valid when applied in the appropriate context, is thus insufficient for establishing the notion as an unavoidable concomitant of mastering ordinary language. On the contrary, the notion only seems appropriate to situations where the rationality of an argument (or norms) is in doubt. The "ideal speaking situation," far from being a quasi-regulative telos implicit in every speech act, represents a very special abstraction of potential use for discriminating a true from a forced (and hence false) consensus in a presumptively rational dialogue between parties with conflicting points of view.[26]

One last point. Habermas appends to his description of the "ideal speaking situation" the following maxim, which he thinks valid wherever the ideal is actualized: "Always, when we begin a discourse and carry it on long enough, a consensus would have to result which would be per se a true consensus."[27] As a *profession de foi* this is revealing; as a seriously advanced claim, it is astonishingly naive.

In formulating this maxim, the forcefulness of the fact-value debate seems to have eluded Habermas (and in pointing out this forcefulness, I do not intend to endorse the dichotomy). One reason that Max Weber denied rationality to the choice of values, after all, lay in his belief that no universally recognized criteria could be invoked to mediate disputes between adherents to fundamentally opposed moral positions, such as the Christian believer on the one hand, and the free-thinking skeptic on the other. Similarly, Wittgenstein held that language consisted of incommensurable universes of discourse which could never be systematically reconciled; thus it was inconceivable to

26. Thomas McCarthy, in his marvelously lucid and sympathetic introduction to *Legitimation Crisis*, manages to disengage Habermas' notion of the ideal speech situation from the constitutive framework of ordinary language. For McCarthy, the ideal can serve "as a guide for the institutionalization of discourse or the critique of systematically distorted communication" —as a criterion, in short, for assessing the rationality of a dialogue consisting of propositions, observations and judgments. (*Legitimation Crisis*, p. xvii.) But Habermas intends a stronger statement: that the ideal speech situation *inheres* in ordinary language. Thus Habermas himself writes that "it belongs to the structure of possible communication that we contra-factually operate as if the imputation of an ideal speaking-situation were not simply fictitious, but real. The normative fundament of a linguistic agreement is consequently both: it is anticipated, but as an anticipated basis it is also real. The formal anticipation of idealized discussion (as a form of life to be realized in the future?) guarantees the final supporting, contra-factual consensus which must previously connect the potential speakers-hearers. To that extent the concept of the ideal speaking situation is not simply a regulative principle in Kant's sense; for we must always already factually undertake this imputation with the first act of linguistic agreement. On the other hand the concept of the ideal speaking-situation is also not an existing concept in Hegel's sense; for no historical society is identical with that form of life which we anticipate in the concept of an ideal speaking-situation." It is this proposition which I find unacceptable as well as confused. (See Habermas, "Summation and Response," p. 132.)

27. *Ibid.*, p. 132.

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him that the realm of religious beliefs could ever be accomodated to the realm of mathematical knowledge. They were simply two different worlds, two contradictory forms of life that were nonetheless both "rational" taken on their own terms. Even Plato, that supreme philosopher of dialogue, seems to have felt that an impetuous rhetorician like Thrasymachus or Callicles could only be silenced, not persuaded by reasons; in the Platonic dialogue, proponents of opposing positions often acquiesce rather than assent to Socrates' arguments.

For his part, Habermas, far from seriously grappling with such hard differences, aspires, through the theory of undistorted communication, to the kind of identity theory that Adorno assailed: the concept of ultimate grounds, which a negative dialectics foreswore, reappears in Habermas' relapse into a kind of liberal utopianism, where everybody, by being honest and open with each other, might be enabled to assent to a universal truth, thereby reconciling all disputes and striking a happy medium. Traces of this conciliatory posture characterize, as we have seen, Habermas' own method, in his generous treatment of systems theory, for example, as well as in his rampant eclecticism generally.

Moreover, the suspicion arises that Habermas, confronted with the difficulty of grounding a historical theory, has retreated to transcendental theorems under the guise of anthropological insight. Thus in an intriguing digression in *Legitimation Crisis*, he remarks that "It is my conjecture that the fundamental mechanism [sic] for social evolution in general is to be found in an automatic inability not to learn."[28] Such comments can only recall Horkheimer's own court of last resort in 1937: "The thrust toward a rational society, which admittedly seems to exist today only in the realm of fantasy, is really innate in every man."[29]

It is hard, therefore, to rate Habermas' attempt to ground critical theory a success. Indeed, by turning to philosophical anthropology, Habermas retreats from many of the most arresting positions taken by Horkheimer, and especially by Adorno in *Negative Dialectics*. In particular, the emphasis on "communication" has led Habermas on an extended detour away from questions of historical action and meaning; despite its promising subject matter, *Legitimation Crisis* in no way alters this trend of thought.[30]

Against Habermas, we might do well to reconsider Adorno's principles in *Negative Dialectics*. What the aim of emancipation requires is not transcendental grounding—it finds reason enough in the palpable inequities and injustices perpetrated by contemporary institutions.[31] And who is to say that the aim of emancipation would not be best served by imagining the kinds of alternative institutions and political devices appropriate to a free society? What role a formal and ahistorical emancipatory "interest" might play in elaborating such alternatives remains problematical.

What, after all, does Habermas' ideal look like? "Public, unrestricted discussion, free from domination, of the suitability and desireability of action-orienting principles and norms in the light of the socio-cultural repercussions of developing subsystems of purposive-rational action—such communication at all levels of political and repoliticized decision-making processes is the only medium in which anything like "rationali-

28. Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 15.

29. Horkheimer, *Critical Theory*, p. 251.

30. Göran Therborn's critique is useful on this point; see Therborn, "Jürgen Habermas: A New Eclecticism," *New Left Review*, 67 (May-June, 1974), pp. 69-83.

31. For further discussion of this point, see my "Marxism and the Question of Man: Beyond Philosophical Anthropology." Forthcoming someplace.

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zation' is possible."[32] The good society appears here as a professorial nightmare, a babel of deliberative gobbledygook. Is "steering" a concept appropriate to such a rational society? Would existing techniques merely be integrated within an order soliciting public discussion among the people affected? Habermas himself cautions that "the growth of productive forces is not the same as the intention of the 'good life'."[33] But the problems of devising alternative institutions, of setting limits to growth—problems linked with viewing (and creating) society as an order of men, rather than a complex system to be efficiently "steered," no matter in whose presumptive interest—such problems are rarely mentioned by Habermas.[34] Meanwhile, the concept of freedom has been redefined in terms of communication and control: the good society would facilitate "approximation to a type of behavioral control that would allow role distance and the flexible application of norms."[35]

Habermas' ideal in any case remains insulated from the political and social concerns that might make it practicable. In place of an insistence on historical action, Habermas resorts to taxonomy and epistemology; instead of refounding the critical theory, he has helped to consign it to the panoply of academic disciplines. To his credit, Habermas is forthright about the implications of his theorizing: "The practical consequences of self-reflection are changes in attitude which result from insight into the causalities *in the past*, and indeed result of themselves. In contrast, strategic action oriented toward the future, which is prepared for in the internal discussions of groups, who (as the avant-garde) presuppose for themselves already completed processes of enlightenment, cannot be justified in the same manner by reflective knowledge."[36]

But of course, "strategic action oriented toward the future" is precisely what Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse in their own day set out to justify: a transcending historical practice was, at the outset, critical theory's *raison d'être*. As Horkheimer put it in "traditional and Critical Theory," "Every part of the [critical] theory presupposes the critique of the existing order *and the struggle against it along lines determined by the theory itself*."[37] It is here that Habermas has abandoned the original project of critical theory.

Admittedly, this turn in the theory's development was anticipated by Horkheimer and Adorno themselves. As Adorno confessed in the opening sentence of *Negative Dialectics*, "Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on because the moment to realize it was missed."[38] And if Habermas rejects "decisionism" and "Marxistically embellished orthodoxy," he just as surely endorses "critical attempts to expose the stress limits of advanced capitalism to conspicuous tests," whatever *that* might precisely mean.[39] Still, on this level, the work of Jürgen Habermas appears as little more than a provocative *cul de sac*—and as yet another symptom of the difficulties in formulating a thoroughgoing critique of contemporary society that is actively oriented toward the possibilities for a better form of life without being arbitrary.

James Miller

32. Habermas, *Toward a Rational Society*, pp. 118-119.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 119.
34. Cf. Theodor Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, trans. Jephcott (London, 1974), Section 100, pp. 155-157.
35. Habermas, *Toward a Rational Society*, p. 119.
36. Habermas, *Theory and Practice*, p. 39.
37. Horkheimer, *Critical Theory*, p. 229 (emphasis added).
38. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, p. 3.
39. Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, pp. 142-143.

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John Murray Cuddihy. *The Ordeal of Civility, Freud, Marx, Lévi-Strauss, Jewish Struggle with Modernity*. New York: Basic Books, 1974. 272 pages. $11.95.

Current preoccupation with counter- and sub-cultures was sooner or later bound to encompass the Jew. Perhaps this interest is partly a product of a certain disappointment, for as the revolutionary potential which some saw in the Afro-Americans and Puerto Ricans appeared far from fulfillment, interest in these sub-cultures may have run its course. The earlier hopes were based upon the fact that the blacks and Puerto Ricans have a clearly defined sub-culture which could be directed against the establishment. Because the Jews by and large wanted to assimilate into the dominant gentile society, and succeeded only too well, they seemed to lack interest for those concerned with counter-communities.

The Ordeal of Civility, Freud, Marx, Lévi-Strauss and the Jewish Struggle with Modernity denies these popular assumptions regarding Jewish integration and assimilation. Cuddihy questions the success of Jewish assimilation and argues that in reality the Jew, forever the pariah, is doing his best to undermine gentile society even while embracing it. For Cuddihy, the Jewish sub-culture is alive and well, if hidden from gentile eyes. As he succinctly puts it: "the id of the Yid is hidden under Western decorum" (29). Sammy no longer runs in order to beat the gentiles at their own game, as in the novels of the 1930s and 1940s, but forms a counter-community subversive of Christian and bourgeois values. The Jew is devoted to the truly human values of openness, honesty and community which Christian civilization suppresses in the name of civility and decorum. Cuddihy equates Christian civilization and bourgeois culture, and in his hands the Jew becomes the anti-bourgeois who subverts present society because he is able to keep his ghetto past alive. Thus the tradition of the Jewish ghetto becomes the foil of Christian and bourgeois civility.

Freud, Marx and Lévi-Strauss provide Cuddihy with his Jewish intellectuals who fulfill the counter-culture's mission. As the archetypical Jewish intellectuals, all these men oppose false decorum and base themselves upon their ghetto past. Thus, the analysis of the Jewish ghetto is central to the book, but Cuddihy's ghetto is a sentimentalized world in which honesty and love predominate, and where there are no bourgeois hypocrites to impose false standards of behavior which distort the true community. *Life is With People* by Mark Zborowski and Elizabeth Herzog provides the author's principal source on ghetto culture. That book, however, is a nostalgic romanticization of the *shtetl*, and is silent about the misery, poverty, envy and oppression which dominated its daily life. Typically, Irving Howe is also quoted as an authority on the ghetto Jews—"having love they had no need for politeness" (14). This inane comment is only possible because Howe and the authors of *Life is With People* are so far removed from the Jewish ghetto past that they happily substitute myth for reality.

Those who still lived when Jewish ghettos existed in Europe, were impressed by Emil Franzos' stories depicting the *shtetl* of his native Bucovina and Galicia as "half Asia": neither Europe nor Russia, but a poverty stricken region devoid of beauty. Contrary to Zborowsky and Herzog or Howe, Emil Franzos saw in the *shtetl* belief that only religion brings salvation a denial of love which costs much blood and tears. This picture was also exaggerated, although it corresponded closely to the perception of those who had experienced ghetto life and had fled from it. Jews like Franzos in the 19th century were as close to the Jewish ghetto as contemporary blacks to their own; and one does not

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encounter any romanticization of the ghettos of Detroit, Cleveland or Watts by those who experienced them as a living reality.

Glorification of the Jewish ghettos became a fact only after the Second World War when they no longer existed and their people had been wiped out. As long as one could visit the Jewish ghettos at Minsk, Czernowitz, or for that matter Whitechapel and the New York East Side, it seemed no fun at all to live there. Contrary to what he believes, Mr. Cuddihy's view of the ghetto is completely assimilated to the Christian world; annexed to a European romanticism which was not a part of the ghetto tradition of Jewish orthodoxy.

It becomes apparent that Mr. Cuddihy is unconcerned with history, but instead with building models which float outside time. His hero seems to be Max Weber, whom he rather perversely cites as an authority on Jewish religion and as the synthesizer of that Protestant ethic and civility which confronts *Yiddishkeit*. Analysis of the thought of Freud or Marx is supported by references to Norman Podhoretz or Theodore Reik. The reader is taken on a dizzying tour of Weberian ideal-type figures, all of whom substituted Jewish coarseness for gentile civility. All of them, Cuddihy argues, also sought to opt out of bourgeois assimilation in order to become Jewish pariahs. Thus, Freud is said to have made improper social behavior (i.e., Jewish coarseness) psychologically normal, and Marx, for his part, made vulgar Jewish economic acquisitiveness the foundation of the supposedly proper Christian and bourgeois society. Lévi-Strauss, in turn, uses the primitive savage in order to lay low the pretensions of the gentile world. Always the ghetto tradition as Cuddihy defines it helps these Jews to break through the barriers of existing society.

Despite his dubious method and unhistorical analysis, several interesting truths do exist underneath all the perversity. No less a figure than August Bebel, himself of working-class origins, in 1894 characterized Jews as pushy and tactless. Bebel equated Jewish tactlessness with Jewish intellectuality, and here Mr. Cuddihy might have found a clue for his thesis which should have led him to scrap his own flawed models. Jewish intellectuality seemed coarse and uncivil because it was a way of completing the process of assimilation. Taking ideas of equality and liberation seriously would, in fact, emancipate the Jew and thus at the turn of the century young left-wing Jews were apt to reject compromise and tactics which might erode the force of those ideas. Looking at the subsequent history of socialism, they were right in clinging to idealism against the leadership. Moreover, the Jew was bound to be competitive, for in all fields he had to make way on his own against stiff opposition. Since it was not easy for a Jew to be heard, at times he had to yell louder than the others. Contary to the thesis of this book, such coarseness was an effort at integration, and the intellectuality such Jews championed had no *shtetl* background. Mr. Cuddihy's Jewish pariahs no longer knew the ghetto and its culture: Freud, Marx and Lévi-Strauss were, on the contarry, reared in the ideals of the Enlightenment which played such a crucial role in liquidating the ghetto. All these men were devoted to a universalism which would give them their place in the sun through overcoming the Jewish past. Thus Jewish intellectual pushiness was a paradoxical effort at self-transcendence.

This was not confined solely to socialists whom Bebel castigated, for Zionists also were in flight from the ghetto towards a nationalism shared with all other Europeans. Whether Bebel's intellectuals or the Zionist Max Nordau's "muscle Jews," all aspired to live as part of gentile society and bourgeois culture. Yet, for all this, even the intellectuals retained a Jewish consciousness which survived efforts at transcendence. This consciousness was partly related to the ordeal of status seeking, exemplified by

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Freud's Jewish jokes, or through bitter irony about a stereotype which would not vanish, such as Marx's anti-Semitic remarks, meant for insiders only. In the end, this self-consciousness became a pride in Jewish intellectuality, opposed to the gentiles, and many a Jewish intellectual believed that Jew and intellectual were synonymous.

To be sure, the propagation of ideals based not on the ghetto but on Kant, Hegel and Marx tended at certain times, especially during the Weimar Republic, to become a Jewish monopoly. Jewishness for such intellectuals was never meant to entail coarseness versus civility, but instead the belief in a body of thought which stressed universalism, freedom and equality while at the same time claiming a proprietory interest in such ideas as a Jew. The drive for emancipation produced not a regression into the past but a new and heightened Jewish consciousness based upon essentially gentile, idealistic foundations. The Jews did undermine gentile society even while embracing it, but contrary to what Mr. Cuddihy believes, they used the tradition of European idealism and universalism to do so. Indeed, the relationship between Jewishness and assimilation is governed by a dialectic which is ignored in this book in favor of a static analysis.

Moreover, the coarseness which makes up the supposed Jewish sub-culture is not unique but indistinguishable from the revolt against bourgeois conventions which continued from the last decades of the 19th century into our own. Mr. Cuddihy can only posit the uniqueness of the Jewish pariah by ignoring the onslaught upon accepted civility which was led by both gentile and Jew. Neither Wedekind nor Jarry, for example, were Jews, yet their attack upon Christian and bourgeois values were as influential as any Cuddihy cites. If the chapter on Freud makes the most convincing reading of the book, it is not because of anything specifically Jewish, but because Freud was a part of *fin de siècle* Vienna. The historical dimension is only ignored at some peril, and ideal-types are no valid substitute.

For Mr. Cuddihy, the Yippy with his sub-culture presents the climax of the Jewish attack upon the modern world. Abbie Hoffman, the unassimilated east-European Jew, is contrasted to Judge Julius Hoffman, who passes among the gentiles. The pages which the book devotes to that confrontation are perhaps among the most interesting. Yet, Abbie Hoffman stands in no ghetto tradition, but is part of the continuing revolt against middle-class mores and conventions. He is an assimilated Jew standing in one general historical tradition, while Julius Hoffman is another assimilated Jew defending another set of values which derive from the common Jewish and gentile past. Assimilation is beside the point here as it is in the rest of the book: all the Jews described are assimilated and it only depends upon what European traditions they embraced, even if, as stated earlier, they at times claimed a monopoly over one of them.

It is necessary to tell Mr. Cuddihy that Jews have no secret writing, as he seems to believe. They do not have to be turned into a myth and the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* do not have to be stood upon their head. Diaspora creativity is not due to a Jewish *pays réel* which must be read, as the book tells us, between the lines of the *pays légale*. Here the Jews become more Europe's inner demons (to use Norman Cohn's description of 16th-century witches). This unhistorical book itself stands in a historical tradition of analyzing the phenomenon of the Jew as an abstract principle; good or bad, but never indifferent. Such truth about the Jewish experience which this book contains is dissolved in the attempt to fathom the "secrets of the Jews." What a pity that they have none.

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Jacques Rancière. *La Leçon d'Althusser.* Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1974.

Jacques Rancière made his theoretical debut when, under the Althusserian umbrella, he published a long essay in the 1965 edition of *Lire le Capital.* This essay was later omitted from the 1969 edition.[1] Why? It has been suggested that Rancière's contribution was particularly vulnerable to a critique written by André Glucksmann.[2] As such its omission was part of a "premeditated partial withdrawal, in order to narrow tactical flanks."[3] This is true, there was a tactical retreat. However, André Glucksmann was not the only person who criticized *Lire le Capital.* There was the leadership of the French Communist Party who viewed Althusser's heterodoxy with increasing alarm. And there was Althusser himself, who, under party pressure, produced a self-criticism, referring to his structuralist texts as "theoreticist" deviations. And then there was Jacques Rancière. The latter claims that his excommunication was voluntary; that it was propelled by the events of May 1968. In 1969 he published an essay[4] that "attacked Althusser's theory of science with some violence."[5] In *La Leçon d'Althusser* Rancière continues his offensive.

Included among the book's strengths is its ability to define the specificity of Althusser as a political phenomenon. Althusser is considered by Rancière as being neither a Stalinist, a revisionist, a social-democrat, nor a Maoist. He is not assimilated into the forms of the past but is conceptualized within the *positivity* of the present. How is his theory shaped by its historical context? And how, in turn, does it attempt to influence this theory? And how is it perceived, used and denied by Althusser's contemporaries? In short, this book is part biographical sociology of knowledge, and part autobiography: the reasons behind Jacques Rancière's original attraction to Althusser and the "left Althusserians," his own *"Coupure épistemologique et politique,"* and his continued opposition. And it is also a contemporary history of the French left—a history that revolves around one central question: what is the present reality and meaning of Marxism?

This theoretical approach to the problems of Althusser is, in part, defined by Althusser's approach to the problem of theory. For if Althusser elevates theory to the realm of pure "science" uncontaminated by the "ideological" currents flowing through society at large, Rancière turns Althusser on his head. He demonstrates that Althusser's "science" is an expression of that very same socio-political reality that he seeks to deny. It is in the tension implied by this reversal that Rancière's critique discovers its mark. And yet the reversal remains a mere reversal: Althusser's strengths become Rancière's weaknesses.

Among Rancière's weaknesses is his inability to define the specificity of Althusser as a *theoretical* phenomenon. Rancière is aware that Althusser's structuralism has left its imprint on a number of texts whose political significance is opposite to that of

1. The English translation, *Reading Capital* (London: New Left Books, 1970), is based on the 1969 edition.

2. André Glucksmann's critique was first printed in the May 1967 issue of *Les Temps Modernes.* It was reprinted in English under the title "A Ventriloquist Structuralism," *New Left Review,* 72 (March-April 1972).

3. "Introduction to Glucksmann," *New Left Review,* 72 (March-April 1972), p. 66.

4. This essay appeared in Saul Karsz, ed., *Lecturas de Althusser* (Buenos Aires, 1969). It was later reprinted in French, under the title "Sur la Théorie de l'Idéologie" in *L'Homme et la Société,* 27 (January-March 1973) and can also be found appended to *La Leçon d'Althusser* as "Pour Mémoire."

5. "Introduction to Glucksmann," *op.cit.,* p. 66.

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Althusser. He recognizes that Jean-François Lyotard, for example, is "another one of those abolishing the subject." But why should the Althusserian problematic overlap with that of Lyotard? Because they are both university intellectuals intent on preserving their mandarin status? Rancière tries, but his explantion falls short.

This, however, is only an expression of a larger problem. For if Rancière cannot define the specificity of theory, neither can he ascribe to theory its own "relative autonomy," i.e., its own positivity. For example, in the appendix to the third chapter, after mocking Althusser's clumsy periodization of Marx's writings, Rancière suggests that Marx did indeed employ different conceptualizations during different periods of his life. But what is the significance of these theoretical shifts? Rancière tells us that they have no significance, or more precisely, that their significance is purely empirical. They are merely diverse expressions, elaborated according to diverse circumstances, of a single impulse deriving from the aspirations embedded within the proletariat. What we have here is the crude economistic conception of base-superstructure reproduced at the level of theory-practice. Theory has become a mere reflection of practice. And because theory no longer mediates practice, but merely reflects it, theory becomes rootless—or more precisely it becomes rooted in faith. In the case of a non-authoritarian "neo-Maoist" like Rancière, this resolves into what might be termed a faith in the "democratic instincts of the masses." The justification of theory is based in the activity of the masses; the activity of the masses needs no justification. Activity, however, is not practice unless it aspires to its own self-consciousness.

In spite of the limitations expressed above, the book remains invaluable. It illuminates a dimension of Althusser that is systematically hidden by the latter's posturing. To read Althusser's silences we must read Rancière.

Althusser's original theoretical efforts emerged during the period after the XXth Congress. This was a time when the official Marxism of the Third International was in deep crisis, straining under the dual impact of Stalin's ghost and an emergent liberal eclecticism. Althusser's attitude towards this latter tendency is well known. Against the disintegrative effects implied by the liberal and "modernist" tendencies, he appealed to the rigor of a reconstituted orthodoxy. That this political project served an apologetic function useful to the Communist Party is obvious. What is less obvious and what is perhaps more significant is his relation to Stalinism, or more precisely, to that form of Stalinism endured by intellectuals: Zhdanovism. The historical irrationality contained in the slogan "Proletarian Science" haunts its discourse. "Once proclaimed, it dominated everything. Under its imperative line, what then counted as philosophy could only choose between commentary and silence, between conviction whether inspired or forced, and dumb embarrassment."[6] Zhdanovism became paradigmatic. It is the original bad totality of leftism: a totality that absorbs Marx's philosophy into historical materialism, that subordinates theory to history and science to the manoeuvers of the Cold War. "All the theoretical scaffolding of Althusser, the entire system of differences that he puts to work, is rooted here: the distinction between instances, the time specific to each instance, the disjunction between science and ideology, and the epistemological break that throws all the themes of leftist subjectivism into the personal prehistory of Marx" (65). Althusser is obsessed. He uncovers the bad totality of Zhdanovism in its multiple avatars: in Lukács, Bogdanov, Gramsci, Kautsky and the student movement. Historicism, voluntarism, economism, humanism, all these tendencies are reduced to a single and unique model. And if this

6. Louis Althusser, *For Marx* (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), p. 22.

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model has two sides (right deviations and left deviations), it is because Althusser is charting a path between the Scylla of Stalin and the Charybdis of Garaudy.

Althusser's conceptualization of Zhdanovism suggests the direction of this third way. He reduces Zhdanovism to a theoretical deviation. And what lies behind this deviation? Nothing: "The absence of any real *theoretical* culture in the history of the French workers' movement."[7] A lack of science. An emptiness filled by ideology. Althusser refuses to analyze the social processes underlying this theoretical phenomenon. He denies history. One can even say that he is fleeing the history of his own recent past; and it is in this flight, in the detours that it implies, that the political significance of his writings emerge.

This flight involves above all a detour into theory. This implies the attempt to recover the specificity and rationality of Marxist theory *via* the return to Marx. However, this should be understood as an attempt to recover not only the content of Marxist theory, but also its place. Althusser formally baptizes this place a "theoretical practice"—a practice to be distinguished from other practices. This is more than a merely verbal manoeuver. Althusser is attempting to give theory a realm of its own, sheltered from the vicissitudes of party politics. And he has been fairly successful on this score. Communist intellectuals are no longer mocked for their narrow and dogmatic politicization of the various disciplines. Under the influence of Althusser they have gained an unheard of respectability. As a result, "university Marxism" has undergone a sort of renaissance, not only in the areas of traditional to Marxist thought, but also, *via* structuralism, in such exotic disciplines as anthropology, psychology and linguistics.

The distinction between practices is also marked by the distinction between science and ideology. Ideology is considered as the objective correlative of structures. Science is independent of structures and thus of ideology. It follows that only the scientist is capable of puncturing the web of illusions that imprison the structures' "agents." Not only is theory given a place, its place is privileged (and philosophy is doubly privileged being the "science of sciences"). As for the theorist, he is transformed into a type of hero: the solitary explorer, who, guided by careful research a a correct epistemology, discovers new continents of knowledge.

It would be wrong, however, to think that Althusser's flight into theory would remain in theory. For the search for a Marxist theory suggested a search for a theory of Marxist politics. And this latter search involved another flight and another detour: a flight from the opportunism, dogmatism and provincialism of French political life in the early sixties, and a detour into the heroic figures of a mythical past—the Lenin of 1917 and Mao of 1937. Althusser hoped that through this detour the "delirious" politics of the CPF during the Zhdanov era would be replaced by an enlightened politics informed by theory. It was a long-term project—one that in practice could be indefinitely postponed; and it was Althusser himself who provided the "decaying mechanism." For, according to Althusser, the time of theory lagged behind that of politics. Yet, while one could hesitate in one's theoretical judgments, one could not remain irresolute before political necessities. One had to act. The policies of the party had to be supported, even if they could not be theoretically justified. In the end, politics returned to the politicians and theory to the theoreticians.

All this suggests Althusser's potential utility to the CPF. He promised to reconstruct the Marxist façade imperilled by Garaudy. He warned against premature

7. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

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formulations on the left. In short, he provided the means by which the machine-guns of a receding era could be replaced with a set of guard-rails more appropriate to the phase of "peaceful coexistence." The party, however, was suspicious. There was traditionally no independent role for intellectuals to play within the party. After all, an independent role suggested an appeal to an independent authority. In December of 1963 Althusser was brought before the Directive Committee of *La Pensée*. Why, they asked, did he constantly refer to the Maoist theory of contradictions? Was he trying to justify Mao's attacks on the Soviet Union?[8] The *rapprochement* with the Communist Party would come later, and only after Althusser had produced a self-criticism. But this episode belongs to a new drama that was only beginning to emerge in the universities.

The student movement, due to its participation in the Algerian struggles, had achieved sufficient autonomy to press for demands specific to the needs of students *qua* students. These demands would revolve around the problem of knowledge—not the traditional problem of the contents of knowledge, but of its form: i.e., the modes of its acquisition and transmission, its role in the reproduction of power, the relation of the student and professor to each other and to society at large, and so on. These demands suggested a dual split within the intellectual community, not only between Marxists and non-Marxists, but also among Marxists and between students and professors. Althusser soon realized what was at stake. He perceived in the student movement an assault on that theoretical realm he had so assiduously cultivated. It was the bad totality of leftism in a new disguise: the subordination of theory to politics; the aggression of the illiterates against the *savants*. He replied by attempting to shift the "problematic"; by displacing the struggle over the forms of knowledge back to its content. The real struggle, he argued, was between science (proletarian) and ideology (bourgeois).[9] This blind and dogmatic argument would weigh heavily on the course of the future. It would provide the line of defense for the CPF's university policy; and it would reflect and reproduce a schism among those to the left of the CPF—between the discourse of the "petty-bourgeois," non-authoritarian left and that of the authoritarian guardians of "Marxist" theory and "proletarian" politics.

Althusser's future development, however, would be affected, not only by the student struggles in general, but by a rather specific struggle emerging between the CPF and Althusser's own students (the so-called *Cercle d'Ulm*).[10] At the time the student organization of the CPF—the *Union des Etudiants Communistes* (UEC)—was, much to the chagrin of the party hierarchy, not under its strict control, being dominated instead by certain "Italinist" tendencies. The "Italinists" were also opposed by *le Cercle d'Ulm,* who, arguing from a strictly Althusserian perspective, opposed Marxist rigor to revisionist eclecticism. The problem emerged when the party hierarchy regained control over the UEC; when the junior Althusserians were no longer in opposition. In these changed circumstances, *le Cercle d'Ulm* had one of two choices. It could either provide the theoretical *point d'honeur* for a neo-Stalinist normalization, or it could simply break with the politics of the party. Both cases implied a departure

8. Althusser's response was typical, if, perhaps, not honest. He drew a sharp distinction between Mao's theory and his politics, claiming that the former was genuinely Marxist, while the latter was purely empirical.

9. Althusser's thoughts on the student movement can be found in "Problèmes Etudiants," *La Nouvelle Critique* (January 1964).

10. Le Cercle d'Ulm was centered in the Ecole Normale Superieure (on Rue d'Ulm), a highly selective school for the training of university professors.

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from a strictly Althusserian framework: the first case involved an abdication of theoretical autonomy; and the second case suggested a break with the customary Althusserian prudence inscribed in the disjunction between theory and politics. Althusserian theory, however, suggested its own mode of self-destruction. It had taught that "science" was not dependent on any social instant or its organizational representative. It was not necessary that the party mediated one's relation to Marx. Althusserianism had provided the means to escape from the vicious circle of "petty-bourgeois" guilt by which intellectuals had traditionally been subordinated to the party. Under the impact of the Chinese Cultural Revolution and the Sino-Soviet dispute, *le Cercle d'Ulm* broke with the CPF and formed the leading cadre of the *Union des Jeunes Communistes Marxistes-Leninistes* (UJCML). The formation of the UJCML represented a partial break with Althusser. Althusser's infinite and clandestine ideological struggle within the party was replaced by an immediate and overt struggle against the party. And yet *le Cercle d'Ulm's* rupture was not complete. It retained Althusser's conception of the *savant* and his "science;" and as such adopted a politics not dissimilar to that of Althusser and the CPF *vis-à-vis* the emergent student revolts that culminated in May 1968. The student demands were misdirected, reflecting "petty-bourgeois" ideology. Students had to be educated in the norms of "proletarian science." Behind such revolutionary posturing lurked an authoritarian paternalism, and the latter, via a similar mechanism, was reproduced in the UJCML's internal organization. For the UJCML the problem of organization was a problem of its content, i.e., of its class ideology. The form of an organization was neutral; it had no positivity of its own; it was merely an instrument for the application of the party line. The UJCML soon degenerated into another authoritarian and ultra-left sect.

And Althusser? He had been exposed by the UJCML. Had the party not complained that he had neglected the writings of, say, Maurice Thorez in his pantheon of "texts"? Had it not suspected him of confiscating theory for the profit of philosophers? And now it was obvious where his efforts led. Althusser's students had already encountered the limits of Althusserianism, and as a result of their choice, Althusser himself would have to face the very same dilemma. He would have either to follow his students and dissociate himself from the party or to dissociate himself from his students and submit to the party. There is evidence that he did not dismiss the former possibility totally out of hand; his analysis of the Chinese Cultural Revolution was similar to that of the UJCML.[11] Rancière suggests that Althusser would have left the party if the Chinese offensive had had a greater impact on the Communist parties of the west (a failure Rancière attributes to the ambiguous relation of Maoist thought to Stalin). Whatever the case may be, Althusser judged the moment inopportune. He had heard the party's criticisms at Argenteuil, and now he produced his own self-criticism. His "theoreticist" writings, he announced, had wanted to place philosophy outside the control of politics. From now on philosophy would enter into the service of politics; it would "take sides" (*prise de parti*). "Black humor. This *prise de parti* was one of the more important slogans of the Zhdanov era against which Althusser had elaborated his whole enterprise" (110). The circle was complete. His "post-theoreticist" writings would suffer.[12]

11. "Sur la Révolution culturelle," *Cahiers marxistes-léninistes*, no. 13-14. It should be noted that this article, although written by Althusser, does not bear his name. Nor does it draw any conclusions concerning the nature of Soviet society.

12. A brief summary of Althusser's self criticism can be found in the "Foreword to the Italian Edition" of *Reading Capital, op.cit.*, and "To my English Readers," in *For Marx, op.cit.* A more

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Philosophy must "take sides." But against what? And in defense of what? Althusser replies: in defense of the spontaneous belief of the scientist in the reality of his object.[13] A bizarre answer. It would appear that Althusser has introduced "politics" into theory only to expunge theory of its political implications; as if he desired to reconstruct the shattered dreams of his old political project; as if to recover a more secure realm for theory, sheltered from such political accidents as the formation of the UJCML. Look closely at his argument. The scientist, Althusser argues, given the nature of his production, has a spontaneous tendency to think in materialist terms. However, he lives in a bourgeois society and is thus subject to the corrupting influence of bourgeois idealism. Against this influence he is powerless; the idealist element always predominates over the materialist element; thus the need for the philosopher to protect the scientist's best instincts. The argument has an aspect of *déjà vu*. There is the belief that the producers are incapable of thinking their own production. There is the attempt to delimit and justify the place of philosophy. And there is a shifting of the problematic to safer terrain; at a time when scientists are questioning science's social functions, its image, its institutional organization, Althusser is meditating on the grave threats posed by idealist intrusions.

It would, however, be a mistake to think that this reproduction of old themes involves merely their repetition. In his "theoreticist" writings Althusser retreated into theory; but it was a tactical retreat that indicated an eventual return to politics. Now he openly proclaims the necessity of politics only in order to seek refuge in the safety of theory. His "theoreticist" phase involved a conscious intervention into a specific conjuncture, and as such it implied political motivations and political consequences. His "post-theoreticist" writings, on the other hand, eschew the complexities of real political stakes for the disembodied realm of a mechanical and atemporal struggle of materialism vs. idealism. Althusser says that he is defending science against its exploiters; however, he is referring not to the influence of Zhdanovism on Lyssenko, but to the influence of religion on Teilhard de Chardin.

The situation partakes of the comical, but it is not innocent. Look once more at the elements that structure his argument. "An irresistible wind from the exterior that produces this struggle; residual elements (words) that allow it to penetrate the paradise of a society without classes; the impotence of the victims of this aggression to defend themselves; the necessity of a force to help them repel this aggression: a story similar to that of a Soviet paradise without classes that requires a system of police and informers in order that the residues of a clique of Hitlero-Trotskyist saboteurs do not deliver its defenseless citizens to the bad wind of a neighboring imperialism" (129). Formerly, Althusser's philosophy had demarcated a realm of "science" in order that the latter could be protected from politics. Now philosophy takes science under its wing in order that it can be made more submissive to politics. The Althusserian enterprise has found its place as a censor of words and a police of concepts.

The above suggests the normalization of the Althusserian project. And yet Althusser

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extended treatment of this topic can be found in *Eléments d'autocritique* (Paris: Hachette littérature, 1974), a book which has only recently appeared and is thus not dealt with by Rancière. The other major writings of Althusser's "post-theoreticist" stage include *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays* (London: New Left Books, 1971), *Réponse à John Lewis* (Paris: Maspero, 1973), and *Philosophie et philosophie spontanée des savants* (Paris: Maspero, 1974)—an altered version of a text that was circulated in 1967 under the title of *Cours de philosophie pour les scientifiques*.

13. This paragraph is based on *Cours de philosophie pour les scientifiques*.

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still maintains a certain distance *vis-à-vis* the official line of the CPF. This can be demonstrated by an analysis of his response to the May events. This response had two faces. When addressing the outside world, Althusser, by and large, reproduced the analysis of Georges Marchais.[14] When, however, Althusser's analysis was meant for the internal consumption of the Communist party, his stance was much more critical.[15] In order to understand what was at stake, it should be remembered that during this period the Communist Party was attempting to restore order in the universities. And it was using Althusser's earlier writings to convince the students that their revolt was merely an expression of their petty-bourgeois background. No doubt, Althusser felt that he was being placed in a personally compromising position; but he also realized that the CPF was in a similar position—despite the fact that he supported its policy. He understood that it was dangerous for the party to become a prisoner of a simple philosophy of order. At a time when frightened mandarins and careerist intellectuals were flocking to the party as the last defense of their privileges, the party could not afford to alienate the left. Thus Althusser's seemingly autonomous and critical stance. However, once again familiar stances reveal new meanings. While during his "theoreticist" period, his apparent orthodoxy concealed a certain heterodoxy, in his more recent writings, his apparent heterodoxy reveals an underlying orthodoxy. He may still have been trying to move the party to the left, but it was only in order to move the left into the party.

At the same time that Althusser was commenting on the May events, he produced a much more abstract and theoretical piece entitled "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus (Notes Towards an Investigation)."[16] The interesting thing about this essay is that it considers ideology as being neither the absence of science nor the objective correlative of structures—i.e., an abstract and spontaneous reflection of material conditions. Instead ideology is perceived as being in itself a system of material powers which are rooted in and reproduced by the various practices inscribed in diverse institutional apparatuses. In short, this essay has introduced for the first (and last) time what was earlier referred to as the problematic of the form. One can assume that it was not easy for Althusser to investigate a problematic that his earlier writings had so assiduously ignored—particularly when this problematic was directed toward an analysis of the educational system. "In this concert, one ideological State apparatus certainly has the dominant role, although hardly anyone lends an ear to its music: it is so silent! This is the school."[17] It should be remembered that this statement was written only shortly after the May events. What Althusser perceived as a silence was in actuality a thunderous roar which only the most deaf and stubborn could fail to hear. Why did Althusser resort to such a patently absurd manoeuver? Why did he attempt to deny those events which had so obviously induced his theoretical reflection? One senses another and more desperate attempt to deny history; a denial that proceeds through the recovery of older and more familiar themes. One recalls the figure of the theorist as hero and its obverse; the belief that everyone else passively submits to a world of illusions inscribed in their functions as agents. These themes, however, are provided with a new context; a context that suggests the omniscience and omnipotence of the ideological apparatus. This essay presents a picture of domination so total that it

14. Cf. Maria Antonietta Macciocchi, *Letters from Inside the Italian Communist Party to Louis Althusser* (London: New Left Books, 1973), pp. 301-320.
15. Cf. "A propos de l'article de Michel Verret sur Mai étudiant," *La Pensée* (June 1969).
16. In *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, op.cit.*, pp. 121-176.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 146.

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excludes a concept of the dominated, for the latter can only be thought in its opposition without which there can be no relation of power to individuals. In orthodox terms, Althusser has omitted classes and the class struggle (despite certain rhetorical indications to the contrary) and as such he is incapable of providing concepts that could guide and transcend this struggle. Althusser has understood the lessons of May. He has even incorporated them into his theory, but only in order to anaesthetize their political implications.

In the most recent work reviewed by Rancière, *Réponse à John Lewis*, Althusser returns to the safer and more familiar territory explored in *Cours de philosophie pour les scientifiques*. While ostensibly replying to the common-sensical critique of John Lewis, Althusser uses the occasion to resume his struggle against idealism, or more particularly, humanism and its concept of "man." Rancière immediately asks what the relation is between the "man" against which Althusser struggles and the "man" to which the LIP workers appeal (the LIP struggle being contemporaneous with the writing of *Réponse*). At first glance, Althusser denies that there is any relation. The "man" he is considering is a theoretical concept; that of the LIP workers represents mere cries of indignation and-or anger. However, if one draws such a separation between "man" in theory and "man" in practice, then the problem of "man" becomes meaningless except in the restricted setting of the seminar room. It is doubtful that this is what Althusser has in mind. He had earlier stated that "in political, ideological and philosophical struggle, the words are also weapons, explosives, tranquilizers, and poisons. Occasionally, the whole class struggle may be summed up in the struggle for one word against another word."[18] This statement suggests that philosophy is unwilling to renounce its political pretensions. As such, it must consider humanism as having a practical and political relevance; that is, it must explain why "man" is on the side of the bourgeois. In his *Réponse* Althusser attempts to do just that. He argues that humanism is based on a juridical ideology (the rights of man, the concept of liberty, the subject of law, etc.) which both sanctions and obscures the reality of market relations. The proletariat, in order to perceive the reality of the market and the class struggle, must therefore be liberated from any demands for "human dignity." This argument presupposes that the "man" of which the proletariat speaks is the very same "man" of which the bourgeois speaks. It presumes, for example, that when the proletarian speaks of liberty, he is referring to the freedom to sell his labor power; and that when he speaks of equality, he is defending the impersonal discrimination of the market. Posed in these terms, Althusser's argument is, to say the least, inaccurate. However, it is not the only inaccuracy in which he indulges. One can push the critique further. Is it true, for example, that bourgeois ideology is rooted in the notion that "man is the subject of history"? Does bourgeois ideology not have a more paternalist conception of man? Does it not teach that man can be changed by education and by the manipulation of circumstances, while forgetting that "circumstances are changed by men and that the educator himself must be educated"? Does this doctrine not divide "society into two parts, one of which is superior to society"? Is the materialism to which Althusser appeals not the very same materialism denounced by Marx in his "Theses on Feuerbach"?

In his *Réponse à John Lewis*, Althusser discards the concept of ideology he had begun to explore in his essay on the state ideological apparatuses. There is no longer any attempt to conceptualize ideology as being a system of material powers rooted in

18. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

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and reproduced by the everyday practices inscribed in various institutional apparatuses. This is not to say that Althusser denies the "rootedness" of ideology in those practices usually referred to as the "base." On the contrary, the weight of the "base" remains overwhelmingly determinant in the sense that ideology is perceived as a passive representation of this deeper social reality. The point is, however, that Althusser's conception of ideology does not partake of this social reality, but remains superimposed upon it—and in the most abstract way. There is no attempt to think ideology as actively mediating the experience of the individual to his societal existence. Thus Althusser's conception is "overdeterminate," i.e., it allows the discourse of the "proletariat" to be identified with that of the bourgeois domination, while being simultaneously indeterminate, i.e., ideologies live in a phantasmagoric life of their own as suggested by his use of the terms humanism, economism, etc. Moreover, the efficacy of ideologies such as humanism and economism are based not on the practical and discursive effects of that deeper social reality they supposedly reflect, but on the nature of ideology itself. The power of words is, for Althusser, based on a simple subversion of vision; and the overcoming of ideology is based on the simple replacement, with the aid of science, of a false vision with a true one. As paradoxical as it may sound, in the Althusserian scheme, the realm of ideology is dependent on the "base" for its existence, but is independent of the "base" for its transcendence. There is simply no concrete attempt to link the overcoming of ideology with the transformation of the individual's societal existence. Instead, Althusser prefers to divide words into two different camps: those that belong to the false vision and those that belong to the true one. And given the derivation of the false vision in social practice, the separation ideology-science coincides with that of practical-theoretical. There is an interesting mechanism of self-censorship at work here, the logic of which proceeds something like this: the LIP workers have no choice in the words they use, but we, the guardians of theory, have a choice and should therefore not import their vocabulary—even if we sympathize with their struggle.

Althusser's *Réponse* also includes a discussion and critique of Stalinism which in some circles has been greeted as a bold and innovative departure. The core of this critique concerns the development at all costs of the productive forces at the expense of the relations of production. This is not a new idea. It is derived from certain Maoist notions developed by Bettelheim, Macciocchi, and Karol among others. What is new is Althusser's attempt to appropriate the patrimony of a certain sector of the left into the Communist Party orthodoxy. This manoeuver is sustained via the recovery of certain themes intrinsic to the Althusserian discourse. The result is a theoretical and political impoverishment of the original patrimony.

Althusser begins by transforming Stalinism into the manifestation of a single and familiar deviation, that of economism. There is a rather peculiar operation at work here. It consists of reducing historical phenomena to the tidy abbreviation of a conceptual abstraction and incarnating conceptual abstractions into the empirical existence of real individuals. Althusser tells us that economism is a bourgeois ideology that infiltrated the Second International and that the Second International underwent a posthumous return in the form of Stalinism. Althusser poses history as discontinuous only to introduce rather strange continuities. His Marxism pretends to speak of real events and processes when in actual fact it refers only to the history of speculative phantoms. Lurking behind these bizarre contrivances is a hypostatized conception of *the* working class movement considered as an essential unity whose historical moments are referred to a single trajectory. It is this conception that allows Althusser to pose

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"the theory of the working class movement" as having a unitary essence that distributes theoretical representations into either norms or deviations. Marxism, however, does not tell us what it should produce. There can be no split between an orthodox Marxism and its deviations. There are only different modes of appropriating Marxism according to different circumstances and different ends. But Althusser believes otherwise. He continues to denounce the economist deviation, which, as we all know, is the inverse of the humanist deviation. Althusser has opted for his habitual role as the materialist philosopher repudiating his eternal adversaries.

The original "neo-Maoist" critique of Stalinism (and the critique was not limited to Stalinism) had as its target certain features of the industrial system; the rigidity of the division of labor and its corresponding hierarchies, the system of material incentives, the over-centralization of the planning apparatus, etc. And it had understood that these features had practical and repressive effects, e.g., the imposition of an individualistic and competitive mold on the worker, the mutilation of his intelligence, the dispossession of his initiative, etc. The target of the Althusserian critique, however, is rather different It is aimed at an ideological discourse considered as an obstacle to the acquisition of a correct vision of the world. These differences between the Althusserian and the "neo-Maoist" critique are not fortuitous. To put it bluntly, the former critique simply avoids the central issue of the latter critique; i.e., the absence of power at the level of the productive apparatus. For Althusser it is a matter of combatting words, not power. The struggle over the conditions of our everyday existence is to be replaced by a struggle against the phantoms of humanism and economism. Is it any wonder that the Althusserian discourse appears to be both esoteric and paranoid?

The early "Althusser had a grand ambition: to think Marx in his history in order that we could fashion Marxism into ours; to recover, against the guardians of the doctrine, this *singularity* that could make of Marxism something other than a discourse of justification..." (205). At present the Althusserian enterprise is a caricature of its former self. It had always been marked by a certain ambiguity *vis-à-vis* "the guardians of the doctrine." Now, however, it has taken its place among these guardians with its new and more subtle brand of orthodoxy.

Brian Singer

Régis Debray. *La Critique des Armes I.* Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1974. 320 pages.

Régis Debray. *Les Epreuves du Feu* (*La Critique des Armes II*). Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1974. 380 pages.

Régis Debray. *Prison Writings.* Translated by Rosemary Sheed. London: Allen Lane, 1973. 207 pages.

In *La Critique des Armes* Debray sifts through the political wreckage left in the wake of the defeat of the Latin American guerrilla movements of the 1960s. The importance of this task should not be belittled or ignored: after all, what is at stake is nothing less than the fate of the peoples of an entire continent dominated by imperialism. But is Régis Debray the Marxist best suited to undertake this project? His famous book, *Revolution in the Revolution?* (1967), is now universally recognized to

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have been, even by its author, an unmitigated disaster. Debray abstracted the concrete experiences of the Cuban Revolution into a theory of guerrilla warfare, abstracted it again, and projected it onto the continent as a whole. It became a manual of defeat. For the U.S. New Left its theory of the revolutionary foco became a justification for political isolation and adventurism. (Debray devotes a chapter in *La Critique des Armes I* to explaining the political conjuncture which gave birth to *Revolution in the Revolution?*)

Anyone who was in SDS is well aware of the romantic mythology which surrounded the guerrillas who were fighting in Guatemala, Venezuela and Colombia. The Tupamaros of Uruguay became legendary super-heroes before their destruction in 1972.[1] In *Les Epreuves du Feu* Debray undertakes a lengthy re-examination of the movements in Venezuela, Guatemala and Uruguay. These are sober pages which destroy all the myths. Many of the romantic qualities which gave rise to the legends of the New Left individualism (Venezuela), audacity (Uruguay), military élan (Guatemala)—were actually elements of political weakness. It is unfortunate that many of the activists who identified with these movements will probably never read this work.[2] But as Debray remarks, the spontaneous enthusiasm which appears in the first days of battle is short-lived and the war is long.

The final chapter of *La Critique des Armes I* deals a blow to a myth of the 1970s: the left critique of Allende which holds that he should have armed the people, that he could have taken steps which would have prevented the murderous *coup d'état*. Debray replies that, yes, perhaps Allende should have acted more decisively in the final days of the Unidad Popular government. But in the context of the general situation he acted on the advice of Lenin: when someone has a gun at your head, you compromise. In this case, the military held the monopoly on firepower. Allende was playing for time. It is pointless, Debray argues, to suggest that he should have armed the people. With what? And, considering the delicate situation, how could he have done so without giving his enemies the excuse to move against him? In fact, most of the government's most active supporters were armed from the first days of the Unidad Popular victory (Allende, a competent marksman, was himself armed with a sub-machine gun given to him by Fidel Castro).

Debray was close to the situation in Chile (and a personal friend of Allende) and his arguments are convincing. His perceptive warnings of the onset of a period of grave

1. There has been a resurgence of guerrilla activity recently in Colombia. There are also reports of an active front in Nicaragua. See "U.S. Advisors in Nicaragua," *San Francisco Bay Guardian* (September 13, 1975).

2. *La Critique des Armes* is definitely recommended reading for the urban underground in West Germany and the U.S. When, if ever, will these groups abandon the idea that the military assault against the state generates support for the revolution? The man who is perhaps the most successful guerrilla of all did not entertain such illusions: "As early as March 1929, in his prescient report on the peasant movement in Hunan province, Mao outlined the sequence that should be followed in conducting the coming struggle in the rural areas: first, win the political struggle, so that the landlords are completely overthrown; second, engage in the economic struggle in order to redistribute land to poor peasants and to solve their economic problems; finally eliminate other systems of authority (clan, supernatural, etc.) and their supporting ideologies of 'natural' inequalities, superstition, and religion." John G. Gurley, "The Formation of Mao's Economic Strategy, 1927-1949," *Monthly Review* (July-August, 1975), p. 60.

Although Mao was writing about the peasantry his advice regarding the undermining of supporting ideologies (suggestive of Gramsci's concept of hegemony) has even greater relevance in advanced capitalist countries. This idea is advanced with persuasive clarity in Carl Boggs, "Gramsci's Prison Notebooks: Part 2," *Socialist Revolution*, 12 (November-December, 1972).

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danger for the Unidad Popular government are contained in the introduction to his famous interview with Allende.[3] In fact this is where Debray is in his element—analysis of what C. Wright Mills used to call the knife-edge present. The crisis of the moment encompasses the entire field of his theoretical enquiries: "What must be done must be done at once, but what is done will also have effects that ramify over a long period. There is the shortest possible gap between the strategic plan and the tactical one. In fact the strategy appears as tactics, *all its force is directly tactical* [Debray's emphasis], the two become as one" (*Prison Writings,* p. 113).

The theoretical assumptions of Debray's Marxism have never been explicit and this is true of *La Critique des Armes* as well. Except for the theoretical fragments in the *Prison Writings* Debray's work has always been confined to the level of political strategy. In this regard *La Critique des Armes* demonstrates a major strategic shift in Debray's thinking. The foco is replaced by people's war as the point of departure for revolutionary struggle. (The question of the Party is largely played down by Debray; dogmatic Leninism is avoided.) The war of the guerrilla column and its voluntarist aspects is now compared with the simplicity of mathematics, that of people's war with the higher equations of algebra.

The terrible decimation of the wandering guerrilla columns of the 1960s is explained by the absence of secure base areas and-or secure rear areas across national boundaries. The Vietnamese, Cambodians, Chinese, Algerians, Koreans and the guerrilla fighters in Portuguese Africa all had strong rear areas. In Cuba an advanced base area was built up in the Sierra Cristal (the "Frank Pais" Second Front) led by Raul Castro. A system of dual power was established with popular tribunals, a rudimentary fiscal system, schools and workers assemblies, all of which provided trained cadres for the future revolutionary government.

Revolutionary movements which succeed are those that become popularly identified as the leaders of a patriotic resistance against foreign aggression. The Chinese Communist Party grew spectacularly after the Japanese invasion. The European CP's also owed their strength in the period of the Second World War to their role as leaders of the Resistance. And Debray reminds us that the term "guerrilla" is a Spanish invention born in the widespread and dispersed resistance to the Napoleonic Empire. Debray implies that a war of this type may be the only kind which can succeed today. The overwhelming power of the repressive forces (originating in the U.S. 'special war' arsenal) have rendered classical models of insurrection obsolete. Debray warns that any attempt to wage urban warfare from fixed positions will result in holocausts equal in intensity to the disaster which befell the Warsaw Ghetto (in the Chilean *coup d'état*, for example, occupied factories were bombed by the Air Force); an example of politically successful but costly mobile urban warfare is the ferocious fighting in Hue during the 1968 Tet offensive which resulted in widespread devastation (caused primarily by U.S. air strikes); we also need to recall that well-armed Palestinian guerrillas suffered a catastrophic defeat in Amman during King Hussein's "Black September" offensive in 1970. Notably absent from *La Critique des Armes* is any account of the historic *Cordobazo*—the massive workers' uprising in Cordoba, Argentina during May, 1969.[4] The struggle in Northern Ireland, though outside the

3. Régis Debray, *Entretiens avec Allende sur la situation au Chile* (Paris, 1971); in English from New Left Books and Vintage.

4. See James Petras, "Urban Guerrillas in Argentina," *New Left Review,* 71 (January-February, 1972).

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specific scope of Debray's study, also needs to be incorporated into the general discussion of urban warfare.

The Latin American guerrillas of the 1960s tried to mechanically repeat the success of the Cuban Revolution. The rush towards armed struggle resulted in an ideological mosaic (Guevaraism) which defied precise definition. Many of the guerrilla units consisted of predominantly middle class elements including students. Perhaps the easiest way to illustrate the consequences of the class origins of the guerrillas is to relate Debray's account of a speech made by a representative of the Bolivian workers' confederation in Havana in 1971—he never even mentioned 'Che,' to the embarrassment of the other Bolivian delegates.

Debray contributes the important observation that while Marx may have hegemony over the ideas of the left intelligentsia in Europe, in Latin America Lenin is better known. This preference for Lenin originates in the feeling among militants that they must act, that they must do something. It is also rooted in a native antiintellectualism. In Uruguay this anti-intellectualism of the left was reflected in the Tupamaros preference for technique and method over theory. National traditions of romantic humanism and individual heroism also played havoc among the guerrilla bands.

While *La Critique des Armes* offers valuable insights into the problems of guerrilla warfare it also exhibits the very faults it seemingly criticizes. Debray still appears intent on developing a military strategy for the continent as a whole; at times, despite all his own stated disclaimers regarding such a project, *La Critique des Armes* reads like a guerrilla warfare manual. The concrete studies of the guerrilla movements in *Les Epreuves du Feu* are sharply in focus but they are also limited by Debray's failure to undertake an exhaustive analysis of the concrete realities of each country or to take into account the changing nature of imperialism in Latin America.[5] Debray is, in effect, jumping the gun again, a revolutionary in a hurry to analyze past mistakes and to get on with the revolution. But such an approach keeps the movement on a merry-go-round of changing tactics.

In his chapter on Chile Debray at once outlines a new course for the left under the junta, the struggle against state power, the return as it were, of the tactics of 'Che.' And he does so in the absence of a specific analysis of Chilean society. But one can envision other possibilities based on the international financial and diplomatic requirements of imperialism: the junta in Greece[6] fell but not at the hands of a revolutionary army. The Chilean junta is in poor shape politically and economically; is it too far-fetched to suggest that its creditors may seek an accommodation with right-wing elements of the Christian Democrats and gradually force the military into the background?

Althusser's brief critique of *Revolution in the Revolution?*[7] (included in *La Critique des Armes I*) could apply in some respects to Debray's current work as well. In his letter to "Bien cher Régis" (dated March 1, 1967), Althusser complains that he has searched in vain in Debray's text for any information on Latin American economic conditions.

5. A study which does take this into consideration is Fernando Henrique Cardoso's "Dependent Capitalist Development in Latin America," *New Left Review*, 74 (July-August, 1972).

6. The history of the decisive period in recent Greek history can be found in the fascinating work by Dominique Eudes, *The Kapetanios—Partisans and Civil War in Greece, 1943-1949* (London, 1972).

7. One of the best critiques of *Revolution in the Revolution?* is Joao Quartim's "Regis Debray and the Brazilian Revolution," *New Left Review*, 59 (January-February, 1970).

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Debray has also managed to reduce the history of Cuba to a military history, he laments.

I was hopeful that these two latest volumes would be weightier tomes than *Revolution in the Revolution?* They are not. The only theoretical conception advanced by Debray consists of the following: People's war, he informs us, is born in the text of Lenin defining the dialectic in the *Philosophical Notebooks*. The condition for knowing all the processes of the world in their self-movement, in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of the unity of opposites. People's war is founded on the antinomies between the city and the country, the Party and the foco, legal work and illegal work, self-defense and offense. People's war, as Debray theorizes it, is the translation into the language of military strategy of the law of objective phenomena. Now this is a bit ridiculous and it is obviously tacked on to what appears throughout *La Critique des Armes* to be Debray's major interest, namely military strategy. There are coherent theoretical assumptions operative here but to unravel them we have to examine the philosophical fragments of Debray's *Prison Writings*.

The theoretical essay "Time and Politics"[8] clearly establishes Debray's intellectual debt to his former professor Louis Althusser. Like Althusser, Debray splits Marx in two. There is an early Marx who exhibits an "episodic voluntarism" and the later Marx of *Capital* who follows Darwin "almost word for word" (p. 117). The paragraph in this essay which gives the clearest insight into Debray's Althusserianism is perhaps the following: "Unity must be split in order to give birth to a new unity; there cannot be a better structure unless it grows out of a break in the old structure. The ideology of 'mutations' presupposes the mechanical alteration of a mechanism, in other words a spontaneous and automatic development *affecting one by one the different parts of a composite* [emphasis added]. To avoid thinking of the general crisis as a necessary and determining moment in a given historical development, one must avoid thinking of the subject of the development, i.e., a given society, as an organic whole. Reformist mechanism articulates its conception of society; revolutionary dialectic does the same" (p. 147).

These remarks, it seems to me, are a reflection of the fragmented Althusserian conception of capitalism as a system composed of autonomous structures. For Althusser, as Piccone has explained, "...it is no longer the working out of internal contradictions that eventually explode the system but 'overdetermination'—the accumulation of a series of 'relatively autonomous' elements which eventually lead to the revolutionary break."[9]

Politically this mis-reading of Marx has two results: the capitalist system as a whole is lost sight of and political practice is reduced to developing tactical formulations to deal with developments in each autonomous layer of society. It is easy to see how this theoretical interpretation of Marx coincides with the reformist political requirements of the French Communist Party. What is not so readily apparent is that it is also compatible with an ultra-leftist politics (including the Maoist formations inspired by Althusser) which continually searches for the tactics which can best reap the benefits of the overdetermined contradiction in each structure of society.

In this conception strategy gives way to a tactical focus on the immediate political facts of each developing layer of the capitalist system. The two opposite poles of

8. Originally published as "Notes de Prison—'Temps et Politique'," *Les Temps Modernes* (June, 1970).

9. Paul Piccone, "Structuralist Marxism?" *Radical America*, III, 5 (September, 1969), p. 26.

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Althusserian Marxism (ultra-leftism and reformism) are clearly apparent in Debray whose political trajectory follows a line from guerrilla warfare to parliamentary reformism (i.e., his endorsement of Mitterand for President in the last election).[10]

Debray's politics were originally formed in the political milieu of the PCF (including his tutelage under Althusser). In his autobiographical sketch in the *Prison Writings* Debray never misses a chance to express his contempt for the politics of his youth and he finds Althusser's current work abstract,[11] although in *La Critique des Armes I* he still occasionally relies upon the 'langage althusserien' (p. 166).

In the early 1960s Debray, a committed militant, left the dull routines of Paris for the jungles of Latin America only to find that his rifle was loaded with blanks. His work became an 'ism'—a mirage—which in the feverish hour of that heroic brief spell of "two, three, many Vietnams" took on the appearance of the harbinger of revolution. This political conjuncture had its origins in the world-wide shock waves generated by the Vietnamese war of national liberation, the global offensive of U.S. imperialism, and the developing split between the guerrilla movements and the pro-Moscow Communist Parties. This latter point requires a specific clarification: while the guerrillas were frequently pitted against the CP's it should be kept in mind that they shared many of the political assumptions of "orthodox" Marxism-Leninism (including the comprehension of Marxism as a dogma and the preference for problems of the base over those of the superstructure). In Venezuela and Guatemala the guerrilla organizations were more or less the errant offspring of the traditional CP's.

In *La Critique des Armes* Debray fails to transcend either the theoretical poverty of his youth or the errors of his recent past. Theoretical confusion and politics without theory—Marxism and Debray remain locked in this double vice of the contemporary revolutionary movement.

Tom Good

10. Andrew Feenberg, "Socialism in France? The *Common Program* and the Future of the French Left," *Socialist Revolution*, 19 (January-March, 1974), p. 14.

11. This would appear to be a reference to Althusser's *Lire le Capital* (Paris, 1965). In "Time and Politics" (p. 108) Debray still has high praise for Althusser's essay "Contradiction and Over determination" describing it as the most useful and concrete of his works. He disparages, however, that "...a certain mistaken passion for theorizing has since led him to wander off to heights of logic from which one can only wonder if he will ever be able to return to the political earth..." (*ibid.*). Althusser's most recent works are the small volume *Réponse a John Lewis* (Paris, 1973), and the attempt at a theoretical reassessment *Elements d'Auto-Critique* (Paris, 1974). For a boisterous celebration of the new Althusserian "offensive" (which includes new books by Etienne Balibar and Dominique Lecourt) see "Althusser et les Siens," by Gilles Anquetil, in *Les Nouvelles Littéraires* (October 7, 1974).

David N. Smith. *Who Rules the Universities? An Essay in Class Analysis.* New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974.

In a period in which the student left has all but disappeared on North American university and college campuses—with students apparently primarily concerned with the immediate relevance of their education for career purposes on the one hand, and radical activities taking the form of sporadic acts of political terrorism and crime on the other—it seems quite futile and not a bit ironic that a book should appear

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optimistically reaffirming not just the central importance but also the unity and necessity of the student movement. While former participants in the left are busy writing critical but nostalgic obituaries of late 1960s activism (for example, the recent work of Susan Stern and Dave Dellinger), David Smith has attempted a synthesis placing the revolt against the universities in a general analytical critique of American state monopoly capitalism.

As the subtitle clearly indicates, this analysis is unfortunately developed within the logic of a perspective that reduces the complexity of American society to the simplistic schema of class struggle. Through this highly selective methodological emphasis, what is by itself an interesting and essential component of the social picture is erroneously presumed to represent the totality; the result is a highly formalized, empty, and abstract mechanistic Marxism that clearly is inadequate for a critical and radical understanding of the role of the universities in U.S. society, let alone the economic, political, cultural and psychological dimensions of the whole of life under American state capitalism. Underlying Smith's analysis is the old base-superstructure bifurcation, and all of the crude deterministic, rationalistic materialism implied in that formulation. This can be seen in the basic assertion from which Smith's whole argument develops, that "college-educated workers are members of an expanded working class which has been called into being by a capitalist class faced with new needs in a new historical situation" (12). As we shall see, it then follows that Smith's overriding historical picture explains away modern developments by stating that the once ideologically functioning instruments of the base (educational and political institutions are the only ones dealt with) are now structurally integrated with the process of production and hence subject to the old laws of the crisis theory, offered as proof of the necessity of the revolution.

Taking the form of an inquiry into the question posed by the title of the book, the structure of Smith's study is divided into four parts. Part one begins with the question "Who rules the University of California?" whose specific answer develops into a general sociological profile of ruling class trustees shown to follow a similar pattern for most American universities. Part two is historical, linking the genesis and development of ruling class control of the universities with that of American capitalism. Part three is a theoretical analysis of the meaning of ruling class control in the present era of monopoly capitalism. The fourth part is polemical, discussing the problems of "student workers" and activism in general.

Smith opens the first part of his study with a portrait of the University of California regents, focusing on the characteristics of race, age and sex, as well as social, economic and political status and power. Using the pre-established criteria of class analysis he is able to show that college trustees may be subsumed under the category of "capitalist ruling class;" he further argues that their control of higher education follows their manipulation of other institutions for the benefit of American capital. Moving to an examination of the American ruling class in general, Smith uses the same abstract classificatory method in conjunction with three major sociological studies to show that the positive correlation of ruling class control with university trusteeship in America varies only in proportion to the size and importance of the institution. The concept "ruling class control" is the key to the organization of the material presented in this section, though it is not empirically justified; rather, its introduction as theoretical tool prior to the analysis enables Smith to deduce that the survival of the capitalist class is bound up with control of social institutions such as the university.

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How this came about is the subject matter of the second part of the study, where Smith shows that from its beginnings in the latter 19th century, ruling class control of the universities has paralleled the three stages of the development of American capitalism. Again, the deterministic logic of "ruling class control" gives this development the appearance of a causal relationship rather than that of, say, a homologous one. In the rowdy period of competitive capitalism (1869-1900) donations were personal, with the robber barons investing some of their profits in higher education for some administrative and technical skills as well as personal glory. In the period of industrial concentration and monopoly formation (1900-1940) consolidated ruling class control of the universities increased accordingly as Carnegie's and Rockefeller's foundations systematically shaped and restructured the university system to provide for capitalism's needs for an elite of investment bankers, lawyers and government officials as well as the technological needs occasioned by the application of the scientific method to industry. In the period of state monopoly capitalism (1946-present) direct corporate support replaced philanthropy, but the state played the major role in the twofold ruling class transformation of the university as (1) the focus and orientation shifted from ruling class to working class with the production of technical and administrative skills to fulfill capitalism's need for an educated work force, and (2) the universities were converted into research and development centers to meet capitalism's needs for new technical and social scientific knowledge.

The mechanism of this development is clearly that of a reductive Marxist economic determinism in which all causes come from the prime mover of production for accumulation: the logic of the abstract economic system dictates the responses of the capitalist class, who in turn manipulate the political and educational institutions of society first indirectly then directly in accordance with capitalism's needs. This is not a ballet, but rather a march of bloodless categories in which the actual historical subjects are in each case subsumed under the impersonal imperatives of the monolithic capitalist system. The causal nature of this link is crucial for Smith's argument. Since he excludes the whole subjective, irrational, cultural, indeed *human* realm from any kind of dialectical interrelationship with the aspect of society he presents, he is forced to rely on his Newtonian causality to explain crisis, revolution and class consciousness in the third part, where the contradictions of capitalism are passed along the chain to the workers via the university now, as well as the work experience.

Two of the important aspects of this last period of state monopoly capitalism—the essential role of social institutions in capitalist reproduction, and the corresponding transformation of the working class—provide the focal points for Smith's discussion of contemporary ruling class control of the universities in the third part of the book. First of all, the universities are said to satisfy vital needs of capitalism in absorbing surplus production and labor, and in ideologically defending capitalism's internal and imperialist interests. Secondly, this apparently brings about a change in the composition and education of students, transforming the identity of the majority of students to that of working class. Here Smith indulges in a bit of sophistry permitted by his abstract method of analysis: since the proletariat as a *whole* (i.e., those involved in direct as well as indirect production) must be viewed as the agent of productive labor, its composition is judged to have changed some but structurally remained the same. That is, its historical composition may have altered, but its abstract essence (in terms of its function in the capitalist system, that of being both alienated and exploited) has not. Concretely, evidence of this transformation is seen in the large

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growth of professional and technical workers—teachers, engineers, nurses, accountants and technicians—that comprise the college-educated portion of the working class. Thus, it becomes clear how in Smith's view the university becomes the last link in the chain which connects the worker to the capitalist system, is reproduced by it, and in turn reproduces its contradictions in the proletariat. Besides perpetuating all of the problematic aspects of his analysis mentioned above, Smith introduces two more dubious elements in this section. His first point on the relation of the university to capitalism hinges on Baran and Sweezy's overproduction-underconsumption thesis, a rather questionable assumption at best. Secondly, his whole discussion of the nature of working class students is based on an interpretation of the changing composition of the proletariat that assumes "the direct creation of surplus value is. . . not a necessary condition for proletarian status" (207). Thus, he attempts a rather vague theoretical exercise as a justification for the level of generality necessary so that his abstract categories can span the diverse and even contradictory aspects of social reality discussed.

The importance of the transformation of the universities and consequent introduction of students into the proletariat for the student movement as well as the struggle for socialism in general are the concerns of the last section of Smith's book. The proletarianization of students introduces dimensions of the class struggle into the student-trustee relationship; its manifestations in the content, structure and conditions of education are shown to have led to the student revolt. Thus Smith is able to consistently reinterpret the anti-authoritarian movement of the 1960s in terms of his framework. He uses an absurdly simple schema to distinguish the two main tendencies in the student movement defining present alternatives for action: "anti-imperialist," incredibly including non-Marxist radical moralists as well as Leninist sects and the CP; and "socialist," whose primary possession is what Smith feels is a correct class consciousness, and includes independent Marxist collectives and groups such as the New American Movement. As if the poverty of his analytical framework were not shown up clearly enough by his sharp dichotomy into correct and incorrect radical responses, Smith winds up the show by ritually trotting out the expected and empty exhortations: the increasing manifestations of the contradictions of capitalist society should lead to a recognition of a need for workers' control as the only answer. The resulting struggle for democratic socialism will focus on the state as the locus of capitalist authority; in it, socialist intellectuals will play a "highly modified vanguard role," aided by "the autonomous development of socialist consciousness" (292) in the traditional portion of the working class.

It is readily apparent that Smith has no basis for these assertions: he has shown no reason why an economic crisis should result in any kind of critical consciousness at all, let alone why the specific idea of workers' control should arise, and out of the university of all places. Furthermore, he gives no reason why university-educated workers should even play a "highly modified" vanguard role; he makes no mention of any party structure or ranking of revolutionary merit. The final point is almost too obvious to mention: I have yet to see "autonomous" consciousness develop anywhere.

Yet it should be clear at this stage why the path Smith chooses leads to this *cul de sac*. Under the guise of a synthetic Marxist analysis of the role of the universities in modern capitalism, Smith has presented an analysis whose fundamental method is in every way consistent with the logic of the objective social sciences. That is, he ignores approximately half of the material content of reality, as well as its dialectical form, both of which are fundamental for any kind of radical investigation. Consequently, his

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picture of ruling class hegemony leaves room for no alternative on his own terms and he is led to those absurd *non sequitors* in his final section. His analysis tends to present a picture of a relatively homogeneous ruling class which consciously and rationally acts in its own interests. Such an approach can be useful, but in its partiality it is misleading. For example, Smith ignores concrete differences within the ruling class in his hurry to subsume all under abstract categories; he also misses irrationalities of social life such as the perverse tenacity of established beliefs and institutions; likewise, he misses the plurality of values and actions within the group which may be unconscious as well as conflicting. The same one-dimensionality characterizes his pasteboard proletariat as well; as an abstract category it only differs from the ruling class in being foolishly unaware of its real interests; once this awareness is attained, the revolution is just around the corner. But it is precisely the very conditions which militate *against* this transformation—the forces of capitalism which transform the social structure, institutions, and personal identity of the workers themselves—that constitute the object of Smith's study. By focusing on the causal nexus of domination as it is extended into the universities, Smith deprives himself of any basis for a reciprocating dialectic of liberation; by the form which his exposition takes, its net effect defeats its initial intent. Smith turns into that which he is attempting to combat, an academic sociologist serving an ultimately ideological function.

This exorcism of the dialectic, and its replacement by the American radical's own form of the domino theory in which class consciousness is magically produced on the assembly line of social revolution completely misses the sources of opposition in the internal dynamics of social processes on all levels of human existence. It should be obvious at this stage in the discussion among the radical community in North America that the cast-iron categories of a mechanistic Marxism such as Smith uses are somewhat crude instruments for a proper intellectual appropriation of the subtleties of the interaction of economic and social reproduction, let alone the understanding of class consciousness necessary for an adequate theory of radical social change.

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SHORT JOURNAL REVIEWS: *

ARENA, No. 38 (1975)

Box 36, P.O.Greensborough, Victoria 3088, Australia; Aust. $6.00 per year (4 issues). NONIE SHARP, *"Bougainville Coppers."* The newly independent Somare regime in Papua New Guinea projects an image of national welfarism, self-reliance, respect for local institutions, Melanesian forms of decision-making, regionalism, participatory decentralization. Thus far social control is almost entirely cultural—national stabilization is achieved through these ideologies and through the regime's subjects' attachment to their own modes of social organization and culture. Yet the contradictions inherent in the post-independents structures of oppression are already emergent. A major recent strike by copper workers—most of whom were fired, arrested, or arbitrarily placed behind barbed wire—is understood in this context. PAUL ROBERTS, *"Political Economy Movement: The Sydney Experience."* From a few minor incidents, the dispute in the Economics Department at Sydney University has become part of a general movement for its democratization, spearheaded by radical political economists. FRANK STILWELL, *"Alternative Courses in Economics."* What Galbraith has called the "instrumental role of [orthodox] economics" is elaborated and five features of the current revival of interest in political economy are outlined, including: (a) the rejuvenation of the grand themes of classical political economy, with its emphasis on the progress of society as illustrated through an understanding of accumulation, growth and distribution; (b) concern about the interdependence of economics, social and political forces; (c) vehement criticism of equilibrium analysis and a reinstatement of the importance of the dimension of conflict; (d) emphasis on transcending the fact-value dualism; and (e) concern over the role of the state in advanced capitalism. EVAN JONES, *"The Critique of Positive Economics."* An outline and stinging critique of the positivism of neoclassical economics: "Academic economics in Australia has been subject to a successful coup by sympathizers of American sophistication. They have swept the old guard from their armchairs and vanquished thought from the seat of the pants. Rigour is their watchword and scientific progress is their divinity." TED WHEELWRIGHT, KEN BUCKLEY, *"Political Economy, Power and the Universities."* More on the Sydney University saga. JOHN KEANE, *"Work and Interaction in Habermas."* After summarizing Habermas' intellectual development, Keane, in some critical comments, suggests that in undialectically formulating work and natural science as *technical* in character, Habermas has ontologized these human activities. Historical processes can thus never qualitatively alter this technical interest; they can merely alter the "combination" of the two interests by a "diminution" of work and an "expansion" of communication. And, in analytically severing "communication" from "discourse." Habermas' understanding of the dialectic of distorted and non-distorted communication is tantalizingly formalistic and poorly grounded. JUERGEN HABERMAS, *"Historical Materialism Reconsidered."* This is Habermas' rejection of the 5-stage historical model of orthodox Marxism and his attempt to "ground" the categories of work and interaction through an examination of a major problem of any theory of social evolution—the emergence of the state (from kinship forms of organization) and, thereby, the establishment of class societies. In examining several concepts and assumptions of "historical materialism"—social labor, the history of the species, the base-superstructure model, and the theory of the dialectic of the productive forces and relations of production—he suggests that the concept of social labor is suitable for understanding the derivation of the mode of life of the hominoids from that of the primates. But it does not hold for the specifically *human* mode of the reproduction of life. Both social labor *and* socialization (especially through the family system) are essential moments in this reproduction of the human species. This argument is illustrated with reference to 5 theories of the origin of the state, none of which differentiates between systemic problems (which overstrain the steering capacity of the kinship system) and these evolutionary learning processes. Habermas' reconstructed version thus takes the following form: in the evolutionary process of neolithic societies systemic problems arose which could not be managed by the kinship system; insoluble problems led to the casting and stabilizing of new structures; finally, on the basis of political (and class) authority the material process of production could be uncoupled from the limiting conditions of the kinship system and henceforth intensified. GLEN LEWIS, *"Nationalism and Capitalism in Australia: The Queensland Economy 1890-1930."* A groundbreaking exploration of the political economy and culture of a decisive era in Australian

*This journal review section was prepared by the Toronto *Telos* Group, 240 Vanier College, York University, 4700 Keele Street, Downsview, Ontario M3J 1P3 Canada, with the assistance of John Ainlay, Roberta Arnold, Carl Boggs, Ruth Heydebrand, Paul Mier, Peter Murphy, Lauren Roberds, and Andrew Wernick.

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history. During this period nationalism militated against the formation of a clear and militant working class ethos. In addition, the dominant economic ideology was "collective competition" while the more normal reality was "controlled competition." Socially, while the main ideology was equality the results were often authoritarian and exploitative. Overall, according to Lewis, the most significant feature of Australian capitalism during these years was the evolution of the techniques of corporate neo-capitalism at a remarkably early period. A "statized" capitalism was the form most acceptable to Australians: it was a fusion of American and British methods peculiar to Australia.

DAS ARGUMENT, No. 89 (February 1975)

Special Issue on Conservative Perspectives on Anti-Psychiatry

75 Karlsruhe 21, P.O. Box 21 0730, West Germany. 9 DM per issue. ERICH WULFF, *"Richters Konzept der Randgruppentheorie."* An attempt to define marginal groups, minorities, and the concept of "deviance" in relation to Leftist strategies through a critique of Richter's "reformism." IRMA GLEISS, *"Der konservative Gehalt der Anti-Psychiatrie."* A critical analysis of labelling theory and behavior modification, as well as of Parsons' concept of deviance. RUSSELL JACOBY, *"Laing, Cooper und das Verhältnis von Gesellschaftstheorie und Psychotherapie."* This is a translation of Jacoby's article in *Telos* 17. WOLFGANG FRITZ HAUG, *"Einige Probleme."* This review essay focuses on the problems involved in preparing a study guide to Marxism, particularly for non-students. ROBERT KATZENSTEIN, *"Haugs Einführung ins* Kapital." Haug's published lectures on *Kapital* are evaluated, both as an "introduction" to Marx and as a model to the methodology of scientific work.

DAS ARGUMENT, No. 90 (May 1975)

Special Issue on Reflection Theory in Theories of Literature and Art

PETER BUERGER, *"Was leistet der Widerspiegelungsbegriff in der Literaturwissenschaft?"* An attempt to relate Lenin and Lukács on literature, where Lenin is, of course, found to be somewhat less of an expert than Lukács. THOMAS METSCHER, *"Aesthetische Erkenntnis und realistische Kunst."* Metscher combines Lukács with certain aspects of Brecht in an effort to contribute to a theory of materialist aesthetics. ULLA HAHN, *"Notiz über Kagans System der Aesthetik."* A generally favorable review of Moissej Kagans "Marxist-Leninist Aesthetics." WOLFGANG PFAFFENBERGER, *"Konsequenzen aus der Wirtschaftskrise im Sachverständigengutachten 1974."* The detailed analysis of an "independent group of experts" (*Sachverständigenrat*) of the German economic crisis is castigated as a narrow, bourgeois attempt to explain and justify state interventionism. HANS IMMLER, *"Literaturbericht zur Umweltpolitik."* A survey over recent publications on environmental issues, with some emphasis on the Club of Rome's "limits to growth" ideology.

DAS ARGUMENT, No. 91 (June 1975)

Special Issue on Behavior Modification and Group Dynamics

DIETER HENKEL, DOROTHEE ROER, *"Die Politik der klinisch-psychologischen Standesverbände."* The authors report on the history and present state of the type and distribution of psychological disorders in West Germany, with a critical evaluation of available treatment facilities and personnel. EVA JAEGGI, *"Persönlichkeitstheoretische Implikationen verhaltenstherapeutischer Praxis."* The discrepancy between the theory and praxis of behavior modification is analyzed, with emphasis on Skinner's work. IRMA GLEISS, *"Verhalten oder Tätigkeit?"* A critique of behaviorism leads to suggestions towards a more "genetic" approach to therapy, i.e., beyond the focus on the individual and his "symptoms." WOLFGANG MAIERS, *"Normalität und Pathologie des Psychischen."* The analysis and discussion of the assumptions underlying psychological theories demonstrates the complexity involved in definitions of "normal behavior." PETER HEINTEL, *"Zum Wissenschaftsbegriff der Gruppendynamik."* This is, more or less, a postscript to an earlier *Argument* discussion of group dynamics, with a response by Christof Ohm.

AUT AUT, No. 147 (May-June 1975)

via Curti 8, 20136 Milano, Italy. Six issues $13.00. ELMAR ALTVATER, *"Per una Critica Metodologica delle Teorie Borghesi della Congiuntura."* A recycling of orthodox Marxist categories pointing to the primacy of the glorious proletariat as the focus of class-struggle, in a polemic with bourgeois theories which no Marxist has ever taken seriously. An exercise in

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orthodox ritual. ALESSANDRO CASICCIA, *"Ideologia dei 'Limiti dello Sviluppo' e Ristrutturazione."* A critique of the Club of Rome from the view of the function of the organization of work and the class struggle. MARIA GRAZIA MERIGGI, *Rileggendo 'Operai e Capitale': dall'Autonomia Operaia all'Autonomia del Politico."* A Re-examination of Tronti's work and its relevance for the 1970s. FRANCO FORTINI, *"Per il Comunismo dei Prodotti Intellettuali II"* EDOARDA MASI, *"Qualche Spunto per la Discussione del Pensiero di Mao-Tse-tung."* A reply to an earlier article on Mao Tse-tung. ROBERTA TOMASSINI, *"Critica, Crisi dell'Economia Politica e Soggetto Rivoluzionario."* A reply and elaboration of Cacciari's earlier article on the crisis of political economy. FRANCO FERGNANI, *"Le Conversazioni di Sartre con i 'Maos'."* A long review of Sartre's most recent book *On a raison de se révolter*. PIER ALDO ROVATTI, *"Intellettuali e Compromesso Storico."* Continuing an excellent discussion which has been articulated for several issues, Rovatti looks at the Italian Communist Party's new strategy towards intellectuals in the "historical compromise." Indicating how on the one hand the Left intellectual is being prepared by the party to manage state power when the PCI enters the government, the price demanded is, on the other hand, a *depoliticization* of the intellectual and a restriction of his role solely within his specific competence and independent of the broader popular cultural dimension from which he in fact ends up separated. MARIACHIARA FUGAZZA, *"I Due Marx di Colletti."* An analysis of Colletti's recent positions as outlined in his *New Left Review* interview, with particular emphasis on the separation of Marxism as science and Marxism as revolutionary theory. FRANCO RELLA,*"La Costruzione del Testo Analitico."* ANDREA SABADINI, *"Note a Nodi."* A review of the Italian translation of Laing's *Knots*.

CANADIAN DIMENSION, Vol. 10, No. 8 (June 1975)

Special Issue on Women

Box 1413, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada. $6.00 for one year. CLAIRE CULHANE, *"Women and Vietnam."* A description of women's role in the revolutionary struggle and a positive view of their prospects for liberation with the defeat of the U.S. Although the situation with regard to childcare, abortion and housework seems promising, specific emphasis is placed on women's contribution to industrial production and the reconstruction of the country. MARGIE GORDON, SHELLEY GAVIGAN, *"The Prosecution of Dr. Morgentaler."* The case for the repeal of the abortion laws from the Criminal Code of Canada, written from the perspective of a "woman's right to choose." SANDRA HENNEMAN, *"Women's Impossible Dream?"* The problem: sex roles and socialization. The solution: women must say "no." DOROTHY LIVESAY, *"Livesay's Choice."* A review of the author's own edition of *Forty Women Poets of Canada*; some consideration of the question: is there feminist poetry? ROBERTA BUCHANAN, *"Divorce: Newfoundland Style."* ANITA SHILTON MARTIN, *"Women and Imperialism."* An empirical presentation in which the author uses Juliet Mitchell's "key structures" of production, reproduction and sexuality to examine the effect of imperialism on women in the Third World. DEBORAH GORHAM, *"Singing Up the Hill."* The origins, history and political character of the Canadian women's movement for suffrage and equal rights. Significant for the attempt to critically discuss some of the assumptions commonly held by historians of the early women's movement—in particular, a discussion of "maternal feminism" (the view that suffrage for women would clean up corrupt politics because of women's natural goodness) as well as a discussion of the frontier-as-equalizer concept which attempts to explain earlier success of women's suffrage in the western provinces. KAY MacPHERSON, *"The Seeds of the Seventies."* GWEN MATHESON, *"Nellie McClung."* A review of McClung's *In Times Like These*, edited by Strong-Boag. An intellectual biography of McClung in which Matheson occasionally digresses to criticize Strong-Boag's editorial comments. Contrary to Strong-Boag, Matheson tries to situate McClung in turn-of-the-century Canadian West, arguing that feminism itself can be radical even in the absence of a "socialist ideology." This argument is related to the current debate in the modern women's movement, broadly defined as feminism vs. socialism, or the primacy of the objectively-defined working class vs. the subjectively self-defined solidarity of sisterhood. MARGARET RANDALL, *"Venceremos: Women in the New Cuba."* Randall presents the Cuban view of women's liberation which sees it as being achieved with women's complete integration into the waged labor force. Hence, it differs little from the western capitalist version being promoted during International Women's Year. The obstacle to women's liberation is similarly seen as merely a problem of consciousness or ideology—either in women's lack of confidence or men's lack of consciousness. MARLENE DIXON, *"Women's Liberation: Opening Chapter Two."* Given Dixon's political orientation that reduces people to objects of

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capitalist development, she fails to understand the major thrust of the women's movement: feminism as the assertion of women as subjects of history. Men, according to Dixon, only *appear* to be agents of capital in their relations to women, since the man's wage is really a family wage and includes the value of the woman's domestic labor. Women's consciousness of oppression is thus reduced to false consciousness and women must be educated to achieve working class consciousness. This is best accomplished by the integration of women into the waged labor force. The failure to create a powerful and radical movement hence lies in the lack of a correct theoretical analysis. MARGARET BENSTON, PAT DAVITT, *"Women Invent Society."* The transformation of the sexual division of labor from a differentiation of tasks originally based on human needs and the struggle for survival to a social division of power between men and women. Z. FARID, J. KYUEK, *"Who Speaks for Working-Class Women?"* Another feeble attempt to straighten out the "middle-class women's movement" and set it on the correct path of working class struggle. Revolutionary struggle, the authors inform us, consists of the struggle for union recognition, better working conditions, a decent place to live, enough to eat, and better welfare; all other discussion is "secondary."

THE CANADIAN FORUM (July 1975)

56 Esplanade Street, Toronto, Ont. Canada. $1.00 per issue. D. BERCUSON, *"Labour's Road to Nowhere: the CLCS-NDP Alliance.* M.W. WESTMACOTT, J. McDOUGALL, *"Lougheed's Energy Mandate."* D. ALEXANDER, *"And Newfoundland's Arabs?"* N. CAMERON, *"Permanent Life Insurance and the Public Interest.* I. MACDONALD, *"From University to Political Laboratory."* ANDREW WERNICK, *"The Politics of the University."* Wernick's critique of Bissell's *Half Up Parnassus* unfolds as a good analysis of the western university's social and historical location. While Bissell recognizes the symptoms—the emergence of the multi-versity with its social service function that poses a threat to the 'truth-seeking' goal of universities and a democratization hostile to competition, high culture and hierarchy—his nostalgic, ideologically myopic standpoint obscures the real causes: the development of mass culture in line with technological and industrial civilization that mitigates against elitism and excellence, and educational cutbacks. Wernick concludes with optimistic speculation: cutbacks as a part of the world economic downturn will set the stage for more intensive internal crisis that will parallel an increasing class polarization in the broader society.

CHINA QUARTERLY, No. 62 (June 1975)

Research Publications Ltd., Victoria Hall, E. Greenwich, London SE10 ORF. $15.00 per year. RICHARD SUTTMEIER, *"Science Policy Shifts, Organizational Change and China's Development."* An analysis of the effects policy shifts have had on science and technology and the concomitant organizational and administrative units responsible for their implementation in China's developmental experiences. Using the generally agreed upon breakdown of China's "periodicity," Suttmeier constructs a series of "models" which coincide with the various stages of the "evolution of the science system." These models reflect overall patterns of organization and administration characterizing China's experiments at modernization. Hence, China's attempts at building a platform for the role played by science and technology have been concerned with relationships between research and production; science and technology and production; science and technology and its integration with "revolutionary social change and mass cultural transformation." ROBERTA MARTIN, *"The Socialization of Children in China and on Taiwan: An Analysis of Elementary School Textbooks."* The socialization processes in Taiwan are geared toward the traditional Confucian system of personal and social behavior stressing individual achievement, acceptance and respect for authority, education, and the importance of the family. Together, they guide this "model citizen" into the capitalist productive process. China, on the other hand, is attempting to construct a new "socialist" system of personal and social behavior which emphasizes asceticism, hard work, social service and responsibility, and which therefore contributes to the collectivist and communal endeavors involved in building a new socialist China. ALLEN WHITING, *"New Light on Mao: Quemoy 1958: Mao's Miscalculations."* A short analysis of Mao's position and arguments *vis-à-vis* the Quemoy crises which resulted in a "double miscalculation." However, Quemoy should not be seen as a contributing factor in Mao's 'removal' as chief of state in 1959. JAN S. PRYBYLA, *"Notes on Chinese Higher Education: 1974."* A descriptive account of the organization, structure and purpose of the major institutions of higher education in China since the Cultural Revolution. The information, given by high officials at the various institutions, stresses participation and the

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common theme is one where theory is combined with practice. However, the author's discussion of the contemporary philosophy of education with his personal observations arising from recent visits paint a picture which is in sharp contrast with the goals of the revolution in education. ALEXANDER CASELLA, *"Recent Developments in China's University Recruitment System."* Since 1970, recruitment has been from the workers and peasants via a system of committees representing all levels of administration. Ideological achievement has become the basic criterion of choice. WILLIAM G. SNEAD, *"Self-Reliance, Internal Trade and China's Economic Structure."* Argues that China hasn't moved toward a cellular economy. Self-reliance has in many instances enhanced trade between localities. FREDERICK C. TEIWES, *"The Assignment of University Graduates in China, 1974."* ELLIS JOFFE, *"China's Military Elites."* A review of Whitson, *The Chinese High Command.*

DIALECTICS AND HUMANISM, Vol. II, No. 2 (Spring 1975)

Studia Filozoficzne, Nowy Swiat 49, 00-042 Warszawa, Poland. $10 per year. The following articles were presented at a conference dedicated to the philosophy of Roman Ingarden. ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA, *"Roman Ingarden's Philosophical Legacy and Beyond: The Creative Freedom of the Possible Worlds."* MAX RIESER, *"The Philosophy of Roman Ingarden in a Critical Light."* K.M. DOLGOV, *"Roman Ingarden's Phenomenology of Literature."* JAN NYGAARD, *"An Analysis of Ingarden's Distinction between the Literary Work of Art and its Related Branches of Art."* BOHDAN DZIEMIDOK, *"Roman Ingarden's Theory of Value of the Work of Art in the Light of Marxist Aesthetics."* MARIA GOLASZEWSKA, *"Ingarden's World of Values."* ZBIGNIEW KUDEROWICZ, *"The Problem of the Relation of Philosophy to Special Sciences as Discussed in Cracow in the Period 1944-1974."* Other articles in the issue: ANDRZEJ NOWICKI, *"Marxism and Phenomenology in Contemporary Italian Philosophy."* WLADY-SLAW TATARKIEWICZ, *"The Concept of Poetry."* F. DAVID MARTIN, *"The 'Between': Brancusi, Moore, and Giacometti."* JAN SZEZEPANSKI, *"Florian Znaniecki's Views of Technological Civilization."* ZDZISLAW CACKOWSKI, *"Philosophical and General Methodological Problems of the Investigation of the Human Environment."*

ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, Vol. 4, No. 3 (August 1975)

Broadway House, Readin Road, Henley-on-Thames, Oxon RG9 1EN, England. TALAL ASAD, *"Anthropological Texts and Ideological Problems: An Analysis of Cohen on Arab Villages in Israel."* Anthropological texts are always related in complex ways to social practice. Abner Cohen's *Arab Border Villages in Israel* is analyzed as an "ideological specimen" which embodies contemporary anthropological practice in its typical form—the field monograph—and objectifies a specific historical reality in a politically charged manner. To be adequate at the theoretical level, Cohen would have had to break radically with anthropological practice and attack the political reality which he attempts to reflect. CESARE LUPORINI, *"Reality and Historicity: Economy and Dialectics in Marxism, Part 2."* Part 1 appeared in Vol. 4, No. 2. KAREL WILLIAMS, *"Facing Reality—a Critique of Karl Popper's Empiricism."* Popper's epistemology is seen as an attempt to resolve the difficulties which stem from the creation within philosophy of an abstract problem of knowledge via the antithesis of knowing subject vs. known object. He attempts to resolve these difficulties by installing "controls" on the subject, but even within the circle of his empiricist presuppositions, the operation of these controls is dependent upon a certain organization of knowledge. And, more fundamentally, Popper always imposes his philosophical preconceptions about the nature of knowledge upon the theoretical discourses which he considers. Popper fails to establish the scientificity of the natural sciences and the non-scientificity of Marx and Freud.

ENDARCH, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Fall 1974)

Dept. of Political Science, Atlanta University, Atlanta, GA 30311. $4.00 per year. This is a new quarterly journal of political theory put out by Black radicals at Atlanta University. *Endarch* seeks to build a new movement grounded in a careful analysis of the economic, political and social structures and functions of capitalism. NORMAN HARRI, *"A Recurring Malady: Baraka's Move to the 'Left'."* A sketch of Baraka's life from being a white-oriented beat poet, to a Black artist, to a leftist revolutionary. Harri views Baraka's present prescriptions to alter reality as another example of the way in which the creation of a Black philosophy is hindered: Baraka's revolutionary stance is rooted more in unsynthesized concepts than in concrete social analysis. ADOLPH REED, JR., *"Scientistic Socialism: Notes on the New Afro-American Magic*

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Marxism." A polemical diatribe against the recent idealistic tendency in the Black movement. By arguing that magic Marxism fetishizes history and Marxist categories, Reed is repeating the themes that have preoccupied some elements of the left for decades.

HECATE, Vol. 1, No. 1 (January 1975)

G.P.O. Box 99, St. Lucia, Queensland, Australia. $4 per year (2 issues). CARMEL SHUTE, *"Heroines and Heroes: Sexual Mythology in Australia, 1914-1918."* Both pre-war and anti-war forces during World War I presumed a universal female nature and accepted women's "separate sphere" as moral gardians of Australian manhood. Women's groups at the time split on the question of whether it was a woman's duty as a mother to sacrifice her sons for the protection of the nation, or to harness male aggression and abolish war. JANET D'URSO, *"The Social Construction of Woman: Western Mythic and Religions Stereotypes."* A review of the standard mythical figures (e.g., virgin, whore, etc.) in which the author argues that these role stereotypes are coercive social controls to compel women to conform to male expectations. CAROLE FERRIER, *" 'Lives in Conflict': Dorris Lessing's* Children of Violence *Novels."* Review of Lessing's work which is noteworthy primarily owing to the author's attempt to relate the unfolding of Lessing's literary concerns to parallel developments in psychological theory (from Freud to anti-psychiatry and parapsychology) and politics through the 1950s and 1960s. PADDY McCORRY, *"More Advanced, Better Prepared? The Status of Women Inquiry."* A critique of the report by the Commission on Inquiry into the status of women in Queensland which could adequately serve as a criticism of any other report of a similar nature that sees the problem of women as simply one of under-representation, leaving unchallenged the status quo which presumes a "natural" hierarchy of capacity and achievement on an individual basis. This article is also a critique of "equal rights feminism" which seeks to open up for women social positions of wealth and power traditionally reserved for men and does not question the existence of those hierarchies. Equal pay for equal work is also criticized as inadequate when the job categories themselves are sexual ghettoes. JANE GRUCHY, *"Women and Film: Freud and Marx."* Review of 2 books on women and film: Haskell's *From Reverence to Rape* and Mellen's *Women and their Sexuality in the New Film.* RAYMOND EVANS, *"Thirty Dissertations on the Fur Trade."* Review of Rowbotham's *Hidden from History.* MARGARET PEARCE, *"Bibliography: Women in India."*

L'HOMME ET LA SOCIETE, Nos. 35-36 (January-June 1975)

Editions Anthropos, 12 ave. du Maine, Paris 15. 90F per year. MIHAILO MARKOVIC, *"La philosophie marxiste en Yougoslavie—le groupe Praxis."* An historical-sociological account of the philosophers grouped around the Yugoslav journal *Praxis* and their struggles with the authorities and with "diamat" Marxism. This article was written before the author's expulsion from the University of Belgrade and the ultimate suppression of *Praxis.* TRIVO INDJIC, *"L'Organisation entre la liberté et l'efficacité."* A critique written by another victim of the purges at the University of Belgrade, of various theories of political organization, principally those of Lukács and Lenin, from a "New Left" perspective. JOSEPH GABEL, *"Marxisme hongrois, 'hungaro-marxisme' et école de Budapest."* A much improved translation of this piece appears in this issue of *Telos.* DANIEL MARTIN, SERGE FRANKEL, *"La nouvelle gauche hongroise."* Not only has this article appeared twice in English (first in *Telos* 17 and then 2 years later in *Monthly Review*), but now the French are repeating history as well, since this piece was published a year ago in *Les Temps Modernes* (337-338). MICHAEL LOWY, *"Notes sur Lukács et Gramsci."* This traces some of the similarities in the works of Lukács and Gramsci. Although not an especially profound essay, Löwy does succeed in situating them and their respective projects *vis-à-vis* the then dominant varieties of Marxism and political currents. SOLANGE MERCIER-JOSA, *"Hegel et la société."* A comparison between Hegel's *System of Ethical Life* and his *Philosophy of Right*, which contains three short sections of the *System* in French translation. The translated excerpts deal with market and family relations, Spirit, and the system of needs. MARIO HIRSCH, *"L'ecole de frankfort: une critique de la raison instrumentale."* A review of the critique of positivism as formulated by the various members of the "Frankfurt School," from Horkheimer to Habermas. Hirsch includes a criticism of the school for its progressive abandonment of the concept of praxis. An interesting and well documented essay. ANDRE GUNDER-FRANK, *"Smith et Marx contre Weber et les wébérians: sur les origines du développement et du sous-développement dans le nouveau monde."* A very poor article in which the author seeks to purify Marx as an economist, badly misrepresenting Weber in the process.

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Essentially a polemic, as the title indicates, against Arghiri Emmanuel and others. PIERRE RIBOULET, *"Quelques rémarques à propos de la luttes des classes dans l'idéologie."* Riboulet summarizes some works by Althusser, Poulantzas and Gorz while arguing for Gramsci's conception of ideology as a moment of hegemony instead of in terms of a base-superstructure model. MICHEL MAFFESOLI, *"L'idéologie, sa genèse et sa duplicité."* Argues for a more positive approach to speech, poetry, symbols, and imagination in the study of ideology as a moment of the social totality. PAUL LUSINCHI, *"L'idéologie hollywoodienne de la loi: l'analysur 'Bogart'."* JACQUES GUIGOU, *"Les coûts de l'éducation permanente: un été chez Illich."*

INSURGENT SOCIOLOGIST, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1975)

Sociology Dept., University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403. $4.00 per year low income, $8.00 per year otherwise. This issue focuses on contemporary developments in research into the American power structure, and encompasses such a wide range of divergent approaches that it fails to retain any thematic continuity. LAURENCE H. SHOUP, *"Shaping the Postwar World: The Council of Foreign Relations and United States War Aims During World War II."* By examining the role of the Council on Foreign Relations in the formation of the United Nations, this article illustrates the subtle economic manipulations by which a private policy planning organization was able to cement American control over weaker territorial units. The failure of the post-WWII economy to develop a variant of democratic socialism is traced to the power of such organizations to retain the locus of economic decisions in the hands of a definite upper-class owning group. DIANA ROOSE, *"Top Dogs and Top Brass: An inside Look at a Government Advisory Committee."* A content analysis of the minutes of the Industry Advisory Council to the Department of Defense from 1962-72, elucidating the manner in which upper level private business personnel, as federal advisory groups, both chart and review politically relevant US public policies. GLENN K. HIRSCH, *"Only You Can Prevent Ideological Hegemony: The Advertising Council and its Place in the American Power Structure."* Through the use of "network analysis" this article investigates the location of the Advertising Council in the US power structure. Hirsch's material suggests that the Council's ideology endorses corporate morality, concretizes a common consciousness for business oriented groups, serving to buffer information which might form into an oppositional ideology. DAVID SERVER, *"Regulating Reform: The Social Organization of Insurance Regulation."* After examining the manner through which the insurance industry influences the state governments' regulatory agencies, the author concludes that the promise of "tactical reform" cannot be realized by isolated individual work. There is the necessity for the direct confrontation between industry and collective, popular organizations. The success of the latter depends upon "advanced means of socialization." FRANK DARKNELL, *"The Carnegie Council for Policy Studies in Higher Education: A New Policy Group for the Ruling Class."* The methods by which the Carnegie Council employs unilateral action in its direction of higher education at the expense of consensus are probed. The Council's insistence on its separation from other organized bodies which study higher education is grounded in its concern to act as a mediator between corporate business interests and higher education public service institutions. Such mediation is an indirect means of shaping one area of government policy into an informal protectorate for US political economy. RICHARD ZWEIGENHAFT, *"Who Represents America?"* An analysis of the social backgrounds of the members of the 92nd Congress reveals the overwhelming predominance of a small class of upper level businessmen and lawyers. As such the social responsiveness of Congress is questioned. BETH MINTZ, *"The President's Cabinet, 1897-1972: A Contribution to the Power Structure Debate."* The composition of the social backgrounds of the Presidents' Cabinets are analyzed as a means by which the debate between pluralist and elitist theories can be resolved. The author's conclusions support the elitist model, underlining the dominant influence on executive decisions by an overlapping group of business and social elites whose socio-economic position represents less than 1% of the nation. MICHAEL P. MERLIE, EDWARD T. SILVA, *"The First Family: Presidential Kinship and its Theoretical Implications."* The data concerning presidential kinship is evaluated from the contrasting perspectives of the pluralist and elite theories. It is argued that kinship and class connections encroach upon the presidental selection process to the degree that an upper economic class can be defined by kinship organization. G. WILLIAM DOMHOFF, *"Social Clubs, Policy-Planning Groups, and Corporations: A Network Study of Ruling-Class Cohesiveness."* In order to rebut theories that state that upper-level businessmen lack the cohesion to form a dominant, homogeneous class, the author constructs a matrix which outlines

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evidence of both a social and policy cohesiveness among a distinct, tight ruling class. But, more, this class overlaps with major US corporations and their research study groups. New directions for future study on the sociological cohesiveness question are outlined. EDMUND M. McLAUGLIN, *"The Power Network in Phoenix: An Application of Smallest Space Analysis."* Using Phoenix as an example, a method for analyzing the social connections between individuals and institutions which comprise the power network of a metropolitan center is sketched. The article supports the monolithic power elite thesis. JOHN A. SONQUIST, THOMAS KOENIG, *"Interlocking Directorates in the Top U.S. Corporations: A Graph Theory Approach."* Before mapping the formal interrelations of the upper echelon of the American corporate system by graph theory, the variety of theoretical models concerning these interconnections (i.e., management control theory, environment control and reciprocity theory, financial control theory, class hegemony theory), is overviewed. Due to the nature of the information scanned, analysis of the corporate interlocking phenomena will be incomplete as long as they do not incorporate the combined perspectives of each theoretical orientation. PETER DREIER, *"Power Structures and Power Struggles."* This work suggests that current power structure research is only structurally analytical and, thus, provides no framework for analyzing the real power struggles in American society, i.e., those struggles between the ruling and the working class. Efforts to formulate socialist strategy short of the seizure of state power are clipped by this occlusion. The analyses of contemporary radical power structure researchers, e.g., Kolko, Weinstein, Domhoff, Miliband, Wolf Ash, fail to focus on the vulnerability and delegitimation of elites and their organizations—and as such they fail to define the possibilities of reform within true political struggle. JOHN MOLLENKOPK, *"Theories of the State and Power Structure Research."* As demonstrated by the San Francisco Bart example power structure research neglects social dynamics. The tendency to subordinate political power and systems of cultural meaning to a role subservient to economic power results in the reification of the state as a completely servile force of economic interests and fails to approach questions of legitimation. Theoretical criteria such as the Hegelian Marxist notion of totality as a framework for analysis are outlined as goals for a more substantial body of research.

INSURGENT SOCIOLOGIST, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Fall 1975)

ERIK OLIN WRIGHT, *"Alternative Perspectives in Marxist Theory of Accumulation and Crisis."* Through exposing a historical pattern of constraints on capitalist accumulation and emergent structural solutions, the dialectic of the accumulation process is outlined. The inherent contradictions of the repressive institutional reorderings and adaptations are perceived as systemic solutions originating in accumulation constraints. ALFRED McCLUNG LEE, *"Humanist Challenges to Positivists."* Humanist and positivistic sociology are contrasted by questioning the focus, development, and use of contemporary sociological knowledge. Naturalistic, positivistic social science is confronted with its occlusion of the foundations and social processes in which it is grounded. DEAN MANDERS, *"Labelling Theory and Social Reality: a Marxist Critique."* The affinity of social control theory with pluralist ideology is revealed through the former's liberal biases which hinder the formation of an adequate concept of class and inequality. Despite its desire to conceptualize a causal explanation of criminal deviance, the theory fails to comprehend the oppressive nature of American law. Themes for future work are outlined, among which is a systematic, critical approach to social, economic and political conditions as a requisite to the severance of the theory from the political-economic, ideological and linguistic hegemony of capitalist society.

INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISM, No. 81-82 (September 1975)

Special Issue: "Portugal at the Crossroads," by Tony Cliff

IS Journal, 8 Cottons Gardens, London E2 8DN. $10 per year. *"Introduction."* The revolutionary situation in Portugal is put into a historical framework. Cliff draws on a number of sources including 54 reports by IS members who visited Portugal this past August. *"Chronology of Events."* Revolutionary events in Portugal from April 1974 to September 1975. *"Glossary."* A list of important acronyms including organizations of the state, political parties, centrist, reformist, and liberation groups. *"The Collapse of the Fascist Regime."* An analysis of the passing of the old (Caetano) regime in April 1974, using supportive quotes from Lenin and Marx. *"The Masses enter the Arena."* A vivid documentary of *saneamento* (purging) by workers' committees, strikes, the occupation of factories by workers, workers' control of the media and workers' mobilization to take control of other areas affecting their lives such as health, transport, education, housing.

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"The Workers Parties." An essential chapter in understanding workers parties in Portugal which criticizes the Portuguese CP as manipulative, the Socialist Party as petty bourgeois, the Maoists as Stalinists and centrists who move between reformism and the revolutionary left. The Proletarian Revolutionary Party-Revolutionary Brigades (PRP-BR) is the "authentic revolutionary organization" in Portugal. *"Two failed Right-Wing Coups."* Cliff describes the attempted Sept. 28, 1974 and March 11, 1975 coups and the lessons learned by workers. *"The Armed Forces Movement."* The Armed Forces Movement (MFA) is a unique phenomenon and Cliff gives the history of its relationship with the revolution as a whole. *"The Economy is Impasse."* A thorough discussion of the capitalist contradictions in Portugal which includes the role of foreign capital, inflation and unemployment. He also deals with the peasants, agriculture and land reform. *"The Way Ahead."* In this chapter, Cliff develops predictions on the future of the Portuguese Revolution based on the lessons of the past workers' revolutions. There is an urgent need for the formation of workers' and soldiers' councils, a united front, the arming of workers, a revolutionary party and an international perspective. He presents a concise discussion of the relationship of the party to the masses, the role of leaders within the party and the relationship of theory and praxis. If the Portuguese Revolution falters, right wing fascists aided by NATO, the CIA, Tories *et al.* will see to it that Portugal turns into another Chile. In conclusion, this *IS* issues provides a moving account of a workers' revolution in process.

INTERVENTION, No. 5 (July 1975)

Post Office Box 104, Carlton, Victoria 3053, Australia. $1.50 per issue. GRANT EVANS, *"Timor: The Dynamics of Underdevelopment and Independence."* It is overwhelmingly the "underdevelopment" aspect which figures in this tiny East Indies island's past and present and, unfortunately, according to Evan's prognosis, its future as well. Timor's history is replete with the dismal social, economic, political and cultural features common to colonized areas, made worse by the economically underdeveloped and politically fascist character of its exploiter, Portugal. With 90% of its people still engaged in subsistence agriculture, a chronic trade deficit, social relations dominated by kinship relations, an animistic culture, and an essentially parochial politics, it is easy to understand why the coup in Lisbon has not had much of a liberating effect on Eastern Timor. The programs offered by the three political parties present neo-colonial solutions (integration with Portugal, or with Indonesia), or, in the case of the nationalist party, a naive analysis of the possibilities for preventing neo-colonialism. Recent threats of invasion from the Indonesian-dominated western half of Timor complete the dismal picture. KEITH TRIBE, *"Capitalism and Industrialization."* Criticizing recent tendencies in Marxist historiography which treat the forces of production as the prime mover in the development of capitalism and industrialism, Tribe argues for the primacy of the social relations in the formation of capitalism. He examines the period of this formation in Britain, concentrating on the agrarian sector, and concludes that the capitalist mode of production, when understood to be primarily a matter of certain social relations of production, had developed prior to the industrial revolution; it was essentially these capitalist social relations that put the forces (capital, machines, etc.) to work. Tribe claims that a focus on the *forces*, rather than the *relations* of production as characteristic of the capitalist mode of production constitutes technological determinism and the degeneration of Marxist analysis into a search for economic laws. MAURICE GODELIER, *"Anthropology and Ecology."* The problem of the analysis of the conditions of reproduction and non-reproduction of social systems is receiving much attention in social anthropological research. 19th century sociological evolutionism proved to be a dead end approach to this problem, while functionalist and structuralist approaches were not much better. Godelier sees the new school of cultural ecology (which claims to be neo-functionalist, neo-structuralist, *and* Marxist) as producing more fruitful analyses. Cultural ecological studies of societies' adaptations to their environments reveal that each so-called "primitive" economic and social system determines a specific mode of utilization of its natural resources (and human labor) and consequently determines specific standards which govern the "good" and "bad" use of these resources, i.e., "an original and specific form of 'intentional rationality'." Successful adaptation leads to a different model of social organization. Although cultural ecology sometimes produces economistic analyses or mistakenly views social evolution as a general, one-way, progressive development, Godelier believes this approach may reveal much about the role of the economy in the logic governing adaptation of societies to their environment and in the logic of their evolution.

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KURSBUCH, No. 38 (December 1974)

Issue Theme: Wage Labor

Kursbuch-Rotbuch Verlag, 1 Berlin 31, Jenaer Str. 9, West Germany. DM 7 per issue. THOMAS LEITHAEUSER, *"Erfahrungen eines chilenischen Arbeiters in der Bundesrepublik."* Interview with a Chilean exile—a case study for the forthcoming book *Formen des Alltagsbewusstseins*—which reveals the frustrations of a class-conscious Latin American with the overly-disciplined and politically docile West German. *"Stück für Stück: Gespräche mit deutschen Arbeitern."* Conversations with West German workers. *"Hermann Mühleisen am Band: Tagebuchzeichnungen eines Vertauensmanns."* An account of the frustrations of working on a conveyor belt and trying to change working conditions through union officials. OTTO JACOBI, *"Gewerkschaftliche Tarifpolitik in der Bundesrepublik."* Based on a book by Jacobi and others, *Gewerkschaften in der Bundesrepublik*, this describes how real gains in labor income facilitated a wage policy which conformed to the needs of economic cycles, thus contributing to stability. The structural weakness of union wage policy is traced to the dual system of representation whereby trade unions are limited to inter-factory conflicts and workers' councils to intra-factory disputes. SOPHIE B. ALF, *" 'Neuer Syndikalismus': Dia Tarifkämpfe der italienischen Metalarbeiter, 1972-73."* A case study of the most "progressive" type of industrial labor (metal workers) in Italy which suggests, in contrast to West Germany, a situation of "open" class conflict. RENATE DAMUS, *"Ist die Arbeit im Sozialismus Lohnarbeit? Zum Charakter der Arbeit in den nachkapitalistischen Gesellschaften Osteuropas."* In a lucid and sober discussion, the author negatively evaluates the condition of labor in socialist countries, but argues that we still cannot speak of "wage labor." This is all-important in that the abolition of wage labor is one of the "constitutive" conditions of a post-capitalist society. But since this has taken the form of direct domination, the system of planning requires the retention of bourgeois social relations in order to de-politicize the population through privatization. MIKLOS HARASZTI, *"Stücklohn."* Work experiences of a young Hungarian who wanted to find out what it was like to be a factory piece-rate worker since performance pay (*Leistungslohn*) had been described by Hungarian "management science" experts as the perfect socialist method of payment. But he finds that "the calculations are harder to learn than the work." In this manner deceptive norms can be reset continuously and speed-up pressure maintained while the workers work more for the same wage. Yet the small differential advantage *vis-à-vis* hourly workers is enough incentive to make the system work. In effect, the author decides, piece-rate payment is a veiled form of time-payment which is calculated in minutes. *"Aus dem Tagebuch eines Bergmannes."* Diary of a miner published by the Polish journal *Polityka* and followed by an interview with a mining administrator who explains away the miner's complaints with the logic of "Das ist Produktion." *"Fragen an eine Brigade."* Conversations with an intimate group of construction workers in East Germany who claim that they have been deprived of all their rights. MICHAEL SCHARANG, *"Bericht an das Lohnkomittee."* A personalized report, ostensibly documentary, of a factory debate on the wage-labor question. The author has also published a recent collection of tapes by workers on workers. RAINER TRAUB, *"Exkurs über Gleichmacherei."* Three views of the implications of "equalization" are distinguished: that of the worker's official for whom the pressure of the worker for equality is the special and socialism the general interest; that of the worker himself, for whom socialism means the abolition of differentials between the work of the head and the hand; and that of those who dominate for whom it is—in Stalin's words—"playing with fire." RENATE SCHERER, *"China: Die Lohnfrage im Kampf zweier Linien."* In the shifts back and forth between an emphasis on piece-rate and now hourly forms of payment, changes in official policy can be traced, as well as the emergence with the Cultural revolution of actual workers movements. It is suggested that the more recent campaigns against "anarchism in the factories" points to the dilemmas of carrying revolution to the point of questioning the structure of the factory itself and its necessary disciplines.

LEVIATHAN, No. 2

Claus Koch, D 1000 Berlin 12, Mommsenstrasse 66, West Germany. WINFRIED VOGT, *"Zur langfristigen ökonomischen Entwicklung eines kapitalistischen Systems."* This paper confronts some of the most important theories of the long-run development of a capitalist system: the classical (Ricardian) stagnation theory, the Marxian theory of the tendency of the falling rate of profit, the Keynesian theory of capitalism's institutional instability, the modern stagnation theory, and the "neo-neo-classical" theory of economic growth. None of these has succeeded in proving either the long run breakdown or the permanent survival of capitalist systems. Some new

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arguments are then developed in favor of a "breakdown" or "transformation" thesis. In the long-run two alternative developments are possible: (a) a permanent decline of the rate of profit and hence a strong tendency towards a "breakdown" of the capitalist system; or (b) a gradual approximation towards full automation of the private sector, towards a continuous shift from private to public employment and thus towards financing the bulk of total wages by taxes raised in the private sector. CLAUS OFFE, VOLKER RONGE, *"Fiskalische Krise, Bauindustrie und die Grenzen staatlicher Aufgabenrationalisierung."* The stability of industrial capitalism requires state expenditures (both "social capital" and "social expenses") through fiscal "growth dividends." What is necessary for one aspect becomes a threat to the private economy for the other. This contradiction forces the state to economize. This thesis is then applied to contemporary conditions in West Germany. WALTHER MUELLER-JENTSCH, *"Bedingungen kooperativer und konfliktorischer Gewerkschaftspolitik."* In both the social sciences and political discussion in Western Europe trade unionism and the collective bargaining process have become a new focus of concern. A new wave of working class militancy together with the ongoing debate about the causes of inflation and the introduction of incomes policies have exposed the unions to contradictory expectations. The mediating character of the unions has developed out of three main historical tendencies: (a) centralization and bureaucratization of unions; (b) institutionalization of the class struggle; (c) state intervention into the economic process. These developments have increased the potential power of unions as well as the pressures on the unions toward integration into the socio-economic process. Two distinct types of union politics are described: the cooperative and the conflict-oriented unions. The paper shows both the specific conditions under which a union is likely to adopt one of the alternative strategies, and the dilemmas inherent in both types of union politics. JOACHIM BERGMANN, *"Organisationsinterne Prozesse in kooperativen Gewerkschaften."* Empirical data shows that the vast majority of rank-and-file union members do not participate in internal union politics, but that they nevertheless believe that trade unions are necessary organizations defending their basic interests. Here a new approach is proposed to understanding this phenomenon. "Cooperative" trade unions have to solve two problems: (a) the decisions of the leaders must be legitimated by democratic procedures, for only if the internal process is democratic will the membership believe that their interests are being represented effectively; but (b) a union pursuing a cooperative policy cannot allow the rank-and-file to articulate their interests without concern about the prevailing economic conditions and established relationships with employers' associations. The internal process of cooperative unions is thus characterized by a series of restrictive mechanisms limiting the participation of members by strategies that avoid the positive test of legitimating policy decisions through unlimited discussions of members' interests. Empirical evidence for this thesis is offered. WERNER HOFFACKER, *"Der Streik der Beamten."* JOHANN GALTUNG, WOLF-DIETER NARR, *"Meadows, Forrester und die profitable Krise."* Reviewing the *Limits to Growth*, Galtung portrays this kind of catastrophic message as "completely acceptable to the elites of the world." The consequences of the LTG study point to more growth in the industrialized nations (by recycling and "anti-factories" to balance pollution and depletion), to more division of labor and social control. Capitalist structures as such remain untouched by the LTG analysis. The ecologism promoted by Meadows, Forrester and the Club of Rome is characterized as a new middle class ideology. Narr criticizes some fundamental features of the methodology used by Meadows and Forrester. The systems dynamics model building, as worked out in earlier studies by Forrester, pretends to be apolitical but indeed by its very structure it is highly charged with political implications.

LIBERATION, Vol. 19, No. 5 (July-August 1974)

339 Lafayette St., New York, NY 10012. $1 per issue. THE EDITORS, *"Notes from the Collective."* The Bicentennial Congress is in the process of drafting a standardized revision of the federal criminal code (S-1 in the Senate and HR 333 in the House). The Editors review the background of the legislation and cite a number of the bill's provisions which would effectively provide the government with a carte blanche for political repression. Arguing that there is no way to salvage the law through liberal amendment, the *Liberation* Collective urges that a battle be fought now, before it is too late, to prevent enactment in any form. BARBARA GARSON, *"Tunafish."* In this installment of an essay to be continued in the next issue, Garson provides a vivid account of the demeaning labor of women workers in a fish cannery of Astoria, Oregon. The article consists mainly of interviews in which the women describe the degrading conditions of the workplace and indicate the everyday methods they have evolved for coping with their jobs.

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This issue of *Liberation* is perhaps most noteworthy for its series of pieces dealing with the revolution in Portugal. FRED STRASSER, *"These Are Your Streets."* This article sets forth a description of the Program for Cultural Dynamization initiated and carried out by Portugal's surprisingly progressive Armed Forces Movement. The purpose of the program is to carry the revolution to the isolated rural areas of the country and to help forge a People-MFA alliance. Thus, an important aspect of cultural dynamization consists of the attempt to quickly raise the consciousness of the peasantry in order to gain their support. But, as Strasser notes, this program embodies a central contradiction of the MFA. After years of paternalistic fascist rule, much of the population of Portugal is politically underdeveloped. The MFA's Program for Cultural Dynamization tries to overcome this backwardness through intensive political reeducation. In doing so, however, it would appear that the MFA tends to perpetuate precisely those paternalistic social relations between the peasantry and the central authority, which it seeks to overcome. MIMI KECK, *"Interview with an Independent Left Socialist."* In this interview, Antonio Mega Ferreira discusses the need for the revolution in Portugal to plot an independent political course. Internally, this means the creation of a "new socialist party" which would unify the left around a program rejecting both the social democracy of the Socialist Party and the Stalinism of the Communist Party. Internationally, an independent political course would eschew integration with both Western and Eastern Europe and seek, instead, closer ties with the Third World, including Portugal's former colonies. MICHAEL GLABERMAN, *"Conversation with Philip Agee."* Ex-CIA agent Agee answers a number of questions dealing with a variety of the Agency's domestic and international activities. MANUEL CABIESE DONOSO *et al.*, *"Chile: After the Coup."* The author and his family describe the events of the September 11 coup and its aftermath, including the brutal torture to which they and others were subjected at the hands of the counterrevolutionary military junta.

MAYDAY, Vol. 1, No. 1

P.O. Box 69403 Station K, Vancouver, BC Canada. This is the first issue of a new magazine whose launching is symptomatic of growing interest in cultural questions in the milieux of the North American Left. The editorial indicates its projected orientation: "We . . . are striving for an activist perspective in the critique of art as it is defined and restricted by capitalism." 100 pages of critical and review articles, interlaced with graphics and poetry (those by Tom Wayman are outstanding). DAN HEALY, *"Surrealist Illusion: or Towards a Marxian Strategy for Art."* Starts from the position that a truly socialist art can only exist in a socialist society. Socialist-intended art before the revolution is assigned an ideological role in the collective conscientization of the revolutionary subject. Chrostpher Caudwell and Mao's Yenan Forum formulations are appealed to in polemic against all forms of artistic individualism for which surrealism and Trotsky (in his support of this trend) are roundly condemned. Absence of reference to the unconscious and to surrealism's socialist realist adversary weakens the argument's force. DEIDRE GALLAGHER, *"Mayakovski and Mayerhold: The Second Tide."* Stylishly contextualizes the tragic defeats of 2 key protagonists in 1920s Russian artistic vanguard. Against 'official' contemporary view that Mayakovsky's suicide had nothing in common with the public and literary attitude of the poet argues that the tragedy illustrates the contradictions of the period. Now, however, Meyerhold and Mayakovsky have a new and comprehending audience in the radical consciousness currently awakening in the Soviet Union. The centerpiece of the issue is a special section on Canadian Theater. CHRIS HALLGREN, *"Notes toward a Working Theatre."* A rumination on revitalizing trends in modern theater in light of the political need to return theater to the masses, and reintegrate it into the texture of everyday social life. Sees hope for a convergence between spontaneous theater (especially as exemplified in the mass street politics of the 1960s) and contemporary experimental drama. A formal critique of bourgeois theater is advanced, stressing the relationship between its typical artificial distancing of dramatic presentation from an uninvolved audience with the general assimilation of artistic activity into the processes of commodity production. SANDRA HEINDSMANN, *"Company Town."* A behind-the-scenes look at a successful docu-theater production by the Mummer's Troupe of Newfoundland. Their play is about an actual strike in a company mining-town, and was produced primarily *for* the community whose struggle it dramatizes. The article lightly sketches the dialectic that unfolded among the theatrical collective as they attempted to carry through their project of radical pedagogy and brings to the surface some of the issues the genre of docu-theater misses for the development of a political theater. The theater section ends with 3 other pieces—*"Black Theatre Canada"* and *"Royal Canadian Aerial Theatre"* (both interviews), and a

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brief account of the working Breadbakers' Theatre. Surpringly (though presumably the result of a deliberate editorial decision) the whole section includes no discussion of the 'national question' in Canada which continues to be a major topic of discussion in the Canadian Left. *Anthony Wilden: The Scientific Discourse as a Commodity.*" A revised reprint of the introduction to Wilden's *System and Structure*. Wilden argues the non-neutrality and non-independence of all intellectual activity from the perspective of an eclectic synthesis of communication theory, Marxian social theory, psychoanalysis, etc.

MONTHLY REVIEW, Vol. 27, No. 3 (July-August 1975)

62 W. 14th Street, New York, NY 10011. $9 per year. Special issue on *China's Economic Strategy: Its Development and Some Resulting Contrasts with Capitalism and the USSR*. PAUL M. SWEEZY, *"China: Contrasts with Capitalism."* Based on university lectures given after a 5-week visit to China in the Fall of 1974, this article simplistically notes the absence of both unemployment and inflation in the People's Republic; this is seen as a result of its concern with use values instead of profit, and is reflected in the ongoing class struggle in the process of Chinese modernization. HARRY MAGDOFF, *"China: Contrasts with the USSR."* Likewise based on lectures after a visit to China, this article is more substantive than Sweezy's, offering a greater conceptual clarity and a wealth of supporting data. After an introductory note on the physical environment in China, Magdoff goes on to discuss the use of the Soviet model of modernization as an ideal type. He notes that, consistent with their relative pre-liberation Soviet loyalty, the Chinese followed the Soviet model after 1949 in the First Five-Year Plan, only to reject it drastically in the antibureaucratic Great Leap Forward. That program's failure led to a return to the Soviet path and the creation of tensions that erupted in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, an attempt to synthesize pro- and anti-Soviet policies. The resulting multi-sided approach promises to be instructive in the problems of transition to socialism. JOHN G. GURLEY, *"The Formation of Mao's Economic Strategy, 1927-1949."* A chapter from Gurley's *Essays on China's Economy and Mao's Strategy* (MR Press, 1976) featuring an effective topical structure rather than a strict chronological development, though it is somewhat hampered by a relative lack of historical research and a consequent overheavy reliance on Mao's own writings. Gurley shows how Mao's view of the Chinese revolution as one of the "new democratic" type led him to economic policies meant to increase productive forces in ways that strengthen the desired relations of production, a moderate path more consistent with capitalist than industrial class struggle, but in keeping with China's status as a semi-feudal, semi-colonial nation. While the first priority was on the political-military struggle, the second on the economic relations and forces of production, and the third on the cultural and ideological struggle, Mao is shown to have consistently focused on the optimal strategy for raising the living standard of the working classes in ways that simultaneously strengthened their advantage over former oppressors. Mao's merit in this period of struggle in the countryside lay in his ability to integrate diverse areas of Marxist struggle: in his view, military victories required politically conscious cadres who could carry out effective production campaigns.

NEUES FORUM, No. 249-250 (September-October 1974)

Museumstrasse 5, A-1070 Vienna. DM 7. Feature section: *"Das Mittelmeer kocht."* A number of articles on the situations in Portugal and Palestine. *"Osterrich."* An article on the reform of Austrian public communications system and another on the "castrated trade union." Section on *"Wohin, Sozialisten?"* RUDI DUTSCHKE, *"Asiatische Sowjetunion. Versuch einer Neubewertung der russischen Revolution."* This is the forward to Dutschke's recently published book *Versuch, Lenin auf die Füsse zu stellen*. The project is described by the author as follows: "Through a critical-materialist reconstruction of the understanding of revolution by Lenin and the early Lukács, I proceed from the thesis that the fundamental traits of the Leninist conception of the party and society can only be understood consistently if the asiatic conception of Marx and Engels also applied to Russia, i.e., that Russia not be understood as a West European social formation." JOSE BAPTISTA, *"Von der Kapitalbürokratie zur Sozialbürokratie."* Another version of the thesis presented by the author in *Telos* 22. PAUL M. SWEEZY, HARRY MAGDOFF, *"Die Weltrevolution war ein Irrtum."* Translation from *Monthly Review*: reflections on its 25th anniversary. Section on *"Erziehung."* Articles on authoritarian kindergarten and the dehumanizing architecture of a Viennese orphanage.

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NEUES FORUM, No. 251 (November 1974)

Section on "Osterreich:" articles on discrimination against Slavs in Kärnten. ANDRE GUNDER FRANK, *"Oekogorillas."* Protest letter published worldwide on the first anniversary of the Chilean coup. Section on *"Medizin."* IVAN ILLICH, *"Gesundheitsverbrecher. Wider den medizinischen Hygienewahn."* JOSEPH SCHOLMER, *"Streit der weissen Götter. Der deutsche Art beginnt zu zweifeln."* Illich takes his critique of institutionalized medicine back home. Section on *"Profit im Rausch."* Two articles on the drug trade, one a reprint of the *Village Voice* article on Timothy Leary. Section on *"Literatur."* PETER TURRINI, *"Schlachet die Kritiker"* and MICHAEL SIEGERT, *"Was hat Turrini gegen Onanie?"* A complaint and reply concerning the tyranny of theater critics. Section on *"Filmfritz Majakovski."* HUGO HUPPERT, *"An der Filmfront! Majakovski, Vertov und die LEF,"* and HEIDI PATAKI, *"Rote Burg. Majakovski in Wien."* On the Russian futurist and the recent presentation of one of his plays in Vienna. WERNER KOFLER, *"Familienverrat."* Autobiographical remenbrances by an Austrian writer.

NEUES FORUM, No. 252 (December 1974)

Lead articles on internal violence in the West German Left (Peter Bückner), the church in Austria, and Turkish politics. Section on *"Italien: Rot oder schwarz?"* GISELA WENZEL, *"Die schwarze Spur. Anschläge der Neofaschisten."* On neo-fascist violence. Documents on the CIA. MARCELLE PADOVANI, *"KP hilf! Wie Italiens KP durch eine historischen Kompromiss das Land vor dem Faschismus rettet."* A critical account of Communist Party policy in Italy. Section on *"Animazione: Theater mit Irren und Kindern."* GIULIANO SCABIA, *"Das grosse Theater des Pferdes Markus"* and ILSE HANL, *"Der Wundervogel fliegt. Animazione: Das Publikum selbst in das Theater."* Articles on the theory, practice and further development of a technique combining theater, pedagogy, group therapy and media first developed by Gian Renzo Morteo in Italy.

NEUES FORUM, Nos. 253-254 (January-February 1975)

Lead section on *"Anarchistenverfolgung."* Three commentaries on the anarchist trials in West Germany by Heinrich Böll, Manfred Clemenz and Klaus Röhl. Also other articles on current German politics. Section on *"Gold wird Papier."* SAMIR AMIN, ANDRE GUNDER FRANK, *"Eins, zwei, drei—1984! Wie der Kapitalismus seine Krise überwinden will."* Interview with the Italian newspaper *Il Manifesto*. KURT BAYER, *"Wer gewinnt die Inflation? Lohn-Preis Spirale und Einkommensverteilung in Osterreich, 1967-74."* RICHARD VAHRENKAMP, *"Krach! Firmenzusammenbrüche und Krisenaussichten in der BRD"* and AIKE BLECHSCHMIDT, *"Die Profitspirale. Ein marxistisches Modell zur Erkärung der Inflation."* Excellent, well-documented analyses of recent inflation tendencies in Austria and West Germany which demonstrate the nature of the reciprocal relations between wages, profits and taxes. Austria's dependence is revealed as is the effect of prices on the inflationary spiral. A number of popular myths on the responsibility of labor for inflation is challenged. Blechschmidt's study is based on a recent coauthored book: *Die Inflationäre Struktur des Kapitalismus*. Section on *"Exorzismus in Tirol."* Description of the "radical" doctrines of the Jesuit Peter Schupp and his recent repression by the church. Section on *"Medien."* FRIEDRICH GEYHOFER, *"Industrialisierung der Kunst. Zur Soziologie des Films (I. Teil)."* A review essay based on W. Benjamin and recent works by D. Prokop. HEIDI PATAKI, *"Die Rhythmen des Kapitals. Music is where the Money is."* On the sociology of rock music.

NEW LEFT REVIEW, No. 91 (May-June 1975)

7 Carlisle Street, London W1V 6NL. One year $16. MIKLOS HARASZTI, *"I Have Heard the Iron Cry."* The author's experiences and impressions upon going to work in a Budapest factory, excerpted from a forthcoming book (cf. also *Kursbuch*, No. 38). Haraszti is a 30 year old Hungarian poet who has been persecuted for his poems as well as for his book. He concentrates on the incentive system operative in the Red Star tractor factory, and the result is a fascinating look into Eastern European working conditions. MICHAEL LOEWY, *"Lukács and Stalinism."* This examines Lukács' relation to Stalinism, principally in terms of his conception of realism, arguing that Lukács returns in the last years of his life to some of the positions of his youth. Löwy's discussion of the shift in Lukács' position from the emphasis on totality in *History and Class Consciousness* to the stress on realism in his 1926 essay on Moses Hess is especially illuminating, although the author tends to overlook the equally significant areas of continuity throughout Lukács' work. SEBASTIANO TIMPANARO, *"The Freudian Slip."* A critique of the

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second of the two examples of "slips of the tongue" analyzed by Freud in his *Psychopathology of Everyday Life*. Timpanaro uses philological techniques to account for the "slip" in question, which concerned the misquoting of a line from Virgil, and then criticizes Freud's mode of interpretation on the grounds of its not being open to falsification, and therefore, following Popper, "unscientific." Another chapter in *NLR's* continuing project to resurrect Diamat. RALPH MILIBAND, *"Bettelheim and Soviet Experience."* Charles Bettelheim's recent book, *Les luttes de classes en URSS 1917-1923,* is subjected here to a forceful critique. Miliband focuses on the distortions engendered by a Maoist interpretation of Soviet history, and is particularly eager to attack Bettelheim's claim that there is an unbroken line of development in the Soviet experience from the Revolution through Stalin. GRANT EVANS, *"Portuguese Timor."* Cf. the review of the same article in *Intervention*, No. 5. FRANCIS MULHERN, *" 'Ideology and Literary Form'—A Comment."* A criticism of an essay by Terry Eagleton which appeared in *NLR* 90. Mulhern's critique centers on Eagleton's reduction of literature to ideology, and of ideology to class situation. RAINER WERNER FASSBINDER, *"Six Films by Douglas Sirk."* An elegy to the Danish-born Hollywood director by a contemporary German film-maker.

LA PENSEE, No. 179 (February 1975)

146, rue de Fg.—Poisonnière, Paris 10. F 15. MARIE-ADINE LESTERLIN, PIERRE-FRANCOIS MOREAU, *"Sur la notion d'espace théorique. Une politique cartésienne."* An attempt to elaborate a methodology appropriate to the study of the history of philosophy. The authors argue that philosophy has a unity and autonomy that cannot be reduced to a study of its social origins. This sense of autonomy is preserved by an investigation of a given philosophy's "theoretical space;" the latter referring to its conceptual structure independent of its specific problematic. This procedure is illustrated by a detailed analysis of how the conceptual structure employed by Descartes in his analysis of the individual subject presents striking parallels with that of Rousseau in his analysis of the collective subject (i.e., the state). It is further suggested that the notion of "theoretical space" will enable one to think the relation of the history of philosophy to other histories. PIERRE LECOCQ, *"Situation de la psychologie scientifique dans la bataille d'idées des années 70 en France."* This article begins and ends with a rather desultory discussion on the relation between science and philosophy. Squeezed in between, however, is a strange attempt to transcend structuralism and incorporate it into a more orthodox Marxist framework. Structuralism is seen as having created a series of negative anthropologies wherein man gets lost in a monolithic system of determinations with an ultimately ahistorical and biologistic foundation. But, according to the author, each emergent anthropology, given its totalizing nature, tends to cancel out its predecessor: Freud abolishes *homo psychologicus;* Lévi-Strauss reveals that the Oedipal complex is embedded in the logic of kinship relations; Lacan demonstrates that the logic of kinship relations coincides with that of language. And the logic underlying symbolic relations is based on family relations; i.e., the original unit of production and reproduction linking natural to social history. By this series of regressions, the author claims to have uncovered the positive and historical essence of man, while simultaneously overcoming the opposition of biology-society and synchrony-diachrony. JEAN-PIERRE TERRAIL, *"Population et mode de production. Contribution à une réflexion."* Reiterating the idea that population and production are not autonomous phenomena, the author attempts to deepen an analysis of their interconnections with specific reference to pre-capitalist formations, noting that demographic patterns may be the result not only of factors embedded in material production, but also of social practices that comprise a "demographic politics." In periods of severe crisis, when the productive mode must be recast in order to prevent a society's degeneration, these "politics" may be so rigid as to retard or even exclude a proper adaptation. CHRISTIAN ROCHET, *"Population, subsistances et mode de production. La condition féminine."* After blaming neo-Kantian epistemology for the feminine mystique, the author gives a progress report on research into the feminine condition during the feudal ages. The resulting discussion is confused, mechanistic, incomplete and politically disastrous. GEORGES COGNIOT, *" 'Galileo tradito' en version française."* An attack on the French government's policies on research and education. ANTOINE PELLETIER, *"Le despotisme éclairé en France au XVIIIe Siècle: Une utopie bourgeoise?"* This examines the theoretical status of the concept of enlightened despotism —a concept implying both the relative autonomy of the monarchic state and a possible peaceful transition to capitalism. Certain authors (in particular Althusser) believe that the bourgeoisie and aristocracy were totally integrated into the monarchic state, and thus unable to prevent the French Revolution. Enlightened despotism is reduced to a merely ideological concept of minor

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historical importance. Pelletier criticizes this position, charging that it is based on an undialectical and dogmatic understanding of the appearance vs. reality opposition. Finally, these antinomies are overcome only by a concrete examination of the changes in the state's internal policies, and the ideas that informed and justified these policies in the century preceding the revolution. DANIELLE BONNAUD-LAMOTTE, *"L'élan culturel des années trente en Union Soviétique."* The cultural accomplishments of the Soviet Union in the 1930s exhibited an "abundance, diversity and originality" lasting until the last third of the decade. This is not a purely apologetic piece, but the author does his best to overwhelm the reader with an enormous list of books written, operas performed, etc., while dismissing the period's negative elements as due to unfortunate incidents of maladaptation. *"La prochaine publication de 'La critique du droit politique hegelien' de Karl Marx."* This is the introduction to the French translation of Marx's *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right.*

LA PENSEE, No. 180 (April 1975)

Theme: Social Needs and Consumption

The essays included in this issue should be seen as an attempt to criticize and incorporate a range of ideas and problems raised in particular by the radical left into a framework more suitable to the concerns of the intellectual vangard of the French Communist Party. This accounts for their quality; their orthodoxy, their haphazard and schematic character, and their lack of an original and compelling synthesis. With the exception of the article by Chombart de Lauwe this issue is the result of a collective effort originating in the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Marxistes. JEAN-PIERRE TERRAIL, *"Production des besoins et besoins de la production."* Needs and their concrete expressions (forms of consumption and individuality) do not proceed from a subject, whether individual or collective, but originate within a given socio-economic formation's sphere of production. The subjective needs asserted by the working class in the class struggle should thus be seen as corresponding to the objective needs of capital. The problem is that capital, because of its inexorable substitution of dead for living labor, is unable by itself to satisfy the requirements necessary for its own reproduction, including the reproduction of the labor force. The internal contradictions of capital can be solved only by the incorporation of its "negation," i.e., by the satisfaction of the demands of labor. In this manner capitalism continually strengthens itself. This does not rule out the possibility of a revolutionary transformation, for the objective needs of capital and the subjective needs of capital will eventually—and this eventuality happily corresponds to the present—coincide with socialism. EDMOND PRETECEILLE, *"Besoins sociaux et socialisation de la consommation."* An in-depth reiteration of the major points of the preceding article—though the hidden but rampant evolutionism of the latter is disguised by a vast proliferation of categories whose value is purely taxonomic, and by a series of tangential discussions on more specific topics. JEAN-LOUIS MOYNOT, *"Déterminations sociales et individuelles des besoins."* In an implicit critique of the preceding articles, the author begins by labelling as economistic those analyses that reduce needs to the reproduction of the labor force. A proper understanding, he argues, must be based on a psychology that would situate needs in terms of individual biography. Unfortunately these notions are not followed through and the rest of the essay is not at all incompatible with the positions criticized earlier. The article concludes with an analysis of the female condition in the USSR in which it is suggested that equality between the sexes has not been achieved because there has been no major change in the family structure. This failure is attributed, with the humility of apologetics, to the relatively recent date of the socialist transformation, for the "socialist men of today, if their development is necessarily limited, are 'new' men whose personalities already announce the unlimited possibilities of future development." Etc. SUSANNA MAGRI, *"Besoins sociaux et politique du logement."* Because capital is unable by itself to guarantee the reproduction of the labor force, a public sector must be created to maintain a minimum living standard. In terms of the interpretive schema of the first article, the state provides the means by which labor's demands are incorporated to the benefit of capital. But because the state acts in the interests of capital it must place limits on the public sector, thereby deepening the contradiction labor-capital. This framework is complemented by a historical analysis of the French government's housing policies. PATRICE GREVET, *"Le moment objectif et le moment subjectif des besoins."* An attempt to criticize Baudrillard on the same grounds that Baudrillard criticizes Marx, i.e., accusing Baudrillard of a naturalistic conception of needs that ultimately resolves into a form of idealism. The author is impressed with the force and originality of Baudrillard's analysis but wishes to limit its conclusions and incorporate them into the framework outlined in

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the preceding essay. PAUL-HENRY CHOMBART DE LAUWE, *"Les intérêts contre les besoins. La double nécessité."* Needs have a double necessity (as biological and social, as individual and collective) that must be distinguished from the functioning of aspirations and interests. As the last article in this issue points out, Chombart de Lauwe's taxonomic schemas should be seen as an attempt to avoid an ahistorical conception of needs without collapsing needs into the sphere of production. And as the same article points out, his solution is purely formal. FRANCIS GODARD, *"Classes sociales et modes de consommation."* The analysis of consumption practices usually reduces the latter to class practices in the narrow sense or to an empirical investigation of households. In order to avoid these antinomies, the author attempts to specify a series of determinations that mediate between the class and the household. In this manner, an analysis of consumption need not escape the orbit of the relations of production. JEAN-PIERRE TERRAIL, *"Besoins, consommation et occultation des rapports de production."* Analyses that fail to relate the problem of needs and their satisfaction to the sphere of production reveal irresolvable contradictions. This idea is pursued in all its complexities by a critique of the neo-marginalists, Keynes, Galbraith, the functionalists and the "differentialist" tendency (Veblen, Goblot, Halbwachs, Bourdieux, and Baudrillard).

POLITICAL THEORY, Vol. 3, No. 2 (May 1975)

SHIRLEY ROBIN LETWIN, *"Hume: Inventor of a New Task for Philosophy."* Surveying the various interpretations of Hume, the author rejects any understanding of him as purely a skeptic, naturalist or empiricist. Juxtaposed to Hobbes, the originality of Hume's epistemology was his assertion that between truth and opinion only the latter exists. Thus, his new task was to establish that all men have to go by is what they have made; that is, that knowledge is culturally bound. PAUL THOMAS, *Karl Marx and Max Stirner."* Concentrating on the almost totally ignored and lengthy third section of *The German Ideology* devoted to an analysis of Max Stirner's *The Ego and His Own*, this essay examines the importance of Stirner's influence on the development of Marx's thought. Largely in agreement with Lobkowicz, Thomas suggests that it was Stirner who indicated to Marx the problems of Feuerbachian humanism and forced Marx to define his own position, not only against Feuerbach, but against Stirner as well. The inclusion of an extensive background to Stirner makes this essay even more valuable. F.M. BARNARD, R.A. VERNON, *Pluralism, Participation and Politics: Reflections on the Intermediate Group."* In confusing the question of mediation between particular and general, the core problem of political pluralism (the relation between diversity and unity) is greatly obscured by the "direct participationist theorists." Critical of their basic premise that participation in particularist associations is analogous to participation at the level of the state, this essay stresses several principal objections to this view. The emphasis is primarily on the English pluralists, Harold Laski and G.D.H. Cole, as well as some contemporary exponents of participatory democracy, such as Peter Bacharach. ROGER W. SMITH, *"The Economy of Guilt."* In an attempt to carry on the work of Nietzsche to integrate the themes of politics and guilt, this essay focuses on the idea of an "economy of guilt" to be able to compare two types of society—the political and the prepolitical. However, as the author himself points out, the comparison inevitably becomes a case study of the way guilt varies within differing modes of government. ELIAS BERG, *"A Note on Power and Influence."* Rejecting the recent trend to doubt the utility of power as a concept in political analysis, this brief note centers upon Harold D. Laswell and Abraham Kaplan's book, *Power and Society*, arguing that a clear distinction can be drawn between the concepts of power and influence and that this distinction is empirically useful.

PRAXIS, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1975)

2125 Hearst Ave., Berkely, CA 94709. $8 per year. First issue of a journal of radical aesthetics, with a large number of articles having diverse styles, varied intellectual positions, differing degrees and qualities of substance. GENE H. BELL, *"Bruno's Castle, or Some Current Literary Misconceptions."* The first chapter of a work in progress on the social dimension of literature. Theoretically lightweight, but a rhetorically effective attack on apological American literary criticism. E. SAN JUAN, *"Art against Imperialism."* A paper presented at a 1973 symposium on Marxist aesthetics affirming that Third World artists and intellectuals are of necessity 'engagé.' NAOMI GREENE, *"Brecht, Godard and Epic Cinema."* A rather uncritical article which praises Goddard for attempting to break away from realism in his application of Brechtian theory to the screen. JOHN FEKETE, *"Reflectons on Literary Theory and Culture."* A substantial critique of the mainstream North American tradition in literary and cultural theory, which

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argues that close examination of the three moments of this tradition—Richards and New Criticism in the 1940s, Northrop Frye and archetypal myth analysis in the 1950s, and Marshal McLuhan's media theory in the 1960s—reveals the bankruptcy of traditional humanistic criticism. The traditional literary program, and its most recent structuralist tendencies as well, present the false alternative of a refetishized human experience inadequate for understanding future human possibilities. RUTH LECHLITNER, *"A Shift in Weather."* A three-stanza poem using the extended metaphor of weather to illustrate the shift in consciousness from superficial optimism to critical doubt. STEFAN MORAWSKI, *"Art, Censorship and Socialism."* Clichéd reformism which affirms the importance of unrestricted artistic freedom in the overall program of socialism. JOHN BERGER, ANYA BOSTOCK, *"Mayakovsky: Language and Death of a Revolutionary Poet."* While the language of the initial stages of the Russian revolution demanded a poetic expression, that of the periods from the NEP onward frustrated the initial revolutionary intent; disillusion with the bureaucratization of the revolution, plus personal depression resulted in the poet taking his own life. MARX W. WARTOFSKY, *"Art as Humanizing Praxis."* In this paper given at the International Husserl and Phenomenological Research Society in 1974, the author emphasizes that art is one of the specifically human creative modes of self-knowledge by which humanity realizes itself; though mass art subject to commodity production negates this function, radical art continues to reaffirm the self-becoming human essence—praxis. THEODORE SHANK, *"The Living Theater in Brazil."* A sketchy interview with that portion of the Living Theater group that attempted radical Brazilian street theater techniques. DUNCAN SMITH, *"Education to Despair: Some Thoughts on 'Death in Venice'."* A brief article focusing on the problems of an ironic examination of the paradoxes of bourgeois culture. WILLIAM GROPPER, *"Three Drawings."* FRANK GALASSI, *"The Lumpen Drama of Frank Wedekind."* Discussion of the *Lulu Plays: Earth Spirit* and *Pandora's Box*, emphasizing the bourgeois-lumpen sexual antagonism. KINGSLEY WIDMER, *"The End of Criticism: Some Reflections on Radical Practice."* This article is the worst of the three in this issue on the poverty of North American literary criticism. ALAN SWINGEWOOD, *"Hegemony, Praxis and the Novel Form."* Sophisticated realist position arguing that Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony, with its central idea of society as a dialectical unity of cultural, economic and political structures made by human praxis, is an important element in an overall social theory of literature. Swingewood examines Russian and English realist novels of the 19th century to show the essence of the novel as praxis. ANTONIN J. LIEHM, *"The Contemporary Social Film: Its Content and Aesthetic Character."* An assertion of the growing importance of socially critical television films. CARL ANDRE, *"Against Duchamp."* This 1973 address is a ridiculous four-paragraph critique. LEE BAXANDALL, *"The San Francisco Mime Troupe Perform Brecht: A Comradely Criticism."* IRA SHOR, *"The Case for Revolutionary Culture: The Mime Troupe versus Baxandall."* LEE BAXANDALL, *"Reply to Ira Shor."* The above three articles are an impoverished exchange of one-sided views about the 1973 production of *The Mother*: Baxandall is concerned about a tendency towards the "aesthetics of immediacy" that focuses on "relevant" political concerns at the expense of the play's critical historical distance; Shor defends the heavy use of contemporary referents as important political education. CHARLES RUSSELL, *"Doubt and the Self-Reflexive Politics of Gunter Grass."* Russell traces the emergence of the theme of explicit commitment in Grass' work. EARL CONRAD, *"We Must Begin by Making Sacrifice."* Verse selected from the play, *The Red, White and Blues* satirizing deferred gratification in an affluent society.

RADICAL AMERICA, Vol. 9, No. 2 (March-April 1975)

SARA M. EVANS, *"The Origin of the Women's Liberation Movement."* More specifically interested in the contemporary women's liberation movement, this investigation of its claim that "the personal is political" concentrates on the oppression of women as housewives and the central role of this claim in generating the shift in consciousness evident in the past 6-8 years. KEN LAWRENCE, *"The Roots of the Class Struggle in the South."* Opposing the familiar view of the Southerner as a helpless victim, the article emphasizes the unevenness of development which allows for advanced sections of the working class to live side by side with the most oppressed sections. In distinguishing between the history of workers and the history of unions from before the Civil War up to the present, the use of statistics is rejected as an accurate measure in contemporary society and instead a comparison of the similarities of the present to past historical periods is relied on. BARRY BRODSKY, *"Tenants First: FHA Tenants Organize in Massachusetts."* This very relevant article highlights the flourish of FHA subsidized apartment

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developments throughout the state during the mid-1960s through to the early 1970s, and the subsequent organization of the Tenant's First Coalition to oppose the frequent rent hikes. JEAN MONDS, *"Syndicalism and Revolution in Spain: The Workers' Commissions."* Beginning with the repression following Franco's victory, this essay discusses the era of production under fascist administration and the consequent strategy of the Spanish Communist party. The 1958 Collective Bargaining Law which alleviated slightly the repressive situation allowed for the creation of the *comisiones obreras* or workers' commissions. Their development and activities regarding the elections of 1966 through to the present are also examined.

RADICAL PHILOSOPHERS' NEWSJOURNAL (August 1975)

MILTON FISK, *"Rate of Profit and Class Struggle."* The Marxist law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall is here presented from a political perspective. The way the law relates to the struggle of working people against capitalist institutions is the primary concern and is elucidated by an examination of the materialist basis for underconsumption, as well as the permanent arms economy of post World War II. Though work of a statistical nature is recognized as not irrelevant it is understood as fundamentally an economic abstraction from a fact of political economy. PAULA ROTHENBERG STRUHL, *"Crisis at the University."* Concise and extremely relevant, this article concentrates on the solutions to the problems of higher education offered by the Carnegie Commission Report and the Committee for Economic Development which emphasize the need to reestablish stratification among students and faculty, as well as a renewed emphasis on specialization.

REVIEW OF AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY, No. 3 (May-October 1975)

Sufferance Wharf, 2-4 West Ferry Road, London EI4, England. ISSA SHIVJI, *"Peasants and Class Alliances."* The conditions under which capitalism has penetrated African countries have not produced the kind of capitalist development that occurred in Europe. It is out of this recognition that the process of differentiation of the peasantry must be analyzed. While some ranks of the peasantry protect their interests by fraternizing with the bureaucracy, the poor peasantry is exploited by both internal and external dominating classes. The notion of the worker-peasant alliance thus grows from an analysis of both the working class and poor peasantry in relation to other classes, from their role in social production, and their "objective" interests in conflict with imperialism and its local class allies. OLIVER LEBRUN, CHRIS GERRY, *"Petty Producers and Capitalism."* A preliminary theoretical framework for analyses of labor in Senegal. The writers' studies of petty commodity and commodity production in Dakar—arising from which they propose to analyze the process of class formation of the urban labor force—requiring at the outset an analysis of the dialectical relationship between the dominant capitalist mode of production and the subordinate *forms* of production in underdeveloped countries. *Mode* of production seems to the writers inappropriate, since it refers essentially to a totality which is "self-sufficient" at both the superstructural levels and at the economic base. Forms of production exist at the margins of the capitalist mode of production, but are nevertheless integrated into and subordinate to it. P.L. RAIKES, *"Ujamaa and Rural Socialism."* Tanzania's policy of Ujamaa Vijijini aimed at bringing peasant producers together in villages for cooperative production. At first the policy was voluntaristic, stressing that the peasants themselves should initiate, control and run their villages. More recently the 'frontal' approach has resulted in administrative coercion and compulsory villagization. Ujamaa was intended to be pursued politically, through the education and mobilization of peasants; instead it conforms with the interests and methods of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. ANDREW COULSON, *"Peasants and Bureaucrats."* This account of the sequence of Ujamaa policy implementation from 1968 to 1974 is the second half of an article prepared in Tanzania which asked: "Can a government bureaucracy bring about development?" It traces chronologically the rise and decline of the strategy of Ujamaa and self-reliance, complementing Raikes' analysis. RICHARD JEFFRIES, *"The Labour Aristicracy? Ghana Case Study."* Does the African working class constitute a labor aristocracy, absorbing a significant proportion of the surplus, and identifying with the elites and sub-elites in the civil service and expatriate concerns? This thesis is tested against Ghanian material, in particular the 1961 strike of railway and harbor workers in Sekondi-Takoradi. *"Bibliographic Supplement: Current Africana No. 7."*

SCIENCE AND SOCIETY, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Spring 1975)

Room 4331, John Jay College, CUNY, 445 W. 59th St., New York, NY 10019. $8 per year. Issue Theme: Latin America: Aspects of Labor History. CRISTOBAL KAY, *"Chile: The Making of*

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a Coup d'Etat." STEVEN S. VOLK, *"Class, Union, Party: The Development of a Revolutionary Union Movement in Bolivia (1905-1952)."* ADRIAN DEWIND, *"From Peasants to Miners: The Background to Strikes in the Mines of Peru."* FABIO GROBART, *"The Cuban Working Class Movement from 1925-1933."* LOUIS A. PEREZ, JR., *"Women in the Cuban Revolutionary War, 1953-1958. A Bibliography."*

SCIENCE AND SOCIETY, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Summer 1975)

ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN, *"European Feudalism and Middle Eastern Despotisms."* JULIUS SENSAT JR., GEORGE CONSTANTINE, *"A Critique of the Foundations of Utility Theory."* STEVEN S. VOLK, *"Class, Union, Party: The Development of a Revolutionary Movement in Bolivia (1905-1952), Part II: From the Chaco War to 1952."* RICHARD FRUCHT, *"Emancipation and Revolt in the West Indies: St. Kitts, 1834."* JOHN-PAUL HEMKE, *"The Limits of Historical Poverty: The Philosophical Basis of Social Science."* This is an insubstantial attempt to refute, in 8 logical steps, Popper's refutation of the possibility of historical prediction.

THE SECOND WAVE, Vol. 4, No. 1

Box 344, Cambridge A, Cambridge MA 02139. Subscriptions: $3.50 per year (4 issues). MAGGIE POPKIN, *"Raises Not Roses."* The problems and possibilities of union organizing among women clerical workers. Illuminates both the limitations of the trade unions (which challenge neither job hierarchies nor the ghettoization of women in certain types of jobs) and the problems of unorganized women workers (low pay and benefits, irregular raises and promotions, and lack of job security). TRANSFUSION COLLECTIVE, *"Within and Without Trade Unions."* Faced with the limitations of trade unions, this collective opts to build independent workers' organizations while at the same time participating in union struggles. Why? To deal with bread-and-butter issues while at the same time raising questions concerning the quality of life, job hierarchies, decision-making, control of the process of production and making links with community struggles. EMILY ERWIN CULPEPPER, *"Female History Myth Making."* Wide-ranging and insightful comments on the state of the male-dominated scholarly discourse concerning anthropology and cultural history which reverses contradictory speculations made by men and dismisses feminist woman-centered speculations as biased and unscholarly. Culpepper further asserts that myths constitute a side (usually dismissed or ignored) of human historical reality the history of human thought (fears, impulses and aspirations)—that is no less significant than the history of human deeds; and in this context looks at some of the present-day manifestations of the Amazon Myth in feminist literature. JULIA HOMER, *"Grand Juries."* The grand jury procedure is described as Kafkaesque, while citizen's rights are few. DEBBY ROSENBERG, GEORGIA SASSEN, *"Their Profit, Our Loss: A Feminist View of Corporate Power."* The thrust of capital into the social services, with the consequent rationalization, dehumanization and intensification of exploitation that this entails for women, who constitute the majority of social service workers. The choice for women then becomes: work in social services (which women seem to "prefer" though there is no discussion of why this should be so) at low wages and in poor conditions; or work elsewhere and make more money. The mythical nature of this "choice" however remains unexplored and their concentration on the power of the corporations over waged work ignores not only women's jobs as unwaged houseworkers but women as consumers as well. PEGGY KORNEGGER, *"Anarchism: The Feminist Connection."* An exploration of the common roots of anarchism and radical feminism: anti-authoritarianism, cooperation, autonomy. The Spanish revolution and May-June 1968 in France are viewed as examples of failed anarchist revolutions and the women's movement is seen as the most consistent movement against domination. Because of the specific nature of female oppression, the political content of feminism (anti-authoritarianism, non-hierarchical sisterhood, critique of subject-object relations), is essential to human liberation.

SOCIALIST REVOLUTION, No. 25

396 Sanchez St., San Francisco, CA 94114. $10 per year. BANNING GARRETT, PAUL JOSEPH, *"Thirty Years of United States Imperialism in Vietnam."* The article analyzes American involvement in Southeast Asia as part of a broad counterrevolutionary strategy, which was never reducible to the relatively minor direct economic interests of the U.S. in the area, or to considerations of national honor, or to the irresponsible behavior of a few politicians and government institutions. The authors argue that the victory of Vietnam coincides with an economic crisis characterized by simultaneous inflation and recession, precipitated in part by the

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economic effects of the war. They point out that the U.S. now faces severe problems in trying to dominate the imperialist system economically and to retain the resources necessary to police it militarily; this weakness is as likely to result in reckless military adventures as in a quiet retreat. ANDRE GUNDER FRANK, *"World Crisis, Class Struggle, and 1984."* The main thesis is that efforts on the part of the ruling classes to reorganize the capitalist world system in the present crisis will involve new levels of authoritarianism, repression, and manipulative ideology. The relative decline of the U.S. opens a period of diverse strategies aimed at limiting the autonomous power of countries seeking to assert themselves within global capitalism. In this setting, governments and social formations will appear whose features are hard to evaluate: governments that are not socialist but which cannot be described as "nationalist" or "petit-bourgeois." New questions have to be asked about the meaning of nationalism, of anti-imperialism, and of "autonomous" capitalist development. TOMAS ALMAGUER, *"Class, Race, and Chicano Oppression."* The author puts into historical perspective Chicano oppression in the U.S. He poses the problem of the nature of Chicano oppression historically and thus begins to overcome of the weaknesses of the colonial or national model without discarding its strengths. SAMUEL BOWLES, HERBERT GINTIS, *"Capitalism and Education in the United States."* The authors view the history of the educational system in a way that emphasizes the fundamental importance of economic transformations to changes in education, while insisting that an understanding of the correspondence between schooling and the economy is not sufficient as an explanation of the course of educatonal history. They argue that the educational system has been shaped by struggles within and around it over the content and control of education, the outcome of which has not been simply identifiable with the intentions of the major participants.

LES TEMPS MODERNES, No. 345 (April 1975)

26 rue de Conde, Paris 6, France. F 14. CLAIRE ETCHERELLI, *"La banane."* A short story. BERNARD BUIGERT, *"L'enjeu de la crise."* In contrast to the typical Marxist analyses of France which are "too general, too mutually contradictory and finally, too apologetic to illuminate. . . the revolutionary movement," this is an effort to specify the nature of the crises of post World War II France. The result is a noteworthy analysis of the particular form the redeployment of class conflict has taken. CLAUDE COLLIN, JEAN-FRANCOIS LANFREY, *"La Martinique, département ou colonie?"* A detailed study of the situation in Martinique which throws into relief the nature of French territorial domination. DOMINIQUE PIGNON, *"Pour une critique politique de la technologie."* An insightful attempt to locate the relations between technique and politics at the factory level—an interface which the author feels will increasingly become the locus of political struggle. ANTONELLA SANTACROCE, *"Maga ecferre mysteria."* Poems by an Italian woman now writing in French. ANNE RAULIN, LEILA SEBBAR-PIGNON, *"Le tiers-monde dans S.A.S."* An ideological critique of the remarkably successful espionage series published by Plon and written by Villiers. These novels are seen as responding to the urgent need for a new colonial literature in which the reconstruction of Occidental myths further distorts the understanding of the Third World. KATHERINE CHARALAMBIDES, ANTONIS CHARALAMBIDES, *"Le drame de Chypre."* A proposal for an equitable solution to the Cypress conflict. *"L'internationale sexiste."* A collection of female views. CHRISTIAN ZIMMER, *"Ghettos et enfermements."* Notes on the "second era of political cinema" followed by comments on the uniqueness of Japanese art.

LES TEMPS MODERNES, No. 346 (May 1975)

CHRISTINE DELPHY, *"Proto-féminisme et anti-féminisme."* A critique of Leclerc's book *Parole de Femme* which is taken as symptomatic of a recent tendency to postulate the sexual division of labor as resting upon a natural order of values, thus reproducing a mirror image of sexist ideology from the female perspective. KAROUI M'HAMED, *"Les jours et la danse."* Expressive excerpts from a book to be published by Grasset. JEAN-PIERRE OLIVIER, *"Afrique: qui exploite qui?"* A detailed critique of Samir Amin who, despite his sincerity as an enemy of imperialism, is characterized as unwittingly contributing to the ideology of the new state bourgeoisies in Africa and that of "progressive" circles in France. This is taken as most evident in his failure to explore the class struggle and his emphasis on the obstacles to the national development of dominated countries. Thus, following Frank, it is proposed that "if the contradiction with imperialism is *fundamental*, the contradiction with the bourgeoisie and the state is *principal*." JACQUES DOURNES, *"Les marches sauvages."* On the history of the little known marginal peoples of South Indo-China. JEAN-MARIE ALLIAUME, *"Le partage des*

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sciences." A somewhat confusing and inconclusive argument for a conception of the history of science which completely separates scientific discourse from other types. This point is developed in the context of a critique of D. Lecourt's study of Bachelard. MAHMOUD HUSSEIN, *"Sur 'les luttes de class en URSS'."* On the "class struggle" in the Soviet Union. *"Le sexisme ordinaire."* Comments by women. RENEE SAUREL, *"L'âge d'or au Théâtre du Soleil."* Theater review. CHRISTIAN ZIMMER, *"La mort sans mime."* Film reviews. *"Protestation."* Protest against self-censorship in the West German film industry.

THEORY AND SOCIETY, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Fall 1975)

P.O. Box 330, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. $13.50 per year (4 issues). JUERGEN HABERMAS, *"Towards a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism."* This is the same article published in *Arena*, No. 38. JONATHAN M. WEINER, *"The Barrington Moore Thesis and its Critics."* A well-done extensive analysis of the academic reception of Moore's *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. J.C. CHAMBOREDON, J. PRIVOT, *"Changes in the Social Definition of Early Childhood and the New Forms of Symbolic Violence."* An inconclusive analysis of French nursery schools and changing patterns of socialization at that level. KENNETH COLBURN, JR., *"Hedonism, Incest and the Problem of Difference."* A typical example of that profound sociological phenomenon called "farting in the wind" coming from nowhere and headed in the same direction. Is this essay a put-on? KEITHA SAPSIN FINE, *"Philosophy as Politics."* After reviewing the case of the history of the Yugoslav journal *Praxis* and the decline and fall of critical Marxism, Fine carefully evaluates Stojanovic's and Markovic's works recently published in English. DEVRA LEE DAVIS, *"Theodor W. Adorno: Theoretician through Negations."* An attempted (and failed) review of Adorno's *Negative Dialectics*. In marketing Adorno to an audience assumed to be unfamiliar with the tradition of the Frankfurt School, Davis totally trivializes the problematic and ends up with a few pages of empty rhetoric. RICHARD FLACKS, *"The Importance of the Romantic Myth for the Left."* Taking as his point of departure Clecak's *Radical Paradoxes: The Dilemmas of the American Left 1945-1970*, Flacks undertakes a discussion of the Left which is significantly better than the book being discussed.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

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